From qualitative differences to a continuum of development: commentary on Leslie Smith's epistemological principles for developmental psychology

In his article Epistemological principles for developmental psychology Leslie Smith helps to re-open some of the key issues Piaget explored through his genetic epistemology. Smith shows the important parallels between logician Gottlieb Frege's understanding of rational thought, and the way in which Piaget developed such notions in his own theory. But while Frege's theory helps set the parameters for whether thought can be judged as rational, or if it even should be judged as rational, it also shows the logicians' disdain for exploring anything resembling development of rationality. Thus Frege might have an important, but necessarily mediated impact on the field of human development. Piaget's carefully crafted theory of epistemological development potentially serves as such a mediating device. It can be argued that Piaget crafted together arguments of logicians such as Frege, and epistemologists such as Lévy-Bruhl, to develop his extraordinary achievement of a genetic epistemology that leads to an understanding of the human condition. One of Piaget's accomplishments was to develop a continuum out of the logicians' dichotomy between non-logical and logical in which the non-rational flows into the rational.     

Experimental Studies of Children's Learning

This article compares John Dewey's theory of inquiry with Jean Piaget's analysis of the mechanisms implied in the increase of knowledge. The sources for this paper are Dewey's studies on logic and the theory of inquiry and Piaget's historical-critical and psychogenetic investigations. Three major conclusions result from the comparison: first, there are significant convergences between the two theories; second, Piaget's developmental analysis makes explicit what is programmatic in Dewey's investigations; and, finally, Piaget is incorrect in characterizing Dewey's pragmatism as a method that does not meet the criteria of intelligent activity.     

From Piaget's Epistemic Subject to Pascual-Leone's Metasubject: Epistemic Transition in the Constructivist—Rationalist Theory of Cognitive Development

The explanation of the transition from one epistemic theory to another is an important part of Piaget's genetic epistemology. It is argued that this epistemic transition leads to a retrodictable orthogenetic tendency toward optimizing equilibration. The objective of this paper is to establish a relationship between Piaget's epistemic subject and Pascual-Leone's metasubject and to demonstrate that the postulation of the latter can be considered as an epistemic transition between two constructivist—rationalist theories, which leads to the development of a theory with greater explanatory power. Epistemic transition in this paper refers to a progressive problemshift (cf. Lakatos, 1970), between the theories of Piaget and Pascual-Leone. Piaget builds a “general model” by neglecting individual differences, that is, studies the epistemic subject, whereas Pascual-Leone by incorporating a framework for individual difference variables, studies the metasubject—the psychological organization of the epistemic subject. Empirical evidence is presented to demonstrate that Pascual-Leone's theory of constructive operators is a model of the psychological organism (the metasubject), which is at work inside Piaget's epistemic subject. Finally, it is concluded that the greater explanatory power of Pascual-Leone's theory can be interpreted as an epistemic transition between Piaget's epistemic subject and Pascual-Leone's metasubject.     

The meaning of “significance” for different types of research [translated and annotated by Eric-Jan Wagenmakers,Denny Borsboom,Josine Verhagen,Rogier Kievit,Marjan Bakker,Angelique Cramer,Dora Matzke,Don Mellenbergh,and Han L. J. van der Maas]

Adrianus Dingeman de Groot (1914–2006) was one of the most influential Dutch psychologists. He became famous for his work “Thought and Choice in Chess”, but his main contribution was methodological — De Groot co-founded the Department of Psychological Methods at the University of Amsterdam (together with R. F. van Naerssen), founded one of the leading testing and assessment companies (CITO), and wrote the monograph “Methodology” that centers on the empirical-scientific cycle: observation–induction–deduction–testing–evaluation. Here we translate one of De Groot's early articles, published in 1956 in the Dutch journal Nederlands Tijdschrift voor de Psychologie en Haar Grensgebieden. This article is more topical now than it was almost 60 years ago. De Groot stresses the difference between exploratory and confirmatory (“hypothesis testing”) research and argues that statistical inference is only sensible for the latter: “One ‘is allowed’ to apply statistical tests in exploratory research, just as long as one realizes that they do not have evidential impact”. De Groot may have also been one of the first psychologists to argue explicitly for preregistration of experiments and the associated plan of statistical analysis. The appendix provides annotations that connect De Groot's arguments to the current-day debate on transparency and reproducibility in psychological science.     

Eight good questions for developmental epistemology and psychology

My reply to eight good questions arising from commentary is an elaboration of my main argument that there are parallels in the epistemologies of Frege and Piaget and that these parallels have distinctive implications for developmental psychology. The eight questions are: (i) was Piaget really an epistemologist? (ii) is Piaget's epistemic subject psychological or epistemological? (iii) is Frege's non-modal logic consistent with Piaget's account of necessity? (iv) does Piaget's constructivism entail realism? (v) what is the relation between thinking and thought? (vi) is Frege's concept of mind too narrow? (vii) how are cause and reason related in the interpretation of thought? (viii) what is the status of an act of judgment in the interpretation of thought? These questions are productive, and can be developed.     

Perspective et actualité de Pierre Janet sur les possessions et les extases mystiques

Pierre Janet (1859–1947), a professor of psychology at the collège de France (1901–1934) and the founder of the French Psychological Society in 1901, took interest in the psychology of religion very young and then all along his career. At age 15, a painful crisis of doubts changes him: he becomes atheistic and above all, gains a passion for the psychology of belief (Prévost, 1973). After his “aggregation” degree, he starts examining and curing people with mental diseases at the hospital in Le Havre. Within six years, his works would build the reference synthesis on the “dissociation of the personality”. But the dissociation process is tightly bounded to the properties of belief (L’automatisme psychologique, 1889). The presentation of his famous case “Achille” (1891–1898) possessed “by the devil” will stand for Janet as a textbook case about religious dissociation, and he will consider his successful treatment of this patient as a “modern exorcism” (Névroses et idées fixes, 1898). The famous mystic “Madeleine” who suffered from psychasthenia provided him the opportunity to precise the links between religious phenomena and the properties of belief. Madeleine's oscillations between torture, void and ecstasy, pertain to “tension” variations that directly impact her belief according to their stage – asseritive or reflected – on the Janetian hierarchy ( Janet, 1926–1928). In the second part of his life and career, where Janet takes time to think about his models and practice, he paints a large picture of the evolution of the “self” (L’Évolution psychologique de la personnalité, Janet, 1929) and extends his analysis to traditional cultures where the bounds of the self is more variable, the personality being able to include spirits within itself. The inclusion in the DSM III, of “dissociative troubles” in 1980, for its first atheoretic release, is visibly drawn upon Janet's English writings ( 0175, 0215 and 0070). Following this introduction, a great body of international studies took Janet's modelization and results into consideration (except in France). In 1994, the DSM-IV also adds the dissociative transe disorder category (DTD), which includes religious possession by demons or spirits: this leads to the development of international studies on the psychology of religion within a transcultural frame. After being forgotten for years, the experimental results of Pierre Janet currently undergo an important excavation thanks to recent psychological research, and prove their relevance to contribute to contemporary debates.     

The intelligent career framework as a basis for interdisciplinary inquiry

This paper examines how separate behavioral science disciplines can be brought together to more fully understand the dynamics of contemporary careers. We adopt one interdisciplinary framework – that of the “intelligent career” – and use it to examine how separate disciplinary approaches relate to one another. The intelligent career framework suggests careers unfold through three interdependent “ways of knowing” reflecting why, how and with whom people work. Breaking this framework down into six unidirectional links, we examine the contributions made by a variety of behavioral science approaches. Our review suggests that separate bodies of career-relevant theory reflect separate links from one way of knowing to another. We offer several lessons concerned with (a) the intelligent career framework; (b) evidence underlying separate theories; (c) differing definitions of career; (d) research methodologies; (e) time; and (f) interdependence among variables. We conclude with some ideas on how to better promote future interdisciplinary careers research.     

Epistemological principles for developmental psychology in Frege and Piaget

My main aim is to identify and discuss parallels between the epistemologies of Gottlob Frege and Jean Piaget. Although their work has attracted massive attention individually, parallels in their work have gone unnoticed. My discussion is in four parts and covers psychologism and epistemology; five epistemological criteria in Frege's rational epistemology under an AEIOU mnemonic, namely autonomy, entailment, intersubjectivity, objectivity and universality; the elaboration of these same criteria in Piaget's developmental epistemology; their implications for developmental psychology and epistemology. One main conclusion is that the same criteria fit both Frege's and Piaget's epistemology. A second conclusion is that Piaget's developmental epistemology can be regarded as an elaboration of Frege's rational epistemology in each of these five respects on both methodological and substantive grounds. Both conclusions are compatible with non-psychologism, which was accepted by both Frege and Piaget.     

WHAT CAN PIAGET OFFER LONERGAN'S PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY?

In Insight, Bernard Lonergan provides, albeit schematically, a unique philosophy of biology which he takes as having “profound differences” with the world view presented by Darwin. These turn on Lonergan's idea of “schemes of recurrence” and of organisms as “solutions to the problem of living in an environment.” His lapidary prose requires some deciphering. I present the broad lines of his philosophy of biology and argue that Jean Piaget's structuralism can shed light on Lonergan's intentions in virtue of his use of cybernetics and the isomorphism between biology and knowledge. In turn, Piaget draws on Waddington's restatement of epigenesis and I suggest that the result, “process structuralism,” is a viable alternative to the modern Darwinian synthesis.     

Avoiding misinterpretations of Piaget and Vygotsky: Mathematical teaching without learning,learning without teaching,or helpful learning-path teaching?

This article provides an overview of some perspectives about special issues in classroom mathematical teaching and learning that have stemmed from the huge explosion of research in children's mathematical thinking stimulated by Piaget. It concentrates on issues that are particularly important for less-advanced learners and for those who might be having special difficulties in learning mathematics. A major goal of the article is to develop a framework for understanding what effective mathematics teaching and learning is, because doing so is so important for struggling students and for research about them. Piaget's research had a fundamental influence on the on-going tension between understanding and fluency in the classroom, supporting efforts toward increasing understanding. But in some countries, misinterpretations of Piaget led to practices that are counterproductive for children, especially struggling learners. Such misinterpretations are identified and a more balanced approach that also draws on Vygotsky is described—a learning-path developmentally-appropriate learning/teaching approach.     

ORGANISMIC PROCESSES FOR NEO-PIAGETIAN THEORIES: A DIALECTICAL CAUSAL ACCOUNT OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT

The paper criticizes some epistemological presuppositions of Piaget's and of neo-Piagetian's work, in particular, the psycho-Logical principle. This principle is contrasted with a more valid psycho-dialectical one. It is suggested that a dialectical-constructivist (i.e., causal-dynamic) perspective offers a causal theoretical framework for cognitive development that is superior to that of Piaget and many neo-Piagetians. I outline criteria for evaluating causal developmental theories, and point out deficiencies in Piaget's and neo-Piagetian's stage theories vis-à-vis the criteria. An organismic theory of constructive operators - a dialectical/causal theory - is introduced as a remedy for these deficiencies. I focus on a modular model of mental attention that is constituted by four dynamically interacting functional systems. These systems together explain the ‘beam’ of mental attention and its phenomenological/behavioural effects. I claim that the stages of cognitive development are caused by growth of mental attention. The validity of this model is supported by data on a motor performance task (Rho task). The Rho data show: (a) the existence of stage-wise plateaus in children's performance at ages congruent with the redefined Piagetian stages; (b) the psychological structures which, driven by mental attention (M-capacity), are responsible for performance on the task, appear to be located in the left hemisphere of the brain. These findings, predicted by the dialectical theory of mental attention, highlight its causal-predictive power.     

Reason

ReasonJean Piaget wrote three short papers shortly before his death in 1980

Paper I: Scientific Report on Work during 1978-1979.Paper II: Reason as Objective of the Understanding.Paper III: Reason: Introduction.Each is probably incomplete, Papers II and III definitely so. These papers were intended as a contribution to his 1979-1980 research project “Reason,” here translated into English for the first time. Their central argument is distinctive. It amounts to Piaget's final statement of his empirical model of normative reason as a mechanism intrinsic to the construction of knowledge during children's cognitive development.     

A Framework for a Preschool Curriculum Based on Some Piagetian Concepts1

ABSTRACT The position is taken that compensatory preschools must build a solid foundation for further intellectual development by going back to the sensory motor period, as delineated by Jean Piaget, and making certain that intermediate stages are not skipped or only partially achieved. Portions of Piaget's theory which appear to be essential for future academic achievement are conceptualized into a framework for a preschool curriculum particularly geared to the needs of disadvantaged children. Two areas of cognitive development necessary for logical thinking are described in detail. One area concerns the representation of objects; the second area concerns the understanding of relationships among objects. The implications of these concepts for teaching are discussed, with stress placed upon the importance of mastery of prerequisites.     

Sick? Or slow? On the origins of intelligence as a psychological object

This paper examines the first moments of the emergence of “psychometrics” as a discipline, using a history of the Binet–Simon test (precursor to the Stanford–Binet) to engage the question of how intelligence became a “psychological object.” To begin to answer this, we used a previously-unexamined set of French texts to highlight the negotiations and collaborations that led Alfred Binet (1857–1911) to identify “mental testing” as a research area worth pursuing. This included a long-standing rivalry with Désiré-Magloire Bourneville (1840–1909), who argued for decades that psychiatrists ought to be the professional arbiters of which children would be removed from the standard curriculum and referred to special education classes in asylums. In contrast, Binet sought to keep children in schools and conceived of a way for psychologists to do this. Supported by the Société libre de l'étude psychologique de l'enfant [Free society for the psychological study of the child], and by a number of collaborators and friends, he thus undertook to create a “metric” scale of intelligence—and the associated testing apparatus—to legitimize the role of psychologists in a to-that-point psychiatric domain: identifying and treating “the abnormal”. The result was a change in the earlier law requiring all healthy French children to attend school, between the ages of 6 and 13, to recognize instead that otherwise normal children sometimes need special help: they are “slow” (arriéré), but not “sick.” This conceptualization of intelligence was then carried forward, through the test's influence on Lewis Terman (1877–1956) and Lightner Witmer (1867–1956), to shape virtually all subsequent thinking about intelligence testing and its role in society.     

Piaget's stages: the unfinished symphony of cognitive development

After a period during which Piaget's work in developmental psychology went into serious decline as a central force in the field, it has once again gained considerable interest to theorists and researchers. The purpose of the current discussion is to reconsider Piaget's stage construct so that a revised version is viable within the psychological part of the theory. The premise of the discussion is that Piaget fully intended his stages to remain at the heart of his psychology, but had difficulty meeting the objections of critics: that the stages as proposed were too vague, too broad, and too dependent on faith in a “miraculous” transition process. By shifting stage transitions to the midpoint of each stage, by adopting recursive transition processes from neo-Piagetian theories, by embracing decalage as systematic and necessary, and by using Piaget's idea of the taking of consciousness, some of the main problems of his stages can be resolved in a satisfying way. Although still not fully specified, the Piagetian stages can retain their place as general guides to cognitive development and as sources of constraints on what structures and functions are available to the developing mind.     

Why won’t you do what I want? The informative failures of children and models

Computational models are powerful tools – too powerful, according to some. We argue that the idea that models can “do anything” is wrong, and we describe how their failures have been informative. We present new work showing surprising diversity in the effects of feedback on children's task-switching, such that some children perseverate despite this feedback, other children switch as instructed, and yet others play an “opposites” game without truly switching to the newly instructed task. We present simulations that demonstrate the failure of an otherwise-successful neural network model to capture this failure. Simulating this pattern motivates the inclusion of updating mechanisms that make contact with a growing literature on frontostriatal function, despite their absence in theories of the development of cognitive flexibility. We argue from this and other examples that computational models are more constrained than is typically acknowledged and that their resulting failures can be theoretically illuminating.     

The Life Space of a Scientist: The Visionary Function and Other Aspects of Jean Piaget's Thinking

This article (a) sketches briefly some systematic aspects of creative work as part of the rationale for the use of the case study method, (b) outlines a spectrum of processes that can be grouped as the 'visionary function,' which includes metaphor and other figures of thought, and (c) illustrates the previous points by examining both Jean Piaget's creative work and his ideas about creative work, drawing on unpublished interviews and other sources. Special attention is given to an example of metaphors and other figures of thought that play important roles in Piaget's thinking. These include the circle of the sciences, nourishment and growth, biology and knowledge, toys, projection, possibilities, incubation, writing as thinking, internal logic, music, morality and structure, adolescent dreamer, ascent, and ascending equilibration.     

Observed actions affect body-specific associations between space and valence

Right-handers tend to associate “good” with the right side of space and “bad” with the left. This implicit association appears to arise from the way people perform actions, more or less fluently, with their right and left hands. Here we tested whether observing manual actions performed with greater or lesser fluency can affect observers' space–valence associations. In two experiments, we assigned one participant (the actor) to perform a bimanual fine motor task while another participant (the observer) watched. Actors were assigned to wear a ski glove on either the right or left hand, which made performing the actions on this side of space disfluent. In Experiment 1, observers stood behind the actors, sharing their spatial perspective. After motor training, both actors and observers tended to associate “good” with the side of the actors' free hand and “bad” with the side of the gloved hand. To determine whether observers' space–valence associations were computed from their own perspectives or the actors', in Experiment 2 we asked the observer to stand face-to-face with the actor, reversing their spatial perspectives. After motor training, both actors and observers associated “good” with the side of space where disfluent actions had occurred from their own egocentric spatial perspectives; if “good” was associated with the actor's right-hand side it was likely to be associated with the observer's left-hand side. Results show that vicarious experiences of motor fluency can shape valence judgments, and that observers spontaneously encode the locations of fluent and disfluent actions in egocentric spatial coordinates.     

When family considerations influence work decisions: Decision-making processes

The work–family literature has provided an abundance of evidence that various family factors are linked to various work decisions, suggesting that the “family-relatedness” of work decisions is a prevalent phenomenon (Greenhaus & Powell, 2012). However, the cognitive processes by which such linkages occur have received little attention. We offer a framework by which to examine individuals' decision-making processes when they take family considerations into account in their work decisions. The framework suggests stages through which individuals proceed when making a work decision that takes family considerations into account and cognitive processes that influence how they proceed through each stage.     

The concept of egocentrism in the context of Piaget’s theory

In this paper, we trace the origin and development of the concept of egocentrism in Piaget’s work. We evaluate a number of criticisms that have been leveled against the concept of egocentrism. Based on our evaluation, we propose a reconceptualization of the concept of egocentrism as a decentering process with different phases that is recapitulated at different stages of development. We provide examples of the decentering process for the sensorimotor, preoperational, concrete-operational, and formal operational stages.Piaget introduced the concept of egocentrism in his early writings in the 1920s to describe general characteristics of the preschool child. Since its introduction, the concept of egocentrism has received considerable theoretical and empirical attention and has drawn numerous criticisms. Piaget attributed these criticisms to serious misunderstandings of the concept of egocentrism. Indeed, Piaget (1945/1962, p. 285, fn) admitted that the choice of the term egocentrism was “unfortunate”, and he apologized (Piaget & Inhelder, 1948/1967, p. 220) for having dwelt on this expression for the last twenty-five years.In this paper, we trace the origins of the concept of egocentrism in Piaget’s writings and examine the subsequent changes to this concept. We examine some of the criticisms leveled against the concept of egocentrism and conclude that the concept of egocentrism remained ambiguous in Piaget’s writings. Finally, we suggest a revision of the concept of egocentrism that addresses these ambiguities.