Integrating African heritage studies as a new terrain of African philosophy

One of the innovative features of post-apartheid scholarship in Africa is the emergence of African heritage studies, an inter-disciplinary field concerned with the study of the collection, conservation and interpretation of historical, archaeological and anthropological artefacts of African cultural heritage. However, despite the preoccupation with questions about the value of African heritage in African philosophy, the imperative and benefits of integrating African heritage studies and contemporary African philosophy have largely been ignored by both fields. In this article, I argue for the integration of African heritage studies and African philosophy by showing their inherent symbiosis and the potential mutual benefits of their integration. By highlighting the mistaken assumption that critics of ethnophilosophy reject the centrality of the study of African heritage in African philosophy, I show how criticisms of ethnophilosophy, in fact, provide not only the rationale for African heritage studies, but also the most promising theoretical direction for how African philosophy could draw on African heritage studies, for its object of analysis and how African heritage studies can, in turn, benefit conceptually and methodologically from integrating itself with African philosophy.     

Quine against Lewis (and Carnap) on Truth by Convention

Many commentators now view Quine's ‘Truth by Convention’ as a flawed criticism of Carnap. Gary Ebbs argued recently that Quine never intended Carnap as his target. Quine's criticisms were part of his attempt to work out his own scientific naturalism. I agree that Carnap was not Quine's target but object that Quine's criticisms were wholly internal to his own philosophy. Instead, I argue that C.I. Lewis held the kind of truth‐by‐convention thesis that Quine rejects. This, however, leaves Carnap out of the picture. I then show how Quine came to see the earlier criticisms as also having force against Carnap.     

Hilary Putnam's Dialectical Thinking: An Application to Fallacy Theory

In recent and not so recent years, fallacy theory has sustained numerous challenges, challenges which have seen the theory charged with lack of systematicity as well as failure to deliver significant insights into its subject matter. In the following discussion, I argue that these criticisms are subordinate to a more fundamental criticism of fallacy theory, a criticism pertaining to the lack of intelligibility of this theory. The charge of unintelligibility against fallacy theory derives from a similar charge against philosophical theories of truth and rationality developed by Hilary Putnam. I examine how Putnam develops this charge in the case of the conception of rationality pursued by logical positivism. Following that examination, I demonstrate the significance of this charge for how we proceed routinely to analyse one informal fallacy, the fallacy of petitio principii. Specifically, I argue that the significance of this charge lies in its issuance of a rejection of the urge to theorise in fallacy inquiry in general and petitio inquiry in particular. My conclusion takes the form of guidelines for the post-theoretical pursuit of fallacy inquiry.     

The blaze of her splendors: Suggestions about revitalizing fallacy theory

Criticisms of fallacy theory have been lodged from many different directions. In this paper, I consider the classic criticism of incompleteness by DeMorgan, Finocchiaro's claim that fallacies probably exist only in the mind of the interpreter, McPeck's claim that fallacies are at best context-dependent and Paul's complaints about the teaching of fallacies. I seek not merely to defend fallacy theory against unfair criticisms but also to learn from the criticisms what can be done in order to make fallacy theory a viable theory of criticism. I argue that this will involve several changes: rethinking of the nature of fallacy; addressing some theoretical issues; and presenting fallacy theory in a more rigorous fashion. The paper concludes with reflections on how Quine's ontological advice about the resolution of ontological disputes might be applied to the issue of whether or not there are fallacies.     

Pierre Duhem's conception of natural classification

Duhem's discussion of physical theories as natural classifications is neither antithetical nor incidental to the main thrust of his philosophy of science. Contrary to what is often supposed, Duhem does not argue that theories are better thought of as economically organizing empirical laws than as providing information concerning the nature of the world. What he is primarily concerned with is the character and justification of the scientific method, not the logical status of theoretical entities. The crucial point to notice is that he took the principle of the autonomy of physics to be of paramount importance and he developed the conception of natural classification in opposition to accounts of physical theories that contravened it.I have benefited from discussions with Howard Duncan concerning Duhem's philosophy, and from Roger Ariew's and Michel Stack's criticisms of an earlier version of the paper. Also I would like to thank Ernan McMullin for his comments at the Blacksburg Conference.     

The theory of justice from a hermeneutic perspective

In this article, I argue that Gadamer's hermeneutics of historical tradition does not imply a conservative stance on ethical and political issues. My essay seeks to show that Gadamer's philosophy leaves ample room for normative criticism, objectivity, and theories of justice at odds with conventional common sense. I critically examine Walzer's Spheres of Justice, reading it as an attempt to obtain a normative account of justice based on a hermeneutical framework of interpretation. I make several criticisms of Walzer's method and results, which I use to develop my own critical model for interpreting, criticizing, and revising traditional understandings, and common sense meanings. My conclusion is that we need to extend Gadamer's philosophy, in order to identify the ways that established traditions of understanding and common sense can result from, or produce, inconsistency, irrationality, hermeneutical incoherence, and meaningless deprivations or suffering. This essay thus seeks to develop an influential continental philosophy in a direction that makes fruitful contact with Anglo-American theories of justice, and normativity.     

Analytic philosophy challenged. Scepticism and arguing transcendentally

Analytic philosophy has recently been challenged from a perspective advocated by Richard Rorty: this favours edifying philosophy against systematic philosophy comprising also analytic philosophy. In Rorty's presentation analytic philosophy is one more variant of the Cartesian—Kantian epistemology which, being committed to a permanent framework of inquiry rooted in our human subjectivity, implies the uniqueness of one conceptual scheme.Against this tenet I argue in two ways. First, I show that analytic philosophy of mind and language with the Fregean background and possible world semantics implies the pluralism of conceptual schemes on logical-conventionalist grounds. Secondly, I show that although analytic philosophy shares the claim for legitimation of a conceptual scheme with Kantian epistemology, it is critical of the latter in that the uniqueness-claim is refuted.In connection with legitimation the relation of analytic philosophy to scepticism is also discussed.     

Langtry on God,the Best and Evil

Bruce Langtry's ‘God, the Best and Evil’ is a fine contribution to the literature. Here, I review the contents of the book, and then provide some critical remarks that, as fas as I know, have not been made elsewhere. In particular, I argue that his criticism of my formulations of logical arguments from evil (in my Arguing about Gods) is unsuccessful.     

Locke and the Primary Signification of Words: An Approach to Word Meaning

Locke's claim that the primary signification of (most) words is an idea, or complex of ideas, has received different interpretations. I support the majority view that Locke's notion of primary signification can be construed in terms of linguistic meaning. But this reading has been seen as making Locke's account vulnerable to various criticisms, of which I consider two. First, it appears to make the account vulnerable to the charge that an idea cannot play the role that a word meaning should play. I argue that the role Locke actually gives to signified ideas is not susceptible to this criticism. Second, it appears to make Locke guilty of at least some degree of semantic idealism. I argue that Locke is not guilty of this and that he makes a proper distinction between the non-referential relation that holds between a word and its primary signification and the referential relation that holds between a word and things the word is used to speak about.     

Has the last decade of challenges to the multiple realization argument provided aid and comfort to psychoneural reductionists?

The previous decade has seen renewed critical interest in the multiple realization argument. These criticisms constitute a “second wave” of challenges to this central argument in late-20th century philosophy of mind. Unlike the first wave, which challenged the premise that multiple realization is inconsistent with reduction or type identity, this second wave challenges the truth of the multiple realization premise itself. Since psychoneural reductionism was prominent among the explicit targets of the multiple realization argument, one might think that this second wave of challenges provides important aid and comfort to reductionists. In this paper, however, I provide reasons for thinking it does not. This is not to the detriment of psychoneural reductionism because, as I also argue here, and unrecognized by the current non-reductive orthodoxy in philosophy of mind, one key argument among the first wave of criticisms of the multiple realization argument has never been adequately rejoined.     

Contextualism and a puzzle about seeing

Contextualist solutions to skeptical puzzles have recently been subjected to various criticisms. In this paper, I will defend contextualism against an objection pressed by Jason Stanley. In the course of doing so, I argue that either semantic context-sensitivity is very widespread in natural language, or else Stanley's ``binding' test for the presence of hidden variables in logical form is not a good test.     

HUMANE PHILOSOPHY AND THE QUESTION OF PROGRESS

According to some recent critics, philosophy has not progressed over the course of its history because it has not exhibited any substantial increase in the stock of human wisdom. I reject this pessimistic conclusion by arguing that such criticisms employ a conception of progress drawn from the sciences which is inapplicable to a humanistic discipline such as philosophy. Philosophy should not be understood as the accumulation of epistemic goods in a manner analogous to the natural sciences. I argue that the progressiveness of philosophy consists, if anything, in its capacity to provoke and sustain critical reflections upon the ideas and practices which shape and guide human life.     

Punishment,Consent and Value

In this paper I take another look at the view, defended by C. Nino, that we may punish criminals because, by knowingly breaking a law, they have consented to becoming liable to the prescribed punishment. I will first rebut the criticisms usually aimed at this view in the literature, aiming to show that they are inconclusive. They are all efforts to show that criminal offenders in fact do not consent to becoming liable to punishment simply by committing crimes. I then turn to a different line of criticism, which I find more promising. I argue that the moral power of effecting normative changes by consenting reflects the power holder’s value as a person, and show how this idea makes sense of how refusal to recognize that power wrongs a person. I then argue that the “power” of consenting to punishability does not fit that model, and is better explained as reflecting the value of other people, whom the offender has wronged. Hence the power of consenting is not involved in typical cases of wrongdoing.     

为分析性辩护

自从蒯因在著名的《经验论的两个教条》等一系列文章中对分析性做出批评以后,分析传统内已经很少有哲学家再对分析性概念持肯定态度了;随之受到威胁的是意义以及逻辑必然性的概念。     

Can Rawls’ Constructivism Avoid the Euthyphro Dilemma? In Reply to Shafer-Landau

In this essay, I consider two challenges implicit in Russ Shafer-Landau’s criticism of constructivists: the realism challenge and the relativism challenge, respectively. I do not try to offer a decisive set of objections to the challenges; instead I argue that some objective versions of constructivism, especially Rawls’s constructivism, are not susceptible to the criticisms.     

Protecting God from Science and Technology: How Religious Criticisms of Biotechnologies Backfire

Many religious critics argue that biotechnology (such as cloning and genetic engineering) intrudes on God's domain, or plays God, or revolts against God. While some of these criticisms are standard complaints about human hubris, I argue that some of the recent criticism represents a "Promethean" concern, in which believers unreflectively seem to fear that science and technology are actually replicating or stealing God's special deity–defining powers. These criticisms backfire theologically, because they diminish God, portraying God as an anthropomorphic superbeing whose relevance and special nature are increasingly rivaled by human power.     

Singular Term, Subject and Predicate

Several writers on the philosophy of language have put forward definitions of a class of English expressions which they call 'singular terms'. Two kinds of definition have been particularly popular: one which derives from Dummett and one, inspired by Aristotle, which is based on the idea that you can negate a predicable but not a singular term. I argue that the Dummettian definition leads to unacceptable consequences. I suggest, however, that the 'Aristotelian' definition is of more use than has sometimes been thought. 'Negation' can be understood in two ways: one which is more'grammatical' and one which is more 'logical'. A criterion derived from grammar should be used to recognize which linguistic expressions should count as singular terms, predicables, etc., while a more logic-based criterion should be used to check whether the classification suggested by grammar actually has any logical importance.     

On the Substitutional Characterization of First-Order Logical Truth

I consider the well-known criticism of Quine's characterization of first-order logical truth that it expands the class of logical truths beyond what is sanctioned by the model-theoretic account. Briefly, I argue that at best the criticism is shallow and can be answered with slight alterations in Quine's account. At worse the criticism is defective because, in part, it is based on a misrepresentation of Quine. This serves not only to clarify Quine's position, but also to crystallize what is and what is not at issue in choosing the model-theoretic account of first-order logical truth over one in terms of substitutions. I conclude by highlighting the need for justifying the belief that the definition of first-order logical truth in terms of models is superior to its definition in terms of substitutions.