Intuition in Judgment and Decision Making: Extensive Thinking Without Effort

We claim that intuition is capable of quickly processing multiple pieces of information without noticeable cognitive effort. We advocate a component view stating that intuitive processes in judgment and decision making are responsible for information integration and output formation (e.g., preference, choice), whereas analytic thinking mainly guides input formation such as search, generation, and change of information. We present empirical evidence corroborating this notion and show that integration of information and preference formation works without cognitive control and is unconstrained by the amount of encoded information and cognitive capacity. We discuss the implications of our findings for the bounded rationality perspective and the multiple strategy approach to judgment and decision making. Finally we outline a connectionist framework for integrating intuitive and analytic thought processes.     

The role of motivation and volition in economic decisions: Evidence from eye movements and pupillometry

Economic decisions usually involve high stakes, real consequences, and some degree of personal risk. This article explores the impact of motivational and volitional states on economic decision processes in an incentivized lottery choice task. We investigated the patterns of decision time, choice, information search, and pupil dilation dependent on an experimental manipulation of motivation and volition, that is, the deliberative and the implemental mindset. The results indicated that choice preferences in economic decisions were robust and remained unaffected by motivational and volitional states, but decision processes were notably impacted. Decision makers in a deliberative state of mind searched for information more extensively and made slower decisions than the baseline. The implemental mindset was associated with more attention paid to the probability attributes of the gambles relative to the deliberative mindset. Furthermore, we observed that gamble outcomes that entailed no win at all (i.e., zero outcomes) played an important role for information search. These outcomes were largely disregarded in terms of predecisional information search but elicited pupillary responses similar to very high outcome lotteries. These results inform the current debate about the zero effect in risky choice. We also discuss the potential of eye-tracking studies of risky choice to dissolve ambiguities concerning the contributions of effort and arousal to modulating pupillary response. Implications for theoretical advances in decision research are discussed.     

Response modes, decision processes and decision outcomes

Until recently, research on riskless multiattribute decision making has generally ignored a distinction among response modes, i.e. the type of response required of the decision maker. This neglect persisted in spite of the results of early studies on preference reversals in gambles, which showed a distinct difference between the decision outcomes of choice and those of judgment. This article examines the effects of response modes in relation to two explanations proposed in recent response mode studies: the compatibility hypothesis and the response mode continuum. An experiment was conducted with a process tracing technique (information boards), in which 104 subjects made decisions on the quality of student papers submitted for publication. Four response modes were compared: selecting, rejecting, classifying, and ranking of alternatives. In addition, information load was manipulated. Response mode influenced both the decision process and the decision outcome. The results are interpreted as supporting the response mode continuum idea, but not the compatibility hypothesis. A classification of response modes is proposed.     

Information Processing Strategies in Riskless Preference Reversals: The Prominence Effect

A preference reversal occurs whenever an individual prefers one alternative to another in one response mode (e.g., choice) but shows the opposite preference order in another response mode (e.g., attractiveness ratings, matching). In previous studies of riskless multiattribute preferences the most common reversal pattern involves a prominence effect: The more important attribute has a greater influence in choices than in matching judgments. Previous research has suggested that the prominence effect can be accounted for by the strategy compatibility principle, which states that response tasks can evoke different decision strategies and these strategies determine the relative impact of the various attributes. This article attempts to establish the mediating role of decision processes in determining the occurrence and pattern of riskless preference reversals. In a process tracing experiment we replicate previous findings of a prominence effect in riskless two-attribute preferences. In addition, there are clear differences in process between response modes, and these differences are consistent with previous explanations of riskless preference reversals. Finally, we are able to predict subject level differences in choice preferences and choice versus matching reversals using measures of information search.     

A dual‐system framework to understand preference construction processes in choice

Building on the dual-system theory of judgment, we propose an intuitive and deliberate framework for understanding the effects of preference construction in choice. We argue that while certain choice effects can be attributed primarily to rapid, unintentional, and intuitive processing, others arise from intentional and deliberate processing. We use this distinction to group choice effects previously identified in the literature, discuss evidence in support of the dual-system framework of preference construction, and propose new research directions. Since the defining property of intuitive versus deliberate mental processes is the degree to which they engage working memory, the proposed framework sheds light on how these previously identified effects will change with conditions such as the availability of cognitive resources. We conclude by calling for additional research to explore the interplay between intuitive and deliberate processing to determine which processes are implicated in generating a preference, as well as research on new moderators of choice effects based on the difference in the amount of willful information processing that underlies decision making.     

Sadder but wiser or happier and smarter? A demonstration of judgment and decision making

Researchers have debated whether positive or negative emotions will positively improve decision performance (B. Kuvaas & G. Kaufmann, 2004). The author explored (a) which coping strategies decision makers use when they experience positive or negative emotions and (b) how cognitive processes are influenced by negative and positive emotions. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 120) in positive emotional states (i.e., happier and smarter) were better at problem-focused coping than were participants with negative emotions (i.e., sadder but wiser). In Experiment 2, participants (N = 124) displayed greater accuracy of choice, took longer to research information, and processed a larger amount of information when they were in positive emotional states. The two experiments showed similar results between judgment and decision-making contexts in which positive emotion enhances problem solving.     

Threat and selective exposure: the moderating role of threat and decision context on confirmatory information search after decisions

Previous studies on the impact of perceived threat on confirmatory information search (selective exposure) in the context of decision making have yielded mixed results. Some studies have suggested that confirmatory information search is reduced, yet others have found contradictory effects. The present series of 5 studies consistently found that the crucial moderator for these inconsistent findings was whether the induced threat was contextually related to the subsequent decision and information search tasks. Contextual incongruence (e.g., an induction of terrorist threat followed by an economic decision case) results in reduced levels of confirmatory information search, whereas a congruent threat (e.g., an induction of terrorist threat followed by a decision case on terrorism) results in increased levels of confirmatory information search. Analyses of the underlying psychological processes revealed that decision-unrelated threat inductions increase decision makers' experienced decision uncertainty, thus reducing confirmatory information search.     

Factors influencing the use of internal summary evaluations versus external information in choice

Decision makers cope with more demanding tasks by shifting their cognitive strategies, balancing effort expenditure against the desire to produce an accurate response. In choice tasks, one method for reducing effort while simultaneously maintaining accuracy is to shift from a reliance on information obtained from the external environment to that retrieved from memory, particularly summary evaluations (i.e. relatively stable evaluative reactions to the overall attractiveness of individual alternatives) acquired from previous decision-making experience. We examined four factors that should all encourage decision makers to rely to some extent on internal summary evaluations rather than external information search: (1) increased external search costs, (2) greater time pressure, (3) increased incentives to make an accurate choice, and (4) increased levels of prior experience with the choice context. Sixty experimental subjects chose their preferred alternative from a set of women's magazines. Decision processes were inferred from verbal protocols, computer-generated search records, and decision times. Only increased external search costs led to a greater reliance on summary evaluations. Although increased time pressure, increased incentives, and increased experience with the context did lead to changes in search and evaluation processes, contrary to initial expectations decision makers did not shift to a greater reliance on summary evaluations. These results suggest that while decision makers do sometimes use summary evaluations as a substitute for external search, this is only one of several mechanisms available for effort reduction. Understanding when and where decision makers rely upon summary evaluations probably requires a broader conceptualization of knowledge structures, particularly a consideration of the knowledge that decision makers possess about different choice strategies and their effectiveness.     

The Effects of Alternative Labels on Decision Behavior: The Case of Corporate Site Selection Decisions

The influence of alternative labels on decision processes and outcomes were examined in a multidimensional decision task with realistic decision information and experienced decision makers. Based on prior research, it was predicted that labels would influence selection and ratings of decision alternatives, as well as the extent of information search and the information search strategies. Subjects (n = 26) experienced in making and/or aiding business relocation decisions completed two computer controlled site selection tasks: one with labeled locations and one with unlabeled locations. Results indicated that labeling influenced both decision processes and location ratings. An interaction between order of task completion and labeling suggested that labeling effects on decision making may be minimized if an unlabeled task is completed prior to a labeled task. Implications and limitations are discussed in terms of labeling effects and decision quality.     

Information search in heuristic decision making

Simple heuristics of the type introduced by Gigerenzer, Todd, and The ABC Research Group ( 1999 ) embody principles for information search, stop and decision making. These heuristics suggest that such processes are simple. In an analysis of general practitioners' (GPs) information search and decision‐making behaviour when prescribing a lipid lowering drug, we examined whether information search was simple, and whether a heuristic that predicts a simple decision‐making process was also accurate at describing information search. We found that GPs' information search behaviour was simple in that it demonstrated characteristics of the matching heuristic (e.g. stopping rule). In addition, although the matching heuristic which correctly predicted on average 75% of GPs' decisions used significantly fewer cues on average than the GPs did in the information search task, it was reasonably accurate in describing order of information search. These findings have implications for the validity of simple heuristics describing both information search and decision making. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

选项数量和属性重要性对决策中信息加工的影响

本研究采用决策过程研究方法中的信息板技术,以现实生活中的职业选择作为决策任务,考察了选项数量和选项属性的重要性对决策过程中信息加工的影响方式。结果表明:选项数量对决策过程的信息搜索深度、搜索模式和策略的补偿性产生了影响;选项属性的重要性并不影响决策者对属性的查看时间,但影响了决策者对属性的点击次数。     

Choice/Matching Preference Reversals in Groups: Consensus Processes and Justification-Based Reasoning

Individual preferences can vary significantly by the mode in which they are elicited. Thus, the seemingly benign procedural issue of elicitation mode (i.e., choice, buying price, rating, matching) could have a profound effect on group decisions, although elicitation mode has not been much studied as a group procedural variable. Individual preferences differ by elicitation mode when the elicitation contexts differentially emphasize particular aspects of the decision. Emphasis on explainability, for example, may produce decisions that are based only on a few, important, attributes. Because group consensus processes also can encourage particular reasoning strategies, grouping may interact with elicitation mode; that is, group consensus processes may moderate or exacerbate preference reversals. The present study explored a particular elicitation effect, choice versus matching preference reversals, for decisions with both low and high social significance. The results confirmed both that elicitation mode can affect group decisions and that group consensus processes moderate choice/matching preference reversals. Further, evidence from both preference measures and rating scales suggested that the moderation was due to an increase in easily defended, justifiable decisions. Social significance did not affect individual or group decisions, but decreased members′ post group commitment to the group decision. These results have implications both for group decision making and for the study of the role of explanation-based strategies in preference formation.     

直觉和分析在不同信息获取与呈现方式下对多特征目标判断质量的影响

采用多特征目标判断任务,考察了不同信息获取方式与信息呈现方式条件下,直觉和分析思维模式对判断质量的影响。结果发现：（1）在多特征目标判断任务中,直觉思维比分析思维更有效;（2）直觉型决策者运用直觉思维的判断质量比感觉型决策者更高;（3）归类组块的信息呈现方式能够有效提升决策者运用直觉思维的判断质量;（4）思维模式、信息获取方式与信息呈现方式对多特征目标的判断质量存在三阶交互作用,归类组块的信息呈现方式使直觉型决策者运用直觉思维的判断质量最高,而运用分析思维的判断质量低于感觉型决策者;归类组块排列信息时,直觉型决策者运用分析思维的判断质量低于信息随机排列时的水平。     

Modeling the Dynamics of Risky Choice

Individuals make decisions under uncertainty every day. Decisions are based on incomplete information concerning the potential outcome or the predicted likelihood with which events occur. In addition, individuals' choices often deviate from the rational or mathematically objective solution. Accordingly, the dynamics of human decision making are difficult to capture using conventional, linear mathematical models. Here, we present data from a 2-choice task with variable risk between sure loss and risky loss to illustrate how a simple nonlinear dynamical system can be employed to capture the dynamics of human decision making under uncertainty (i.e., multistability, bifurcations). We test the feasibility of this model quantitatively and demonstrate how the model can account for up to 86% of the observed choice behavior. The implications of using dynamical models for explaining the nonlinear complexities of human decision making are discussed as well as the degree to which the theory of nonlinear dynamical systems might offer an alternative framework for understanding human decision making processes.     

An eye‐tracking study on information processing in risky decisions: Evidence for compensatory strategies based on automatic processes

Many everyday decisions have to be made under risk and can be interpreted as choices between gambles with different outcomes that are realized with specific probabilities. The underlying cognitive processes were investigated by testing six sets of hypotheses concerning choices, decision times, and information search derived from cumulative prospect theory, decision field theory, priority heuristic and parallel constraint satisfaction models. Our participants completed 40 decision tasks of two gambles with two non‐negative outcomes each. Information search was recorded using eye‐tracking technology. Results for choices, decision time, the amount of information searched for, fixation durations, the direction of the information search, and the distribution of fixations conflict with the prediction of the non‐compensatory priority heuristic and indicate that individuals use compensatory strategies. Choice proportions are well in line with the predictions of cumulative prospect theory. Process measures indicate that individuals thereby do not rely on deliberate calculations of weighted sums. Information integration processes seem to be better explained by models that partially rely on automatic processes such as decision field theory or parallel constraint satisfaction models. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

直觉和分析在不同任务条件下的逃生决策效果

目的：探讨针对简单和复杂逃生任务时, 直觉和分析在不同判断依据条件下的逃生决策效果。方法：采用两个主实验和两个预备实验。实验一和实验二的被试人数分别为：85人和87人。两个主实验均采取2 (思维方式：直觉和分析) × 2 (判断依据：简单和复杂)组间实验设计。主要结果：(1)针对简单逃生任务, 直觉组和分析组在不同判断依据条件下的逃生决策效果差异不明显; (2)针对复杂逃生任务, 在简单判断依据条件下分析决策优于直觉决策; 在复杂判断依据条件下直觉决策优于分析决策。主要结论：直觉性和分析性逃生决策的效果主要与决策任务的复杂程度有关, 而与判断依据的复杂程度关系不大。     

The Hard–Easy Effect in Subjective Probability Calibration

Four different factors have been used to explain the hard–easy effect in subjective probability judgments, in which calibration goes systematically from over- to underconfidence as task difficulty decreases. The factors are biased judgment, lack of suitable adjustment of response criteria (decision variable partition model), biased choice of stimulus material (ecological model), and random error in judgment (error model). Although there is strong evidence for judgmental bias, it seems unlikely to account fully for the systematic character of the effect. We describe the judgment models that emphasize the other three factors and then present two new experiments and a further analysis of the calibration problem. The findings of these experiments and the analysis support the response criteria approach and indicate that the ecological model, and biased choice of stimulus material, is not correct. Since error by itself cannot fully explain observed underconfidence phenomena, we conclude that the most likely explanation of the hard–easy effect is in terms of response criteria. A simulation of the decision variable partition model shows that its behavior closely matches the observed relation between overconfidence and proportion correct for a large sample of experimental results.     

To achieve or not to achieve? Comparative mindsets elicit assimilation and contrast in goal priming

Goal priming typically leads to goal‐consistent behavior. This uniform pattern is surprising given other types of priming effects, which have been found to be more variable. On the basis of previous research on judgment priming effects, we predicted that a comparative mindset to focus on similarities versus differences also affects the direction of goal priming. Two studies show that assimilation to a primed goal results if participants focus on similarities, whereas a focus on differences leads to contrast. In Study 1, participants induced to focus on similarities behaved more neatly after being primed with neatness rather than the goal to be carefree. For participants induced to focus on differences, the opposite pattern emerged. In Study 2, a similarity focus led to assimilation to an achievement prime, whereas a difference focus resulted in contrast. These findings highlight the importance of comparative processes in goal striving and demonstrate that assimilative goal‐priming effects are less invariable than existing research suggests. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Choice confidence in the webrooming purchase process: The impact of online positive reviews and the motivation to touch

The webrooming purchase process (i.e. searching for information online and then buying the product offline) is the most extended cross‐channel shopping behaviour. With the aim of offering a better understanding of this behaviour, this research relies on information processing and uncertainty reduction theories to propose that consumers use the online information to make the offline purchase with a higher degree of confidence. We examine the effects of a previous online interaction with a product on the preferences and decision at the physical store, as well as on the outcomes of the experience. In this path to purchase, we analyse how positive online customer reviews, as a specific form of electronic word of mouth, help the consumer to improve their experience, given their great potential to reduce the consumer's uncertainty in a purchase situation. In addition, the role of the motivation to touch the product is examined. The results of two studies show that the combination of an online search and an offline purchase improves the consumers' purchase experience in pre‐choice variables (i.e. purchase intentions), choice and post‐choice variables (i.e. search‐process satisfaction and choice confidence). Moreover, reading a positive online customer review influences choice confidence, and all the variables considered in the research when it is received at the physical store. Finally, the results stress the importance of the motivation to touch when studying multichannel shopping behaviour, given its direct and moderating effects on the webrooming purchase process. Implications for theory and practice are discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A dynamic context model of interactive behavior

A dynamic context model of interactive behavior was developed to explain results from two experiments that tested the effects of interaction costs on encoding strategies, cognitive representations, and response selection processes in a decision-making and a judgment task. The model assumes that the dynamic context defined by the mixes of internal and external representations and processes are sensitive to the interaction cost imposed by the task environment. The model predicts that changes in the dynamic context may lead to systematic biases in cognitive representations and processes that eventually influence decision-making and judgment outcomes. Consistent with the predictions by the model, results from the experiments showed that as interaction costs increased, encoding strategies and cognitive representations shifted from perception-based to memory-based. Memory-based comparisons of the stimuli enhanced the similarity and dominance effects, and led to stronger systematic biases in response outcomes in a choice task. However, in a judgment task, memory-based representations enhanced only the dominance effects. Results suggested that systematic response biases in the dominance context were caused by biases in the cognitive representations of the stimuli, but response biases in the similarity context were caused by biases in the comparison process induced by the choice task. Results suggest that changes in interaction costs not only change whether information was assessed from the external world or from memory but also introduce systematic biases in the cognitive representation of the information, which act as biased inputs to the subsequent decision-making and judgment processes. Results are consistent with the idea of interactive cognition, which proposes that representations and processes are contingent on the dynamic context defined by the information flow between the external task environment and internal cognition.