Conferring humanness: The role of anthropomorphism in hoarding

Hoarding is characterized by a persistent and extreme difficulty with discarding one’s possessions, often resulting in cluttered living spaces and marked distress or impairment. Despite being increasingly recognized as a substantial public health burden, much remains unknown about the etiology. One facet within the cognitive-behavioral model of hoarding that remains poorly understood is the strong emotional attachment to possessions. The tendency to anthropomorphize (i.e., see human-like qualities in non-human entities) may be one possible mechanism contributing to this emotional attachment. The current report is the first empirical study to examine the association between anthropomorphism and hoarding. Non-clinical participants (n = 72) completed a battery of self-report measures focused on hoarding symptoms, saving cognitions, anthropomorphism, and emotional attachments to personal and novel items. Anthropomorphic tendencies were significantly associated with greater saving behaviors and the acquisition of free things. Levels of anthropomorphism moderated the relationship between specific hoarding beliefs and acquiring tendencies, as well as the emotional attachment towards a novel item. Results are discussed with regard to future research directions, and implications for the cognitive-behavioral model of hoarding.     

The explanatory power of theism

Special thanks to Alvin Plantinga, Michael Detlefsen and William Alston for many helpful suggestions.     

Hume's atheism and the role of Cleanthes

This is a reply to Willem Lemmens' discussion of my interpretation of the Dialogues on Natural Religion in my 2000 collection Themes from Hume: Self, Will, Religion. I use Lemmens' careful textual analysis to clarify my considered position and to further the reading of Part 12 of the Dialogues.     

The origins and the worth of theism

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

The Lure of Pan(en)theism

Abstract

This response to Karmen MacKendrick’s work follows the thematic trail of desire through Divine Enticement (2012), seeking to clarify the relationship in MacKendrick’s work between God and creation. While MacKendrick expresses an initial desire for an “immanent divine,” especially in relation to the work of St. Augustine, she later feels more drawn to “a world that in its beauty calls out the name of its creator” than to a world “in which the creator is simply present.” This brief engagement explores MacKendrick’s logic of seduction in relation to the panentheist and pantheist theologies of Cusa and Bruno, ultimately suggesting that “immanence” only collapses the distance of desire if creation is understood to be finite and self-identical.     

The inertness of reason and Hume's legacy

Hume argues against the seventeenth-century rationalists that reason is impotent to motivate action and to originate morality. Hume's arguments have standardly been considered the foundation for the Humean theory of motivation in contemporary philosophy. The Humean theory alleges that beliefs require independent desires to motivate action. Recently, however, new commentaries allege that Hume's argument concerning the inertness of reason has no bearing on whether beliefs can motivate. These commentaries maintain that for Hume, beliefs about future pleasurable and painful objects on their own can produce the desires that move us to action. First, I show that this reading puts Hume at odds with Humeans, since the latter are committed, not only to the view that beliefs and desires are both necessary to action, but also to the view that beliefs do not produce desires. Second, I review textual, philosophical and historical grounds for my interpretation of Hume's argument for the inertness of reason. I argue that the new line on Hume, while consistent with a certain reading of the Treatise, is not supported by the Dissertation on the Passions and the second Enquiry, where Hume argues that all motivation has an origin in “taste”, which I take to be different from belief. Thus, Hume's arguments do support the contemporary Humean theory of motivation.     

Paying the cost of skeptical theism

In this paper I show that two arguments for the inconsistency of skeptical theism fail. After setting up the debate in “Introduction” section, I show in “The initial debate” section why Mylan Engel’s argument (Engel 2004) against skeptical theism does not succeed. In “COST” section I strengthen the argument so that it both avoids my reply to Engel and parallels Jon Laraudogoitia’s argument against skeptical theism (Laraudogoitia 2000). In “COST*” section, I provide three replies—one by an evidentialist theist, one by a closure-denying theist, and one by a necessitarian theist, and argue that the necessitarian’s reply successfully rebuts the inconsistency charge. I conclude that skeptical theism which accepts God’s necessary existence is immune to both kinds of arguments for its inconsistency.     

The problem of polytheisms: a serious challenge to theism

Theistic and analytic philosophers of religion typically privilege classical theism and monotheism by ignoring or underestimating the great threat of polytheism (We take ‘theism’ to mean ‘classical theism’, which is but one of many possible monotheisms. Avoiding much of the discussion around classical theism, we wish to focus on the challenges in arguing for monotheism over polytheism. We take monotheisms and polytheisms to be versions of supernaturalism, and not of ‘theism’. We consider monotheisms and polytheisms to entail the notion of divine transcendence). We develop an argument from infinitely many alternatives, which decisively demonstrates that if a monotheistic or polytheistic god-model obtains, it will almost certainly be polytheistic. Probabilistic calculations are performed in order to illustrate the difficulties faced by the monotheistic proponent. After considering possible objections, such as whether there should be limits placed on how many possible god-models could obtain, we conclude that our argument from infinitely many alternatives is sound, and highly unlikely to be overcome.     

The role of primary prevention in mental health services: A review and critique

Community psychology in the West has had a growing impact on mental health service provision. One facet of this development has been the advocacy of an increased focus on the primary prevention of mental illness. This paper reviews both theoretical and practical work in this area in order to assess the current role and relevance of primary preventive interventions. There is a discussion of primary prevention's historical and theoretical contexts, of its conceptualisations and definitions, of criticisms of its relevance and efficacy, and of examples of its practice. It is argued that primary prevention is inappropriately marginalised in current service provision and that there is a need to engage in the long-term planning and evaluation of primary preventive interventions in order to facilitate their fuller incorporation into national and local policies on mental health.     

The Alliance of Virtue and Vanity in Hume's Moral Theory

In this article I argue that vanity, the desire for and delight in the favorable opinion of others, plays a fundamental role in Hume's account of moral motivation. Hume says that vanity and virtue are inseparable, though he does not explicitly say how or why this should be. I argue that Hume's account of sympathy can explain this alliance. In resting moral sentiment on sympathy, Hume gives a fundamental role to vanity as it becomes either a mediating motive to virtue or else strengthens the otherwise weak motive of moral sentiment.     

The problem of evil: skeptical theism leads to moral paralysis

Natural disasters would seem to constitute evidence against the existence of God, for, on the face of things, it is mysterious why a completely good and all-powerful God would allow the sort of suffering we see from earthquakes, diseases, and the like. The skeptical theist replies that we should not expect to be able to understand God’s ways, and thus we should not regard it as surprising or mysterious that God would allow natural evil. I argue that skeptical theism leads to moral paralysis: accepting skeptical theism would undermine our ability to make any moral judgments whatsoever. Second, and more briefly, I argue that skeptical theism would undercut our ability to accept any form of the argument from design, including recent approaches based on fine-tuning.