Target-directed visual attention is a prerequisite for action-specific perception

Witt et al. (2008) have recently shown that golfers who putt with more success perceive the hole to be bigger than golfers who putt with less success. In three experiments, we systematically examined whether this phenomenon, labelled action-specific perception, depends on directing visual attention towards the action target. In Experiment 1 we replicated previously reported action-specific effects on perception in golf putting. In 3 and 4 we directly assessed whether action-specific effects on perception in golf putting are dependent on focusing visual attention on the target. To this end, the participants performed the putting task while visual attention towards the target was either completely withheld (Experiment 2) or divided over the target and other task-relevant objects (Experiment 3). No action-specific effects were found when visual attention towards the action target was occluded or partially diverted from the target. Together, our results provide evidence to suggest that focusing visual attention on the target while performing the action is a prerequisite for the emergence of action-specific perception.     

Hitting ability and perception of object’s size: evidence for a negative relation

We examined the relation between motor performance and perception of object’s size in near space. The general task was to repeatedly hit a target by means of pointing movements and to estimate target’s size. In contrast to the results of previous studies, Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 revealed a negative relation between action ability and perceived target size: Participants who hit the target relatively often and whose motor variability was relatively low judged targets to be smaller than did participants whose motor performance was relatively poor. In Experiment 3, the size judgments were made in the presence of the target before, as well as after, pointing movements. The target was judged as smaller when it was easy, rather than difficult, to hit before as well as after the movement. Altogether, these results indicate that under certain conditions, an increased action ability reduces the apparent size of the actions’ target objects.     

The effects of avoidant instructions on golf putting proficiency and kinematics

ObjectivesAlthough the effects of avoidant or negative instructions on skilled performance in sport has received little research attention, de la Pena, Murray, and Janelle (2008) reported recently that novice golfers who were instructed not to leave a putt short of a circle, overcompensated by leaving their putts significantly longer than at baseline, and vice versa. It is unclear, however, whether athletes' propensity to engage in over-compensatory behaviour is affected by their level of expertise.DesignTo address this unresolved issue, the present study investigated the influence of avoidant instructions on golfers' putting stroke proficiency (i.e., as measured by an index of putting performance and the direction in which putts are missed) and on their putting stroke performance (as measured by motion analysis).Methods14 high-skilled and 14 low-skilled golfers were required to putt from a distance of 2.5 m on a sloped surface which caused the ball to move left-to-right as it approached the hole. All participants performed in a condition in which they were given no instructions and in a condition in which they were instructed not to miss a putt in a specific direction (i.e., left or right of the hole).ResultsHigh-skilled golfers' overall putting proficiency was unaffected by avoidant instructions. In contrast, low-skilled golfers' performance was significantly degraded due to disruption of certain kinematic features of their putting stroke (e.g., putter path and forward-swing times).ConclusionsOver-compensatory behaviour was more prevalent amongst low-skilled than high-skilled golfers. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Realism of Confidence,Modes of Apprehension,and Variable-Use in Visual Discrimination of Relative Mass

We investigated the role of movement in the perception of a novel affordance for wheelchair locomotion. Healthy adults without prior wheelchair experience judged the lowest lintel under which they could roll in the wheelchair. Prior to judgments, some participants were given brief (~2 min) practice at self-controlled wheelchair locomotion. There were 2 main results. First, participants who had this brief practice accurately judged their own minimum passage height (even when practice did not include passage under low lintels), whereas participants who had no practice gave inaccurate judgments. Second, prejudgment practice strongly influenced movement of the head and torso during judgment sessions. The results demonstrate that affordance perception can be learned through brief, indirect practice and suggest that such practice can inform exploratory movement.     

Age of acquisition in sport: starting early matters

Although the age at which a skill is learned (age of acquisition [AoA]) is one of the most studied predictors of success in domains ranging from language to music, very little work has focused on this factor in sports. In order to uncover how the age at which a skill is learned relates to how athletes cognitively represent that skill, we asked a group of skilled golfers who learned to play golf before (early learners) or after (late learners) the age of 10 to take a series of putts on an indoor putting green. Golfers putted in isolation (single-task condition), while monitoring a stream of words presented over a loudspeaker (dual-task condition), or while being instructed to attend to specific aspects of their golf swing (skill-focused condition). Early and late learners putted equally well in the single-task and dual-task conditions. However, in the skill-focused condition, golfers who learned earlier performed worse than those who learned later. The results are consistent with the notion that AoA influences the manner in which sports, like other domains such as language and music, are represented in memory.     

Action-specific effects underwater

Action-specific effects on perception are apparent in terrestrial environments. For example, targets that require more effort to walk, jump, or throw to look farther away than when the targets require less effort. Here, we examined whether action-specific effects would generalize to an underwater environment. Instead, perception might be geometrically precise, rather than action-specific, in an environment that is novel from an evolutionary perspective. We manipulated ease to swim by giving participants swimming flippers or taking them away. Those who estimated distance while wearing the flippers judged underwater targets to be closer than did participants who had taken them off. In addition, participants with better swimming ability judged the targets to be closer than did those with worse swimming ability. These results suggest perceived distance underwater is a function of the perceiver's ability to swim to the targets.     

Tempo,Rhythm, and Aging in Golf

Older (n = 12) and younger (n = 12) golfers attempted to hit a golf ball into a target net a short distance away. An accelerometer attached to the back of the clubhead measured the applied force. In contrast to the more typical finding of slower perceptual-motor performance by older adults, older golfers reached their peak downswing force earlier in the shot and also exhibited a trend toward a faster overall speed or tempo of the shot. Additionally, older golfers exhibited greater changes in applied force and greater variability. A pattern of divergence among the force-time histories from multiple shots suggested that the overall person-plus-golf-club dynamics were unstable during a part of the shot. Older adults may be slower in controlling this instability. Half of the participants heard a tone whose pitch was proportional to their force. These participants had a slower follow through; however, they did not make significantly more or fewer shots than participants who had not been presented with the tone. Analyses of the temporal covariation among the backswing, downswing, and follow-through favored a chain-like temporal structure over a hierarchical, proportional structure. The pattern of covariation suggests that the tempo and rhythm of the shot are not independent and that changing one's tempo may disrupt rhythm.     

Performance and ease influence perceived speed

According to the action-specific perception account, perception is a function of optical information and the perceiver's ability to perform the intended action. While most of the evidence for the action-specific perception account is on spatial perception, in the current experiments we examined similar effects in the perception of speed. Tennis players reproduced the time the ball traveled from the feeder machine to when they hit it. The players judged the ball to be moving faster on trials when they hit the ball out-of-bounds than on trials where they successfully hit the ball in-bounds. Follow-up experiments in the laboratory showed that participants judged virtual balls to be moving slower when they played with a bigger paddle in a modified version of Pong. These studies suggest that performance and task ease influence perceived speed.     

No transfer of calibration between action and perception in learning a golf putting task

We assessed calibration of perception and action in the context of a golf putting task. Previous research has shown that right-handed novice golfers make rightward errors both in the perception of the perfect aiming line from the ball to the hole and in the putting action. Right-handed experts, however, produce accurate putting actions but tend to make leftward errors in perception. In two experiments, we examined whether these skill-related differences in directional error reflect transfer of calibration from action to perception. In the main experiment, three groups of right-handed novice participants followed a pretest, practice, posttest, retention test design. During the tests, directional error for the putting action and the perception of the perfect aiming line were determined. During practice, participants were provided only with verbal outcome feedback about directional error; one group trained perception and the second trained action, whereas the third group did not practice. Practice led to a relatively permanent annihilation of directional error, but these improvements in accuracy were specific to the trained task. Hence, no transfer of calibration occurred between perception and action. The findings are discussed within the two-visual-system model for perception and action, and implications for perceptual learning in action are raised.     

Haste does not always make waste: Expertise,direction of attention,and speed versus accuracy in performing sensorimotor skills

In two experiments, we examined the attentional mechanisms governing sensorimotor skill execution across levels of expertise. In Experiment 1, novice and expert golfers took a series of putts under dual-task conditions designed to distract attention from putting and under skill-focused conditions that prompted attention to step-by-stePperformance. Novices performed better under skill-focused than under dual-task conditions. Experts showed the opposite pattern. In Experiment 2, novice and expert golfers putted under instructions that emphasized either putting accuracy or speed—the latter intended to reduce the time available to monitor and explicitly adjust execution parameters. Novices putted better under accuracy instructions. Experts were more accurate under speed instructions. In agreement with theories of skill acquisition and automaticity, novice performance is enhanced by conditions that allow for on-line attentional monitoring (e.g., skill-focused or accuracy instructions) in comparison with conditions that prevent explicit attentional control of skill execution (e.g., dual-task or speed constraints). In contrast, the proceduralized skill of experts benefits from environments that limit, rather than encourage, attention to execution.     

Head-putter coordination patterns in expert and less skilled golfers

The authors examined the patterns of expert and less skilled golfers in putting on an indoor surface to 1 of 3 circular targets (1, 3, and 5 m away) in trials with a ball present (and putted) or not present (a practice stroke). As expected, the experts performed better than the less skilled golfers on a large number of outcome and kinematic measures. Displacement and velocity profiles of the head and putter revealed high positive correlations for the less skilled golfers, indicating a dominant allocentric coordination pattern, but high negative correlations for the expert golfers, indicating a dominant egocentric coordination pattern. The observed coordination patterns did not interact with the distance of the intended putt or the presence/absence of a ball. These findings offer preliminary evidence that, although contrary to traditional beliefs, fundamental differences exist in putting coordination modes between expert and less skilled golfers.     

When paying attention becomes counterproductive: impact of divided versus skill-focused attention on novice and experienced performance of sensorimotor skills

Two experiments examined the impact of attention on sensorimotor skills. In Experiment 1, experienced golfers putted under dual-task conditions designed to distract attention from putting and under skill-focused conditions that prompted attention to step-by-step putting performance. Dual-task condition putting was more accurate. In Experiment 2, right-footed novice and experienced soccer players dribbled through a slalom course under dual-task or skill-focused conditions. When using their dominant right foot, experts again performed better in the dual-task condition. However, when using their less proficient left foot, experts performed better in the skill-focused condition. Novices performed better under skill-focus regardless of foot. Whereas novices and the less-proficient performances of experts benefit from online attentional monitoring of step-by-step performance, high-level skill execution is harmed.     

Terror Management and Meaning: Evidence That the Opportunity to Defend the Worldview in Response to Mortality Salience Increases the Meaningfulness of Life in the Mildly Depressed

Previous terror management research has demonstrated that mildly depressed participants show a greater increase in worldview defense in response to reminders of their mortality than do nondepressed participants. Because the cultural worldview is posited to provide a meaningful conception of life, we hypothesized that mildly depressed participants who defend their worldview in response to mortality salience (MS) would increase their perception that the world is meaningful. A preliminary study first examined the Kunzendorf No Meaning Scale as a measure to assess perceptions of meaning. In the primary study, mildly depressed and nondepressed participants contemplated their own mortality or a neutral topic, evaluated two targets in a manner that either allowed them to defend their worldview or that did not, and then completed the Kunzendorf No Meaning Scale. As predicted, mildly depressed participants who had the opportunity to defend their worldview in response to mortality salience reported greater meaning in life than did mildly depressed participants who did not have the opportunity to defend their worldview, or mildly depressed participants not exposed to mortality salience. Implications for understanding and treating depression are briefly discussed.     

Hide-and-seek around the centre of interest: The dead zone of attention revealed by change blindness

Three experiments examined spatial allocation of attention during active search for visual changes. In all experiments, there were three conditions of change location related to a centre of interest: (1) Central (most attended location itself), (2) near, and (3) far marginal change. In Experiment 1, participants showed the slowest search and the largest number of undetected changes in near condition. Moreover, they misidentified near changes more frequently than central and far ones. In Experiment 2, participants had to search for marginal changes in the presence of a once noticed central change that summoned additional attention to a central location. It resulted in further search slowing for near changes. In Experiment 3, participants searched for one of two concurrent marginal changes in the presence of a central one. They detected far changes about 2.3 times more frequently than near ones. Taken together, these results support the notion of “dead zone of attention” surrounding attentional focus. Several speculations about the nature of dead zone are discussed.     

Revisiting the picture-superiority effect in symbolic comparisons: do pictures provide privileged access?

In 4 experiments, symbolic comparisons were investigated to test semantic-memory retrieval accounts espousing processing advantages for picture over word stimuli. In Experiment 1, participants judged pairs of animal names or pictures by responding to questions probing concrete or abstract attributes (texture or size, ferocity or intelligence). Per pair, attributes were salient or nonsalient concerning their prerated relevance to animals being compared. Distance (near or far) between attribute magnitudes was also varied. Pictures did not significantly speed responding relative to words across all other variables. Advantages were found forfar attribute magnitudes (i.e., the distance effect) and salient attributes. The distance effect was much less for salient than nonsalient concrete-attribute comparisons. These results were consistently found in additional experiments with increased statistical power to detect modality effects. Our findings argue against dual-coding and some common-code accounts of conceptual attribute processing, urging reexamination of the assumption that pictures confer privileged access to long-term knowledge.     

Close, and a cigar!--Why size perception relates to performance

In baseball batting, golf putting, and dart throwing, successful players estimate the size of the target object to be bigger than their less successful counterparts. While more and more empirical evidence is accumulated supporting the existence of this intriguing phenomenon, an explanation of the processes underpinning this effect remains to be provided. Here, we re-analysed data from a dart throwing experiment to examine the proposal--recently put forward by Proffitt and Linkenauger (in press)--that the variability in target-related performance may serve as a scaling metric for perceived target size which may explain why actors who perform consistently close to the target perceive the target to be bigger. Our results confirm that less variability in target-related performance in darts relates to perceiving the target as being bigger, thereby providing initial support for Proffitt and Linkenauger's proposal.     

Self‐Control Success Revealed: Greater Approach Motivation Towards Healthy versus Unhealthy Food

Deviating from existing literature on self‐control failure the current research examines self‐control success and the role of motivation. Functional research suggests people visually perceive objects to be bigger when they are motivated to approach them. Using the size perception task, participants estimated the size of a healthy and an unhealthy food object that were identical in size. In the current research we simulated a reflective state vs. impulsive state using an ego‐depletion manipulation in Study 1 and a cognitive load manipulation in Study 2. Results from both studies revealed that participants in a reflective state (vs. impulsive state) assigned increased size estimations to the healthy food item compared to the unhealthy food item. Current findings demonstrate greater approach motivation towards a ‘virtue’ (i.e., healthy food) as a mechanism that underlies self‐control success, suggesting that successful self‐control involves initiating approach towards a virtue rather than inhibiting a vice. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Only because I love you: why people make and why they break promises in romantic relationships

People make and break promises frequently in interpersonal relationships. In this article, we investigate the processes leading up to making promises and the processes involved in keeping them. Across 4 studies, we demonstrate that people who had the most positive relationship feelings and who were most motivated to be responsive to the partner's needs made bigger promises than did other people but were not any better at keeping them. Instead, promisers' self-regulation skills, such as trait conscientiousness, predicted the extent to which promises were kept or broken. In a causal test of our hypotheses, participants who were focused on their feelings for their partner promised more, whereas participants who generated a plan of self-regulation followed through more on their promises. Thus, people were making promises for very different reasons (positive relationship feelings, responsiveness motivation) than what made them keep these promises (self-regulation skills). Ironically, then, those who are most motivated to be responsive may be most likely to break their romantic promises, as they are making ambitious commitments they will later be unable to keep.     

Vulnerability to depression is associated with a failure to acquire implicit social appraisals

Major depressive disorder (MDD) is associated with disrupted relationships with partners, family, and peers. These problems can precipitate the onset of clinical illness, influence severity and the prospects for recovery. Here, we investigated whether individuals who have recovered from depression use interpersonal signals to form favourable appraisals of others as social partners. Twenty recovered-depressed adults (with >1 adult episode of MDD but euthymic and medication-free for six months) and 23 healthy, never-depressed adults completed a task in which the gaze direction of some faces reliably cued the location a target (valid faces), whereas other faces cued the opposite location (invalid faces). No participants reported awareness of this contingency, and both groups were significantly faster to categorise targets following valid compared with invalid gaze cueing faces. Following this task, participants judged the trustworthiness of the faces. Whereas the healthy never-depressed participants judged the valid faces to be significantly more trustworthy than the invalid faces; this implicit social appraisal was absent in the recovered-depressed participants. Individuals who have recovered from MDD are able to respond appropriately to joint attention with other people but appear to not use joint attention to form implicit trust appraisals of others as potential social partners.     

Windows to the soul: children and adults see the eyes as the location of the self

Where are we? In three experiments, we explore preschoolers’ and adults’ intuitions about the location of the self using a novel method that asks when an object is closet to a person. Children and adults judge objects near a person’s eyes to be closer to her than objects near other parts of her body. This holds even when considering an alien character whose eyes are located on its chest. Objects located near the eyes but out of sight are also judged to be close, suggesting that participants are not using what a person can see as a proxy for what is close to her. These findings suggest that children and adults intuitively think of the self as occupying a precise location within the body, at or near the eyes.