Does episodic future thinking improve prospective remembering?

Extant findings suggest interesting avenues for the investigation of the potential relationship between EFT and PM. However, as they stand, they are inconclusive as to the causal role that EFT may play in aiding prospective remembering. In one Experiment, we showed that accuracy in a prospective memory (PM) task performed on the second day was significantly higher when participants, on the first day, had mentally simulated the sequence of events expected to occur on the second day, including the PM task, than when they had performed control tasks. These data extend previous findings on the functional benefit of future simulations in different domains by revealing a substantial facilitation effect of future-oriented thoughts on PM performance when the mentally simulated future task matched the actually executed task.     

Does goal relevant episodic future thinking amplify the effect on delay discounting?

Delay discounting (DD) is the preference for smaller immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards. Research shows episodic future thinking (EFT), or mentally simulating future experiences, reframes the choice between small immediate and larger delayed rewards, and can reduce DD. Only general EFT has been studied, whereby people reframe decisions in terms of non-goal related future events. Since future thinking is often goal-oriented and leads to greater activation of brain regions involved in prospection, goal-oriented EFT may be associated with greater reductions in DD than general goal-unrelated EFT. The present study (n = 104, M_age = 22.25, SD = 3.42; 50% Female) used a between-subjects 2 × 2 factorial design with type of episodic thinking (Goal, General) and temporal perspective (Episodic future versus recent thinking; EFT vs ERT) as between factors. Results showed a significant reduction in DD for EFT groups (p < 0.001, Cohen’s d effect size = 0.89), and goal-EFT was more effective than general-EFT on reducing DD (p = 0.03, d = 0.64).     

What is primed in priming from imagery?

Priming from imagery is typically weaker than that from perception. This has been interpreted as resulting from weaker activation of perceptual processes. However, for imagery and perception, commonality is only half the story: Each is also characterized by specific processes. If priming can be due to both unshared and shared components of imagery and perception, then it should be possible to observe greater priming from imagery than from perception. Two new priming experiments were designed to test this hypothesis, while controlling incidental task differences. In both experiments, participants studied objects by counting their parts (from a mental image or a picture). Experiment 1 used a word-picture matching test task, which was hypothesized to depend on stimulus processing specific to perception, and Experiment 2 a size judgment test task, which was hypothesized to depend on retrieval and generation processes specific to imagery. As predicted, priming for perceived objects was greater than priming for imagined objects in the word-picture matching task. Conversely, in the size judgment task, more priming from imagery than from perception was observed. These results support the conclusions that (a) imagery and perception have substantial unshared processes, and (b) these processes contribute to priming.     

What is wrong with imagery questionnaires?

Research evidence is reviewed which shows that the questionnaire method represents a deviant case in imagery research: Whereas experimental techniques consistently produce strong effects for the imagery variable in a large specter of cognitive tasks, research based on imagery questionnaires yields ambiguous and most frequently negative results. Existing explanations of the discrepant findings are critically examined and found to be inadequate. An alternative interpretation is offered, where it is hypothesized that the questionnaire approach to the study of imagery is infected by a serious methodological flaw, due to differences in subjective conceptions of the rating scale employed in imagery questionnaires. Experimental evidence is reported which supports this interpretation.     

What constitutes an episode in episodic memory?

The idea of episodic memory implies the existence of a process that segments experience into episodes so that they can be stored in memory. It is therefore surprising that the link between event segmentation and the organization of experiences into episodes in memory has not been addressed. We found that after participants read narratives containing temporal event boundaries at varying locations in the narrative, their long-term associative memory for information across event boundaries was lower than their memory for information within an event. This suggests that event segmentation during encoding resulted in segmentation of those same events in memory. Further, functional imaging data revealed that, across participants, brain activity consistent with the ongoing integration of information within events correlated with this pattern of mnemonic segmentation. These data are the first to address the mechanisms that support the organization of experiences into episodes in long-term memory.     

Is memory for remembering? Recollection as a form of episodic hypothetical thinking

Misremembering is a systematic and ordinary occurrence in our daily lives. Since it is commonly assumed that the function of memory is to remember the past, misremembering is typically thought to happen because our memory system malfunctions. In this paper I argue that not all cases of misremembering are due to failures in our memory system. In particular, I argue that many ordinary cases of misremembering should not be seen as instances of memory’s malfunction, but rather as the normal result of a larger cognitive system that performs a different function, and for which remembering is just one operation. Building upon extant psychological and neuroscientific evidence, I offer a picture of memory as an integral part of a larger system that supports not only thinking of what was the case and what potentially could be the case, but also what could have been the case. More precisely, I claim that remembering is a particular operation of a cognitive system that permits the flexible recombination of different components of encoded traces into representations of possible past events that might or might not have occurred, in the service of constructing mental simulations of possible future events. So that imagination and memory are but one thing, which for diverse considerations hath diverse names. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 1.2.      

Seeing future success: does imagery perspective influence achievement motivation?

Imagining future success can sometimes enhance people's motivation to achieve it. This article examines a phenomenological aspect of positive mental imagery--the visual perspective adopted--that may moderate its motivational impact. The authors hypothesize that people feel more motivated to succeed on a future task when they visualize its successful completion from a third-person rather than a first-person perspective. Actions viewed from the third-person perspective are generally construed at a relatively high level of abstraction--in a manner that highlights their larger meaning and significance--which should heighten their motivational impact. Three studies in the domain of academic motivation support this reasoning. Students experience a greater increase in achievement motivation when they imagine their successful task completion from a third-rather than a first-person perspective. Moreover, mediational analyses reveal that third-person imagery boosts motivation by prompting students to construe their success abstractly and to perceive it as important.     

Do process simulations during episodic future thinking enhance the reduction of delay discounting for middle income participants and those living in poverty?

Two studies examined whether episodic future thinking (EFT; pre‐experiencing future events) reduces discounting of future rewards (DD). No studies have investigated whether process simulations (i.e., simulating the process of executing a future event) amplify EFT's reduction of DD. Study 1 examined the effect of incorporating process simulations into EFT (N = 42, M_age = 43.27; 91% female, family income = $75,976) using a 2 × 2 factorial design with type of episodic thinking (process, nonprocess/general) and temporal perspective (EFT, episodic recent thinking) as between‐subjects factors. Study 2 replicated Study 1 in a sample of adults living in poverty (N = 36; M_age = 38.44, 88% female; family income = $25,625). The results of both studies showed EFT reduced DD, but process‐oriented EFT did not amplify the effect of EFT. Our findings suggest the key ingredient in EFT's effect on DD is self‐projection into the future. This was also the first study to show EFT improves DD in a sample living in poverty.     

What is episodic memory and how do we use it?

What are the neural and computational principles that give rise to episodic memory? Although memory is probably the most studied topic in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, most research has focused on learning at the micro-level. I outline the limitations of this approach and propose a ‘molar’ approach to tackle episodic memory at the scale of life.     

Future self-appraisals and global self-esteem: Who benefits more from thinking about the future,and why?

People tend to think positively about their future selves. However, it remains unclear to what extent this tendency depends on the positivity of their current self-appraisal. To study this problem, we employed the assumptions of construal level theory, the concept of self-enhancement, and the assumptions of temporal self-appraisal theory, and we examined the role of global self-esteem in the relationship between temporal distance and future self-appraisals measured in absolute (Study 1), comparative temporal (Study 2), or comparative social (Study 3) ways. In all three studies, when assessed in terms of specific dimensions, future self-appraisals increased with temporal distance only in people with low self-esteem, but when assessed in terms of general dimensions, self-appraisals were higher in the distant compared to the near future irrespective of self-esteem level.     

What is nature? – ziran in early Daoist thinking

The question of the relation between humans and nature lies at the foundation of any philosophy. With the daily worsening environmental crisis, we are forced to face this ancient question again. Yet when we put it into the form of ‘humans and nature’, a metaphysics is already implied and the problem of nature has not yet been questioned. At this moment, the very question that needs to be put forward is, ‘What is nature’? The question of nature will be interrogated through a comparative view in this essay. First, I argue the modern understanding of nature lies at the root of today’s environmental problems. Then, I go back to early Daoism to explore Daoist thinking on ziran (usually translated as ‘nature’). The meaning of ‘dao emulates ziran’ is brought to light through a detailed interpretation of the ziran of dao and things. Ziran penetrates the dao, the heavenly, the earthly and the human. It is with the understanding of ziran that the nature of humans and all things are illuminated. Heidegger’s thinking on nature in connection with Daoism is briefly examined together with some other significant environmental philosophies.     

"When did I learn and when shall I act?": The developmental relationship between episodic future thinking and memory

This study investigated the development of the ability to reflect on one’s personal past and future. A total of 64 4- to 6-year-olds received tasks of delayed self-recognition, source memory, delay of gratification, and a newly developed task of future-oriented action timing. Although children’s performance on delayed self-recognition, source memory, and action timing improved with age, their performance on delay of gratification did not. Children’s errors in source memory and action timing were solely and strongly associated with each other in older children (5–6 years) even after controlling for age and verbal ability. Results are discussed in terms of mental time travel underlying episodic memory and future thinking that includes both the projection of oneself into the past and future and the appreciation of events’ temporal relations.     

Creativity from Constraints: What can we learn from Motherwell? from Modrian? from Klee?

This article presents a problem‐solving model of variability and creativity built on the classic Reitman and Simon analyses of musical composition and architectural design. The model focuses on paired constraints: one precluding (or limiting search among) reliable, existing solutions, the other promoting (or directing search to) novel, often opposite, ones. The primary constraint pair precludes an existing goal criterion and promotes a novel one. Other constraints — source (elements for recombination), task (how materials are used) and subject (motif, theme) — are then strategically selected to realize the goal. A brief discussion of Abstract Expressionism introduces the model, which is then applied to the painting careers of Piet Modrian and Paul Klee.     

How does dysfunctional thinking decrease during recovery from major depression?

Decreased dysfunctional thinking in recovering depressed patents could reflect predominantly (a). reduced access to dysfunctional schemas or (b). increased metacognitive monitoring of dysfunctional schematic products. Twenty acutely depressed patients, 20 partially remitted depressed patients, and 20 controls were compared on tasks primarily reflecting one or the other of these processes. On both tasks, acutely depressed patients differed significantly from controls. Partially remitted patients resembled acutely depressed patients on the task assessing dysfunctional schema access but resembled controls on the metacognitive monitoring task. Results suggest that reduced dysfunctional thinking associated with partial remission is mediated primarily by increased metacognitive monitoring of dysfunctional cognitive products rather than reduced access to dysfunctional schemas.     

What Have Lutherans Learned from Orthodox?

The purpose of this article is to consider the influence of Eastern Orthodox theology and spirituality, particularly soteriology, upon the Lutheran doctrine of salvation. It focuses on the emergence of a new interpretation of Martin Luther’s view of justification as union and Christ’s “real” presence in the believer through the Holy Spirit. This account materially reflects key intuitions of the Eastern Orthodox vision of deification (divinization, theosis) and was developed in Helsinki, Finland, under the tutelage of Tuomo Mannermaa and his school. Even though this new interpretation continues to be contested and debated, particularly in German Luther scholarship, it has also exercised wide influence on international theological discussion. The latter part of the article, more constructive in nature, seeks to link the Helsinki School insights to some other current Lutheran contributions as well as relevant viewpoints from the wider Christian West.     

What is the future for tool-specific generalized motor programs?

A key issue in cognitive sciences is to understand the cognitive bases of human tool use. Answers have been provided by two competing approaches. The manipulation-based approach assumes that humans can use tools because of the ability to store sensorimotor knowledge about how to manipulate tools. By contrast, for the reasoning-based approach, human tool use is based on the ability to reason about physical object properties. Recently, Caruana and Cuccio proposed a kind of reconciliation, based on the distinction between three types of abductive inference, involving a different contribution of motor and cognitive elements: Automatic abduction (motor + and cognitive-), abduction by selection (motor ± and cognitive±) and creative abduction (motor- and cognitive+). This perspective offers new interesting avenues. Nevertheless, it is also subject to several theoretical and epistemological limitations, which make it in its present form inappropriate for the study of the cognitive bases of human tool use. This article aims to discuss these limitations.     

What did Popper learn from Lakatos?

The canonical version of the history of twentieth century philosophy of science tells us that Lakatos was Popper’s disciple, but it is rarely mentioned that Popper would have learned anything from Lakatos. The aim of this paper is to examine Lakatos’ influence on Popper’s philosophical system and to argue that Lakatos did have an important, yet somewhat unexpected, impact on Popper’s thinking: he influenced Popper’s evolutionary model for ‘progress’ in science. And Lakatos’ influence sheds new light on why and how Popper continually revised one of the central claims of his philosophy of science: the evolutionary account of scientific theory change.