All together now: when dissociations between knowledge and action disappear

Why do people sometimes seem to know things but fail to act appropriately on the basis of this knowledge? Such dissociations between knowledge and action often occur in infants and children, and in adults following brain damage. These dissociations have supported inferences about the organization of cognitive processes (e.g., separable knowledge and action systems) and their development (e.g., knowledge systems develop before action systems). The current study tested the basis for knowledge-action dissociations in a card-sorting task in which children typically correctly answer questions about sorting rules while sorting cards incorrectly. When questions and sorting measures were more closely equated for the amount of conflict that needed to be resolved for a correct response, children showed no systematic dissociation between knowledge and action. The results challenge standard interpretations of knowledge-action dissociations and support an alternative account based on graded knowledge representations.     

A neuroconstructivist model of past tense development and processing

We present a neural network model of learning and processing the English past tense that is based on the notion that experience-dependent cortical development is a core aspect of cognitive development. During learning the model adds and removes units and connections to develop a task-specific final architecture. The model provides an integrated account of characteristic errors during learning the past tense, adult generalization to pseudoverbs, and dissociations between verbs observed after brain damage in aphasic patients. We put forward a theory of verb inflection in which a functional processing architecture develops through interactions between experience-dependent brain development and the structure of the environment, in this case, the statistical properties of verbs in the language. The outcome of this process is a structured processing system giving rise to graded dissociations between verbs that are easy and verbs that are hard to learn and process. In contrast to dual-mechanism accounts of inflection, we argue that describing dissociations as a dichotomy between regular and irregular verbs is a post hoc abstraction and is not linked to underlying processing mechanisms. We extend current single-mechanism accounts of inflection by highlighting the role of structural adaptation in development and in the formation of the adult processing system. In contrast to some single-mechanism accounts, we argue that the link between irregular inflection and verb semantics is not causal and that existing data can be explained on the basis of phonological representations alone. This work highlights the benefit of taking brain development seriously in theories of cognitive development.     

What can functional neuroimaging tell the experimental psychologist?

I argue here that functional neuroimaging data—which I restrict to the haemodynamic techniques of fMRI and PET—can inform psychological theorizing, provided one assumes a “systematic” function-structure mapping in the brain. In this case, imaging data simply comprise another dependent variable, along with behavioural data, that can be used to test competing theories. In particular, I distinguish two types of inference: function-to-structure deduction and structure-to-function induction. With the former inference, a qualitatively different pattern of activity over the brain under two experimental conditions implies at least one different function associated with changes in the independent variable. With the second type of inference, activity of the same brain region(s) under two conditions implies a common function, possibly not predicted a priori. I illustrate these inferences with imaging studies of recognition memory, short-term memory, and repetition priming. I then consider in greater detail what is meant by a “systematic” function-structure mapping and argue that, particularly for structure-to-function induction, this entails a one-to-one mapping between functional and structural units, although the structural unit may be a network of interacting regions and care must be taken over the appropriate level of functional/structural abstraction. Nonetheless, the assumption of a systematic function-structure mapping is a “working hypothesis” that, in common with other scientific fields, cannot be proved on independent grounds and is probably best evaluated by the success of the enterprise as a whole. I also consider statistical issues such as the definition of a qualitative difference and methodological issues such as the relationship between imaging and behavioural data. I finish by reviewing various objections to neuroimaging, including neophrenology, functionalism, and equipotentiality, and by observing some criticisms of current practice in the imaging literature.     

Graded representations in behavioral dissociations

Why do people sometimes seem to know things when they are tested in one way, while seeming unaware of this information when tested in a different way? Such task-dependent behaviors, or dissociations, often occur in infants and children, and in adults following brain damage. To explain these dissociations, researchers have posited separable knowledge systems that are differentially tapped by various tasks, develop at different rates and can be selectively impaired. There is an alternative account in which knowledge is viewed as graded in nature. Certain tasks tap weaker representations, while other tasks require stronger representations, leading to dissociations in behavior. The graded representations approach addresses dissociations observed in perception, attention, memory, executive functioning and language, and has implications for the organization, development and impairment of our cognitive systems.     

Inferences from counterfactual threats and promises

We examine how people understand and reason from counterfactual threats, for example, "if you had hit your sister, I would have grounded you" and counterfactual promises, for example, "if you had tidied your room, I would have given you ice-cream." The first experiment shows that people consider counterfactual threats, but not counterfactual promises, to have the illocutionary force of an inducement. They also make the immediate inference that the action mentioned in the "if" part of the counterfactual threat and promise did not occur. The second experiment shows that people make more negative inferences (modus tollens and denial of the antecedent) than affirmative inferences (modus ponens and affirmation of the consequent) from counterfactual threats and promises, unlike indicative threats and promises. We discuss the implications of the results for theories of the mental representations and cognitive processes that underlie conditional inducements.     

认知神经心理学简介

认知神经心理学是认知心理学的一个分支。它的目的是探讨当人们执行认知活动的时候,心理信息加工过程是怎样的,所采用的手段是研究这些认知功能受损的病人。它与认知神经科学的不同在于：认知神经心理学关注的是心理（mind）,而认知神经科学关注的是大脑（特别是关注与认知有关的大脑机制）。研究认知神经心理学的方法也可以用于研究发展性认知障碍,如阅读障碍,或者特殊的语言损伤,这就是发展性认知神经心理学。这些方法还可以用于高级认知发面的研究,如信念形成和心理理论。这些高级认知方面的障碍是精神病学的范畴,因此这类研究错觉、幻想或虚构等的认知神经心理学叫做认知神经精神病学。认知神经心理学的典型特征有：1）研究症状,而不是并发症;2）采用个案研究,而不是群体研究;3）主要数据来源是症状间的双分离;4）致力于模块化认知模型的建立。     

The road to the unconscious self not taken: Discrepancies between self‐ and observer‐inferences about implicit dispositions from nonverbal behavioural cues

To what extent can individuals gain insight into their own or another person's implicit dispositions' We investigated whether self‐perceivers versus neutral observers can detect implicit dispositions from nonverbal behavioural cues contained in video feedback (cue validity) and whether these cues are in turn used as a valid basis for explicit dispositional inferences (cue utilization). Across three studies in the domains of extraversion and anxiety we consistently obtained reliable cue validity and cue utilization for neutral observers but not for self‐perceivers. An additional measure of state inferences in Study 3 showed that one reason for the lack of mediation in self‐perceivers is their reluctance to use their state inferences as a basis for more general trait inferences. We conclude that people have a ‘blind spot’ with respect to the nonverbal behavioural manifestations of their unconscious selves, even though neutral observers may readily detect and utilize this information for dispositional inferences. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reason and emotion In psychotherapy: Thirty years on

Summary In summary, then, in 1962 RET displayed important features still current. These include the interrelatedness of cognitive, emotive and behavioural processes, the important role that cognition plays in psychological problems, its humanistic view of the self and the futility and dangers of self-rating. The emphasis on perpetuation rather than acquisition processes of emotional disturbance holds good now as it did then, and the core view of therapeutic change is essentially the same now as it was in 1962, despite further, more recent elaborations. Also, one can find the beginnings of a model of psychological health in 1962 that has been more fully developed since that time. Significant change has occurred in RET since 1962 that updates several of Ellis's original ideas. These include the distinction between interpretations (or inferences) and evaluations, the primacy of musts in accounting for psychological disturbance, the clear distinction between healthy and unhealthy negative emotions and the greater role accorded to force and energy in the change process. Aspects of psychoanalytic theory, as well as conditioning theory featured in 1962 no longer appear, and a greater emphasis is placed on biological aspects of emotional disturbance now than thirty years ago. Finally, a greater range of cognitive, imaginal, emotive and behavioural methods are found in current RET literature than inReason and Emotion in Psychotherapy where Ellis restricts himself to illustrating a few cognitive and behavioural techniques. RET, then, has grown and developed over the past thirty years. In large part, this reflects the theory's flexibility and the competent people who have worked to make RET one of the most viable and widely used cognitive-behaviour therapies. Of these, I modestly include myself! This article was originally presented as an Inaugural Lecture at Goldsmiths' College, University of London, on December 8, 1992.     

Why neuroscience matters to cognitive neuropsychology

The broad issue in this paper is the relationship between cognitive psychology and neuroscience. That issue arises particularly sharply for cognitive neurospsychology, some of whose practitioners claim a methodological autonomy for their discipline. They hold that behavioural data from neuropsychological impairments are sufficient to justify assumptions about the underlying modular structure of human cognitive architecture, as well as to make inferences about its various components. But this claim to methodological autonomy can be challenged on both philosophical and empirical grounds. A priori considerations about (cognitive) multiple realisability challenge the thesis on philosophical grounds, and neuroscientific findings from developmental disorders substantiate that challenge empirically. The conclusion is that behavioural evidence alone is inadequate for scientific progress since appearances of modularity can be thoroughly deceptive, obscuring both the dynamic processes of neural development and the endstate network architecture of real cognitive systems.     

Inferences from memory: strategy- and exemplar-based judgment models compared

What are the cognitive processes underlying people's inferences from memory? To provide an answer, the exemplar-based approach to predicting people's inferences is tested against the strategy-based approach. Exemplar models assume that people make inferences about objects by retrieving similar objects from memory. In contrast, the strategy-based approach assumes that people select cognitive strategies that make inferences based on abstracted knowledge and information the inference situation provides. In Experiment 1, in which dichotomous feedback on the level of pair-comparisons was provided, almost all participants were classified as using a simple lexicographic strategy. In Experiment 2, in which continuous feedback for single objects was provided, most participants were classified as using a compensatory strategy. Both experiments suggest that the strategy-based approach is more suitable for predicting people's inferences from memory than the exemplar-based approach. The strategy-based approach shows how people adapt to inference situations by selecting different cognitive strategies.     

Functional localization and double dissociations: the relationship between internal structure and behavior

Lesioning studies are often used in cognitive neuroscience to make inferences about the architecture of cognition. Recently, computational models have been used to address some of the underlying assumptions-such as modularity and locality-often implicitly used when interpreting lesion data. In this article, we explore the "functional localization" assumption and its role in interpreting lesioning data, especially from double dissociations. The functional localization assumption states that units or subunits within an information processing system become functionally specialized for dealing with specific aspects of the input environment. Networks were trained on one of two problems-an abstract "rules and sub-rules" problem, and a more concrete "logic classification" problem-and then systematically lesioned. Networks were analyzed in terms of their overt behavior, and more importantly, in terms of their internal structure. Performance deficits in both form and magnitude could be directly related to the ablated internal structure of the networks. That is, if an ablated area had little or no functional localization, then little or no behavioral dissociations were observed. If, however, the ablated area had very specific internal structure, then very specific behavioral dissociations were observed. It is important to note, however, that there was not a one-to-one correspondence between internal structure and behavioral dissociations, implying that cognitive neuroscientists must be careful when using lesioning data to theorize about the functional architecture of cognition.     

Simulation,simplicity, and selection: an evolutionary perspective on high-level mindreading

In this paper, I argue that a natural selection-based perspective gives reasons for thinking that the core of the ability to mindread cognitively complex mental states is subserved by a simulationist process—that is, that it relies on non-specialised mechanisms in the attributer’s cognitive architecture whose primary function is the generation of her own decisions and inferences. In more detail, I try to establish three conclusions. First, I try to make clearer what the dispute between simulationist and non-simulationist theories of mindreading fundamentally is about. Second, I try to make more precise an argument that is sometimes hinted at in support of the former: this ‘argument from simplicity’ suggests that, since natural selection disfavours building extra cognitive systems where this can be avoided, simulationist theories of mindreading are more in line with natural selection than their competitors. As stated, though, this argument overlooks the fact that building extra cognitive systems can also yield benefits: in particular, it can allow for the parallel processing of multiple problems and it makes for the existence of backups for important elements of the organism’s mind. I therefore try to make this argument more precise by investigating whether these benefits also apply to the present case—and conclude negatively. My third aim in this paper is to use this discussion of mindreading as a means for exploring the promises and difficulties of evolutionary arguments in philosophy and psychology more generally.     

Can cognitive processes be inferred from neuroimaging data?

There is much interest currently in using functional neuroimaging techniques to understand better the nature of cognition. One particular practice that has become common is 'reverse inference', by which the engagement of a particular cognitive process is inferred from the activation of a particular brain region. Such inferences are not deductively valid, but can still provide some information. Using a Bayesian analysis of the BrainMap neuroimaging database, I characterize the amount of additional evidence in favor of the engagement of a cognitive process that can be offered by a reverse inference. Its usefulness is particularly limited by the selectivity of activation in the region of interest. I argue that cognitive neuroscientists should be circumspect in the use of reverse inference, particularly when selectivity of the region in question cannot be established or is known to be weak.     

Pavlovian extinction,phobias, and the limits of the cognitive paradigm

The slow or total lack of decrease in some autonomic responses during extinction in aversive conditioning and concomitant verbalizations of fear have remained a problem for learning theories and psychophysiology. Removal of the aversive stimulus should result in a rapid decrement in responding, as it does in cognitive and somatic systems. In laboratory analogues of phobia and clinical neurosis, however, such decreases do not occur in some autonomic responses and reported fear. In this article three areas of research are presented in which dissociations occur between cognitive and autonomie responses: 1) relational learning, 2) phobia, and 3) incubation. The data indicate that there are some important distinctions to be made concerning the properties of different psychological and physiological systems. These distinctions pertain to the differences between cognitive and noncognitive systems, between the two branches of the ANS, and between acquisition and extinction processes. These distinctions lead to a number of hypotheses concerning dissociations between response systems and have important implications for the understanding and treatment of neurosis.     

The modification of agoraphobic avoidance behaviour: some fresh possibilities

A reconsideration of the theoretical basis of the therapy provided for agoraphobic people is warranted on three grounds. Although current methods of behavioural treatment are moderately effective, many patients are left with significant residual problems. Secondly, consideration of the theoretical basis of current behavioural treatments has been neglected and thirdly, there has been insufficient curiosity about the nature of agoraphobia.Three approaches to the problem of persistent avoidance behaviour and/or fear were selected as being of particular promise: Seligman and Johnston's cognitive theory of avoidance behaviour. Gray's elaboration of the safety signal hypothesis and Bandura's self-efficacy theory. Proposals for two new forms of therapy were formulated from an examination of these theories. The most promising possibilities are ‘therapy by repeated disconfirmation’ and ‘safety-signal therapy’. The general lines of these new forms of therapy are set out, examples provided and suggestions put forward for assessment procedures.It is suggested that in many agoraphobic cases, the control of panic attacks is a target of central importance and renewed attempts to find dependable ways of controlling panic attacks by psychological methods should be made. It is also recommended that self-efficacy estimates should be included in experimental investigations of the therapy provided for people with agoraphobic problems.     

ORGANISMIC PROCESSES FOR NEO-PIAGETIAN THEORIES: A DIALECTICAL CAUSAL ACCOUNT OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT

The paper criticizes some epistemological presuppositions of Piaget's and of neo-Piagetian's work, in particular, the psycho-Logical principle. This principle is contrasted with a more valid psycho-dialectical one. It is suggested that a dialectical-constructivist (i.e., causal-dynamic) perspective offers a causal theoretical framework for cognitive development that is superior to that of Piaget and many neo-Piagetians. I outline criteria for evaluating causal developmental theories, and point out deficiencies in Piaget's and neo-Piagetian's stage theories vis-à-vis the criteria. An organismic theory of constructive operators - a dialectical/causal theory - is introduced as a remedy for these deficiencies. I focus on a modular model of mental attention that is constituted by four dynamically interacting functional systems. These systems together explain the ‘beam’ of mental attention and its phenomenological/behavioural effects. I claim that the stages of cognitive development are caused by growth of mental attention. The validity of this model is supported by data on a motor performance task (Rho task). The Rho data show: (a) the existence of stage-wise plateaus in children's performance at ages congruent with the redefined Piagetian stages; (b) the psychological structures which, driven by mental attention (M-capacity), are responsible for performance on the task, appear to be located in the left hemisphere of the brain. These findings, predicted by the dialectical theory of mental attention, highlight its causal-predictive power.     

Neuroanatomical substrates of age-related cognitive decline

There are many reports of relations between age and cognitive variables and of relations between age and variables representing different aspects of brain structure and a few reports of relations between brain structure variables and cognitive variables. These findings have sometimes led to inferences that the age-related brain changes cause the age-related cognitive changes. Although this conclusion may well be true, it is widely recognized that simple correlations are not sufficient to warrant causal conclusions, and other types of correlational information, such as mediation and correlations between longitudinal brain changes and longitudinal cognitive changes, also have limitations with respect to causal inferences. These issues are discussed, and the existing results on relations of regional volume, white matter hyperintensities, and diffusion tensor imaging measures of white matter integrity to age and to measures of cognitive functioning are reviewed. It is concluded that at the current time the evidence that these aspects of brain structure are neuroanatomical substrates of age-related cognitive decline is weak. The final section contains several suggestions concerning measurement and methodology that may lead to stronger conclusions in the future.     

The epistemic efficacy of stupidity

I show that it follows from both externalist and internalist theories that stupid people may be in a better position to know than smart ones. This untoward consequence results from taking our epistemic goal to be accepting as many truths as possible and rejecting as many falsehoods as possible, combined with a recognition that the standard for acceptability cannot be set too high, else scepticism will prevail. After showing how causal, reliabilist, and coherentist theories devalue intelligence, I suggest that knowledge, as contemporary theories construe it, is not a particularly valuable cognitive achievement, and that we would do well to reopen epistemology to the study of cognitive excellences of all sorts.I am grateful to Warren Goldfarb for sharing his knowledge of wines with me, and to Kenneth Winkler for sharing his knowledge of birds.