Scared stiff: The influence of anxiety on the perception of action capabilities

Influences on the perception of affordances (i.e., opportunities for actions) have been primarily studied by manipulating the functional morphology of the body. However, affordances are not just determined by the functional morphology of the perceiver, but also by the physiological state of the perceiver. States of anxiety have been shown to lead to marked changes in individuals’ physiological state and their behaviour. To assess the influence of emotional state on affordance perception, the perception of action capabilities in near space was examined after participants completed an anxiety-provoking task. Anxiety was induced immediately prior to tasks that assessed participants' perceived reaching ability in Experiment 1, grasping ability in Experiment 2, and the ability to pass their hands through apertures in Experiment 3. Results indicated that those participants who experienced changes in anxiety underestimated their reaching, grasping, and passing ability compared to non-anxious participants. In other words, anxious participants were more conservative in their estimations of their action capabilities. These results suggest that anxiety influences the perception for affordances in near space and are consistent with the notion that anxiety induces withdrawal behaviours.     

Dynamic object perception by pigeons: discrimination of action in video presentations

Two experiments examined the discrimination by pigeons of relative motion using computer-generated video stimuli. Using a go/no-go procedure, pigeons were tested with video stimuli in which the camera's perspective went either "around" or "through" an approaching object in a semi-realistic context. Experiment 1 found that pigeons could learn this discrimination and transfer it to videos composed from novel objects. Experiment 2 found that the order of the video's frames was critical to the discrimination of the videos. We hypothesize that the pigeons perceived a three-dimensional representation of the objects and the camera's relative motion and used this as the primary basis for discrimination. It is proposed that the pigeons might be able to form generalized natural categories for the different kinds of motions portrayed in the videos. Accepted after revision: 23 March 2001 Electronic Publication     

The sound of you and me: Novices represent shared goals in joint action

People performing joint actions coordinate their individual actions with each other to achieve a shared goal. The current study investigated the mental representations that are formed when people learn a new skill as part of a joint action. In a musical transfer-of-learning paradigm, piano novices first learned to perform simple melodies in the joint action context of coordinating with an accompanist to produce musical duets. Participants then performed their previously learned actions with two types of auditory feedback: while hearing either their individual action goal (the melody) or the shared action goal (the duet). As predicted, participants made more performance errors in the individual goal condition than in the shared goal condition. Further experimental manipulations indicated that this difference was not due to different coordination requirements in the two conditions or perceptual dissimilarities between learning and test. Together, these findings indicate that people form representations of shared goals in contexts that promote minimal representations, such as when learning a new action together with another person.     

The sense of agency in human-human vs human-robot joint action

Kinesthesis pertains to the perception of moving body parts, while the sense of agency refers to the experience of controlling one’s action-effects. Based on previous work, we hypothesized that the sense of agency would decrease in joint action with a robot compared to a human partner. Pairs of participants were jointly manipulating two interconnected haptic devices enabling them to feel each other’s forces. Unbeknown to participants, their partner was sometimes replaced by a robot. The sense of agency was assessed using intentional binding, which refers to a contraction of perceived time between an action and its effect for intentional actions, and participants’ judgment of their contribution to joint action. Participants judged their contribution as higher when they were initiating action and when they were paired with the robot. By contrast, intentional binding occurred only with a human partner. This outcome supports the hypothesis that human-robot joint action hinders intentional binding.     

场景知觉过程中的动作意图识别

场景即我们生活于其中的真实环境, 社会场景是其重要组成部分。在社会场景知觉的研究中, 动作意图的识别既受场景背景信息的影响, 也与动作的客观对象有关。因此, 研究者可以根据背景-刺激物、刺激物-刺激物关系, 探索动作识别的影响机制; 另一方面, 也可以根据场景的语义约束和物理限制, 依据合理动作原则及其伴随的生理指标检测并识别动作意图。在机器视觉研究领域, 计算机识别模型为社会场景中动作意图的检测和识别提供了新的视角。在未来的研究中, 研究者需要考虑真实场景中动作意图识别能力的发展、动作意图识别的个体差异和文化差异等问题。     

Social cognition in simple action coordination: A case for direct perception

In this paper we sketch the outlines of an account of the kind of social cognition involved in simple action coordination that is based on direct social perception (DSP) rather than recursive mindreading. While we recognize the viability of a mindreading-based account such as e.g. Michael Tomasello’s, we present an alternative DSP account that (i) explains simple action coordination in a less cognitively demanding manner, (ii) is better able to explain flexibility and strategy-switching in coordination and crucially (iii) allows for formal modeling. This account of action coordination is based on the notion of an agent’s field of affordances. Coordination ensues, we argue, when, given a shared intention, the actions of and/or affordances for one agent shape the field of affordances for another agent. This a form of social perception since in particular perceiving affordances for another person involves seeing that person as an agent. It is a form of social perception since it involves perceiving affordances for another person and registering how another person’s actions influence one’s own perceived field of affordances.     

The world in black and white: Ostracism enhances the categorical perception of social information

In two experiments, ostracized individuals showed more pronounced categorical perception of inclusion- and exclusion-related stimuli. Specifically, ostracism enhanced the ability to distinguish between-category differences (e.g., between happy and angry faces) relative to within-category differences (e.g., between two happy expressions). Participants were socially included or excluded via Cyberball (a virtual ball-tossing task). In Experiment 1, ostracized participants showed greater perceptual acuity in distinguishing between subtly happy and angry expressions combined with a reduced ability to discriminate expressions within each expression category. Experiment 2 found analogous categorical perception effects for targets varying on the dimension of race. Importantly, this effect was specific to social information; categorical perception of non-social objects was not qualified by social exclusion. These results suggest that ostracism exacerbates categorical perception, attuning perceivers to the differences between various inclusion- and exclusion-related categories relative to within category acuity, making the world appear more ‘black-and-white’ than it might otherwise.     

Peak velocity as a cue in audiovisual synchrony perception of rhythmic stimuli

This study investigated audiovisual synchrony perception in a rhythmic context, where the sound was not consequent upon the observed movement. Participants judged synchrony between a bouncing point-light figure and an auditory rhythm in two experiments. Two questions were of interest: (1) whether the reference in the visual movement, with which the auditory beat should coincide, relies on a position or a velocity cue; (2) whether the figure form and motion profile affect synchrony perception. Experiment 1 required synchrony judgment with regard to the same (lowest) position of the movement in four visual conditions: two figure forms (human or non-human) combined with two motion profiles (human or ball trajectory). Whereas figure form did not affect synchrony perception, the point of subjective simultaneity differed between the two motions, suggesting that participants adopted the peak velocity in each downward trajectory as their visual reference. Experiment 2 further demonstrated that, when judgment was required with regard to the highest position, the maximal synchrony response was considerably low for ball motion, which lacked a peak velocity in the upward trajectory. The finding of peak velocity as a cue parallels results of visuomotor synchronization tasks employing biological stimuli, suggesting that synchrony judgment with rhythmic motions relies on the perceived visual beat.     

The factorial structure of individual differences in visual perception

Although at first glance the way we perceive the world is similar for most individuals and resembles a veridical interpretation of the environment, the persistent individual differences found in many perceptual processes continue to inspire and confuse researchers. Despite numerous attempts to map out the reliable factors and correlates of individual variance in perception, the factorial structure of vision has remained elusive. The current article reviews recent developments in the study of individual differences in perception with a focus on work that has applied latent variable techniques for analysing performance across multiple visual paradigms. As this overview reveals, studies that have attempted to answer the question whether one general or several specific factors best describe vision tend to reject the monolithic view. Some general notes are also provided regarding pitfalls that should be taken into account when designing such research in the future.     

On predicting others’ words: Electrophysiological evidence of prediction in speech production

The present study investigated whether lexical processes that occur when we name objects can also be observed when an interaction partner is naming objects. We compared the behavioral and electrophysiological responses of participants performing a conditional go/no-go picture naming task in two different conditions: individually and jointly with a confederate participant. To obtain an index of lexical processing, we manipulated lexical frequency, so that half of the pictures had corresponding names of high-frequency and the remaining half had names of low-frequency. Color cues determined whether participants should respond, whether their task-partner should respond, or whether nobody should respond. Behavioral and ERP results showed that participants engaged in lexical processing when it was their turn to respond. Crucially, ERP results on no-go trials revealed that participants also engaged in lexical processing when it was their partner’s turn to act. In addition, ERP results showed increased response inhibition selectively when it was the partner’s turn to act. These findings provide evidence for the claim that listeners generate predictions about speakers’ utterances by relying on their own action production system.     

How to (and how not to) think about top-down influences on visual perception

The question of whether cognition can influence perception has a long history in neuroscience and philosophy. Here, we outline a novel approach to this issue, arguing that it should be viewed within the framework of top-down information-processing. This approach leads to a reversal of the standard explanatory order of the cognitive penetration debate: we suggest studying top-down processing at various levels without preconceptions of perception or cognition. Once a clear picture has emerged about which processes have influences on those at lower levels, we can re-address the extent to which they should be considered perceptual or cognitive. Using top-down processing within the visual system as a model for higher-level influences, we argue that the current evidence indicates clear constraints on top-down influences at all stages of information processing; it does, however, not support the notion of a boundary between specific types of information-processing as proposed by the cognitive impenetrability hypothesis.     

The cognitive penetrability of perception: A blocked debate and a tentative solution

Despite the extensive body of psychological findings suggesting that cognition influences perception, the debate between defenders and detractors of the cognitive penetrability of perception persists. While detractors demand more strictness in psychological experiments, proponents consider that empirical studies show that cognitive penetrability occurs. These considerations have led some theorists to propose that the debate has reached a dead end. The issue about where perception ends and cognition begins is, I argue, one of the reasons why the debate is cornered. Another reason is the inability of psychological studies to present uncontroversial interpretations of the results obtained. To dive into other kinds of empirical sources is, therefore, required to clarify the debate. In this paper, I explain where the debate is blocked, and suggest that neuroscientific evidence together with the predictive coding account, might decant the discussion on the side of the penetrability thesis.     

The psychophysics of chasing: A case study in the perception of animacy

Psychologists have long been captivated by the perception of animacy – the fact that even simple moving shapes may appear to engage in animate, intentional, and goal-directed movements. Here we report several new types of studies of a particularly salient form of perceived animacy: chasing, in which one shape (the ‘wolf’) pursues another shape (‘the sheep’). We first demonstrate two new cues to perceived chasing – chasing subtlety (the degree to which the wolf deviates from perfectly ‘heat-seeking’ pursuit) and directionality (whether and how the shapes ‘face’ each other). We then use these cues to show how it is possible to assess the objective accuracy of such percepts, and to distinguish the immediate perception of chasing from those more subtle (but nevertheless real) types of ‘stalking’ that cannot be readily perceived. We also report several methodological advances. Previous studies of the perception of animacy have faced two major challenges: (a) it is difficult to measure perceived animacy with quantitative precision; and (b) task demands make it difficult to distinguish perception from higher-level inferences about animacy. We show how these challenges can be met, at least in our case study of perceived chasing, via tasks based on dynamic visual search (the Find-the-Chase task) and a new type of interactive display (the Don’t-Get-Caught! task).     

With or without you: The paradoxical role of identification in predicting joint and ingroup collective action in intergroup conflict

While we have a rich understanding of the motivations of disadvantaged group members to act collectively with their group, especially the important role played by identification, we know less about the disadvantaged's motivations to engage in joint action with the advantaged. This research examines the role of identification in predicting joint and ingroup collective action in intergroup conflicts. Since joint action inherently diffuses the perception of “us versus them”, we propose that identification predicts ingroup action, but not joint action. We also examine conflict intensity as a moderator, and examine how changing identification is linked to change in support for joint action. We test these hypotheses in a three-wave longitudinal study in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. Results support our hypotheses, demonstrating that identification positively predicts ingroup action but not necessarily joint action, and that when conflict intensifies, changes in identification are negatively related to joint action with outgroup members.     

The role of perception, language, and preference in the developmental acquisition of basic color terms

When learning basic color vocabulary, young children show a selective delay in the acquisition of brown and gray relative to other basic color terms. In this study, we first establish the robustness of this finding and then investigate the extent to which perception, language, and color preference may influence color conceptualization. Experimental tasks were designed to measure different aspects of perceptual color processing (discrimination and saliency), color preference and objective counts of color term frequency in preschool-directed language (books and mothers' speech) were used to compare the acquisition of three groups of colors: primary colors, secondary colors (orange, pink, and purple) that appear at the same time as the primary colors, and secondary colors (brown and gray) that appear late. Although our results suggest that perception does not directly shape young children's color term acquisition, we found that children prefer brown and gray significantly less than basic colors and that these color terms appear significantly less often in child-directed speech, suggesting that color preference, linguistic input, and developing color cognition may be linked.     

The perception of (naked only) bodies and faceless heads relies on holistic processing: Evidence from the inversion effect

Faces and bodies are more difficult to perceive when presented inverted than when presented upright (i.e., stimulus inversion effect), an effect that has been attributed to the disruption of holistic processing. The features that can trigger holistic processing in faces and bodies, however, still remain elusive. In this study, using a sequential matching task, we tested whether stimulus inversion affects various categories of visual stimuli: faces, faceless heads, faceless heads in body context, headless bodies naked, whole bodies naked, headless bodies clothed, and whole bodies clothed. Both accuracy and inversion efficiency score results show inversion effects for all categories but for clothed bodies (with and without heads). In addition, the magnitude of the inversion effect for face, naked body, and faceless heads was similar. Our findings demonstrate that the perception of faces, faceless heads, and naked bodies relies on holistic processing. Clothed bodies (with and without heads), on the other side, may trigger clothes-sensitive rather than body-sensitive perceptual mechanisms.     

The role of motor simulation in action perception: a neuropsychological case study

Research on embodied cognition stresses that bodily and motor processes constrain how we perceive others. Regarding action perception the most prominent hypothesis is that observed actions are matched to the observer’s own motor representations. Previous findings demonstrate that the motor laws that constrain one’s performance also constrain one’s perception of others’ actions. The present neuropsychological case study asked whether neurological impairments affect a person’s performance and action perception in the same way. The results showed that patient DS, who suffers from a frontal brain lesion, not only ignored target size when performing movements but also when asked to judge whether others can perform the same movements. In other words DS showed the same violation of Fitts’s law when performing and observing actions. These results further support the assumption of close perception action links and the assumption that these links recruit predictive mechanisms residing in the motor system.     

Slower access to visual awareness but otherwise intact implicit perception of emotional faces in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders

Schizophrenia-spectrum disorders are characterized by deficits in social domains. Extant research has reported an impaired ability to perceive emotional faces in schizophrenia. Yet, it is unclear if these deficits occur already in the access to visual awareness. To investigate this question, 23 people with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder and 22 healthy controls performed a breaking continuous flash suppression task with fearful, happy, and neutral faces. Response times were analysed with generalized linear mixed models. People with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders were slower than controls in detecting faces, but did not show emotion-specific impairments. Moreover, happy faces were detected faster than neutral and fearful faces, across all participants. Although caution is needed when interpreting the main effect of group, our findings may suggest an elevated threshold for visual awareness in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, but an intact implicit emotion perception. Our study provides a new insight into the mechanisms underlying emotion perception in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders.     

Role of visual-perceptual skills (non-motor) in children with developmental coordination disorder

The purposes of this study were to examine test-retest reliability of the Test of Visual-Perceptual Skills (Non-Motor)-Revised (TVPS-R), to explore motor-free visual-perceptual skills, and to categorize subtypes thereof in children with developmental coordination disorder (DCD). One hundred and seventy-eight children, aged 9 and 10 years, identified as having DCD with the Movement Assessment Battery for Children (M-ABC), were assessed, along with 200 typically developing children. The results showed good test-retest reliability for the total perceptual quotient scores of the TVPS-R, but not for all subtests. Children with DCD performed significantly poorer compared to typically developing children on the visual-perceptual test, but the deficits were not common to all children with DCD. This study supported the stance that we should consider the heterogeneous characteristics of children with DCD when designing experimental studies or developing educational interventions.