Feature cues in probability learning: Data base information and judgment

Judgments of probabilistic events are often based partly on some information about past similar events. This study investigates the impact of summarized historical data termed a feature cue on performance in a cue probability learning task. Judges (n = 64) made 150 predictions of a criterion variable (Y_e) from a single cue variable (X). The feature cue variable (Z) provided judges with the “average past criterion” for the cue value on trial i, i.e., the conditional mean . Availability of the feature cue was varied with an AB-BA transfer design. Results demonstrate that the presence of the feature cue greatly imporved prediction achievement and accuracy. Under certain conditions, consistency and cue weighting were also improved by the feature cue aid. Although the feature cue value itself was not used as a prediction, it served as an anchor, around which judgments were dispersed. Implications for decision making with data base information are discussed.     

Why scientists valuep values

According to almost any approach to statistical inference, attained significance levels, orp values, have little value. Despite this consensus among statistical experts,p values are usually reported extensively in research articles in a manner that invites misinterpretation. In the present article, I suggest that the reasonp values are so heavily used is because they provide information concerning the strength of the evidence provided by the experiment. In some typical hypothesis testing situations, researchers may be interested in the relative adequacy of two different theoretical accounts: one that predicts no difference across conditions, and another that predicts some difference. The appropriate statistic for this kind of comparison is the likelihood ratio,P(D|M ₀)/P(D|M ₁), whereM ₀ andM ₁ are the two theoretical accounts. Large values of the likelihood ratio provide evidence thatM ₀ is a better account, whereas small values indicate thatM1 is better. I demonstrate that, under some circumstances, thep value can be interpreted in the same manner as the likelihood ratio. In particular, forZ,t, and sign tests, the likelihood ratio is an approximately linear function of thep value, with a slope between 2 and 3. Thus, researchers may reportp values in scientific communications because they are a proxy for the likelihood ratio and provide the readers with information about the strength of the evidence that is not otherwise available.     

Auditory attention switching and judgment switching: Exploring multicomponent task representations

An auditory attention-switching paradigm was combined with a judgment-switching paradigm to examine the interaction of a varying auditory attention component and a varying judgment component. Participants heard two dichotically presented stimuli—one spoken by a female speaker and one spoken by a male speaker. In each trial, the stimuli were a spoken letter and a spoken number. A visual explicit cue at the beginning of each trial indicated the auditory attention criterion (speaker sex/ear) to identify the target stimulus (Experiment 1) or the judgment that had to be executed (Experiment 2). Hence, the attentional selection criterion switched independently between speaker sexes (or between ears), while the judgment alternated between letter categorization and number categorization. The data indicate that auditory attention criterion and judgment were not processed independently, regardless of whether the attention criterion or the judgment was cued. The partial repetition benefits of the explicitly cued component suggested a hierarchical organization of the auditory attention component and the judgment component within the task set. We suggest that the hierarchy arises due to the explicit cuing of one component rather than due to a “natural” hierarchy of auditory attention component and judgment component.     

The effect of pre-cueing on spatial attention across perception and action

It is well established that processes of perception and action interact. A key question concerns the role of attention in the interaction between perception-action processes. We tested the hypothesis that spatial attention is shared by perception and action. We created a dual-task paradigm: In one task, spatial information is relevant for perception (spatial-input task) but not for action, and in a second task, spatial information is relevant for action (spatial-output task) but not for perception. We used endogenous pre-cueing, with two between-subjects conditions: In one condition the cue was predictive only for the target location in the spatial-input task; in a second condition the cue was predictive only for the location of the response in the spatial-output task. In both conditions, the cueing equally affected both tasks, regardless of the information conveyed by the cue. This finding directly supports the shared input-output attention hypothesis.     

Metacognitive monitoring during criterion learning: When and why are judgments accurate?

Research on metacognitive judgment accuracy during retrieval practice has increased in recent years. However, prior work had not systematically evaluated item-level judgment accuracy and the underlying bases of judgment accuracy in a criterion-learning paradigm (in which items are practiced until correctly recalled during encoding). Understanding these relationships during criterion learning has important theoretical implications for self-regulated learning frameworks, and also has applied implications for student learning: If the factors that influence metacognitive judgments are not predictive of subsequent test performance, students may make poor decisions during self-regulated learning. In the present experiments, participants engaged in test–restudy practice until items were recalled correctly. Once a given item reached criterion, participants made an immediate or delayed judgment of learning (JOL) for the item. A final cued-recall test occurred 30 min later. We examined judgment accuracy (the relationship between JOLs and test performance) and the underlying bases of judgment accuracy by evaluating cue utilization (the relationship between cues and JOLs) and cue diagnosticity (the relationship between cues and test performance). Immediate JOLs were only modestly related to subsequent test performance, and further analyses revealed that the cues related to JOLs were only weakly predictive of test accuracy. However, delaying JOLs improved both the accuracy of the JOLs and the diagnosticity of the cues that influenced judgments.     

Exploring temporal dissipation of attention settings in auditory task switching

Using a cued auditory task-switching variant of dichotic listening, we varied the response–cue interval (RCI) to examine temporal dissipation effects. On each trial, participants were presented with two different number words, one spoken by a female speaker and another by a male speaker (dichotic listening), that served as competing targets for a numerical judgment. The gender of the task-relevant speaker was indicated by a visual task cue prior to each trial. Experiment 1A used two different cues for each task (i.e., gender) and showed only small cue repetition benefits (same cue vs. alternate cue) but large auditory switch costs (alternate cue vs. task switch). A replication without immediate cue repetitions (Experiment 1B) showed very similar switch costs, suggesting that immediate cue repetitions play a negligible role for the size of auditory task switch costs. Moreover, switch costs were reduced when the (entirely task-irrelevant) location of the task-relevant speaker changed, relative to when it was unchanged, suggesting an episodic feature-binding component in our dichotic-listening task. Importantly, both experiments showed no effect of RCI on auditory switch costs. Because statistical power for this null effect was reasonably high across experiments (n?=?50), this finding suggests that auditory attention settings do not dissipate quickly over time.     

Indirect representation and the self-representational theory of consciousness

According to Uriah Kriegel’s self-representational theory of consciousness, mental state M is conscious just in case it is a complex with suitably integrated proper parts, M ₁ and M ₂, such that M ₁ is a higher-order representation of lower-order representation M ₂. Kriegel claims that M thereby “indirectly” represents itself, and he attempts to motivate this claim by appealing to what he regards as intuitive cases of indirect perceptual and pictorial representation. For example, Kriegel claims that it’s natural to say that in directly perceiving the front surface of an apple one thereby perceives the apple itself. Cases such as this are supposed to provide intuitive support for the principle that if X represents Y, and Y is highly integrated into complex object Z, then X indirectly represents Z. In this paper I provide counterexamples to Kriegel’s principle of indirect representation, before going on to argue that we can explain what is going on in those cases in which the subject seems to represent a complex whole by representing one its parts without positing indirect representations anyway. I then argue that my alternative approach is superior to Kriegel’s in a number of ways, thereby rendering his theory of consciousness implausible.     

A constrained optimization model of risky decisions

A decision model is formulated for individual choices between gambles whose probabilities and payoffs are explicitly stated. The decision situation is characterized as R_N = (X, P, Z, T, α) where X is a payoff matrix, P is the objective probability distribution over the states of nature, Z is a class of objective functions, T is tolerable regret and 1 ? α is the maximum probability for accepting regrets greater than T. Given R_N, the problem of selecting a strategy is the solution of a chance constrained optimization problem. The solutions for choice situations having two alternatives and n states of nature are developed in a series of theorems. Some implications for experimentation and possible applications are discussed.     

The hierarchy of consistency: A review and model of longitudinal findings on adult individual differences in intelligence,personality and self-opinion

When viewed in the aggregate, studies of the longitudinal consistency of intelligence, personality traits and self-opinion (self-esteem, life satisfaction etc.) show a hierarchy of consistency. Uncorrected retest coefficients over periods of 6 months to 50 yr are analyzed as the product of period-free reliability (R) and the true stability of the construct (sⁿ, where s is the coefficient of annual stability and n the number of years of the retest interval). The annual stabilities of intelligence, personality traits and self-opinions are estimated as 0.99, 0.98 and 0.94, respectively. While intelligence and personality may be regarded as relatively stable characteristics over the length of the adult lifespan, self-opinion has little stability over periods of more than 10 yr. The hierarchy of consistency should be taken into account in causal models of human development. Although self-opinion is not a longitudinally-stable characteristics, it may still be predicted over long periods of time by higher-order constructs such as personality traits and intelligence.     

Plotting and analyzing cumulative response curves in operant conditioning studies

Because the response and time scales used in plotting cumulative response curves are often poorly selected, ineffective displays often result. The visual cue of a response rate change is the difference, [Formula: see text] between the angles, θ₁ and θ₂, representing the two rates, R₁ and R₂. These variables are related by: [Formula: see text] For a given rate change, the value of θ₁, namely, _Mθ₁, that yields the maximum value of [Formula: see text] namely, [Formula: see text] is given by _Mθ₁=arc sin [Formula: see text] Ideally, the initial response rate should be represented by the _Mθ₁ appropriate for a given rate change. Because of practical considerations, however, some compromises with the ideal are allowable. Included in the discussion are (a) steps required to select appropriate response and time scales, with examples, and (b) guideposts for evaluating rate changes by means of angular changes.     

Adaptive changes between cue abstraction and exemplar memory in a multiple-cue judgment task with continuous cues

The majority of previous studies on multiple-cue judgment with continuous cues have involved comparisons between judgments and multiple linear regression models that integrated cues into a judgment. The authors present an experiment indicating that in a judgment task withadditive combination of multiple continuous cues, people indeed displayed abstract knowledge of the cue criterion relations that was mentally integrated into a judgment, but in a task withmultiplicative combination of continuous cues, people instead relied on retrieval of memory traces of similar judgment cases (exemplars). These results suggest that people may adopt qualitatively distinct forms of knowledge, depending on the structure of a multiple-cue judgment task. The authors discuss implications for theories of multiple-cue judgment.     

Do Children’s Attributions Mediate the Link Between Parental Conditional Regard and Child Depression and Emotion?

Both parental conditional regard for academics and depressogenic attributions are related to detrimental psychological outcomes for children. Here we examine associations among parental conditional negative regard, child depressogenic attributions, child depressive symptoms, and emotion reactivity in children between the ages of 8 and 12, as well as whether children’s self-reported and behavioral attributions for negative events mediate associations between parental conditional negative regard for academics with children’s depressive symptoms and emotion reactivity. In Study 1 (N?=?108, M _age ?=?9.73, 50 male), children’s self-reported attributions for hypothetical events mediated the link between parental conditional negative regard and child depressive symptoms. In Study 2 (N?=?104, M _age ?=?10.28, 54 male), children attempted an impossible puzzle task while their skin conductance level was monitored, after which they completed an interview that was coded for spontaneous attributions for failure. Children’s spontaneous attributions mediated the link between parental conditional negative regard and child emotion reactivity, but not depressive symptoms. Findings suggest that children’s attributions may be a mechanism through which parental conditional negative regard is related to children’s depressive symptoms and emotion reactivity during a performance challenge. These results have implications for developmental models of depression risk and potential areas for clinical interventions with both children and their parents.     

Further test of a subjective probability model of social inference

Subjects read paragraphs suggesting that a fictitious person (O) either did or did not possess an attribute X. Then, they reported their beliefs that they would like O (P_L), that O possessed X (P_X), that O was intelligent (P_I) and that O was sarcastic (P_s). Other beliefs necessary to test the predictive accuracy of Wyer's subjective probability model of cognitive organization were also reported. The model accurately predicted P_L on the basis of beliefs about X (the attribute to which information about O directly pertained); this accuracy was greater than that obtained in an earlier study in which real persons were evaluated, and did not depend upon the favorableness of X. However, predictions of P_L based upon beliefs about O's intelligence overestimated obtained values, while predictions based upon beliefs about O's sarcasm underestimated these values; moreover, P_I and P_S were underestimated and overestimated, respectively, by beliefs about X. It was speculated that these discrepancies were due to temporary inconsistencies among beliefs resulting from the information presented which did not have time to be resolved before beliefs were reported. Changes in P_L, P_I, and P_S resulting from additional information about X were accurately predicted in all cases. Implications of the model for other formulations of social evaluation processes are noted.     

How the mind shapes action: Offline contexts modulate involuntary episodic retrieval

Involuntary retrieval of previous stimulus–response episodes is a centerpiece of many theories of priming, episodic binding, and action control. Typically it is assumed that by repeating a stimulus from trial n–1 to trial n, involuntary retrieval is triggered in a nearly automatic fashion, facilitating (or interfering with) the to-be-executed action. Here we argue that changes in the offline context weaken the involuntary retrieval of previous episodes (the offline context is defined to be the information presented before or after the focal stimulus). In four conditions differing in cue modality and target modality, retrieval was diminished if participants changed the target selection criterion (as indicated by a cue presented before the selection took place) while they still performed the same task. Thus, solely through changes in the offline context (cue or selection criterion), involuntary retrieval can be weakened in an effective way.     

How Should We Assess the Fit of Rasch-Type Models? Approximating the Power of Goodness-of-Fit Statistics in Categorical Data Analysis

We investigate the performance of three statistics, R ₁, R ₂ (Glas in Psychometrika 53:525–546, 1988), and M ₂ (Maydeu-Olivares & Joe in J. Am. Stat. Assoc. 100:1009–1020, 2005, Psychometrika 71:713–732, 2006) to assess the overall fit of a one-parameter logistic model (1PL) estimated by (marginal) maximum likelihood (ML). R ₁ and R ₂ were specifically designed to target specific assumptions of Rasch models, whereas M ₂ is a general purpose test statistic. We report asymptotic power rates under some interesting violations of model assumptions (different item discrimination, presence of guessing, and multidimensionality) as well as empirical rejection rates for correctly specified models and some misspecified models. All three statistics were found to be more powerful than Pearson’s X ² against two- and three-parameter logistic alternatives (2PL and 3PL), and against multidimensional 1PL models. The results suggest that there is no clear advantage in using goodness-of-fit statistics specifically designed for Rasch-type models to test these models when marginal ML estimation is used.     

A Utility Based Evaluation of Logico-probabilistic Systems

Systems of logico-probabilistic (LP) reasoning characterize inference from conditional assertions interpreted as expressing high conditional probabilities. In the present article, we investigate four prominent LP systems (namely, systems O, P, Z, and QC) by means of computer simulations. The results reported here extend our previous work in this area, and evaluate the four systems in terms of the expected utility of the dispositions to act that derive from the conclusions that the systems license. In addition to conforming to the dominant paradigm for assessing the rationality of actions and decisions, our present evaluation complements our previous work, since our previous evaluation may have been too severe in its assessment of inferences to false and uninformative conclusions. In the end, our new results provide additional support for the conclusion that (of the four systems considered) inference by system Z offers the best balance of error avoidance and inferential power. Our new results also suggest that improved performance could be achieved by a modest strengthening of system Z.     

知道感（FOK）和不知道感（FOnK）的双向实验分离

为了实现FOK（feeling-of-knowing）和FonK（feeling-of-not-knowing）的双向分离,实验一采用高频词或者低频词为线索项目,检验FOK和FOnK的预测准确性。结果发现,在低频线索条件下FOK的预测准确性表现出高于FOnK的预测准确性的趋势,而在高频线索条件下则正好相反,但上述两组差异并未在统计学上达到显著的程度。实验二采用词－非词对和相关词对两种实验条件,在证明相关词对条件可以促进FOK并降低FOnK的同时,观察到词－非词条件可以促进FOnK并降低FOK,从而在较为严格的意义上证明了FOK和FOnK是两个不同的维度的量。上述结果为知道感的“双过程假设”提供了进一步的实验证据     

Deciding with the eye: How the visually manipulated accessibility of information in memory influences decision behavior

Decision situations are typically characterized by uncertainty: Individuals do not know the values of different options on a criterion dimension. For example, consumers do not know which is the healthiest of several products. To make a decision, individuals can use information about cues that are probabilistically related to the criterion dimension, such as sugar content or the concentration of natural vitamins. In two experiments, we investigated how the accessibility of cue information in memory affects which decision strategy individuals rely on. The accessibility of cue information was manipulated by means of a newly developed paradigm, the spatial-memory-cueing paradigm, which is based on a combination of the looking-at-nothing phenomenon and the spatial-cueing paradigm. The results indicated that people use different decision strategies, depending on the validity of easily accessible information. If the easily accessible information is valid, people stop information search and decide according to a simple take-the-best heuristic. If, however, information that comes to mind easily has a low predictive validity, people are more likely to integrate all available cue information in a compensatory manner.     

Frequency, probability, and prediction: easy solutions to cognitive illusions?

Many errors in probabilistic judgment have been attributed to people's inability to think in statistical terms when faced with information about a single case. Prior theoretical analyses and empirical results imply that the errors associated with case-specific reasoning may be reduced when people make frequentistic predictions about a set of cases. In studies of three previously identified cognitive biases, we find that frequency-based predictions are different from-but no better than-case-specific judgments of probability. First, in studies of the "planning fallacy, " we compare the accuracy of aggregate frequency and case-specific probability judgments in predictions of students' real-life projects. When aggregate and single-case predictions are collected from different respondents, there is little difference between the two: Both are overly optimistic and show little predictive validity. However, in within-subject comparisons, the aggregate judgments are significantly more conservative than the single-case predictions, though still optimistically biased. Results from studies of overconfidence in general knowledge and base rate neglect in categorical prediction underline a general conclusion. Frequentistic predictions made for sets of events are no more statistically sophisticated, nor more accurate, than predictions made for individual events using subjective probability.     

Source memory in the absence of successful cued recall

Five experiments were conducted to address the question of whether source information could be accessed in the absence of being able to recall an item. The authors used a paired-associate learning paradigm in which cue-target word pairs were studied, and target recall was requested in the presence of the cue. When target recall failed, participants were asked to make a source judgment of whether a man or woman spoke the unrecalled item. In 3 of the 5 experiments, source accuracy was at or very close to chance. By contrast, if cue-target pairs were studied multiple times or participants knew in advance of learning that a predictive judgment would be required, then predictive source accuracy was well above chance. These data are suggestive that context information may not play a very large role in metacognitive judgments such as feeling-of-knowing ratings or putting one into a tip-of-the-tongue state without strong and specific encoding procedures. These same results also highlight the important role that item memory plays in retrieving information about the context in which an item was experienced.