Postmodern Implications for Theoretical Integration of Counseling Approaches

Theoretical integration refers to the conceptual unification of diverse counseling approaches. Past attempts at theoretical integration have not yielded a broad conceptual framework that seamlessly integrates counseling approaches with varied foundational assumptions. The author contends that the failure of these integrative attempts is a by‐product of the modernistic epistemic context in which the systems were considered and proposes an examination of common narrative features of counseling approaches in a postmodern epistemic context to achieve integration. These features are specified, elaborated, and conclusions are drawn.     

Comparing Semantics of Logics for Multi-Agent Systems

We draw parallels between several closely related logics that combine — in different proportions — elements of game theory, computation tree logics, and epistemic logics to reason about agents and their abilities. These are: the coalition game logics CL and ECL introduced by Pauly 2000, the alternating-time temporal logic ATL developed by Alur, Henzinger and Kupferman between 1997 and 2002, and the alternating-time temporal epistemic logic ATEL by van der Hoek and Wooldridge (2002). In particular, we establish some subsumption and equivalence results for their semantics, as well as interpretation of the alternating-time temporal epistemic logic into ATL. The focus in this paper is on models: alternating transition systems, multi-player game models (alias concurrent game structures) and coalition effectivity models turn out to be intimately related, while alternating epistemic transition systems share much of their philosophical and formal apparatus. Our approach is constructive: we present ways to transform between different types of models and languages.     

Re-inflating the Conception of Scientific Representation

This article argues for an anti-deflationist view of scientific representation. Our discussion begins with an analysis of the recent Callender–Cohen deflationary view on scientific representation. We then argue that there are at least two radically different ways in which a thing can be represented: one is purely symbolic, and therefore conventional, and the other is epistemic. The failure to recognize that scientific models are epistemic vehicles rather than symbolic ones has led to the mistaken (deflationary) view that whatever distinguishes scientific models from other representational vehicles must merely be a matter of pragmatics. It is then argued that even though epistemic vehicles also contain conventional elements, they do their job of demonstration (or showing) in spite of such elements.     

The Role of Epistemic Style in Counseling Preference and Orientation

Recent work has suggested that philosophical commitments play a part in directing preferences for different types of counseling, and in this article the authors extend that work with a series of four studies. Study 1 provides partial support for the relationship between epistemic commitments (rational, empirical, or metaphorical) and preferences for particular types of counseling (behavioral, rational emotive, constructivist). Studies 2 and 3 extend these findings by noting differences in how individuals gather, process, and respond to self-relevant feedback as a result of epistemic style. Finally, Study 4 provides tentative support for the possibility that counselor trainees gravitate toward preferring counseling theories that are consistent with their own epistemic orientations. Implications and limitations of these findings are discussed.     

How navigation systems transform epistemic virtues: Knowledge,issues and solutions

In this paper, we analyse how GPS-based navigation systems are transforming some of our intellectual virtues and then suggest two strategies to improve our practices regarding the use of such epistemic tools. We start by outlining the two main approaches in virtue epistemology, namely virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. We then discuss how navigation systems can undermine five epistemic virtues, namely memory, perception, attention, intellectual autonomy, and intellectual carefulness. We end by considering two possible interlinked ways of trying to remedy this situation: [i] redesigning the epistemic tool to improve the epistemic virtues of memory, perception, and attention; and [ii] the cultivation of cognitive diligence for wayfinding tasks scaffolding intellectual autonomy and carefulness.     

Epistemic instrumentalism

According to epistemic instrumentalism, epistemically rational beliefs are beliefs that are produced in ways that are conducive to certain ends that one wants to attain. In “Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique,” Thomas Kelly advances various objections to epistemic instrumentalism. While I agree with the general thrust of Kelly’s objections, he does not distinguish between two forms of epistemic instrumentalism. Intellectualist forms maintain that epistemically rational beliefs are beliefs arrived at in compliance with rules that are conducive to epistemic ends, such as believing true propositions and not believing false propositions. Pragmatist forms maintain that rational beliefs are those that are formed, maintained, and revised in accordance with rules that are conducive to whatever ends one wants to attain. In this paper, I argue against both forms of epistemic instrumentalism and suggest that epistemic instrumentalism grows out of a mistaken conception of what it means to say that the standards of epistemic rationality are ‘normative.’     

Guest Editorial: Conceptualizing Justice and Counter-Expertise

ABSTRACT

Systemic injustices exclude counter-experts from telling their stories and influencing the collective imagination. Four papers and some discussant essays illustrate the ways in which counter-experts cross boundaries to contest knowledge claims, legal institutions, and forms of data in order to resist various forms of injustice. Literature on counter-expertise, socio-technical imaginaries, and epistemic injustice highlights how marginalized groups are prevented from participating in the process of collective imagining. A definition of counter-expertise and a new typology of counter-expertise demonstrate how marginalized groups navigate boundaries to pursue epistemic justice. The four papers in the special issue exemplify the ways in which counter-experts navigate identity politics. To combat epistemic injustice within our field, STS scholars can be more inclusive with teaching, mentoring, reviewing and other forms of scholarly gatekeeping.     

Epistemic Contradictions in Counseling Theories: Implications for the Structure of Human Experience and Counseling Practice

Theories of counseling process are founded on a logical contradiction in that they are simultaneously objectivist and constructivist in nature. Because this epistemic tension is present across diverse theories and has persisted throughout the history of counseling theorizing, the author argues that it has implications for the structure of human experience. These ideas are examined, and applications to counseling practice are discussed.     

Epistemic Normativity and Cognitive Agency

On the assumption that genuinely normative demands concern things connected in some way to our agency, i.e. what we exercise in doing things with or for reasons, epistemologists face an important question: are there genuine epistemic norms governing belief, and if so where in the vicinity of belief are we to find the requisite cognitive agency? Extant accounts of cognitive agency tend to focus on belief itself or the event of belief‐formation to answer this question, to the exclusion of the activity of maintaining a system of beliefs. This paper argues that a full account of epistemic normativity will need to make sense of this activity as a core locus of cognitive agency. This idea is used to motivate the conclusion that one important and often overlooked kind of epistemic norms is the kind of norms governing the various cognitive activities by which we check, sustain, and adjust our belief systems.     

The Morality of Influencing in Counseling

It is the author's intention to help counselors think through the various ways in which they influence their clients and assess the morality of various alternative counseling decisions. The task is a complex one because of the widely varied counseling situations. To consider a wide variety of contexts simultaneously, the author formulates a matrix of influencing that is used to generate a series of questions that have moral significance in counseling contexts. Each question is given extensive discussion. Alternative answers and their moral implications are considered. Examples are used throughout to clarify moral problems and the moral implications of counseling decisions.     

Grandparents and Grandchildren: An Often Neglected Relationship Between Significant Others

The author discusses the grandparent-grandchild relationship and its implications for counseling activities. The historical and contemporary role expectations of grandparents and grandchildren, the reciprocal significance of this relationship, and ways to use the relationship in counseling services and programming in various settings are reviewed.     

Believing on trust

The aim of the paper is to propose a way in which believing on trust can ground doxastic justification and knowledge. My focus will be the notion of trust that plays the role depicted by such cases as concerned Hardwig (J Philos 82:335–49, 1985; J Philos 88:693–708, 1991) in his early papers, papers that are often referenced in recent debates in social epistemology. My primary aim is not exegetical, but since it sometimes not so clear what Hardwig’s claims are, I offer some remarks of interpretation that might be of interest. The main purpose of the paper, however, is this: following various cues in Hardwig’s writing, I specify certain epistemic properties of agents in social systems, such that, roughly speaking, for agents to know (or be justified in believing) what the ‘system knows’, social relations of epistemic trust between agents in the system are necessary. I will suggest that we can view this social form of epistemic trust as non-inferential dispositions to believe what some individual or other source of information asserts or transmits. When this disposition is discriminating and defeater-sensitive, it can ground knowledge and justification. Or, more cautiously, we should be sympathetic to this view if we are inclined to accept the core insight of process reliabilism. Finally, I will offer some remarks about how epistemic trust and epistemic reasons may relate on this picture.     

Immunizing Strategies and Epistemic Defense Mechanisms

An immunizing strategy is an argument brought forward in support of a belief system, though independent from that belief system, which makes it more or less invulnerable to rational argumentation and/or empirical evidence. By contrast, an epistemic defense mechanism is defined as a structural feature of a belief system which has the same effect of deflecting arguments and evidence. We discuss the remarkable recurrence of certain patterns of immunizing strategies and defense mechanisms in pseudoscience and other belief systems. Five different types will be distinguished and analyzed, with examples drawn from widely different domains. The difference between immunizing strategies and defense mechanisms is analyzed, and their epistemological status is discussed. Our classification sheds new light on the various ways in which belief systems may achieve invulnerability against empirical evidence and rational criticism, and we propose our analysis as part of an explanation of these belief systems’ enduring appeal and tenacity.     

Peer disagreement under multiple epistemic systems

In a situation of peer disagreement, peers are usually assumed to share the same evidence. However they might not share the same evidence for the epistemic system used to process the evidence. This synchronic complication of the peer disagreement debate suggested by Goldman (In Feldman R, Warfield T (eds) (2010) Disagreement. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 187–215) is elaborated diachronically by use of a simulation. The Hegselmann–Krause model is extended to multiple epistemic systems and used to investigate the role of consensus and difference splitting in peer disagreement. I find that the very possibility of multiple epistemic systems downgrades the epistemic value of consensus and makes difference splitting a suboptimal strategy.     

The Systems Approach: A Technique for Establishing Counseling and Guidance Programs

Schools and agencies are under increasing pressure to demonstrate program effectiveness and be accountable in terms of cost to the consumer. Systems methodology, developed for use in other fields, may have the potential for program development in counseling. This article discusses some of the ways in which systems technology may be directly employed in a counseling setting.     

The Building of Epistemic Trust: An Adoptive Family’s Experience of Mentalization-Based Therapy

ABSTRACT

Recently, theorists have posited the development of epistemic trust – the trust in others as reliable sources of information – as an essential aspect of the therapeutic relationship and a mechanism of therapeutic change. Epistemic trust is likely to be disrupted in adoptive children and families and Mentalization Based Treatment (MBT) aims to explicitly promote its development. Therefore, this study aims to investigate how epistemic mistrust is addressed and how epistemic trust is established within the MBT framework. This single-case, exploratory study reports data from in-depth interviews with one adoptive family, which were analyzed qualitatively using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. Two superordinate themes are reported: pre-therapy factors contributing to epistemic mistrust and factors contributing to the development of epistemic trust. The findings highlight two critical elements in establishing epistemic trust: the use of certain clinical skills that help build a secure base within therapy and the possibility of trust being transferred from and to other professionals/systems beyond therapy. Hence, this study informs a deeper understanding of how epistemic trust may be built in therapeutic work with adopted children and identifies possible clinical approaches that may be used by clinicians working with this client group.     

Accountability Systems in the Employment Service

Counseling services often culminate in various positive outcomes, many of which are difficult to adapt to a system of accountability. If counseling is to continue to develop, then it must become responsive and accountable to priorities determined by management policies. In the employment service this means how well counseling services relate to clients being placed in meaningful jobs. This article discusses the issues of accountability in the counseling profession, provides information on the basic employment service computerized data systems, and introduces two analysis and planning forms which can be used to derive meaningful data from these systems. Information from these sources will enhance budget and resource planning and evaluation of performances as well as provide other information which state and local offices can profitably use in developing a more standardized and accountable counseling program.     

Coherence,Literary and Epistemic

Coherence is a term of art in both epistemology and literary criticism, and in both contexts judgments of coherence carry evaluative significance. However, whereas the epistemic use of the term picks out a property of belief sets, the literary use can pick out properties of various elements of a literary work, including its plot, characters, and style. For this reason, some have claimed that literary critics are not concerned with the same concept of coherence as epistemologists. In this article I argue against this claim. Although various nonepistemic notions of coherence figure in literary criticism, the epistemic concept has a mirror image in the literary–critical concept of thematic coherence. Moreover, evidence from literary criticism suggests that thematic coherence can be valuable from a literary‐evaluative standpoint because it can be valuable from an epistemic standpoint, in particular by enhancing the credibility of a work's themes or author. My analysis of the notion of thematic coherence thus provides novel support for literary cognitivism, the view that a work's literary‐aesthetic merits can depend on its epistemic merits.     

Counseling psychology and employee assistance programs: Previous obstacles and potential contributions

In the last two decades, an important new therapeutic delivery system has been emerging to serve the needs of the American workforce. Known as Employee Assistance Programs (EAPs), these company and community based programs were created to provide mental health services to workers whose job performance is impaired due to substance abuse or other difficulties. Although there are obvious similarities between the mission espoused by EAPs and traditions of the counseling psychology profession, many members of our discipline have only recently become involved in these programs. This paper discusses various reasons why counseling psychologists have not become involved with EAPs. It also presents some ways that counseling psychologists may contribute to these programs and it highlights the similarities in the philosophies and the activities of EAP and counseling psychology practitioners and scientists. Additionally, some suggestions for how to prepare counseling psychologists for entrance into the EAP profession are offered. Finally, a brief research agenda designed to guide counseling psychologists who are interested in the study of EAP related variables is presented.We are appreciative of Karen Novak's and Marilyn Bayer's editorial assistance on this paper.     

Tracking Privilege‐Preserving Epistemic Pushback in Feminist and Critical Race Philosophy Classes

Classrooms are unlevel knowing fields, contested terrains where knowledge and ignorance are produced and circulate with equal vigor, and where members of dominant groups are accustomed to having an epistemic home‐terrain advantage. My project focuses on one form of resistance that regularly surfaces in discussions with social‐justice content. Privilege‐preserving epistemic pushback is a variety of willful ignorance that many members of dominant groups engage in when asked to consider both the lived and structural injustices that members of marginalized groups experience daily. I argue that this dominant form of resistance is neither an expression of skepticism nor a critical‐thinking practice. I suggest that standard philosophical engagements with these expressions of resistance are incapable of tracking the harms of privilege‐preserving epistemic pushback. I recommend treating this pushback as a “shadow text,” that is, as a text that runs alongside the readings in ways that offer no epistemic friction. I offer this as one critical philosophical practice for making students mindful of the ways they contribute to the circulation of ignorance and epistemic violence during the course of their discussions.