共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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Philosophical Studies - While fallibilism has been the dominant view in epistemology in recent times, the field has witnessed the rise of a new form of infallibilism. In a recent book, Jessica... 相似文献
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Christopher Cowley 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2013,34(3):227-238
In a recent article, Henri Wijsbek discusses the 1991 Chabot “psychiatric euthanasia” case in the Netherlands, and argues that Chabot was justified in helping his patient to die. Dutch legislation at the time permitted physician assisted suicide when the patient’s condition is severe, hopeless, and unbearable. The Dutch Supreme Court agreed with Chabot that the patient met these criteria because of her justified depression, even though she was somatically healthy. Wijsbek argues that in this case, the patient’s integrity had been undermined by recent events, and that this is the basis for taking her request seriously; it was unreasonable to expect that she could start again. In this paper, I do not challenge the Dutch euthanasia criteria in the case of somatic illness, but I argue that both Chabot and Wijsbek are wrong because we can never be sufficiently confident in cases of severe exogenous depression to assist the patient in her irreversible act. This is partly because of the essential difference between somatic and mental illness, and because of the possibility of therapy and other help. In addition, I argue that Wijsbek’s concept of integrity cannot do the work that he expects of it. Finally, I consider a 2011 position paper from the Royal Dutch Medical Association on euthanasia, and the implications it might have for Chabot-style cases in the future. 相似文献
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Adrian Boutel 《Philosophical Studies》2013,164(2):301-320
This paper advances a version of physicalism which reconciles the “a priori entailment thesis” (APET) with the analytic independence of our phenomenal and physical vocabularies. The APET is the claim that, if physicalism is true, the complete truths of physics imply every other truth a priori. If so, “cosmic hermeneutics” is possible: a demon having only complete knowledge of physics could deduce every truth about the world. Analytic independence is a popular physicalist explanation for the apparent “epistemic gaps” between phenomenal and physical truths. The two are generally seen as incompatible, since the demon’s deductions seem to presuppose analytic connections between physical and phenomenal terms. I begin by arguing, in support of the APET, that implications from the complete truths of physics to phenomenal truths cannot be a posteriori. Such implications are (according to the physicalist) necessarily true. But they cannot be Kripke-style a posteriori necessities, since (according to the physicalist) the complete truths of physics fix any relevant a posteriori facts about the reference of terms. I then show how the physicalist can turn the tables: the demon can exploit the physical fixing of reference to bridge the gap between the vocabularies, by deducing when phenomenal and physical terms co-refer. This opens the way for a “type-C” physicalism, which accepts in-principle deducibility while still appealing to analytic independence to explain why we (who are not demons) find it impossible to see phenomenal-physical connections a priori. 相似文献
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Philosophical Studies - Deontic, as opposed to evaluative buck-passing theories seem to be easier to accept, since there appears to be an intimate connection between deontic properties, such as... 相似文献
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Paula Droege 《Consciousness and cognition》2009,18(1):78-90
Consciousness has a peculiar affinity for presence; conscious states represent their contents as now. To understand how conscious states come to represent time in this way, we need a distinction between a mental state that represents now and one that simply occurs now. A teleofunctional theory accounts for the distinction in terms of the development and function of explicit temporal representation. The capacity to represent a situation explicitly as ‘now’ and compare it with past situations in order to prepare for the future involves the separation of goals from the particular action required to attain them. That is, when a creature is able to consider alternative paths of action, it becomes necessary to conceive of alternate future times as distinct from the present moment. The developmental, functional approach of a teleofunctional theory is promising in its ability to integrate research from diverse empirical fields for support of its claims. 相似文献
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Luca Incurvati 《Philosophical Studies》2012,159(1):69-87
According to the iterative conception of set, sets can be arranged in a cumulative hierarchy divided into levels. But why should we think this to be the case? The standard answer in the philosophical literature is that sets are somehow constituted by their members. In the first part of the paper, I present a number of problems for this answer, paying special attention to the view that sets are metaphysically dependent upon their members. In the second part of the paper, I outline a different approach, which circumvents these problems by dispensing with the priority or dependence relation altogether. Along the way, I show how this approach enables the mathematical structuralist to defuse an objection recently raised against her view. 相似文献
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Synthese - Revisionary ontologies seem to go against our common sense convictions about which material objects exist. These views face the so-called Problem of Reasonableness: they have to explain... 相似文献
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MICHAEL PENDLEBURY 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2010,80(1):182-207
Abstract. Expressivism can make space for normative objectivity by treating normative stances as pro or con attitudes that can be correct or incorrect. And it can answer the logical challenges that bedevil it by treating a simple normative assertion not merely as an expression of a normative stance, but as an expression of the endorsement of a proposition that is true if and only if that normative stance is correct. Although this position has superficial similarities to normative realism, it does full justice to the core expressivist thesis that, at bottom, a normative assertion expresses a normative stance rather than a factual belief. 相似文献
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Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - Colours are as objective as shapes. Representationalism about perceptual experiences – the view that perceptual experiences represent that things... 相似文献
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Synthese - Kriegel has revived adverbialism as a theory of consciousness. But recent attacks have shed doubt on the viability of the theory. To save adverbialism, I propose that the adverbialist... 相似文献
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Bruce Russell 《Erkenntnis》2004,61(2-3):245-255
Contextualists often argue from examples where it seems true to say in one context that a person knows something but not true to say that in another context where skeptical hypotheses have been introduced. The skeptical hypotheses can be moderate, simply mentioning what might be the case or raising questions about what a person is certain of, or radical, where scenarios about demon worlds, brains in vats, The Matrix, etc., are introduced. I argue that the introduction of these skeptical hypotheses leads people to fallaciously infer that it is no longer true to say that the relevant person knows. I believe that that is a better explanation of the so-called intuition that the person does not know than the contextualists who claim that raising these skeptical hypotheses changes the standards that determine when it is true to say S knows that P. At the end I raise the possibility that contextualists might defend their view on pragmatic rather than skeptical grounds by arguing that the standards of evidence rise when more is at stake in a practical sense. 相似文献
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Christian Coons 《Philosophical Studies》2011,155(1):83-98
I first argue that there are many true claims of the form: Φ-ing would be morally required, if anything is. I then explain
why the following conditional-type is true: If φ-ing would be morally required, if anything is, then anything is actually
morally required. These results allow us to construct valid proofs for the existence of some substantive moral facts—proofs
that some particular acts really are morally required. Most importantly, none of my argumentation presupposes any substantive
moral claim; I use only plausible claims that most moral skeptics and error theorists can and do accept. The final section
diagnoses why my arguments work. Here, I offer an explanation for the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral that may
help those worried that the strategy is a sophisticated trick. I conclude by considering two objections. In replying to these
objections, I explain why the strategy may allow us to demonstrate more than “obvious” moral truths, and why it may also address
a stronger version of error theory, according to which, moral truths are not possible. 相似文献