Domestication has not affected the understanding of means-end connections in dogs

Recent studies have revealed that dogs often perform well in cognitive tasks in the social domain, but rather poorly in the physical domain. This dichotomy has led to the hypothesis that the domestication process might have enhanced the social cognitive skills of dogs (Hare et al. in Science 298:1634-1636, 2002; Miklósi et al. in Curr Biol 13:763-766, 2003) but at the same time had a detrimental effect on their physical cognition (Frank in Z Tierpsychol 5:389-399, 1980). Despite the recent interest in dog cognition and especially the effects of domestication, the latter hypothesis has hardly been tested and we lack detailed knowledge of the physical understanding of wolves in comparison with dogs. Here, we set out to examine whether adult wolves and dogs rely on means-end connections using the string-pulling task, to test the prediction that wolves would perform better than dogs in such a task of physical cognition. We found that at the group level, dogs were more prone to commit the proximity error, while the wolves showed a stronger side bias. Neither wolves nor dogs showed an instantaneous understanding of means-end connection, but made different mistakes. Thus, the performance of the wolves and dogs in this string-pulling task did not confirm that domestication has affected the physical cognition of dogs.     

Development of the cognitive appraisal and understanding of social events (CAUSE) videos.

This study describes the development and validation of 4 videos designed to assess adolescent cognitive appraisals and understanding of social events (the CAUSE Videos). Story lines varied in outcome (2 negative and 2 ambiguous). Convergent and divergent validity were tested in samples of college freshmen and sophomores. As hypothesized, threatening interpretations during ambiguous situations were positively associated with trait hostility (convergent validity) but were not significantly associated with aggression (divergent validity). Negative video interpretations were not significantly associated with hostility or aggression. These videos provide a valid method for assessing adolescents' appraisals of ambiguous and negative social situations in a laboratory setting and may be used to test hypotheses about cognitive processes underlying associations such as that between low socioeconomic status and health in adolescents.     

Partner's understanding of affective–cognitive meta‐bases predicts relationship quality

Knowledge that partners have about each other's attitudes are consequential for relationship quality. This article extends prior research and examines whether knowledge regarding a partner's meta‐attitudinal bases, or subjective perceptions of how one's attitudes are driven, can influence relationship quality. Given how meta‐bases are reflective of information‐processing goals, we hypothesized that partner understanding of meta‐attitudinal bases would positively predict relationship quality. Self and partner ratings of how relationally relevant attitudes were driven, as well as perceptions of relationship quality, were assessed. Results revealed that a partner's knowledge of one's meta‐bases positively predicts one's own reported relationship quality. Results remained significant when controlling for relationship duration and meta‐bases similarity. Implications of meta‐bases understanding for close relationship functioning are discussed.     

The prospect of negotiating: Stress, cognitive appraisal, and performance

Despite a significant literature on the impact of stress on performance in achievement settings, little is known about whether and how stress might matter for would-be negotiators. In two studies, we investigate how bargainers cognitively appraise a looming negotiation, whether its prospect is stressful and what the consequences are for performance. Individuals who appraised a prospective negotiation as a threat experienced more stress ahead of a negotiation, and reached lower quality deals compared to those who had appraised a challenge. Results from a follow-up experiment showed that would-be negotiators who had appraised a threat behaved more passively and were less likely to use tough tactics compared to those who appraised a challenge. Those who appraised a threat also had relatively inaccurate perceptions of their partners’ priorities and interests, which undermined their outcomes. The outcome advantage for those who appraised a challenge was limited to negotiations that contained integrative potential.     

A cognitive view of the performance appraisal process: A model and research propositions

This paper presents a model of performance appraisal which focuses on the cognitive processes employed by a rater attempting to form an evaluation. The model describes the method by which a rater collects, encodes, stores, and later retrieves information from memory, and the method by which he or she weights and combines this information to form an evaluation which is converted to a rating on a scale. The model is based on diverse bodies of literature which share a social-cognitive orientation, and it forms the foundation for a number of testable research propositions.     

Developmental changes in understanding the influence of emotion upon cognitive performance and motivation

In the light of recent research concerned with children's understanding of mind, a study was conducted in order to test the hypotheses (a) that only older children (i.e., 8-year-olds) would understand that emotional states can influence cognitive performance, but (b) that both older and younger children (i.e., 5- and 8-year-olds) would understand its influence upon cognitive motivation. Children were explicitly questioned about the consequences for cognition and motivation of negative affect. Results based on children's predictions and justifications provided substantial support for the hypotheses.Sincere thanks are extended to the teachers and children of Hillside Infant and Junior Schools and Frithwood Primary School, Northwood, Middlesex. We wish also to express our gratitude to two anonymous reviewers for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.     

Patterns of cognitive appraisal in emotion

There has long been interest in describing emotional experience in terms of underlying dimensions, but traditionally only two dimensions, pleasantness and arousal, have been reliably found. The reasons for these findings are reviewed, and integrating this review with two recent theories of emotions (Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1982), we propose eight cognitive appraisal dimensions to differentiate emotional experience. In an investigation of this model, subjects recalled past experiences associated with each of 15 emotions, and rated them along the proposed dimensions. Six orthogonal dimensions, pleasantness, anticipated effort, certainty, attentional activity, self-other responsibility/control, and situational control, were recovered, and the emotions varied systematically along each of these dimensions, indicating a strong relation between the appraisal of one's circumstances and one's emotional state. The patterns of appraisal for the different emotions, and the role of each of the dimensions in differentiating emotional experience are discussed.     

The effects of an appraisal manipulation: Affect,intrusive cognitions,and performance for two cognitive tasks

We examined the relationship between trait measures of general appraisal and test anxiety, state measures of stress appraisals, affect, and intrusive cognition, and performance measures on two cognitive tests (mental math and Raven matrices). Participants were randomly assigned to threat, challenge, or control conditions that were created by manipulating both primary and secondary appraisals. We predicted that the threat condition would lead to more negative affect, stress appraisals, intrusive cognitions, and more errors. While our manipulated conditions led to inconsistent effects, path analyses tended to confirm predictions that negative task appraisals and trait test anxiety lead to negative affect and to intrusive cognitions, and that for mental math test performance a path from intrusive cognitions to test errors was established. The importance of understanding dispositionaland situational variables and their interactions during stress encounters are discussed, as is future research involving the general appraisal dimension. The authors wish to thank the many students who acted as experimenters and helped with data entry. Thanks go to James Johnson, Ann Schuller, and Brandon Vancura for all their hard work. Special thanks go to Roger Lott for his expert performance as the main investigator in the threat and challenge conditions. An enormous debt of gratitude also goes to my wife Kathy for all her patience and support, and for her help with the audio tapes used in this study. This study was completed as partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Master’s Degree for the first author. Portions of this work will be presented at the annual meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association, 1997.     

Sentimental perceptualism and the challenge from cognitive bases

According to a historically popular view, emotions are normative experiences that ground moral knowledge much as perceptual experiences ground empirical knowledge. Given the analogy it draws between emotion and perception, sentimental perceptualism constitutes a promising, naturalist-friendly alternative to classical rationalist accounts of moral knowledge. In this paper, we consider an important but underappreciated objection to the view, namely that in contrast with perception, emotions depend for their occurrence on prior representational states, with the result that emotions cannot give perceptual-like access to normative properties. We argue that underlying this objection are several specific problems, rooted in the different types of mental states to which emotions may respond, that the sentimental perceptualist must tackle for her view to be successful. We argue, moreover, that the problems can be answered by filling out the theory with several independently motivated yet highly controversial commitments, which we carefully catalogue. The plausibility of sentimental perceptualism, as a result, hinges on further claims sentimental perceptualists should not ignore.

     

Role of cognitive appraisal in panic-related avoidance

The present study examined several dimensions of panic cognitions to test whether panic appraisals predict phobicity among panic sufferers. Thirty-five patients meeting DSM-III-R criteria for panic disorder with minimal or no phobic avoidance were compared to 40 patients meeting DSM-III-R criteria for panic disorder with agoraphobia (severe). The two groups looked strikingly similar on measures of panic symptoms, panic frequency and panic severity. As expected, patients diagnosed as having panic disorder with agoraphobia reported significantly more depression and phobic avoidance than patients with PD. Striking differences emerged on each of the following panic appraisal dimensions: (a) anticipated panic, (b) perceived consequences of panic, and (c) perceived self-efficacy in coping with panic. In each case, patients with panic disorder and agoraphobia reported significantly more dysfunctional panic appraisals than patients with panic disorder and no avoidance. Of those panic appraisal dimensions studied, anticipated panic emerged as the most potent correlate of agoraphobic avoidance. These findings support the hypothesis that cognitive appraisal factors may play an important role in the genesis or maintenance of phobic avoidance among panic patients.     

The cognitive bases of human tool use

This article has two goals. The first is to assess, in the face of accruing reports on the ingenuity of great ape tool use, whether and in what sense human tool use still evidences unique, higher cognitive ability. To that effect, I offer a systematic comparison between humans and nonhuman primates with respect to nine cognitive capacities deemed crucial to tool use: enhanced hand-eye coordination, body schema plasticity, causal reasoning, function representation, executive control, social learning, teaching, social intelligence, and language. Since striking differences between humans and great apes stand firm in eight out of nine of these domains, I conclude that human tool use still marks a major cognitive discontinuity between us and our closest relatives. As a second goal of the paper, I address the evolution of human technologies. In particular, I show how the cognitive traits reviewed help to explain why technological accumulation evolved so markedly in humans, and so modestly in apes.     

Rich interpretation vs. deflationary accounts in cognitive development: the case of means-end skills in 7-month-old infants

Seven-month-old infants appear to learn means-end skills, such as pushing a button to retrieve a distant toy (Psychological Review 104 (1997) 686). The present studies tested whether such apparent means-end behaviors are genuine, or simply the repetition of trained behaviors under conditions of greatest arousal, as suggested by a dynamic systems reinterpretation. When infants were trained to repeat behaviors that did not serve as means to retrieving toys (pushing a button to light a set of distant lights), their button-pushing differed significantly from infants for whom button-pushing served as a means for retrieving toys. Further, infants demonstrated means-end skills with behaviors that they had not been trained to repeat. Implications for early means-end abilities and for debates surrounding the interpretation of infant behavior are discussed.     

Comparison of active and purely visual performance in a multiple-string means-end task in infants

The aim of the present study was to understand what factors influence infants’ problem-solving behaviours on the multiple-string task. The main question focused on why infants usually solve the single string-pulling task at 12 months at the latest, whereas most 16-month-old infants still cannot solve the task when several strings are presented, only one of which is attached to the desired object. We investigated whether this difficulty is related to infants’ ability to inhibit their spontaneous immediate actions by comparing active and purely visual performance in this task. During the first part of the experiment, we assessed the ability of infants aged 16–20 months to solve the multiple-string task. The infants were then divided into three groups based on performance (a “failure” group, an “intermediate” group, and a “success” group). The results of this action task suggest that there were differences in infants’ performance according to their level of inhibitory control of their preferred hand. In the second part of the experiment, the three groups’ predictive looking strategies were compared when seeing an adult performing the task. We found that only infants who successfully performed the action task also visually anticipated which string the adult had to pull in the visual task. Our results suggests that inhibitory control was not the only factor influencing infants’ performance on the task. Furthermore, the data support the direct matching hypothesis (Rizzolatti and Fadiga, 2005), according to which infants need to be able to perform actions themselves before being able to anticipate similar actions performed by others.     

Dogs (Canis lupus familiaris) fail to show understanding of means-end connections in a string-pulling task

Domestic dogs (Canis lupus familiaris) were tested in four experiments for their understanding of means-end connections. In each of the experiments, the dogs attempted to retrieve a food treat that could be seen behind a barrier and which was connected, via string, to a within-reach wooden block. In the experiments, either one or two strings were present, but the treat was attached only to one string. Successful retrieval of the treat required the animals to pull the appropriate string (either by pawing or by grasping the wooden block in their jaws) until the treat emerged from under the barrier. The results showed that the dogs were successful if the treat was in a perpendicular line to the barrier, i.e. straight ahead, but not when the string was at an angle: in the latter condition, the typical response was a proximity error in that the dogs pawed or mouthed at a location closest in line to the treat. When two strings that crossed were present, the dogs tended to pull on the wrong string. The combined results from the experiments show that, although dogs can learn to pull on a string to obtain food, they do not spontaneously understand means-end connections involving strings.     

On the scientific status of cognitive appraisal models of anxiety disorder

The cognitive paradigm for understanding and treating anxiety disorders comprises two distinct and potentially incompatible approaches: appraisal and information-processing. Advocates of the latter approach have sharply criticized the scientific adequacy of the appraisal models popularized by cognitive therapists. The purpose of this essay is to provide a reappraisal of these critiques of appraisal, and to defend an argument for methodological pluralism.