A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness

Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual "filling in," visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.     

Sensory consciousness explained (better) in terms of ‘corporality’ and ‘alerting capacity’

How could neural processes be associated with phenomenal consciousness? We present a way to answer this question by taking the counterintuitive stance that the sensory feel of an experience is not a thing that happens to us, but a thing we do: a skill we exercise. By additionally noting that sensory systems possess two important, objectively measurable properties, corporality and alerting capacity, we are able to explain why sensory experience possesses a sensory feel, but thinking and other mental processes do not. We are additionally able to explain why different sensory feels differ in the way they do.     

Brain areas involved in synaesthesia: a review

Despite a recent upsurge of research, much remains unknown about the neurobiological mechanisms underlying synaesthesia. By integrating results obtained so far in Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) studies, this contribution sheds light on the role of particular brain regions in synaesthetic experiences. First, in accordance with its sensory nature, it seems that the sensory brain areas corresponding to the type of synaesthetic experience are activated. Synaesthetic colour experiences can activate colour regions in occipito-temporal cortex, but this is not necessarily restricted to V4. Furthermore, sensory and motor brain regions have been obtained that extend beyond the particular type of synaesthesia studied. Second, differences in experimental setup, number and type of synaesthetes tested, and method to delineate regions of interest may help explain inconsistent results obtained in the BOLD-MRI (Blood Oxygen Level Dependent functional MRI) studies. Third, an overview of obtained results shows that a network of brain areas rather than a single brain region underlies synaesthesia. Six brain regions of overlapping results emerge, these regions are in sensory and motor regions as well as 'higher level' regions in parietal and frontal lobe. We propose that these regions are related to three different cognitive processes inherently part of synaesthesia; the sensory processes, the (attentional) 'binding' processes, and cognitive control processes. Finally, we discuss how these functional and structural brain properties might relate to the development of synaesthesia. In particular, we believe this relationship is better understood by separating the question what underlies the presence of synaesthesia ('trait') from what determines particular synaesthetic associations ('type').     

Cognitive Architecture and the Epistemic Gap: Defending Physicalism without Phenomenal Concepts

The novel approach presented in this paper accounts for the occurrence of the epistemic gap and defends physicalism against anti-physicalist arguments without relying on so-called phenomenal concepts. Instead of concentrating on conceptual features, the focus is shifted to the special characteristics of experiences themselves. To this extent, the account provided is an alternative to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. It is argued that certain sensory representations, as accessed by higher cognition, lack constituent structure. Unstructured representations could freely exchange their causal roles within a given system which entails their functional unanalysability. These features together with the encapsulated nature of low level complex processes giving rise to unstructured sensory representations readily explain those peculiarities of phenomenal consciousness which are usually taken to pose a serious problem for contemporary physicalism. I conclude that if those concepts which are related to the phenomenal character of conscious experience are special in any way, their characteristics are derivative of and can be accounted for in terms of the cognitive and representational features introduced in the present paper.     

Psychobiology of altered states of consciousness

The article reviews the current knowledge regarding altered states of consciousness (ASC) (a) occurring spontaneously, (b) evoked by physical and physiological stimulation, (c) induced by psychological means, and (d) caused by diseases. The emphasis is laid on psychological and neurobiological approaches. The phenomenological analysis of the multiple ASC resulted in 4 dimensions by which they can be characterized: activation, awareness span, self-awareness, and sensory dynamics. The neurophysiological approach revealed that the different states of consciousness are mainly brought about by a compromised brain structure, transient changes in brain dynamics (disconnectivity), and neurochemical and metabolic processes. Besides these severe alterations, environmental stimuli, mental practices, and techniques of self-control can also temporarily alter brain functioning and conscious experience.     

Oscillatory gamma activity in humans and its role in object representation

We experience objects as whole, complete entities irrespective of whether they are perceived by our sensory systems or are recalled from memory. However, it is also known that many of the properties of objects are encoded and processed in different areas of the brain. How then, do coherent representations emerge? One theory suggests that rhythmic synchronization of neural discharges in the gamma band (around 40 Hz) may provide the necessary spatial and temporal links that bind together the processing in different brain areas to build a coherent percept. In this article we propose that this mechanism could also be used more generally for the construction of object representations that are driven by sensory input or internal, top-down processes. The review will focus on the literature on gamma oscillatory activities in humans and will describe the different types of gamma responses and how to analyze them. Converging evidence that suggests that one particular type of gamma activity (induced gamma activity) is observed during the construction of an object representation will be discussed.     

Neural correlates of sensory‐enabling presentation: An fMRI study of image zooming and rotation video effects on online apparel shopping

For experience products, such as apparel, sensory‐enabling presentations that provide a sense of tactile experience have been suggested as an effective strategy to reduce perceived risk and increase the likelihood of a pleasurable shopping experience. Using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), we investigated whether sensory‐enabling presentations, specifically, image zooming and rotation videos, would evoke different cognitive and affective brain functions during product evaluation and purchase decision processes. The results suggested that whereas image zooming may evoke more visual perception in the product evaluation process, the rotation view evokes more mental imagery, pleasure, and reward anticipation during the purchase decision process. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The reality of phantom limbs

This paper evaluates the joint influence of peripheral neurophysiological factors and higher-order cognitive and affective processes in triggering or modulating a variety of phantom limb experiences, including pain. Part 1 outlines one way in which the sympathetic nervous system may influence phantom limb pain. A model involving a sympathetic-efferent somatic-afferent cycle is presented to explain fluctuations in the intensity of sensations referred to the phantom limb. In part 2, the model is extended to explain the puzzling finding that onlyafter amputation are thoughts and feelings capable of evoking referred sensations to the (phantom) limb. While phantom pains and other sensations frequently are triggered by thoughts and feelings, there is no evidence that the painful or painless phantom limb is a symptom of a psychological disorder. In part 3, the concept of a pain “memory” is introduced and described with examples. The data show that pain experienced prior to amputation may persist in the form of a memory referred to the phantom limb causing continued suffering and distress. It is argued that two independent and potentially dissociable memory components underlie the unified experience of a pain memory. This conceptualization is evaluated in the context of the surgical arena, raising the possibility that under certain conditions postoperative pain may, in part, reflect the persistent central neural memory trace left by the surgical procedure. It is concluded that the experience of a phantom limb is determined by a complex interaction of inputs from the periphery and widespread regions of the brain subserving sensory, cognitive, and affective processes.     

Visual aspects of centrally elicited attack behavior in the cat: “Patterned reflexes” associated with selection of and approach to a rat

It has been previously suggested that the electrical brain stimulation which elicits quiet-biting attack in the cat actively affects the way the central nervous system processes visual and tactile information concerned with the reflexes involved in the terminal aspects of attack. In order to examine the effects of brain stimulation on a nonterminal aspect of attack – the stimulated cat's selection of and approach to a rat – cats were implanted with attack-eliciting electrodes in both the lateral hypothalamus and the midbrain ventral tegmental area. These cats were then tested in an 8-ft-long cage, one end of which was divided into three, 2-ft-long parallel compartments, whose openings faced the end of the cage from which the cat commenced its approach. An anesthetized rat was placed at the back of one compartment, a bowl of food at the back of another compartment, and the third compartment contained no object. It was found in the first experiment that the attack elicited by nearly all electrodes was selectively directed at the rat. However, the success of the cat in finding the compartment containing the rat varied dramatically for different electrodes in the same cat. Further, these differences were stable and did not change as the cat gained experience with the task. The results suggested that the stimulation of different brain sites in the same cat differentially affected the visual neural mechanisms involved in guiding a cat to a rat. Previous studies have also suggested that the effects of brain stimulation which elicits quiet-biting attack are largely lateralized to the side of the brain stimulated. In order to determine if the effects of stimulation on the neural mechanisms mediating the visually guided approach of a cat to a rat were also lateralized, attempts were made in a second experiment to disrupt the visual input to one side of the brain by unilaterally transecting the optic tract. It was found that this manipulation interfered with the visually guided selective approach to a rat, if the cat was stimulated through hypothalamic or mid-brain electrodes ipsilateral to the optic tract transection, but not if the hypothalamic or midbrain stimulation was on the contralateral (visually intact) side of the brain. However, any final interpretation of the results was confounded by the finding in all of these cats of a complex syndrome of neglect of all contralateral sensory information.     

意识状态改变的心理生理学理论与实证研究

从“意识状态”解释人类意识的本质是当前意识心理学研究的一个重要取向。研究意识状态改变(ASC)的物质生理基础具有十分突出的理论和临床实践意义。意识状态改变可以分为自发、物理和生理原因、心理方式和疾病引起这样四个方面,不同类型的意识状态改变可以从激活、意识域、自我觉察和感觉振荡四个维度进行综合归类和分析。不仅脑结构功能状态、脑动力的暂时变化、神经化学过程和新陈代谢过程等因素影响着人的意识经验改变状态,而且环境变化、心理活动和自我控制及技巧也可以暂时改变人的意识功能状态。     

MINDING QUANTA AND COSMOLOGY

The revolution in science inaugurated by quantum physics has made us aware of the role of observation in the construction of data. Eugene Wigner remarked that in quantum physics we no longer have observables (invariants), only observations. Tongue in cheek, I asked him whether that meant that quantum physics is really psychology, expecting a gruff reply to my sassiness. Instead, Wigner beamed understanding and replied "Yes, yes, that's exactly correct." David Bohm pointed out that were we to look at the cosmos without the lenses of our telescopes we would see a hologram. I extend Bohm's insight to the lens in the optics of the eye. The receptor processes of the ear and skin work in a similar fashion. Without these lenses and lenslike operations all of our perceptions would be entangled as in a hologram. Furthermore, the retina absorbs quanta of radiation so that quantum physics uses the very perceptions that become formed by it. In turn, higher-order brain systems send signals to the sensory receptors so that what we perceive is often as much a result of earlier rather than just immediate experience. This influence from inside out becomes especially relevant to our interpretation of how we experience the contents and bounds of cosmology that come to us by way of radiation.     

盲人的跨感觉通道重组

失去视觉的盲人往往伴随着行为代偿,如听觉和触觉能力的提高。脑成像等认知神经科学研究发现,盲人行为代偿的神经机制之一是大脑皮层的跨感觉通道重组,即盲人的视皮层并没有因为视觉剥夺而失去作用,而是广泛地参与了其他感知觉任务。原本暂时的神经联结由于受到新的感觉信息传入方式的持续激活而固化,从而形成新的神经回路,可能是此类跨通道重组的神经基础。     

Conscious awareness: processing in the synaptodendritic web

Evidence is presented which indicates that, at the level of conscious experience, information processing in the brain is basically Gabor-like rather than binary (as in Shannon's information measurement theory). The process takes place in a phase space created by a multiply interconnected web of teledendrons, synapses and dendrites. The axons of neurons sample the phase space to create cell assemblies. Assemblies are kaleidoscopic in that the same neuron can partake in a variety of patterns of neuron ensembles. This is much like the variety of patterns created by the features red sweaters, blond hair, or eyeglass wearing in a classroom. A particular student (or neuron) may participate in one or more (or none) of the patterns. The flexibility of conscious experience is attributed to sensory and cognitive challenges that drive the formation of processes in the teledendron-synapse dendritic web. When the formation of axonal patterns takes time (a temporal hold) because of the novelty of the input, they become experienced consciously.     

Merging familiar and new senses to perceive and act in space

Our experience of the world seems to unfold seamlessly in a unitary 3D space. For this to be possible, the brain has to merge many disparate cognitive representations and sensory inputs. How does it do so? I discuss work on two key combination problems: coordinating multiple frames of reference (e.g. egocentric and allocentric), and coordinating multiple sensory signals (e.g. visual and proprioceptive). I focus on two populations whose spatial processing we can observe at a crucial stage of being configured and optimised: children, whose spatial abilities are still developing significantly, and naïve adults learning new spatial skills, such as sensing distance using auditory cues. The work uses a model-based approach to compare participants’ behaviour with the predictions of alternative information processing models. This lets us see when and how—during development, and with experience—the perceptual-cognitive computations underpinning our experiences in space change. I discuss progress on understanding the limits of effective spatial computation for perception and action, and how lessons from the developing spatial cognitive system can inform approaches to augmenting human abilities with new sensory signals provided by technology.

     

Synchronous neural oscillations and cognitive processes

The central problem for cognitive neuroscience is to describe how cognitive processes arise from brain processes. This review summarizes the recent evidence that synchronous neural oscillations reveal much about the origin and nature of cognitive processes such as memory, attention and consciousness. Memory processes are most closely related to theta and gamma rhythms, whereas attention seems closely associated with alpha and gamma rhythms. Conscious awareness may arise from synchronous neural oscillations occurring globally throughout the brain rather than from the locally synchronous oscillations that occur when a sensory area encodes a stimulus. These associations between the dynamics of the brain and cognitive processes indicate progress towards a unified theory of brain and cognition.     

Mechanisms of synesthesia: cognitive and physiological constraints

Synesthesia is a conscious experience of systematically induced sensory attributes that are not experienced by most people under comparable conditions. Recent findings from cognitive psychology, functional brain imaging and electrophysiology have shed considerable light on the nature of synesthesia and its neurocognitive underpinnings. These cognitive and physiological findings are discussed with respect to a neuroanatomical framework comprising hierarchically organized cortical sensory pathways. We advance a neurobiological theory of synesthesia that fits within this neuroanatomical framework.     

Training the brain: practical applications of neural plasticity from the intersection of cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology, and prevention science

Prior researchers have shown that the brain has a remarkable ability for adapting to environmental changes. The positive effects of such neural plasticity include enhanced functioning in specific cognitive domains and shifts in cortical representation following naturally occurring cases of sensory deprivation; however, maladaptive changes in brain function and development owing to early developmental adversity and stress have also been well documented. Researchers examining enriched rearing environments in animals have revealed the potential for inducing positive brain plasticity effects and have helped to popularize methods for training the brain to reverse early brain deficits or to boost normal cognitive functioning. In this article, two classes of empirically based methods of brain training in children are reviewed and critiqued: laboratory-based, mental process training paradigms and ecological interventions based upon neurocognitive conceptual models. Given the susceptibility of executive function disruption, special attention is paid to training programs that emphasize executive function enhancement. In addition, a third approach to brain training, aimed at tapping into compensatory processes, is postulated. Study results showing the effectiveness of this strategy in the field of neurorehabilitation and in terms of naturally occurring compensatory processing in human aging lend credence to the potential of this approach. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Free-energy and the brain

If one formulates Helmholtz’s ideas about perception in terms of modern-day theories one arrives at a model of perceptual inference and learning that can explain a remarkable range of neurobiological facts. Using constructs from statistical physics it can be shown that the problems of inferring what cause our sensory inputs and learning causal regularities in the sensorium can be resolved using exactly the same principles. Furthermore, inference and learning can proceed in a biologically plausible fashion. The ensuing scheme rests on Empirical Bayes and hierarchical models of how sensory information is generated. The use of hierarchical models enables the brain to construct prior expectations in a dynamic and context-sensitive fashion. This scheme provides a principled way to understand many aspects of the brain’s organisation and responses. In this paper, we suggest that these perceptual processes are just one emergent property of systems that conform to a free-energy principle. The free-energy considered here represents a bound on the surprise inherent in any exchange with the environment, under expectations encoded by its state or configuration. A system can minimise free-energy by changing its configuration to change the way it samples the environment, or to change its expectations. These changes correspond to action and perception, respectively, and lead to an adaptive exchange with the environment that is characteristic of biological systems. This treatment implies that the system’s state and structure encode an implicit and probabilistic model of the environment. We will look at models entailed by the brain and how minimisation of free-energy can explain its dynamics and structure.     

Enhanced processing fluency leads to biases in source memory

The present experiments were conducted to determine whether processing fluency affects source memory decisions. In the first three experiments, participants decided whether test items appeared in the same sensory modality (Experiments 1A, 1B) or perceptual form (font type, Experiment 2) at study and test. The results were consistent across the three studies and showed that perceptual priming leads to an increase in reports that stimuli were presented in the same sensory or perceptual form during the study and test phase. Experiment 3 showed that conceptual fluency affects source attributions in much the same way as perceptual fluency, and Experiment 4 showed that fluency is associated with a subjective experience of familiarity even when it might serve as a basis for source inference. These results are consistent with recent neuropsychological and neuroimaging evidence that familiarity-based processes contribute to source memory decisions under some circumstances, such as when items and contexts are unitized rather than merely bound together at encoding.