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2.
Robert Jubb 《Res Publica》2009,15(4):337-353
In this paper, I seek to undermine G.A. Cohen’s polemical use of a metaethical claim he makes in his article, ‘Facts and Principles’,
by arguing that that use requires an unsustainable equivocation between epistemic and logical grounding. I begin by distinguishing
three theses that Cohen has offered during the course of his critique of Rawls and contractualism more generally, the foundationalism
about grounding thesis, the justice as non-regulative thesis, and the justice as all-encompassing thesis, and briefly argue
that they are analytically independent of each other. I then offer an outline of the foundationalism about grounding thesis,
characterising it, as Cohen does, as a demand of logic. That thesis claims that whenever a normative principle is dependent
on a fact, it is so dependent in virtue of some other principle. I then argue that although this is true as a matter of logic,
it, as Cohen admits, cannot be true of actual justifications, since logic cannot tell us anything about the truth as opposed
to the validity of arguments. Facts about a justification cannot then be decisive for whether or not a given argument violates
the foundationalism about grounding thesis. As long as, independently of actual justifications, theorists can point to plausible
logically grounding principles, as I argue contractualists can, Cohen’s thesis lacks critical bite. 相似文献
3.
Pablo Gilabert 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2012,15(1):39-56
What should our theorizing about social justice aim at? Many political philosophers think that a crucial goal is to identify
a perfectly just society. Amartya Sen disagrees. In The Idea of Justice, he argues that the proper goal of an inquiry about justice is to undertake comparative assessments of feasible social scenarios
in order to identify reforms that involve justice-enhancement, or injustice-reduction, even if the results fall short of perfect
justice. Sen calls this the “comparative approach” to the theory of justice. He urges its adoption on the basis of a sustained
critique of the former approach, which he calls “transcendental.” In this paper I pursue two tasks, one critical and the other
constructive. First, I argue that Sen’s account of the contrast between the transcendental and the comparative approaches
is not convincing, and second, I suggest what I take to be a broader and more plausible account of comparative assessments
of justice. The core claim is that political philosophers should not shy away from the pursuit of ambitious theories of justice
(including, for example, ideal theories of perfect justice), although they should engage in careful consideration of issues
of political feasibility bearing on their practical implementation. 相似文献
4.
Ryan W. Davis 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2011,14(2):207-222
Political liberals, following Rawls, believe that justice should be ‘political’ rather than ‘metaphysical.’ In other words,
a conception of justice ought to be freestanding from first-order moral and metaethical views. The reason for this is to ensure
that the state’s coercion be justified to citizens in terms that meet political liberalism’s principle of legitimacy. I suggest
that privileging a political conception of justice involves costs—such as forgoing the opportunity for political theory to
learn from other areas of philosophy. I argue that it is not clear that it provides any benefit in return. Whether a political
conception of justice more adequately satisfies the liberal principle of legitimacy than a metaphysical conception of justice
is an open question. To show this, I describe three ways in which political conceptions of justice have been developed within
the literature. I then argue that while each might be helpful in finding reasons that reasonable citizens can accept, all
face challenges in satisfying the liberal principle of legitimacy. Political conceptions of justice confront the same set
of justificatory problems as ‘metaphysical’ conceptions. The question of whether a political conception is preferable should
receive greater scrutiny. 相似文献
5.
It is estimated that there could be 200 million‘environmental refugees’ by the middle of this century. One major environmental
cause of population displacement is likely to be global climate change. As the situation is likely to become more pressing,
it is vital to consider now the rights of environmental refugees and the duties of the rest of the world. However, this is
not an issue that has been addressed in mainstream theories of global justice. This paper considers the potential of two leading
liberal theories of international justice to address the particular issues raised by the plight of potential and actual environmental
refugees. I argue that neither John Rawls’s ‘Law of Peoples’ approach nor Charles Beitz’s `cosmopolitanism' is capable of
providing an adequate account of justice in this context. Beitz’s theory does have some advantages over Rawls’s approach but
it fails to take proper account of the attachment that some people have to their own ‘home’.
This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
6.
E. J. Coffman 《Synthese》2006,151(2):257-272
In this paper, I consider some issues involving a certain closure principle for Structural Justification, a relation between
a cognitive subject and a proposition that’s expressed by locutions like ‘S has a source of justification for p’ and ‘p is
justifiable for S’. I begin by summarizing recent work by Peter Klein that advances the thesis that the indicated closure
principle is plausible but lacks Skeptical utility. I then assess objections to Klein’s thesis based on work by Robert Audi
and Anthony Brueckner. One finding is that the typical statement of the relevant closure principle can express a number of
different closure principles, and that recognizing this helps to resolve certain disputes. 相似文献
7.
Michael Wolff 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2010,41(2):359-371
In an earlier article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2010) 41: 341–355) I have compared Aristotle’s syllogistic with Kant’s theory
of “pure ratiocination”. “Ratiocinia pura” („reine Vernunftschlüsse“) is Kant’s designation for assertoric syllogisms Aristotle has called ‘perfect’. In Kant’s view
they differ from non-pure ratiocinia precisely in that their validity rests only on the validity of the Dictum de omni et nullo (which, however, in Kant’s view can be further reduced to more fundamental principles) whereas the validity of non-pure ratiocinia additionally presupposes the validity of inferences which Kant calls consequentiae immediatae. I have argued that Kant’s view is in some (not in all) essential features in accordance with Aristotle’s view concerning
perfect syllogisms and certainly leading to a tenable and interesting logical theory. As a result I have rejected not only
the interpretation of Aristotle adopted by Theodor Ebert, but also the objections he has raised against Kant’s logical theory.
As far as Aristotle is concerned, Ebert has attempted to defend his position in the first part of his reply to my article
published in J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 357–365, and I have argued against this defence in issue 1 of the J Gen Philos Sci (2010) 41: 199–213 (cf. Ebert’s answer
in the same issue pp. 215–231). In the following discussion I deal with Eberts defence of his criticism of Kant published
in the second part of his reply to my article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 365–372). I shall argue, that Kant’s principle ‘nota notae est nota rei ipsius’ and his use of technical vocabulary stand up to the objections raised by Ebert. His attempts to prove that Kant’s logical
theory is defective are based on several misinterpretations. 相似文献
8.
Bell DR 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2003,24(5):381-393
In his paper, “The Relevance of Rawls’ Principle of Justice for Research on Cognitively Impaired Patients” (Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 23 (2002):45–53), Giovanni Maio has developed athought-provoking argument for the permissibility of non-therapeutic research
on cognitively impaired patients. Maio argues that his conclusion follows from the acceptance of John Rawls’s principles of
justice, specifically, Rawls’s “liberty principle” Maio has misinterpreted Rawls’s “libertyprinciple” – correctly interpreted
it does notsupport non-therapeutic research on cognitivelyimpaired patients. Three other ‘Rawlsian’ arguments are suggested
by Maio’s discussion –two “self-respect” arguments and a “presumed consent” argument – but none of them are convincing. However,
an alternative argument developed from Rawls’s discussion of “justice in health care” in his most recent book, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, may justify certain kinds of non-therapeutic research on some cognitively impaired patients in special circumstances. We
should not expect anything more permissive from a liberal theory of justice.
This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
9.
Franziska Dübgen 《Res Publica》2012,18(1):65-77
Critiques of development aid from its recipient’s sometimes draw our attention to the perception of paternalism on the part
of ‘development industry’ actors. Even within participatory project designs, critical voices recount experiences of clear
power divides and informal hierarchies determining the content and form of ‘cooperation’. While neoliberal as well as neo-Marxist
scholars base their critiques on a distributive scheme of global justice, post-development theory emphasizes respect and recognition
as the central aspect of justice Indeed, post-development theorists continue to complain of neo-colonial power structures
between nations as well as on a micro-level between the ‘experts’ and local people. The latter feel misrecognized in being
judged according to the parameters of Western actors within the international community. This article explores how charges
of misrecognition within development cooperation challenge the assumption by many liberal political theorists that more global
justice could be achieved through more aid. 相似文献
10.
Brian Ellis 《Sophia》2011,50(1):135-139
A theory of morality acceptable to humanists must be one that can be accepted independently of religion. In this paper, I
argue that while there is such a theory, it is a non-standard one, and its acceptance would have some far-reaching consequences.
As one might expect, the theory is similar to others in various ways. But it is not the same as any of them. Indeed, it is
a radically new theory. Like Hume’s ethics, it is founded on our natural sociability, and feelings of empathy for others.
Like Aristotle’s theory, it incorporates an ethics of virtue. Like Kant’s theory, it regards the set of moral principles as
those appropriate for a socially ideal society. But unlike Kant’s theory, it is essentially utilitarian. I call it ‘social
contractual utilitarianism’. 相似文献
11.
J. L. Dowell 《Philosophical Studies》2006,131(1):25-60
Intuitively, physicalism is the thesis that there’s nothing ‘over and above’ the physical. Going beyond this intuitive formulation
requires an account of what it is for a property, kind, relation, or object to be a physical one. Here I defend an unfamiliar
implementation of the familiar strategy of defining physical properties, etc. as those posited by the complete and ideal physical
theory. That implementation ties being a physical theory to being a theory with the hallmarks of scientific theories and then
identifies physical theories among the scientific ones by their characteristic subject matter, roughly, the world’s relatively
fundamental elements. I then argue that, fully fleshed out, such an account is able to satisfy an array of constraints on
any account of the physical, as well as avoid a number of prima facie objections, without imposing Wilson’s No Fundamental
Mentality Constraint. 相似文献
12.
Steven Crowell 《Synthese》2008,160(3):335-354
This paper argues that transcendental phenomenology (here represented by Edmund Husserl) can accommodate the main thesis of
semantic externalism, namely, that intentional content is not simply a matter of what is ‘in the head,’ but depends on how
the world is. I first introduce the semantic problem as an issue of how linguistic tokens or mental states can have ‘content’—that
is, how they can set up conditions of satisfaction or be responsive to norms such that they can succeed or fail at referring.
The standard representationalist view—which thinks of the problem in first-person terms—is contrasted with Brandom’s pragmatic
inferentialist approach, which adopts a third-person stance. The rest of the paper defends a phenomenological version of the
representationalist position (seeking to preserve its first-person stance) but offers a conception of representation that
does not identify it with an entity ‘in the head.’ The standard view of Husserl as a Cartesian internalist is undermined by
rejecting its fundamental assumption—that Husserl’s concept of the ‘noema’ is a mental entity—and by defending a concept of
‘phenomenological immanence’ that has a normative, rather than a psychological, structure. Finally, it is argued that phenomenological
immanence cannot be identified with ‘consciousness’ in Husserl’s sense, though consciousness is a necessary condition for
it. 相似文献
13.
Diego Marconi 《Erkenntnis》2006,65(3):301-318
The claim that truth is mind dependent has some initial plausibility only if truth bearers are taken to be mind dependent
entities such as beliefs or statements. Even on that assumption, however, the claim is not uncontroversial. If it is spelled
out as the thesis that “in a world devoid of mind nothing would be true”, then everything depends on how the phrase ‘true
in world w’ is interpreted. If ‘A is true in w’ is interpreted as ‘A is true of
w’ (i.e. ‘w satisfies A’s truth conditions’, the claim need not be true. If on the other hand it is interpreted as ‘A is true of w
and exists in w’ then the claim is trivially true, though devoid of any antirealistic efficacy. Philosophers like Heidegger and Rorty, who
hold that truth is mind dependent but reality is not, must regard such principles as “A if and only if it is true that A”
as only contingently true, which may be a good reason to reject the mind dependence of truth anyway. 相似文献
14.
Stephen Finlay 《Synthese》2010,177(1):67-89
Some intuitive normative principles raise vexing ‘detaching problems’ by their failure to license modus ponens. I examine
three such principles (a self-reliance principle and two different instrumental principles) and recent stategies employed
to resolve their detaching problems. I show that solving these problems necessitates postulating an indefinitely large number
of senses for ‘ought’. The semantics for ‘ought’ that is standard in linguistics offers a unifying strategy for solving these
problems, but I argue that an alternative approach combining an end-relational theory of normativity with a comparative probabilistic semantics for ‘ought’ provides a more satisfactory solution. 相似文献
15.
Kai Horsthemke 《Science and engineering ethics》2011,17(2):321-334
In a recent journal article, as well as in a recent book chapter, in which she critiques my position on ‘indigenous knowledge’,
Lesley Green of the Department of Social Anthropology at the University of Cape Town argues that ‘diverse epistemologies ought
to be evaluated not on their capacity to express a strict realism but on their ability to advance understanding’. In order
to examine the implications of Green’s arguments, and of Nelson Goodman and Catherine Elgin’s work in this regard, I apply
them to a well-known controversy between Native American (or First Nations) creationism and archaeology. I argue that issues
in social justice should be distinguished from issues in epistemology. Moreover, in tightening in this paper the link between
knowledge and truth, I attempt to defend science as a ‘privileged way of seeing the world’. The analysis of truth, and of
related concepts like reality and ‘the way the world is’, will assume a central role here. I contend that, ultimately, the
only coherent and consistent position is a realist view of the pertinent issues and ideas. 相似文献
16.
Josh Weisberg 《Synthese》2008,160(2):161-181
The same-order representation theory of consciousness holds that conscious mental states represent both the world and themselves.
This complex representational structure is posited in part to avoid a powerful objection to the more traditional higher-order
representation theory of consciousness. The objection contends that the higher-order theory fails to account for the intimate
relationship that holds between conscious states and our awareness of them–the theory ‘divides the phenomenal labor’ in an
illicit fashion. This ‘failure of intimacy’ is exposed by the possibility of misrepresentation by higher-order states. In
this paper, I argue that despite appearances, the same-order theory fails to avoid the objection, and thus also has troubles
with intimacy.
A version of this paper was presented at the ‘Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness’ conference, Center for Consciousness
Studies, University of Arizona, March 18th–20th, 2005. 相似文献
17.
Garrett Thomson 《Synthese》2008,162(3):373-384
Kolak’s arguments for the thesis ‘there is only one person’ in fact show that the subject-in-itself is not a countable entity.
The paper argues for this assertion by comparing Kolak’s concept of the subject with Kant’s notion of the transcendental unity
of apperception (TUAP), which is a formal feature of experience and not countable. It also argues the point by contrasting
both the subject and the TUAP with the notion of the individual human being or empirical self, which is the main concern standard
theories of personal identity such as those of Williams, Parfit and Nozick. Unlike the empirical self, but rather like Kant’s
TUAP, the subject-in-itself cannot be counted because it is not an object or substance, despite Kolak’s thesis that there
is only one. The paper also maintains that Kolak’s contention that the subject is an entity hinges on a strong and less plausible
interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism. 相似文献
18.
Volker Heins 《Res Publica》2012,18(1):79-91
If justice means equal participation and inclusion, as authors such as Axel Honneth or Nancy Fraser have argued, the question
still remains: inclusion in what, and of whom? This question has not been investigated with sufficient attention. Drawing
on the example of the experience of Palestinians and Israeli Arabs, I address this issue by distinguishing different meanings
of equality which correspond to different types of political struggles. In so doing, I re-examine Honneth’s claim that the
critical theory of recognition has no room for cultural groups as referents of a potential ‘fourth principle of recognition’
beyond legal equality, the merit principle, and love. It is argued that Honneth’s critique of collective rights neglects crucial
differences between the types of groups that exist in modern states, and between the different kinds of struggles for equality
waged by those groups. 相似文献
19.
20.
Stephen Finlay 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(3):315-340
This paper advances a reductive semantics for ‘ought’ and a naturalistic theory of normativity. It gives a unified analysis
of predictive, instrumental, and categorical uses of ‘ought’: the predictive ‘ought’ is basic, and is interpreted in terms
of probability. Instrumental ‘oughts’ are analyzed as predictive ‘oughts’ occurring under an ‘in order that’ modifer (the
end-relational theory). The theory is then extended to categorical uses of ‘ought’: it is argued that they are special rhetorical
uses of the instrumental ‘ought’. Plausible conversational principles explain how this end-relational ‘ought’ can perform
the expressive functions of the moral ‘ought’. The notion of an ‘ought-simpliciter’ is also discussed.
相似文献
Stephen FinlayEmail: |