正义的战争与战争的正义——关于战争伦理的反思

战争可以定义为两个或两个以上的国家间的有组织的政治暴力。根据战争的目的、过程和结果,战争伦理大致包括“战争权利伦理”、“战争行为伦理”和“战争责任伦理”三个方面。在战争伦理中最重要的是所谓“正义”问题。“正义”与“非正义”这对概念并非规定战争的客观性质,而是一种煽动人们拥战或反战热情的主观态度和伦理立场的表达。     

战争伦理:一种世界观念

战争伦理主要论及战争如何受到道德强制,或者说,它涉及道德的进步如何影响到战争。同时,与人类其他活动相比,战争行为更具国际性,因此,战争伦理作为抑制战争的一种道义力量,也更易成为一种世界观念。可以将战争伦理分为军事伦理、军备伦理、军人伦理三个层面,分别代表基于人、武器以及人与武器相结合而采取的行动———作战之上的伦理规范,它们都是随着时代的发展而发展的。     

The Virtue of Justice and War

There has been a recent revival of interest in the medieval just war theory. But what is the virtue of justice needed to make war just? War is a complex and protracted activity. It is argued that a variety of virtues of justice, as well as a variety of virtues are required to guide the application of the use of force. Although it is mistaken to regard war as punishment, punitive justice—bringing to account those guilty of initiating an unjust war or of war crimes in its conduct— has an important role to play after conflict to restore the wrongs of war and help establish a just peace. Justice as fairness is needed to guide the distribution of resources and so reduce the grounds for war. Protective justice—protecting a community or innocents from harmful attack—helps define what constitutes a just cause for war and so constrains the occasions for war. The just principles set out the criteria to be met if war is to be morally permissible. In practice, this challenging demand requires that political leaders and military at all levels learn and exercise the virtues, particularly the cardinal virtues of justice, courage, self-control and practical wisdom. If we are to make war just and to make only just war, we need justice understood in its broadest sense. Such justice, as Aristotle noted, “is not a part but the whole of virtue.”     

Terrorism and the New Forms of War

Abstract: The March 2003 American preemptive strike on Iraq and related events pose entirely new conceptual questions about the notion of a valid war. A “war on terrorism” goes well beyond any usual version of the “just‐war” concept, which is itself notoriously difficult, if not impossible, to apply in current international circumstances. The implications of the emerging forms of war are examined and are found to bear in an unexpected way on justifying war, “just war,” and justice in distributional and related respects.     

The leaders and the led: Problems of just war theory

Any attempt to justify war in the fashion of just war theories risks underestimating its morally problematic nature. This becomes clear if we ask how the individual soldier or citizen is supposed to use just war theory in his own thinking. Michael Walzer's recent book, Just and Unjust Wars, illustrates the problem nicely. Walzer's view is that whether a state is justified in going to war is not a matter for the citizen to judge, and with regard to the way the war is conducted the individual soldier can have only minimal moral responsibility for what is done. Walzer's position is criticized in detail and the conclusion drawn that such an understanding of just war theory undermines the theory's significance as a moral outlook on war. It is also argued that a more pertinent version of just war theory must have strong implications for social change.     

Should the Changing Character of War Affect Our Theories of War?

War has changed so much that it barely resembles the paradigmatic cases of armed conflict that just war theories and international humanitarian law seemed to have had in mind even a few decades ago. The changing character of war includes not only the use of new technology such as drones, but probably more problematically the changing temporal and spatial scope of war and the changing character of actors in war. These changes give rise to worries about what counts as war and thus what norms to use in evaluating a particular conflict. In this paper, I develop an argument that the changing character of war gives us reasons to take reductionist revisions of just war theory seriously. By reductionist theories of war I mean those revisions within the just war tradition that suggest that we can use ordinary peacetime interpersonal analyses of moral responsibility and liability to harm to decide what justice requires in times of war.     

The Dualism of Modern Just War Theory

Philosophia - Conventional modern just war theory is fundamentally incoherent. On the one hand, the theory contains a theory of public war wherein ethical responsibility for the justice of war...     

Casualties of war and sunk costs: Implications for attitude change and persuasion

The purpose of the present research was to gain greater insight into how people's support for an ongoing war might be influenced by providing information about recent casualties of war. On intuitive grounds, one might expect that such information might often decrease support for the war, especially when the war in question is relatively unpopular. However, research and theory on the “sunk cost effect” suggests, somewhat paradoxically, that highlighting such losses could actually increase, not decrease, support for the war, as driven by the goal to avoid wasting valuable resources. Across two experiments (one focusing on the war in Iraq, another focusing on the war in Afghanistan), we found that the effects of the war casualty information on attitudes were moderated by a recent use and activation of the relevant “don't waste” goal, which had been previously primed in a non-political context. The implications of our findings for theory and research on attitude change, as well as the judgment and decision making area, are discussed.     

WAS THE GULF WAR A JUST WAR?

In the early months of 1991, the United States—in alliance with a number of other nations—fought a large scale air and ground war to evict Iraq's occupying army from the emirate of Kuwait. In this paper, I will consider the question of whether this U.S. military campaign was a just war according to the criteria of traditional just war theory—the only developed moral theory of warfare that we have. My aim, however, is not so much to reach a verdict about the morality of the Gulf War, as it is to identify relevant moral issues, and to reveal certain serious problems of application that are inherent in just war theory itself. Just war theory divides into two parts concerning, respectively, the question of whether or not to fight a particular war (justice of war), and the question of how the war is conducted (justice in war). I begin by considering whether it was just, according to the justice of war criteria, for the U.S. to fight the Gulf War at all. I then turn to the question of whether the way the war was conducted satisfied the criteria of justice in war.     

Research on the Ethics of War in the Context of Violence in Gaza

The paper first demonstrates the ability to provode objective data and analyses during war and then examines the need for such objective gathering of data and analysis in the context of mass violence and war, specifically in the 2009 Gaza War. That data and analysis is required to assess compliance with just war norms in assessing the conduct of the war, a framework quite distinct from human rights norms that can misapply and deform the application of norms such as proportionality and obligations not to target civilians.     

Grasping neither war nor peace: the folly of cosmopolitan preventive war

ABSTRACT

Some liberal-cosmopolitan theorists have sought to justify preventive war by proposing new institutions meant to ensure the accurate evaluation of non-imminent threats, and also make any war against them proportionate. In the debate over these proposals there has been little consideration of the post-war conditions any preventive war will likely produce. This is a serious omission; many theorists emphasize the degree to which the ability to secure a just peace is crucial to whether a war is proportionate. This article begins to remedy this missing piece of the debate over what it calls ‘cosmopolitan preventive war’ (CPW). After reviewing the debate, it discusses preventive war in the context of theorizations of post-war justice, or jus post bellum. It then investigates CPW’s ability to account for jus post bellum concerns through a counterfactual 2003 Iraq CPW. Showing that the proposed institutions do not do enough to account for the likely, and possibly immense, post-war harm wrought by preventive war, the article concludes with a negative evaluation of the CPW program and a brief statement on the ethics of preventive war in general.     

Predictors of College Students' Levels of Knowledge and Concern about Nuclear War

There is a growing interest regarding college student attitudes, knowledge, and concern about the potential threat of nuclear war. The present study attempted to identify salient political, psychological, and educational variables that might account for differing levels of concern and knowledge about nuclear war among college students. The results of two multiple regression analyses indicated that a greater interest in international affairs, less trust in government, more exposure to sources of nuclear war information, and being female contributed to greater concern about nuclear war. Having more political knowledge in general, being male, being more a Democrat than Republican, and having a greater interest in international affairs contributed to more knowledge about nuclear war. The results are discussed in light of their implications for university education.     

Children's understanding of the war in Iraq: views from Britain and Bosnia

Sixty‐one children (aged 9–17) from the United Kingdom (31) and Bosnia (30) were interviewed about the war in Iraq. Significant differences emerged in their views of the war. The Bosnian children were more affected by the Iraq War, more aware of who is involved in it, had different views about its causes, viewed the consequences of the war with greater gravity, and expressed a greater desire to end war and have peace. Two factors which might account for these differences – recent Bosnian history and the nature of media representations of the war in the two countries – are discussed.     

Teaching Peace in a Time of War

It is difficult to distinguish a time of war from a time of peace in America, because the Bush administration prosecutes its war on terrorism with an ongoing supporting economy. "Teaching Peace" means analyzing realistically the vested interests in perpetuating a state of war.     

Children in war and its aftermath: mental health issues in the development of international law

Children now experience war as they never have in the past. This article presents clinical impressions of children from war zones and suggests interventions that might ameliorate the horrors of war for some of these children. It also describes the evolving framework in international law (i.e., the United Nations) that provides a context for implementing some of these interventions and for insulating children from some of the devastating effects of war.     

Risking Aggression: Toleration of Threat and Preventive War

Generally speaking, just war theory (JWT) holds that there are two just causes for war: self‐defence and ‘other‐defence’. The most common type of the latter is popularly known as ‘humanitarian intervention’. There is debate, however, as to whether these can serve as just causes for preventive war. Those who subscribe to JWT tend to be unified in treating so‐called preventive war with a high degree of suspicion on the grounds that it fails to satisfy conventional criteria for jus ad bello; – particularly the just cause and last resort criteria. Francisco di Vitoria held that the only just cause for war was ‘a wrong received’, which renders impossible any justification for preventive war. There are assumptions implicit in recent military practice, however – most notably, the US‐led invasion of Iraq in 2003 – that challenge this ban on preventive war. Interestingly, both supporters and critics attempt to justify their views through the broader logic of JWT; viz., through a conception of what is good for both political communities and individuals, and through a legitimate defence of these goods. Supporters point to situations where so‐called rogue states represent ‘grave and imminent risk’ of committing acts of aggression as grounds that justify preventive war; critics argue that to attack another political community on the basis of crimes not yet committed is a breach of the very rights JWT was created to defend. The advocate of preventive war does not appreciate important aspects concerning the morality of war. In the ongoing tension between Iran and The United States and her allies – if the rhetoric is to be believed – I am asked to tolerate a threat to my security and liberty, and to risk suffering aggression in defence of the rights of the antagonistic, but not yet aggressive, state. The crucial question is how such tolerance and risk fit in with the logic of just war: at what point, if any, does the risk of being attacked become great enough to justify declaring war in anticipation? In this paper I highlight some of the theoretical and practical difficulties in determining what counts as a grave and imminent threat, focusing especially on the complicated case of ‘imminence’ in the face of so‐called ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’. Secondly, I will argue that not only is the notion of preventive war inconsistent with the defence of the rights of political communities that JWT requires; it is also forbidden by the proportionality requirement of jus ad bellum. A risk of being subjected to aggression is the price for global peace. Whilst political communities can do much to prevent aggression and prepare themselves in case it occurs, the conditions for just war require that this prevention and preparation stop short of declaring war. We must live with a certain degree of risk in this area.     

JUST WAR THEORIES RECONSIDERED: Problems with Prima Facie Duties and the Need for a Political Ethic

This essay challenges a “meta‐theory” in just war analysis that purports to bridge the divide between just war and pacifism. According to the meta‐theory, just war and pacifism share a common presumption against killing that can be overridden only under conditions stipulated by the just war criteria. Proponents of this meta‐theory purport that their interpretation leads to ecumenical consensus between “just warriors” and pacifists, and makes the just war theory more effective in reducing recourse to war. Engagement with the new meta‐theory reveals, however, that these purported advantages are illusory, made possible only by ignoring fundamental questions about the nature and function of political authority that are crucial to all moral reflection on the problem of war.     

When Is It Right to Fight? Just War Theory and the Individual-Centric Approach

Recent work in the ethics of war has done much to challenge the collectivism of the convention-based, Walzerian just war theory. In doing so, it raises the question of when it is permissible for soldiers to resort to force. This article considers this issue and, in doing so, argues that the rejection of collectivism in just war should go further still. More specifically, it defends the ‘Individual-Centric Approach’ to the deep morality of war, which asserts that the justifiability of an individual’s contribution to the war, rather than the justifiability of the war more generally, determines the moral acceptability of their participation. It then goes on to present five implications of the Individual-Centric Approach, including for individual liability to attack in war.     

Anxiety and watching the war in Ukraine

On 24 February 2022, Russia attacked Ukraine. Millions of people tuned into social media to watch the war. Media exposure to disasters and large-scale violence can precipitate anxiety resulting in intrusive thoughts. This research investigates factors related to anxiety while watching the war. Since the war began during the ongoing coronavirus pandemic, threat from COVID-19 is seen as a predictor of anxiety when watching the war. A theoretical model is put forward where the outcome was anxiety when watching the war, and predictors were self-reported interference of watching the war with one's studies or work, gender, worry about the war, self-efficacy and coronavirus threat. Data were collected online with independent samples of university students from two European countries close to Ukraine, Germany (n = 348) and Finland (n = 228), who filled out an anonymous questionnaire. Path analysis was used to analyse the data. Findings showed that the model was an acceptable fit to the data in each sample, and standardised regression coefficients indicated that anxiety, when watching the war, increased with interference, war worry and coronavirus threat, and decreased with self-efficacy. Women reported more anxiety when watching the war than men. Implications of the results are discussed.     

Business is not just war. Transferring the principle of double effect from war to business

Abstract

In this article the validity of transferring the Principle of Double Effect from the just war tradition to the domain of business is critically reviewed. If a case can be build for sufficient analogies between war and business, the principle of double effect can legitimately be transferred from war to business. If, on the other hand it can be shown that there are aspects in which business differ substantially from just war, then the transfer to business of a principle developed within the context of war becomes more problematic. After exploring the nature of arguments of analogy and fallacious arguments of weak analogy some important disanalogies between war and business are highlighted. Given these disanalogies it is then contended that the just war background of the Principle of Double Effect had some bearing on both the content and manner of application of the Principle of Double Effect. Finally it is argued that these disanalogies require some revisions to the Principle of Double Effect with regard to both its content and its manner of application before it can be applied meaningfully to foreseeable negative side-effects of business.