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Chetwynd SB 《Journal of applied philosophy》2004,21(2):173-182
In 2002 Diane Pretty went to the European Court of Human Rights to gain a ruling about assisted suicide. In the course of this she argued that the right to life implied a right to die. This paper will consider, from an ethical rather than a legal point of view, how the right to life might imply (or not) a right to die, and whether this includes either a right that others shall help us die, or a right against non-interference if others are willing to help us. It does this by comparing the right to life to conceptions of property rights. This is not because I think human life is property, but because some of our ways of talking and thinking about our control over our own lives seem to be similar to our thoughts about our control over our own property. The right to life has traditionally been taken as a negative right, that is a right that others not deprive us of life. Pretty's argument, however, seems to be moving towards a positive right, not just to remain alive, but to be enabled in doing what we want to with our lives, and thus disposing of them if we so choose. The comparison with property rights suggests that the right to die only applies if our lives are ours absolutely, and may itself be modified by the suggestion that suicide harms all of us by devaluing human life in general. 相似文献
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Belgum D 《Journal of religion and health》1990,29(2):125-137
The Missouri case of Nancy Cruzan brings into sharp focus the medical ethics issue of the right to privacy. It also raises the need for definition of life ranging from cellular to personal. What is it about forced feeding that transforms it into an extraordinary means of nonfunctional treatment? There is the question of balancing benefit and cost (whether personal or financial). Currently we are confronted by the problem of balancing human rights violations against efforts to be “helpful” by the use of heroic medical measures, all of this against the background of ever-changing medical technology. 相似文献
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Purushottama Bilimoria 《亚洲哲学》1995,5(2):159-180
In this paper I am concerned to address the question of voluntary or self‐willed death from two distinct positions—a particular community's socio‐religious practice (viz. Jaina sallekhanā) and as the matter stands in law (penal code, constitution, judicial wisdom, etc.) in India—in the light of the recent move by a bench of its apex court striking down the penal code section proscribing suicide. I also wish to draw out some implications of these deliberations for the beneficence of medical practice and related bio‐ethical ramifications in the Indian context. 相似文献
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Norman J. Finkel Marie L. Hurabiell Kevin C. Hughes 《Behavioral sciences & the law》1993,11(2):135-150
Subjects had to make a “remove” or “do not remove” life-sustaining measures decision in three right to die cases where the patients differed in competence; for half the subjects, a living will was present in all the cases, whereas, for the other half, it was not. Subjects also gave their determinative reasons for their decisions. Support for the right to die varied by case, but not by competency, or by the presence of a living will. The subjects' reasons were highly predictive of their decisions, and related to the way case-specific facts were construed, revealing a number of disparities between the way courts and citizens construe whether the patient's condition is “terminal,” “irreversible,” and “painful,” or not. Beyond construing facts differently, the results also revealed a disparity between evolving case law and the community's “common sense justice” over a fundamental belief: whether dying is seen as private matter, outside the bounds of State intervention, or not. 相似文献
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Sinnett ER Goodyear RK Hannemann V Humphry D 《Journal of counseling and development : JCD》1989,67(10):568-572
Both the terminally ill and those responsible for their care may experience conflict and limited freedom of choice with respect to the right to die. Derek Humphry, founder of the Hemlock Society, shares his personal experience, as well as his efforts to educate the public and stimulate legal reform. He has dedicated more than a decade of prime professional years to this highly charged universal problem. 相似文献
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Cohen-Almagor R 《Science and engineering ethics》1995,1(3):261-272
This paper examines two models of thinking relating to the issue of the right to die in dignity: one takes into consideration
the rights and interests of the individual; the other supposes that human life is inherently valuable. I contend that preference
should be given to the first model, and further assert that the second model may be justified in moral terms only as long
as it does not resort to paternalism. The view that holds that certain patients are not able to comprehend their own interests
in a fully rational manner, and therefore ‘we’ know what is good for these patients better than ‘they’ do, is morally unjustifiable.
I proceed by refuting the ‘quality of life’ argument, asserting that each person is entitled to decide for herself when it
is worth living and when it is not. In this connection, a caveat will be made regarding the role of the family.
The author’s research interests include bioethics, free speech, tolerance and ethics in the media. 相似文献