Causal attributions of married couples: when do they search for causes? What do they conclude when they do?

In this study, we examined when and whether married people engage in attributional activity or form causal attributions to explain their partners' behavior. We used an indirect probe to better approximate naturally occurring cognitive activity. We also examined the content of spouses' causal attributions, using both direct and indirect probes. Spouses were asked about frequent as well as infrequent relationship events, and about partner behaviors that had positive or negative impacts on the recipient. Husbands in unsatisfying relationships reported more attributional thoughts than did happily married husbands, whereas wives in the two groups did not differ. Behaviors having negative impacts elicited more attributional activity than did positive behaviors. Behavioral frequency and impact interacted in ways contrary to predictions. Finally, distressed couples were particularly likely to report distress-maintaining attributions and were particularly unlikely to report relationship-enhancing attributions, compared with their nondistressed counterparts.     

What else do you feel when you feel sad? Emotional overproduction, neuroticism and rumination

Numerous experimental and naturalistic studies have shown the relevant role of ruminative styles in the onset, duration and severity of depressive episodes. Recent research has increasingly focused on the precursors of these ruminative responses. Neuroticism has been found to be closely related to ruminative styles, but the nature of this relationship is unknown. Across three studies, we explored the role of emotional overproduction, conceptualized as the tendency to simultaneously experience an elevated number of negative emotions and feelings during sad episodes. Study 1 showed that emotional overproduction is independently and strongly associated with ruminative styles. Furthermore, emotional overproduction was found to mediate the relationship between neuroticism and ruminative styles. Study 2 replicated these findings in a large community sample even after controlling for mood, personality, and other emotion-related variables. In Study 3, we conducted a laboratory study to increase the internal and external validity of our findings. Implications for personality, for coping and stress literature, and for clinical research and treatment are suggested.     

What do humans feel with mistreated humans,animals, robots,and objects? Exploring the role of cognitive empathy

Motivation and Emotion - The aim of this paper is to present a study in which we compare the degree of empathy that a convenience sample of university students expressed with humans, animals,...     

What gives victims satisfaction when they seek revenge?

The present paper aims to elucidate under what conditions victims of injustice who seek revenge feel satisfied and perceive that everybody got what he or she deserved. Two hypotheses are discussed: The comparative suffering hypothesis states that seeing the offender suffer from fate is sufficient for evoking satisfaction and perceptions of deservingness among victims. The understanding hypothesis states that revenge can only be satisfactory when the offender understands it as a response to his or her prior behavior. These hypotheses were tested in three experimental studies. The comparative suffering hypothesis received only weak support. The understanding hypothesis, on the other hand, received much stronger support: When the offender understood revenge as punishment, revenge led to satisfaction and deservingness among victims. These findings are discussed with regard to the question why people take revenge. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Positively biased appraisals in everyday life: when do they benefit mental health and when do they harm it?

To promote optimal mental health, is it best to evaluate negative experiences accurately or in a positively biased manner? In an attempt to reconcile inconsistent prior research addressing this question, we predicted that the tendency to form positively biased appraisals of negative experiences may reduce the motive to address those experiences and thereby lead to poorer mental health in the context of negative experiences that are controllable and severe but lead to better mental health in the context of controllable negative experiences that are less severe by promoting positive feelings without invoking serious consequences from unaddressed problems. In 2 longitudinal studies, individuals in new marriages were interviewed separately about their ongoing stressful experiences, and their own appraisals of those experiences were compared with those of the interviewers. Across studies, spouses' tendencies to form positively biased appraisals of their stressful experiences predicted fewer depressive symptoms over the subsequent 4 years among individuals judged to be facing relatively mild experiences but more depressive symptoms among individuals judged to be facing relatively severe experiences. Furthermore, in Study 2, these effects were mediated by changes in those experiences, such that the interaction between the tendency to form positively biased appraisals of stressful experiences and the objectively rated severity of initial levels of those experiences directly predicted changes in those experiences, which in turn accounted for changes in depressive symptoms. These findings suggest that cognitive biases are not inherently positive or negative; their implications for mental health depend on the context in which they occur.     

What to do? Upgrade!

The contents of what we transmit in colleges and universities as philosophic traditions need upgrading. But so do the methods of transmission.     

How do you feel?

Does your heart pound because you feel afraid, or do you feel afraid because your heart is racing? This question is the crux of a century-old controversy, stemming from a proposal by William James. A recent neuroimaging study addresses this issue and suggests that the functional connectivity of the insula could provide the key to resolving the debate.     

What do people mean when speaking of evilness?

The term evilness started to become popular in social psychology after the publication in 1999 of the special issue edited by Arthur G. Miller, "Perspectives on evil and violence". It is usually used to define behaviors that are extremely and strongly harmful. However, the concept is still imprecise and needs to be empirically delineated. This article attempts to answer the following questions. What is evilness? What is the difference between aggression and evilness? We conducted several studies with three goals: to analyze how laypersons and experts define evilness, to verify whether laypeople distinguish between different intensities of evilness, and to determine the dimensions that predict aggression and evilness. The results offer preliminary answers to the three questions.     

What do people value when they negotiate? Mapping the domain of subjective value in negotiation

Four studies support the development and validation of a framework for understanding the range of social psychological outcomes valued subjectively as consequences of negotiations. Study 1 inductively elicited and coded elements of subjective value among students, community members, and practitioners, revealing 20 categories that theorists in Study 2 sorted into 4 underlying subconstructs: Feelings About the Instrumental Outcome, Feelings About the Self, Feelings About the Negotiation Process, and Feelings About the Relationship. Study 3 proposed a new Subjective Value Inventory (SVI) and confirmed its 4-factor structure. Study 4 presents convergent, discriminant, and predictive validity data for the SVI. Indeed, subjective value was a better predictor than economic outcomes of future negotiation decisions. Results suggest the SVI is a promising tool to systematize and encourage research on subjective outcomes of negotiation.     

Age and ageing: What do they mean?

This article provides a philosophical overview of different approaches to age and ageing. It is often assumed that our age is determined by the amount of time we have been alive. Here, I challenge this belief. I argue that there are at least three plausible, yet unsatisfactory, accounts to age and ageing: the chronological account, the biological account, and the experiential account. I show that all of them fall short of fully determining what it means to age. Addressing these problems, I suggest the Two‐tier principle of age: whenever the three accounts of age contradict, combine the two accounts that differ the least, and reject the third. However, while this principle does solve some difficulties, it is itself vulnerable to problems; therefore I propose we should jettison it. I conclude that there are no accounts to ageing that are satisfactory; they all come with a bullet to bite.     

What to do with a forecast?

In the literature one finds two non-equivalent responses to forecasts; deference and updating. Herein it is demonstrated that, under certain conditions, both responses are entirely determined by one’s beliefs as regards the calibration of the forecaster. Further it is argued that the choice as to whether to defer to, or update on, a forecast is determined by the aim of the recipient of that forecast. If the aim of the recipient is to match their credence with the prevailing objective chances, they should defer to the forecast; if it is to maximize the veritistic value of their beliefs, they should update on the forecast.     

How do women account for failure when they expect success?

Recent research suggests that men and women account for failures differently. Competent, self-aware men discount failures; competent, self-aware women accept them. This style of accounting for failure outcomes in achievement has been explored in studies of attribution and, more recently, the expectancies an individual holds regarding the outcome (to fail or succeed). The theories do not predict acceptance of failure by competent, self-aware individuals. The incongruent results have been consequently explained as a sex difference. Closer evaluation of the research, however, indicates that most women expect failure rather than success, and that this is a learned expectation. This study attempted to answer whether an exposure to success experiences would alter this expectancy and, if so, whether women would then discount failures in a self-serving manner as men do. Through a manipulation of success and failure outcomes using anagram tasks, it was demonstrated that, given an expectation to succeed, women did use systematic biased attributions to account for failure. These findings have significant implications for attribution research and for our understanding of women's attitude towards achievement and ability to maintain a sense of well-being when faced with failure.     

What do infants remember when they forget? Location and identity in 6-month-olds' memory for objects

What does an infant remember about a forgotten object? Although at age 6 months, infants can keep track of up to three hidden objects, they can remember the featural identity of only one. When infants forget the identity of an object, do they forget the object entirely, or do they retain an inkling of it? In a looking-time study, we familiarized 6-month-olds with a disk and a triangle placed on opposite sides of a stage. During test trials, we hid the objects one at a time behind different screens, and after hiding the second object, we removed the screen where the first object had been hidden. Infants then saw the expected object, the unexpected other object, or the empty stage. Bayes factor analysis showed that although the infants did not notice when the object changed shape, they were surprised when it vanished. This finding indicates that infants can represent an object without its features.     

Sudden gains in cognitive behavioral treatment for depression: when do they occur and do they matter?

Despite the use of efficacious treatments for depression, individuals differ in both the degree to which they recover and the rate at which recovery occurs. Tang and colleagues found that depressed patients who had sudden improvements in their symptomatology not only maintained these gains, but also enjoyed more improvement and higher rates of recovery than those without sudden gains (J. Consulting Clin. Psychol. 67(6) (1999) 894; J. Consulting Clin. Psychol. 70(2) (2002) 444). Our study examined the role of sudden gains in a cognitive-behavioral group treatment for depression. Results indicated that 41.9% of patients experienced sudden gains. Furthermore, sudden gains occurring in the first third of treatment appear to have special importance. Participants enjoying early sudden gains had significantly larger changes in depressive symptom scores over the course of treatment than those without sudden gains and were marginally more likely to be treatment responders compared to those without early sudden gains. In contrast to Tang and DeRubeis (J. Consulting Clin. Psychol. 67(6) (1999) 894), however, sudden gains were not associated with cognitive changes.     

What do children and adolescents say they do during video game play?

We examined the problem-solving behaviors that 5th, 6th, and 7th graders used to negotiate a novel recreational video game. Students were characterized as frequent or infrequent players and instructed to think aloud during game play for 20 consecutive minutes. Comments were used to make inferences about the students' problem-solving behaviors while playing. These comments were then linked to game performance. Among all students, the greatest number of comments concerned their actions and game events at a given point in game play. Females made greater reference to strategies for game play and process goals whereas males made greater reference to their evaluations of the game and when they reached an impasse. Among 5th graders, reference to impasse and rules for game play was linked to better game performance; among 7th graders, reference to insight about how to enact a specific move or circumvent an impasse was related to better performance.     

Children and television advertising: when do they understand persuasive intent?

Children's response to television advertising is investigated in this paper. Children aged between six and ten years were tested for their recall, recognition and understanding of novel television advertisements. Children were able to recognise scenes from the advertisements after one exposure but recall of the brand names was poor for the younger children, even after three exposures. Recall for the advertising content increased by age and number of exposures. None of the six‐year‐olds and only a quarter of the eight‐year‐olds and a third of the ten‐year‐olds discussed advertising in terms of persuasion. Therefore, although children remember television advertisements, their purpose is not fully understood, even by many ten‐year‐olds. Copyright © 2002 Henry Stewart Publications.     

What do parents talk about to infants?

The content of parents' talk is studied here as expressing their conception of their developing infant, from the initial symbiotic fusion to an individual situtated in space, time and society. The topics parents introduce in their speech to their infant reflect the perception and expectations they have of their baby. The social and parental status of fathers and mothers, and the anticipated role and status of the child- and adult-to-be, and in particular the age and gender of the infant, mediate the choice of topics. Parents' spontaneous speech to 3-month- and 9-month-old infants was studied during a diapering episode, before leaving the day-care centre. Five minutes of such a speech was recorded, and each utterance was assigned to a semantic category (e. g. greetings, comments on diapering, on mood). Sex-typing is already noticeable as early as 3 months of age: comments on the present situation and state are more frequent for girls, and comments about absent persons or events more frequent with boys. Both parents contribute to this effect, fathers more than mothers. With age parents become less concerned with immediate problems and more aware of the infant's own performances. First names are used more for boys than for gilrs. As a whole, boys are considered as individuals earlier than girls.