The relativity of perceptual knowledge

Since the most promising path to a solution to the problem of skepticism regarding perceptual knowledge seems to rest on a sharp distinction between perceiving and inferring, I begin by clarifying and defending that distinction. Next, I discuss the chief obstacle to success by this path, the difficulty in making the required distinction between merely logical possibilities that one is mistaken and the real (Austin) or relevant (Dretske) possibilities which would exclude knowledge. I argue that this distinction cannot be drawn in the ways Austin and Dretske suggest without begging the questions at issue. Finally, I sketch and defend a more radical way of identifying relevant possibilities that is inspired by Austin's controversial suggestion of a parallel between saying I know and saying I promise: a claim of knowledge of some particular matter is relative to a context in which questions about the matter have been raised.     

Local Theories of Causation and the a Posteriori Identification of the Causal Relation

The need to find an intrinsic characterization of what makes a relation between events causal arises not only in local theories of causation like Salmon's process theory but also in global approaches like Lewis' counterfactual theory. According to the localist intuition, whether a process connecting two events is causal should depend only on what goes on between the events, not on conditions that hold elsewhere in the world. If such intrinsic characterizations could be found, an identification of the causal relation in the actual world (though not in other possible worlds) with physical processes may be feasible (the a posteriori identification). I consider recent proposals made for intrinsic characterizations of causality and conclude that none of them is able to deliver the intended result.     

On finite approximability of ψ-intermediate logics

The aim of this note is to show (Theorem 1.6) that in each of the cases: = {, }, or {, , }, or {, , } there are uncountably many -intermediate logics which are not finitely approximable. This result together with the results known in literature allow us to conclude (Theorem 2.2) that for each : either all -intermediate logics are finitely approximate or there are uncountably many of them which lack the property.     

Reasoning and logic

Gilbert Harman, in Logic and Reasoning (Synthese 60 (1984), 107–127) describes an unsuccessful attempt ... to develop a theory which would give logic a special role in reasoning. Here reasoning is psychological, a procedure for revising one's beliefs. In the present paper, I construe reasoning sociologically, as a process of linguistic interaction; and show how both reasoning in the psychologistic sense and logic are related to that process.     

Rhetoric and the Unconscious

This paper develops the ideas of rhetorical psychology by applying them to some basic Freudian concepts. In so doing, the paper considers whether there might be a Dialogic Unconscious. So far rhetorical psychology has tended to concentrate upon conscious thought rather than on the unconscious. It has suggested that thinking is modelled on argument and dialogue, and that rhetoric provides the means of opening up matters for thought and discussion. However, rhetoric may also provide the means for closing down topics and, thereby, provide the means of repression. It will be suggested that language is not merely expressive but it is also repressive. Moreover, the repressive aspects of language are built into the very practices of dialogue. In learning language, we learn the codes for socially appropriate ways of speaking. These must be acquired as habits, so that we learn to repress routinely the desire to transgress the codes of appropriate speech. Thus, the routine use of language provides the resources for repression. If language is repressive, then this applies equally to the language of psycho-analysis itself. Freud's famous case histories, such as that of Dora, can be re-examined, in order to see what Freud's own theory of repression was itself repressing.     

The analysis of experience: John Dewey and Elsie Ripley Clapp on desire and thinking, 1911

Unpublished correspondence with Elsie Ripley Clapp, along with extensive notes for a 1911 course, The Analysis of Experience, provide the context for a consideration of John Dewey's discussion of the relation between desire and thinking. Dewey's philosophic point of view is portrayed as it was developing in his own mind. The unity of thought and desire, the necessity of making objects of inquiry, the identification of thinking and acting, are themes in these materials which would appear in their published form in such works as Essays in Experimental Logic, Democracy and Education, and Human Nature and Conduct. In the unpublished materials, Dewey is seen as a naturalist at work in his laboratory, reworking his ideas and acknowledging Clapp's assistance in getting Dewey to connect practical situations in life with the philosophic distinctions under development. The 1911 materials are an excellent connection between problematics in Dewey's earlier writings on ethics, epistemology, and logic, and his later writings, on the same subjects in the 1920's and 1930's.     

Repairing the reticulated model of scientific rationality

InScience and Values (1984) and other, more recent, works, e.g. (1987a, 1987b, 1989a, 1989b, 1990), Larry Laudan proposes a theory of scientific debate he dubs the reticulated model of scientific rationality (Laudan, 1984, pp. 50–66). The model stands in sharp contrast to hierarchical approaches to rationality exemplified by Popper (1959), Hempel (1965), and Reichenbach (1938), as well as the conventionalist views of rationality defended by Carnap (1950), Popper (1959), Kuhn (1962), and Lakatos (1978). Ironically, the model commits some of the same errors Laudan finds in hierarchicalist and conventionalists approaches to scientific rationality. This paper will show that the model can be fixed by recognizing that criteria of goal assessment have no privileged status. These rules are best viewed as simply rules of rationality (or rules of scientific method) by another name.     

Pseudo two-valued evaluation method for intermediate logics

An evaluation method, similar to the two-valued one for the classical logic, is introduced to give a decision procedure for some of intermediate logics. The logics treated here are obtained from some logics by adding the axiom av a.     

Parents’ satisfaction with their child’s first year of school

A group of university and vocationally educated parents (n=486) were requested to evaluate their satisfaction with their childs first school year, and they were also asked to recall the positive and negative events from their childs academic year. Both structured and open-ended measures consistently revealed that parents were quite satisfied with the functioning of their childs school. Parents social–psychological distance from the school, as measured by their social positions in the education hierarchy, tended to structure parental satisfaction: the mothers, and especially the university-educated parents, indicated the highest level of satisfaction, and these groups emphasized both positive and negative recollections; the group farthest from the school turned out be the vocationally educated fathers. Our results highlighted the teacher: the recollections concerning the teachers were evenly distributed into positive and negative accounts, and negative recollections regarding teachers and home-school cooperation in particular affected parents overall satisfaction. The findings were discussed in terms of their implications for educational policy.     

The Stability Theory of Knowledge and Belief Revision: Comments on Rott

In this commentary on Rotts paper Stability, Strength and Sensitivity: Converting Belief into Knowledge, I discuss two problems of the stability theory of knowledge which are pointed out by Rott. I conclude that these problems offer no reason for rejecting the stability theory, but might be grounds for deviating from the standard AGM account of belief revision which Rott presupposes.     

Illustrating two complementary enterprises at the interface of psychology and religion through reading Winnicott

Our work at the interface of psychology and religion can proceed in two complementary directions. When reading a psychological theory, (1) we may pay special attention to how certain concepts in particular, and the system of ideas as a whole, are being or might be used to interpret religious phenomena. We may focus on how those ideas may be involved in doing psychology of religion: the psychological interpretation of religious phenomena. Alternatively, (2) we may pay special attention to how certain concepts in particular, and the system of ideas as a whole, are being or might be used, either implicitly or explicitly, to make claims about human nature, about the meaning and purpose of life, about God. We may identify the psychology as religion-theology: psychological ideas potentially functioning in a religious-theological manner. I will illustrate this by: (a) examining D. W. Winnicott's article, Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena (1953/1986) in terms of three successive concepts or categories: transitional object, transitional phenomena, and a third intermediate area of experiencing; (b) considering how these categories can be used in psychology of religion; (c) reconsidering how the psychological categories may function as religious-theological. The discussion is intended to illustrate how we might more fully appreciate how and why a psychological theory may work well in doing psychology of religion when we more fully appreciate how that psychology implicitly functions as theology.     

Gestalt in social psychology

Summary Citations superficially suggest that the relationship between Gestalt theory and contemporary social psychology is hardly recognizable if we disregard the occasional homage to Kurt Lewin. Neither Gestalt nor field theory belongs to the present pool of social-psychological theories. On the other hand, it can be shown that basic concepts of Gestalt theory have survived under various names and are still of central importance. The author outlines a model of theory sedimentation according to which Gestalt theory, after a brief period of impact on mainstream social psychology has, by sedimentation, become an implicit theory which still feeds explicit models and theories in contemporary social psychology.     

Applications of rational-emotive therapy (RET) to love problems

Rational-emotive therapy (RET) can be particularly applied to individuals with serious love problems, such as people possessed by super-romantic love, limerents who are mired in obsessive-compulsive feelings, insensately jealous and possessive lovers, people who needlessly interfere with their encountering suitable partners, and those who suffer anguish and depression when they lose love. It also has important things to teach about keeping alive and enhancing normal love feelings. This paper outlines the RET theory of love and applies it to various amative difficulties.This article is to appear as a chapter inClinical applications of Rational-Emotive Therapy, edited by Albert Ellis and Michael Bernard, New York: Plenum, 1985.     

Counseling in the classroom: interview with albert ellis

Every teacher had better be trained in counseling. Then they could teach the kids that all humans tend to have emotional problems. That's their nature. They create many kinds of nutty ideas: That theymust do well; and theymust be loved; and thehave to get what they want.In this interview Albert Ellis speaks out on counseling in the classroomrape, incest, masturbation, marital relationships, as well as common discipline problems. Teachers spend far too much time and energy with the very difficult students, and some of the average and gifted get short shrift. By counseling one student in front of the others, often those least upset and involved receive the most benefit. Far from wasting class time, teaching all students Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET) reduces the number of disturbed students, and offers teachers more time to spend in helping develop special education for the gifted. It also enables counselors and psychologists to spend more time servicing teachers. And teachers who practice RET counseling learn an effective technique for coping with even inner city stress and burnout.Joel Dames conducted this interview with Albert Ellis at the Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy in New York. He is employed by the U.S. Department of Defense Dependent Schools of Camp Zama, a U.S. Army post in Japan where he teaches literature and writing to high school students.     

Refutability Revamped: How Quantum Mechanics Saves the Phenomena

On the basis of the Suppes–Sneed structuralview of scientific theories, we take a freshlook at the concept of refutability,which was famously proposed by K.R. Popper in 1934 as a criterion for the demarcation of scientific theories from non-scientific ones, e.g., pseudo-scientificand metaphysical theories. By way of an introduction we argue that a clash between Popper and his critics on whether scientific theories are, in fact, refutablecan be partly explained by the fact Popper and his criticsascribed different meanings to the term theoryThen we narrow our attention to one particular theory,namely quantum mechanics, in order to elucidate general matters discussed. We prove that quantum mechanics is irrefutable in a rather straightforward sense, but argue that it is refutable in a more sophisticated sense, which incorporates someobservations obtained by looking closely at the practiceof physics. We shall locate exactly where non-rigourous elements enter the evaluation of a scientific theory – thismakes us see clearly how fruitful mathematics isfor the philosophy of science.     

Feelings in Moral Conflict and the Hazards of Emotional Intelligence

From some perspectives, it seems obvious that emotions and feelings must be both reasonable and morally significant: from others, it may seem as obvious that they cannot be. This paper seeks to advance discussion of ethical implications of the currently contested issue of the relationship of reason to feeling and emotion via reflection upon various examples of affectively charged moral dilemma. This discussion also proceeds by way of critical consideration of recent empirical enquiry into these issues in the literature of so-called emotional intelligence. In this regard, despite ambiguities in their accounts of the relationship of reason to emotion, advocates of emotional intelligence generally incline to therapeutic conceptions of emotional health which are not inconsistent with currently fashionable cognitivist accounts of feeling and emotion. All the same, it is arguable that therapeutic or other strategies which overplay the possibility of cognitive or other resolution of emotional conflict are prey to certain difficulties. First, they underemphasise those passive but identity-constitutive aspects of affect which are not obviously rationally accountable. Secondly, they insufficiently recognise the extent to which emotional conflicts can be significantly implicated in moral diversity. In view of either or both of these points, they may fail to appreciate the moral inappropriateness of attempts to resolve certain forms of emotional conflict or tension.     

On Grieger's (1985) contextual model of the ABCs of RET

Several features of Grieger's (1985) contextual model of the ABCs of RET are criticized. It is argued that (a) Grieger fails at various points to give due regard to the interactive nature of evaluative and interpretive thinking and that he fails to show clearly how people's evaluative thinking can color the interpretations that they make about A; (b) Grieger fails to distinguish clearly between the terms create and influence; (c) Grieger's claim that Life Positions are dichotomous is not valid; (d) the Life Position of Living Psychologically implies a philosophy toward psychological events, a point neglected by Greiger; (e) Grieger's statements about individuals being totally responsible for their wellbeing are overgeneralizations; (f) Grieger fails to show clearly how some invalid and unempirical declarations can be signs of emotional disturbance; and (g) Grieger's view that emotional disturbance can be seen asirrelevant encourages clients' indifference rather than rational concern. Nevertheless, Grieger has introduced an interesting and thought provoking model into the RET literature. Several suggestions are made to improve the model.Grieger (1985) has outlined a complex model of the ABCs of RET which he terms contextual. It is in many ways an excellent and ambitious model which will, as he hopes, promote much debate among rational-emotive theorists and therapists. However, in my opinion, the model has certain deficiencies and in response to his request for comments on his paper, I will outline these and will indicate how his model could be improved.Windy Dryden Ph.D. is Senior Lecturer in Psychology, Goldsmiths' College (University of London), England and Co-Editor of the Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy: An International Quarterly.     

How can I know I’ve perceived God?

In this paper I argue that a necessary condition of ones perceiving God is that an experience of the right phenomenological sort be caused in one directly enough by God and – bypassing the issue of what is necessary for an experience to be of the right phenomenological sort – discuss some difficulties in finding reasons for thinking that God has or has not directly enough caused any such experience.     

My current views on Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET) and religiousness

Comments on W. B. Johnson's (1992) Rational Emotive Therapy and Religiousness: A Review. Outlines the author's current views on regular religion and on dogmatic, absolutist, devout religiosity, in order to clarify how rational-emotive therapy (RET) and rational-emotive psychology (REP) actually hold, and do not hold, certain attitudes toward religion. Albert Ellis, Ph.D., is the founder of Rational-Emotive Therapy, President of the Institute of Rational-Emotive Therapy in New York, and the author of over fifty books on RET and Psychotherapy.Albertt Eillis, Ph.D., is the founder of Rational-Emotive Therapy, President of the Institute of Rational-Emotive Therapy in New York, and the author of over fifty books on RET and Psychotherapy.