Pedagogies of Hope

Hoping is an integral part of what it is to be human, and its significance for education has been widely noted. Hope is, however, a contested category of human experience and getting to grips with its characteristics and dynamics is a difficult task. The paper argues that hope is not a singular undifferentiated experience and is best understood as a socially mediated human capacity with varying affective, cognitive and behavioural dimensions. Drawing on the philosophy, theology and psychology of hope, five modes of hoping are outlined: patient, critical, sound, resolute and transformative. The key aim of the paper is to illustrate how different modes of hoping are associated with different pedagogical strategies. Phrased differently, the paper seeks to delineate a range of pedagogies of hope. The phrase ‘pedagogy of hope’ is very much associated with critical theory—one thinks instantly of, for example, Paulo Freire, Henry Giroux or bell hooks. There are many pedagogies of hope, however, and an explicitly conservative text such as William Bennett’s Book of Virtues has as strong a claim to the title as Freire’s radical and utopian ideas. A broader argument, therefore, is that there is nothing inherently radical or subversive about a pedagogy of hope. Pedagogies of hope can serve to reproduce social relations as well as to transform them.     

Doing It Together Changing Pedagogies

Changing pedagogies is an ongoing process consequent upon personal and social change. Those of us who teach in religious studies or theology departments risk failure in changing pedagogies if we attempt such change alone. This essay, cast as a personal journey, reviews the changing student body, the reasons why we must adapt our pedagogies to this change, and the processes and consequences of adapting these new pedagogies. The goal of changing pedagogies is to allow the plurality of voices and pedagogies to speak and be used to sustain a community of love and concern in the midst of diversity.     

Pedagogies of Interpretation in Educating Clergy

Abstract. In this essay the authors describe how four seminary educators pedagogically engage students in practices of interpretation and explore how the variations in their teaching practices shape the critical thinking they seek to cultivate in their students. The piece is excerpted from an ethnographic study of Jewish and Christian seminary educator teaching practices sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (Educating Clergy: Teaching Practices and Pastoral Imagination, Jossey‐Bass Publishers, November 2005). The study explores how the classroom‐ and community‐based teaching practices of seminary educators prepare students to integrate professional knowledge and skill with moral integrity and religious commitment in professional practice. In addition to the pedagogies of interpretation explicated here, we observed pedagogies that engage students in practices of formation, contextualization, and performance. Attention is also given in the study to the influence of pedagogies embedded in the traditions of seminary education on student learning and to the cultivation of spiritual and professional practices beyond the classroom in community worship and through strategies of field education and small groups.     

Freedom as Non-domination and Democratic Inclusion

According to neo-republicans, democracy is morally justified because it is among the prerequisites for freedom as non-domination. The claim that democracy secures freedom as non-domination needs to explain why democratic procedures contribute to non-domination and for whom democracy secures non-domination. This requires an account of why domination is countered by democratic procedures and an account of to whom domination is countered by access to democratic procedures. Neo-republican theory of democracy is based on a detailed discussion of the former but a scant discussion of the latter. We address this lacuna by interpreting the two most influential principles of inclusion, the all-subjected principle and the all-affected principle, in light of neo-republican commitments. The preliminary conclusion is that both principles are able to capture relations of domination between the democratic state and the people controlled by it in the relevant sense. Yet, the state has virtually unlimited powers to control residents, but only limited powers to interfere in the lives of non-residents. Republican aspirations are therefore more in tune with the all-subjected principle according to which only residents in the territory of the state should be granted rights to political participation.     

Herzen and James: Freedom as radical

The similarities and differences between Herzen and James as humanist theoreticians are very interesting in view of the roles which they played in their respective countries. Radical freedom was important to the theories of each.     

法尔宗:作为禁锢的自由

萨特的<存在与虚无>引起了许多相互分歧的阐释.最近,克里斯蒂娜·豪威尔斯(Christina Howells)指出,萨特一向坚持自由不能脱离现实世界的观点;而托马斯·安德森(Thomas Anderson)认为,萨特所坚持的是绝对自己的观点.     

Liberatory Pedagogies in the Religious Studies Classroom

The author describes the risks and rewards of her use of liberatory pedagogies in a “Feminist and Womanist Ethics and Spirituality” course. In addition to defining liberation pedagogies and providing a brief bibliography, she includes classroom rules and the projects undertaken that contributed to the character and success of the course.     

Intellectual Freedom and Economic Sufficiency as Educational Entitlements

This paper explores the historic philosophical contributions ofMill and Marx toward a comprehensive conception of intellectual freedomas a basic educational entitlement. In a perhaps surprising confluence,Marx's theory of a material base for freedom of thought is then extendedin a discussion of contemporary freedoms including, importantly,academic freedom and its implication for teaching, the profession andits training.     

被自由误导的自由

本文主要分析了自由以及表现为权利自由的政治哲学问题,其中着重批评了伯林的两种自由模式,试图论证,不自由切割为两种,将导致对自由的各种误解。所谓消极自由和积极自由只是同一种自由的两面,但伯林问题可以转换为消极权利和积极权利问题,这样就可以消除混乱。     

Perpetrators' Freedom of Choice as a Determinant of Responsibility Attribution

Abstract

In the present study, a swindler had high versus low freedom of choice while deciding to commit a crime. He actually swindled Polish university students (involved observers) out of a large versus a small amount of money (high vs. low loss). Other students (noninvolved observers) were informed about the swindler's action. All students suggested the punishment that they believed the swindler deserved (the punishments chosen were used as an index of responsibility attribution). Involved students assigned more severe punishments than noninvolved students did. In the high-loss condition, involved observers were more punitive than they were in the low-loss condition. The judgments of the swindler's victims were determined by the magnitude of their loss; they ignored information about the swindler's freedom of choice. In contrast, the responsibility attributed by the noninvolved observers was influenced by the swindler's freedom of choice, but only in the low-loss condition. Noninvolved observers informed that the swindler had high freedom of choice were insensitive to information about the magnitude of the consequences for the victim.     

Freedom as Non-domination,Robustness, and Distant Threats

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - It is a core feature of the conception of freedom as non-domination that freedom requires the absence of exposure to arbitrary power across a range of relevant...     

Liberal Learning as Freedom: A Capabilities Approach to Undergraduate Education

In this paper, I employ the pioneering works of Nussbaum, Sen, Saito, and Walker, in conjunction with the U.S. tradition of academic freedom, to outline a capability-centered vision of undergraduate education. Pace Nussbaum and Walker, I propose a short list of learning capabilities to which every undergraduate student should be entitled. This working definition of undergraduate education offers a starting point for discussion and experimentation. I employ it here to engage the current controversy in U.S. colleges and universities over the nature, value, and legitimacy of undergraduate students’ academic freedoms. In contrast to the anti-indoctrination emphasis of David Horowitz’s Academic Bill of Rights, I argue that students’ academic freedoms can be more effectively secured through the articulation of “essential freedoms for liberal learning” whose principal focus is not the behavior or political affiliations of teachers but the intellectual needs and circumstances of students.