Nationalism,Patriotism, and Support for the European Union

Does attachment to a nation enhance or dampen support for the European Union (EU)? Using the 2003 and 2013 ISSP national-identity modules, we isolate and provide multi-item measures of two distinct types of national attachment—nationalism and patriotism. We find that they are positively related yet have divergent effects. We validate the measures showing that nationalism increases, and patriotism decreases, support for nationalistic policies (anti-immigration and protectionism) as expected. We then test the effects of nationalism and patriotism on EU attitudes and find that nationalism increases, and patriotism decreases, opposition to the EU. The presence of a neo-nationalist political party enhanced the effects of nationalism on opposition to the EU, underscoring the importance of political rhetoric in shaping nationalistic EU opposition. In further support of the rhetoric hypothesis, the most-educated nationalists are most likely to oppose the EU in countries with a neo-nationalist political party and vote for such parties when present.     

The American South: Explorations on southern attachments and personal values

ABSTRACT

Group membership is central to understanding political behavior and political psychology. However, regional group membership is rarely examined, despite its relevance to political psychology and personal values. To address this, we investigated the relationships among southern identity, southern nationalism, southern pride, and southern constructive patriotism for the U.S. South, as well as the connections between personal values and southern attachments. Results from the structural equation modeling (N = 268) revealed that stronger southern identity predicted more southern nationalism, southern pride, and southern constructive patriotism. Additionally, greater endorsement of conservation values predicted stronger southern identity and southern pride; those favoring self-transcendence values exhibited less southern nationalism and more southern constructive patriotism; and those with higher self-enhancement values expressed more southern nationalism. This study confirms the predictive role of southern identity on other southern attachments and provides support for how different southern attachments are related to but distinctive from each other.     

KILLING FOR THE HOMELAND: PATRIOTISM, NATIONALISM AND VIOLENCE

Political choices favoring one's country or one's nationality are wrong if they conflict with a principle of universal free acceptability, prohibiting choices that violate every set of rules to which any willing cooperator would want all to conform. Despite its universalism, this principle requires patriotic favoritism in political choices and permits individuals to assert nationalist interests in claims for state aid. But it deprives patriotism and nationalism of any distinctive role in establishing the legitimacy of wars and uprisings. These restrictions are appropriate even if stronger forms of patriotism and nationalism are psychologically indispensable for achieving social goals required for universal free acceptability.     

Cosmopolitanism as a Corrective Virtue

This paper defends an account of cosmopolitanism as a corrective virtue of the sort endorsed by Philippa Foot. In particular, it argues that cosmopolitanism corrects a common and dangerous tendency to form overly strong identifications with political entities such as countries, nations, and cultures. The account helps to unify the current heterogeneous collection of cosmopolitan theories, as is illustrated by a discussion of the cultural cosmopolitanism of Jeremy Waldron, and the political cosmopolitanism of Simon Keller. The account also helps distinguish cosmopolitans from their critics, most of whom share the cosmopolitan’s commitment to respect for human rights: for example, liberal patriots, liberal nationalists and liberal culturalists.     

Toward a liberal socialist cosmopolitan nationalism

I explicate and defend a form of liberal socialist nationalism. It is also a nationalism which is cosmopolitan. Explication and explanation are crucially in order here, for it is not unreasonable to believe that ‘cosmopolitan nationalism’ and ‘liberal socialist nationalism’ and even ‘liberal nationalism’ are oxymoronic. Against that I argue that there is a straightforward understanding of these concepts and their relations to each other that does not have inconsistencies or even paradoxes. Liberal socialism properly understood goes well with cosmopolitanism (both moral and institutional), and there are plausible and attractive forms of both liberalism and socialism that go together. Moreover, the only candidate for a nationalism that would survive careful reflective inquiry is a liberal nationalism: a nationalism which is neither ethnic nor civic. It is widely believed, however, that even a liberal nationalism is incompatible with cosmopolitanism. I contend in a series of arguments that in contexts where nationalism is rightly on the agenda the form that it should take is that of a liberal nationalism, and it is further argued that to be viable, nationalism requires cosmopolitanism.     

Liberal Nationalism and Cosmopolitan Justice

Many liberals have argued that a cosmopolitan perspective on global justice follows from the basic liberal principles of justice. Yet, increasingly, it is also said that intrinsic to liberalism is a doctrine of nationalism. This raises a potential problem for the liberal defense of cosmopolitan justice as it is commonly believed that nationalism and cosmopolitanism are conflicting ideals. If this is correct, there appears to be a serious tension within liberal philosophy itself, between its cosmopolitan aspiration on the one hand, and its nationalist agenda on the other. I argue, however, that this alleged conflict between liberal nationalism and cosmopolitan liberalism disappears once we get clear on the scope and goals of cosmopolitan justice and the parameters of liberal nationalism. Liberal nationalism and cosmopolitan global justice, properly understood, are mutually compatible ideals.     

The indeterminacy failures of moral cosmopolitanism and liberal nationalism

Much of the discussion on cosmopolitanism and nationalism has focused on their different normative views. The purpose of this article is to shift the attention away from the normative debate to the metatheoretical argument about how we determine moral and political principles independently of each other. I argue that the discussion among proponents of cosmopolitanism and contextualist models boils down to latent methodological and metatheoretical assumptions about what selection of facts are considered politically relevant. In the article, I explore what I call ‘the indeterminacy failure’ of moral cosmopolitanism, that is, the view according to which moral principles fail to determine what political-institutional level might be preferable; and the ‘indeterminacy failure’ of liberal nationalism, that is, the view according to which national identity fails to determine moral principles. In opposition to dichotomist cosmopolitan models (including various nonideal types of moral cosmopolitanism) and alternative contextualist approaches (including the practice-dependence thesis and liberal nationalism), I promote a ‘split-level’ model that is set to avoid the difficulties in the other approaches. The split-level corrects the indeterminacy failures of cosmopolitanism and contextualism by distinguishing clearly between the level of moral theorising and the level of political theorising.     

Individual aggression,national attachment,and the search for peace: Psychological perspectives

The primary question addressed is the role of affect related factors, particularly values, as possible mediators of individual differences in attitudes towards nuclear armament-disarmament issues. One such factor is value placed on children, those individuals who have greater affection for children or who are more supportive of devoting national resources toward meeting children's needs being more supportive of nuclear disarmament and a nuclear test moratorium. This relationship was found in a well-educated group of adults with a special interest in foreign affairs as well as in college student populations. A significant and strong relationship between the value placed on war as an instrument of foreign policy and a pronuclear armament stance was also found in each of these two samples. Measures of individual aggression, however, were minimally and inconsistently related to the attitude towards nuclear armament-disarmament and the attitude towards war measures. The possible role of patriotic and nationalistic values was also explored. Patriotism or love of and pride in one's country was shown to be functionally distinct from nationalism or the view that one's country is superior to and should be more powerful than other nations. Patriotism but not nationalism was found to be positively correlated with early paternal sattachment while nationalism but not patriotism, was found to be significantly related to pronuclear armament views. The findings from this series of studies indicate that the analysis of individual differences in nuclear armament-disarmament policy attitudes has heuristic usefulness and may be useful for social policy in this area.     

Predictors of Morale in U.S. Peacekeepers1

In this prospective study, we examined pre‐ and postmission predictors of morale in U.S. military peacekeepers deployed to Kosovo. After controlling for demographic and military characteristics, current general life stressors, unit cohesion, and reports of patriotism and nationalism were predictive of predeployment morale. We also found that positive military experiences, general overseas military stressors, and postdeployment unit cohesion were significant predictors of postdeployment morale after controlling for demographic and military characteristics and predeployment morale, cohesion, and patriotism/nationalism. The results suggest the need to broaden our understanding of the factors that may assist and motivate soldiers during demanding peacekeeping operations and the factors that may mitigate the impact of stressful demands and associated mission‐related strain.     

Controlling the Past to Control the Future: Christian Nationalism and Mandatory Patriotic Education in Public Schools

Recent debates about whether educators should teach America's racist history have sparked activism and legislation to ensure students are taught American history in such a way that promotes “patriotism,” amplifying cherished national myths, emphasizing American exceptionalism, and erasing negative historical facts. Building on insights from both social dominance theory and Christian nationalism research, we propose Christian nationalism combines legitimizing myths that whitewash America's past with authoritarian impulses and thus seeks to enforce “patriotic” content in public school classrooms. We also theorize this connection varies across racial, partisan, and ideological identities. Data from a nationally-representative survey of Americans affirm Christian nationalism is by far the leading predictor Americans believe “We should require public school teachers to teach history in a way that promotes patriotism.” This association is consistent across race (possibly due to divergent meanings of both “Christian nationalism” and “patriotism” across groups), but varies by partisanship and ideological identity for whites. Specifically, Christian nationalism brings whites who identify with the ideological and political left into complete alignment with their conservative counterparts who are already more likely to support mandatory patriotic education. Our findings provide critical context for ongoing battles over public-school curricula and education's role in perpetuating social privilege.     

Is Patriotism an Associative Duty?

Associative duties—duties inherent to some of our relationships—are most commonly discussed in terms of intimate associations such as of families, friends, or lovers. In this essay I ask whether impersonal associations such as state or nation can also give rise to genuinely associative duties, i.e., duties of patriotism or nationalism. I distinguish between the two in terms of their objects: the object of patriotism is an institutionalized political community, whereas the object of nationalism is a group of people who share a common identity, often grounded in a belief in shared history, and an aspiration for collective self-government together. I explore three arguments for the thesis that a special concern for one’s polity and fellow-citizens, or one’s nation and co-nationals, is an associative duty: from reciprocity, from collective self-determination, and from the well-being of compatriots or co-nationals. I argue that the relationship among compatriots is a more plausible contender for generating associative duties than the relationship among co-nationals, although even in this case there are questions whether these are genuinely associative duties, or simply special duties. Although the relationship among co-nationals is a less plausible contender for associative duties, the well-being argument does apply to the relationship among both co-nationals and compatriots. I also suggest that there is a certain privileging of the status quo in the way that associative duties arguments work, because they tend to operate from existing relations and associations.     

The implications of threat for blind and constructive patriots and immigration attitudes

Immigration attitudes are influenced by types of patriotism and the perceived threat that immigrants pose. Previous research indicated realistic and symbolic threat mediates the relationships between blind and constructive patriotism types and anti-immigration attitudes in different ways. In two studies, the purpose was to replicate the mediating role of realistic and symbolic threat for the relationship between patriotism types and anti-immigration attitudes, and to determine if inducing threat in constructive patriots would result in immigration attitudes like that of blind patriots. In both studies, hypotheses were confirmed. Blind patriotism predicts realistic threat, symbolic threat, and anti-immigration attitudes. Realistic and symbolic threats provided moderated mediation between blind patriotism and anti-immigration attitudes. Constructive patriotism negatively predicts anti-immigration attitudes, but realistic and symbolic threats provide complete mediation for this relationship. The introduction of threatening information on future demographic changes had no impact on the relationship between blind patriotism, realistic and symbolic threats, and anti-immigration attitude. However, the introduction of demographic threat modified the relationship for constructive patriots, leaving no predictive negative relationship with realistic threat, symbolic threat, or anti-immigration attitude. The findings are important for understanding ethnic threat and the motivations to oppose immigrants in a changing United States.     

Patriotism or Nationalism? Understanding Post‐September 11, 2001, Flag‐Display Behavior1

People reacted to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in a number of different ways. One reaction was to display the American flag on one's home, car, or person. The goal of this research was to understand the underlying motivations that led to this widespread behavior. Specifically, to what extent was post‐9/11 flag‐display behavior motivated by patriotism (love of country and in‐group solidarity), nationalism (uncritical acceptance of national, state, and political authorities and out‐group antipathy), or a combination of both? Results of a national survey (N= 605) provided much stronger support for the hypothesis that post‐9/11 flag‐display behavior was an expression of patriotism, not nationalism. Other results supported the notion that patriotism can exist without nationalism, even in the context of people's reactions to a terrorist attack.     

Patriotism, War, and the Limits of Permissible Partiality

This paper examines whether patriotism and other forms of group partiality can be justified and what are the moral limits on actions performed to benefit countries and other groups. In particular, I ask whether partiality toward one’s country (or other groups) can justify attacking enemy civilians to achieve victory or other political goals. Using a rule utilitarian approach, I then (a) defend the legitimacy of “moderate” patriotic partiality but (b) argue that noncombatant immunity imposes an absolute constraint on what may be done to promote the interests of a country or other group involved in warfare or other forms of violent conflict.     

Patriotism's Impact on Cooperation with the State: An Experimental Study on Tax Compliance

Although it seems reasonable to assume that activating patriotism might motivate citizens to cooperate with the state in reaching societal goals, the empirical evidence supporting this contention is based mostly on correlational rather than experimental studies. In addition, little is known on whether patriotism can be manipulated without simultaneously triggering nationalism and on the psychological processes which determine the patriotism‐cooperation relation. This current article reports results of one survey and three experiments that manipulate patriotism by displaying either a national flag or national landscapes or by priming national achievements. The outcomes indicate that reported and manipulated patriotism indirectly increase tax compliance, although the national flag also increases nationalism. National achievements, on the other hand, seemingly increases trust in national public institutions and the voluntary motivation to cooperate, whereas national landscapes only increase the voluntary motivation to cooperate. Hence, it is possible to increase social capital in the form of trust and cooperation through patriotism without fostering nationalism as well.     

On the Varieties of National Attachment: Blind Versus Constructive Patriotism

Two studies explored a theoretical distinction between "blind" and "constructive" patriotism. Blind patriotism is defined as an attachment to country characterized by unquestioning positive evaluation, staunch allegiance, and intolerance of criticism. Constructive patriotism is defined as an attachment to country characterized by support for questioning and criticism of current group practices that are intended to result in positive change. Items designed to investigate these dimensions of national attachment were administered to two groups of undergraduates in separate surveys. Measures of the two constructs derived from factor analysis of the responses proved to be reliable and valid. Blind patriotism was positively associated with political disengagement, nationalism, perceptions of foreign threat, perceived importance of symbolic behaviors, and selective exposure to pro-U.S. information. In contrast, constructive patriotism was positively associated with multiple indicators of political involvement, including political efficacy, interest, knowledge, and behavior. The implications of this distinction for theory and research on patriotism are discussed.     

Is there a Moral Case for Nationalism?

ABSTRACT Recent writings by philosophers such as David Miller and Yael Tamir have undertaken to provide nationalism with a normative foundation, a task which has been all but ignored by post-War English-language political philosophy. I identify and criticise three lines of argument which have been deployed in their writings. First, it is argued by Miller that the universalism and abstraction of rationalist moral theories have made them suspicious of 'particularisms' such as nationalism, but that they stem from a faulty metaethics. Against this I argue that abstraction and universality need not be grounded in a universalist metaethics, but can be derived pragmatically from the ethical needs of multicultural societies. Second, it is argued that liberal policies such as taxation and material redistribution, restrictions on immigration, as well as liberal concepts such as political obligation, presuppose the validity of the nationalist point of view. Against this I hold that nationalism never provides the strongest moral grounds for these policies and concepts, and that, in the specific case of distributive justice, it can even undermine them. And third, I examine the argument that the historical excesses of which nationalists have been guilty are actually the product of a narrow, 'ethnic'nationalism, in contrast to which we can articulate a categorically distinct, open, 'civic'nationalism, which would be broadly compatible with liberal political morality. I argue that the concept of civic nationalism is unstable, and that under fairly plausible and widespread empirical conditions, it either collapses back into a form of ethnic nationalism, or else becomes devoid of any recognisably nationalist content.     

loneliness and belonging: is stoic cosmopolitanism still defensible ?

In view of recent articles citing the Stoics as a defence or refutation of cosmopolitanism it is legitimate to ask whether the Stoics did in fact have an argument for cosmopolitanism which may be useful to contemporary political philosophers. I begin by discussing an interpretation of Stoic views on cosmopolitanism by Martha Nussbaum and A.A. Long and show that the arguments they attribute to the Stoics are not tenable in the light of present day philosophy. I then argue that the Stoics did offer a very different argument for cosmopolitanism which is both more interesting and more plausible in that it draws on a conception of human nature similar to Aristotles and contemporary virtue ethics. Lastly I consider an objection made to their particular brand of cosmopolitanism by Martha Nussbaum, namely that a Stoic cosmopolitan life is devoid of personal affiliation and therefore unbearably lonely. I argue that this objection is in fact unfounded.I would like to thank William Wringe, Annick Jaulin, the members of the Bilkent Seminar Group and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments.     

The relationship between the need for closure and support for military action against Iraq: moderating effects of national attachment

A variety of studies suggest that a high need for closure--that is, a desire for knowledge that is clear, stable, and unambiguous as opposed to confusing or uncertain--may be associated with greater hostility toward relevant outgroups. Using international attitudes as the context, the authors examine the hypothesis that the relationship between the need for closure and support for military action against Iraq may be moderated by identification with the national ingroup. Specifically, it is expected that this relationship will be moderated by nationalism (i.e., an aggressive form of identification based on a desire for national dominance) but not patriotism (i.e., a more neutral love of one's country). The data provided a clear pattern of support for this hypothesis and additional analyses indicated that a high need for closure reduced variability about the use of force among the highly nationalistic but not the highly patriotic.