Wittgenstein and religious dogma

It is well understood that Wittgenstein defends religious faith against positivistic criticisms on the grounds of its logical independence. But exactly how are we to understand the nature of that independence? Most scholars take Wittgenstein to equate language-games with belief-systems, and thus to assert that religions are logical schemes founded on their own basic beliefs and principles of inference. By contrast, I argue that on Wittgenstein’s view, to have religious faith is to hold fast to a certain picture of the world according to which one orients one’s actions and attitudes, possibly even in dogmatic defiance of contrary evidence. Commitment to such a picture is grounded in passion, not intellection, and systematic coherence is largely irrelevant.     

On intelligence education and religious beliefs

A number of authors have suggested that education mediates the negative effect of intelligence on religiosity. However, there is very little direct evidence for this mediation, and the indirect evidence is contradictory. The results of the current paper suggest that, by and large, education does not mediate the effect of intelligence on religiosity. However, the results also suggest that since education has a positive effect on religiosity when religious background is strong and a negative effect when religious background is weak, and since intelligence has a positive effect on education, the negative effect of intelligence on religiosity is stronger when religious background is strong than when it is weak. We examine this mediated moderation model in two large, nationally representative, databases.     

Language, thinking and religious consciousness

Conclusion The opposition in which many phenomenologists of religion stand to the above remarks is clear. Religious consciousness of the world, in being tied to the language of a particular faith, requires conceptual mastery for its emergence. Linguistic and non-linguistic skills in the use of concepts must be developed through fledgling attempts and repeated practice. In noticing this, attention has been called to the fact that such consciousness is far from being man's natural inheritance. It is acquired through instruction and learning, and the concepts which generate Christian consciousness of the world make demands upon a person which go straight against his grain. Using the Christian concepts as tools in handling the various situations along life's way requires strenuous and repeatedly renewed effort. There remains a certain Christian distance from ordinary ways of doing commerce with the world. The way, after all, is said to be narrow. So to become conscious of the world in a Christian manner is to submit oneself to the rigors of the concepts. It is to permit one's life to be guided and ruled thereby in his regard for the world.In making these observations, it becomes clear, too, that the Christian life and consciousness is one in which a man chooses to be enmeshed. It is a matter of human decision. In so choosing, a man makes his life determinate; he gives it shape. The specificity or concreteness demanded in and with the language of faith should be contrasted with the rather diffuse and indeterminate character of the religious awareness thought to be so deep and abiding by phenomenologists. Because of its lack of particularity in contour, this notion of religious consciousness is virtually inconsequential. That which is increasingly common to all men begins to wane in significance within the life of the single individual. Comparatively speaking, the choice to reduplicate Christian avenues of thinking and acting is replete with ramifications and differences which are clearly discernible. By virtue of the specificity required, however, it is also the case that one must renew that decision daily, seek to nurture it, train and discipline himself in it. Making the faith one's own, abiding in it day and night--these lead down different pathways. But the distinctive patterns of living and thinking add up after a while with a cumulative effect. Through the acquisition and practice in exercising'Christian concepts, one earns a consciousness of the world which is Christian in scope and nature.     

Authoritarianism and religious identification: Response to threats on religious beliefs

The present study illustrates the impact of threat and authoritarianism on individuals and their respective belief systems within a Christian framework. Participants completed Altemeyer's Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) Scale, the Religious Fundamentalism Scale, the Questions and Doubts about Religion Scale, and the Behavioral and Faith Scale. Participants also read a threat- or non-threat-inducing article concerning the crisis of the Catholic Church. Results showed that individuals with high RWA scores demonstrated a greater support for religious fundamentalist ideals, reported less doubts regarding their religious beliefs, and identified more strongly with their religion than did those with low RWA scores. Furthermore, participants who were exposed to threat, regardless of individual level of authoritarianism, scored higher on a measure of religious fundamentalist ideals and identified more strongly with their respective religions than those who were not exposed to a threat. Most importantly, individuals high in authoritarianism who were exposed to threat demonstrated greater support for religious fundamentalist ideals, reported fewer doubts, and more strongly identified with their religion than those individuals with high levels of authoritarianism who were in the non-threatening article condition.     

The enactment effect is due to more than guesses and beliefs

Three experiments examined whether the enactment effect - that is, higher recall of enacted than of corresponding non-enacted information - might be explained by guessing rates and performance expectancies. Experiment 1 checked whether the guessing rate of target items would be higher as a result of a narrowed sampling space defined by the enactment condition. By means of pre-experimental instructions, the subjects in Experiments 2 and 3 were induced to expect respectively a positive enactment effect, a negative enactment effect, or no difference in amount of recall of enacted and non-enacted materials. Experiment 2 had a within-subject design, Experiment 3 a between-subject design. The experiments failed to support the proposed explanations.     

Pragmatic encroachment,stakes, and religious knowledge

It is commonly held that epistemic standards for S’s knowledge that p are affected by practical considerations, such as what is at stake in decisions that are guided by that p. I defend a particular view as to why this is, that is referred to as “pragmatic encroachment.” I then discuss a “new argument against miracles” that uses stakes considerations in order to explore the conditions under which stakes affect the level of epistemic support that is required for knowledge. Finally, I generalize my results to include other religiously significant propositions such as “God exists” and “God does not exist.”     

The Protestant work ethic,religious beliefs,and homonegative attitudes

The purpose of this study was to examine the influence of the Protestant Work Ethic (PWE) on negative attitudes towards gay men and lesbian women (homonegativity). The influence of religious beliefs and the notion of homosexuality as a choice were also examined in combination with PWE in regards to homonegativity. Previous research suggested that those who subscribe to the PWE have more negative attitudes towards societal out-groups (e.g., African–Americans). Thus, it was hypothesized that those with high PWE scores would display more homonegative attitudes. A significant correlation between PWE and homonegativity supported this hypothesis. Multiple regression analyses revealed that PWE interacted with religious beliefs, and religious beliefs interacted marginally with the idea of homosexuality as a choice. Those with high religious beliefs and who strongly believed that homosexuality was a choice were more likely to have negative attitudes towards homosexuals. The implications of these findings are discussed, with particular respect to reducing homonegative attitudes.     

Wittgenstein on the grounds of religious faith: A Kantian proposal

This paper argues that there is an important continuity between Wittgenstein's early remarks on religion and his later treatment of the theme as it appears in his lectures in the 1930s and in his personal diary notes at that time. This continuity pertains to 3 features. First, the early and later Wittgenstein share a critical stance on methodological naturalism, that is, the view that the method of philosophy is relevantly similar to that of the natural sciences. Importantly, religion figures as one of Wittgenstein's examples of the limits of the factual language of natural sciences. Second, both the early and the later Wittgenstein connect religion to the problem of seeing one's life as meaningful while denying the possibility of establishing any objectively understood meaning of life. Third, both evoke the idea of different types of judgments, the conditions of which are independent of each other. Although religious faith is not grounded in factual knowledge and cannot be justified by appeal to empirical evidence or conceptual argumentation, it is not groundless either. Rather, in accordance with Kant who claims that faith may have a nontheoretical justification, Wittgenstein shows that religious faith may result from a personal experience of one's life as a meaningful whole.     

Deconstructing delusions: A qualitative study examining the relationship between religious beliefs and religious delusions

Delusions have been conceptualized as forming in response to experience, yet the relationship between religious belief, and beliefs regarded as delusional, has received little research attention. This is despite the high prevalence of delusions featuring religious content. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with seven participants who had been diagnosed as experiencing delusions. Participants from a range of religious backgrounds were asked about their religious experiences and beliefs, family background and experiences of psychosis. These interviews were analysed qualitatively. Whilst religious background affected the content of delusions, the nature of delusions appeared to be influenced by other factors, such as early family experiences, particularly an absent parent and conflict within the family. Individuals often used a religious framework to understand unusual experiences, and there seemed to be a role for the process of identification and wish fulfilment in influencing delusional content. Whilst this research is clearly limited by its exploratory nature, it offers a possible framework of understanding which helps make sense of religious delusions, and suggests approaches which may be helpful in recovery.     

Iffy beliefs: Conditional thinking and belief change

The ability to entertain possibilities and draw inferences about them is essential to human intelligence. We examine the hypothesis that conditional if-then statements trigger a mental simulation process in which people suppose the antecedent (if statement) to be true and evaluate the consequent (then statement) in that context. On the assumption that supposing an event to be true increases belief that the event has occurred or will occur, this hypothesis is consistent with the claim that evaluating a conditional will heighten belief in its antecedent more than in its consequent. Two experiments, employing conditionals of the form If animal A has property X, then animal B will have property X, in which X was a property that people could not readily relate to the animals, supported this claim. The effect was stronger following the evaluation of conditionals with dissimilar animal categories.