Follow your heart: Emotion adaptively influences perception

The current review introduces a new program of research that suggests the perception of spatial layout is influenced by emotions. Though perceptual systems are often described as closed and insulated, this review presents research suggesting that a variety of induced emotions (e.g., fear, disgust, sadness) can produce changes in vision and audition. Thus, the perceptual system may be highly interconnected, allowing emotional information to influence perceptions that, in turn, influence cognition. The body of work presented here also suggests that emotion-based changes in perception help us solve particular adaptive problems because emotion does not change all perceptions of the world. Taking the adaptive significance of emotion into account allows us to make predictions about when and how emotion influences perception.     

Neural Plasticity and Human Development

In this article, I argue that experience-induced changes in the brain may be a useful way of viewing the course of human development. Work from the neurosciences supports the claim that most of the behavioral phenomena of interest to psychologists (e.g., cognition, perception, language, emotion) are instantiated by the process of neural plasticity. When development is viewed in this manner, the fallaciousness of the long-standing and often contentious debate over nature versus nurture becomes apparent. Moreover, by utilizing theneuroscientific tools used to examine the effects of experience on brain and behavioral development (e.g., functional neuroimaging), we may improve how we conceptualize our notions of intervention, competence, and resilience.     

Switching between sensory and affective systems incurs processing costs

Recent models of the conceptual system hold that concepts are grounded in simulations of actual experiences with instances of those concepts in sensory-motor systems (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2003; Solomon & Barsalou, 2001). Studies supportive of such a viewhave shown that verifying a property of a concept in one modality, and then switching to verify a property of a different concept in a different modality generates temporal processing costs similar to the cost of switching modalities in perception. In addition to non-emotional concepts, the present experiment investigated switching costs in verifying properties of positive and negative (emotional) concepts. Properties of emotional concepts were taken from vision, audition, and the affective system. Parallel to switching costs in neutral concepts, the study showed that for positive and negative concepts, verifying properties from different modalities produced processing costs such that reaction times were longer and error rates were higher. Importantly, this effect was observed when switching from the affective system to sensory modalities, and vice-versa. These results support the embodied cognition view of emotion in humans.     

Emotions beyond brain and body

The emerging consensus in the philosophy of cognition is that cognition is situated, i.e., dependent upon or co-constituted by the body, the environment, and/or the embodied interaction with it. But what about emotions? If the brain alone cannot do much thinking, can the brain alone do some emoting? If not, what else is needed? Do (some) emotions (sometimes) cross an individual's boundary? If so, what kinds of supra-individual systems can be bearers of affective states, and why? And does that make emotions “embedded” or “extended” in the sense cognition is said to be embedded and extended? Section 2 shows why it is important to understand in which sense body, environment, and our embodied interaction with the world contribute to our affective life. Section 3 introduces some key concepts of the debate about situated cognition. Section 4 draws attention to an important disanalogy between cognition and emotion with regard to the role of the body. Section 5 shows under which conditions a contribution by the environment results in non-trivial cases of “embedded” emotions. Section 6 is concerned with affective phenomena that seem to cross the organismic boundaries of an individual, in particular with the idea that emotions are “extended” or “distributed.”     

Affective picture processing is modulated by emotion word type in masked priming paradigm: an event-related potential study

ABSTRACT

Although a large body of research demonstrates the role of language in emotion processing (e.g. emotional facial expressions), how emotion-laden words (e.g. poison, reward) and emotion-label words (e.g. fear, satisfaction) differently impact affective picture processing is not clear. Emotion-label words label affective states straightforwardly, whereas emotion-laden words engender emotion via reflection. The current study adopted the masked priming paradigm to examine how Chinese emotion-laden words and emotion-label words distinctively influence affective picture processing. Twenty Chinese speakers decided the valence of the pictures with their cortical responses recorded. Emotion-label words facilitated affective picture evaluation behaviourally. Moreover, pictures that were preceded by emotion-laden words generated larger electrophysiological activation than those preceded by emotion-label words. Combined behavioural and ERP evidence revealed that emotion word type modulated affective picture processing, suggesting different roles of emotion-laden and emotion-label words in how emotion is shaped by language.     

The “simulation” of the facial expression of emotions in case of short and long stimulus duration. The effect of pre-motor cortex inhibition by rTMS

Embodied cognition model states that the “simulation process” is necessary to the recognition of emotional significance of face. The present research explored the contribution of frontal motor brain components (i.e. mainly premotor area) to embodied cognition by using rTMS stimulation, to produce a temporary disruption of this specific cortical site. Secondly, short and long stimulus duration conditions were included to verify the contribution of the “simulation process” in response to overt and covert emotional stimulus comprehension. Nineteen subjects were asked to detect emotion/no emotion (anger, fear, happiness, neutral) in these two experimental conditions, by using a backward masking procedure. Five-second rTMS (1 Hz) was delivered before the stimulus onset. False alarms (Fa) and RTs increased and Hits decreased when frontal premotor brain activity was disrupted, specifically in response to anger and fear, for both long and shortduration condition. Thus, the present results highlight the main role of the frontal motor system for emotion facial expression processing.     

Alcohol Affects Emotion Through Cognition

Determining how cognition and emotion interact is pivotal to an understanding of human behavior and its disorders. Available data suggest that changes in emotional reactivity and behavior associated with drinking are intertwined with alcohol's effects on cognitive processing. In the study reported here, we demonstrated that alcohol dampens anticipatory fear and response inhibition in human participants not by directly suppressing subcortical emotion centers, as posited by traditional tension-reduction theories, but instead by impairing cognitive-processing capacity. During intoxication, reductions in fear response (assessed via startle potentiation) occurred only under dual-stimulus conditions, and coincided with reduced attentional processing of threat cues as evidenced by brain response (assessed via P3 event-related potentials). The results are consistent with higher cortical mediation of alcohol's effects on fear, and illustrate more broadly how disruption of a cognitive process can lead to alterations in emotional reactivity and adaptive behavior.     

Learning nonlinearly separable categories by inference and classification

Previous research suggests that learning categories by classifying new instances highlights information that is useful for discriminating between categories. In contrast, learning categories by making predictive inferences focuses learners on an abstract summary of each category (e.g., the prototype). To test this characterization of classification and inference learning further, the authors evaluated the two learning procedures with nonlinearly separable categories. In contrast to previous research involving cohesive, linearly separable categories, the authors found that it is more difficult to learn nonlinearly separable categories by making inferences about features than it is to learn them by classifying instances. This finding reflects that the prototype of a nonlinearly separable category does not provide a good summary of the category members. The results from this study suggest that having a cohesive category structure is more important for inference than it is for classification.     

The Role of Overt and Covert Avoidance Strategies in Generalized Anxiety Disorder Symptoms and Fear of Emotion

Models of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) have largely focused on the role of cognitive (i.e. covert) processes in the maintenance of GAD symptoms, including cognitive avoidance (e.g., thought suppression). Researchers have begun to investigate more systematically the role of overt avoidance behaviors in GAD symptoms and processes. However, the contribution of both overt and covert avoidance strategies in GAD symptoms and emotional processes has not been examined yet. The aim of the present study was to investigate if both overt and covert avoidance strategies are related to (Objective 1) and make a unique contribution in the explanation of the variance of (Objective 2) GAD symptoms, chronic worry and emotional processes (i.e. fear of emotion). Individuals high in chronic worry and GAD symptoms (N?=?113) recruited from the community completed measures of the study variables. Greater use of overt and covert avoidance were both related to greater GAD symptoms, worry severity and fear of emotion. However, covert avoidance was the only unique correlate of GAD symptoms, worry severity and fear of emotion. The results suggest that covert avoidance makes a greater contribution to GAD symptoms and fear of emotion, than does overt avoidance. Future studies are needed to understand how overt avoidance behaviors fit into theoretical models of chronic worry and GAD.

     

Emotion,core affect,and psychological construction

As an alternative to using the concepts of emotion, fear, anger, and the like as scientific tools, this article advocates an approach based on the concepts of core affect and psychological construction, expanding the domain of inquiry beyond “emotion”. Core affect is a neurophysiological state that underlies simply feeling good or bad, drowsy or energised. Psychological construction is not one process but an umbrella term for the various processes that produce: (a) a particular emotional episode's “components” (such as facial movement, vocal tone, peripheral nervous system change, appraisal, attribution, behaviour, subjective experience, and emotion regulation); (b) associations among the components; and (c) the categorisation of the pattern of components as a specific emotion.     

Subjective impact, meaning making, and current and recalled emotions for self-defining memories

Two studies examined the impact of self-defining events on individuals (i.e., subjective impact), meaning making with regard to these events, and how subjective impact may account for the pattern of current and recalled emotions for these self-defining memories (Singer & Moffitt, 1991-1992). In Study 1, participants recalled self-defining memories, indicating how much impact the recalled events have had on them and described meaning making for these events. Subjective impact was shown to be a good marker for meaning making. Participants in Study 2 each recalled five self-defining memories, reporting their current emotions about the events, the emotions they recalled feeling at the time, and the impact the events have had on them. As expected, for negative memories, people reported less negative emotion (e.g., sadness) and more positive emotion (e.g., pride) compared to how they recalled feeling at the time. For positive memories, people reported equally intense positive emotion (e.g., love) and less negative emotion (e.g., fear) compared to how they recalled feeling at the time. These patterns of current and recalled emotions were accounted for by impact ratings.     

Brain Systems that Mediate both Emotion and Cognition

Abstract

Neurobiological research with animals strongly suggests that the brain systems which mediate emotion overlap with those that mediate cognition to such a degree that it is difficult, if not impossible, to maintain any clear distinction between them. Possible reasons for this overlap are discussed; and a model of brain systems that simultaneously subserve emotion and cognition is presented. The model postulates the existence of three fundamental systems of this kind in the mammalian brain: a behavioural approach system, a fight/flight system, and a behavioural inhibition system. The neuropsychology of each of these systems is briefly presented.     

Is the glass half empty or half full and does it even matter? Cognition,emotion, and psychopathology

ABSTRACT

This contribution examines the outcomes of recent decades of research on the interaction between cognition and emotion and how it has informed our understanding and treatment of emotional disorders with a special focus on depression. The review identifies important challenges to this work including the dynamic nature of cognitive processes and emotional responding, the bidirectional relation of cognition and emotion, the need for new tasks and for studies conducted outside of the laboratory, and the consideration of context such as interpersonal factors. Examining interactions between cognition and emotion and integrating basic research on cognition into the scientific understanding of emotional difficulties in psychopathology has contributed in many ways to what the field currently knows about the origins and the treatment of emotional disorders. Important challenges lie ahead – especially the integration of this work into the development of novel treatment approaches.     

Functional connectivity dynamics during film viewing reveal common networks for different emotional experiences

Recent theoretical and empirical work has highlighted the role of domain-general, large-scale brain networks in generating emotional experiences. These networks are hypothesized to process aspects of emotional experiences that are not unique to a specific emotional category (e.g., “sadness,” “happiness”), but rather that generalize across categories. In this article, we examined the dynamic interactions (i.e., changing cohesiveness) between specific domain-general networks across time while participants experienced various instances of sadness, fear, and anger. We used a novel method for probing the network connectivity dynamics between two salience networks and three amygdala-based networks. We hypothesized, and found, that the functional connectivity between these networks covaried with the intensity of different emotional experiences. Stronger connectivity between the dorsal salience network and the medial amygdala network was associated with more intense ratings of emotional experience across six different instances of the three emotion categories examined. Also, stronger connectivity between the dorsal salience network and the ventrolateral amygdala network was associated with more intense ratings of emotional experience across five out of the six different instances. Our findings demonstrate that a variety of emotional experiences are associated with dynamic interactions of domain-general neural systems.     

Knowledge and Appraisal in the Cognition—Emotion Relationship

Abstract

Recently there has been considerable theoretical and empirical work attempting to identify specific cognitive dimensions that shape the emotional response. However, this work has almost universally neglected an important theoretical distinction between two types of cognition relevant to emotion: knowledge and appraisal. Knowledge has to do with the facts of an adaptational encounter, whereas appraisal defines the personal significance of an encounter for well-being. In the shaping of an emotion, knowledge is a distal variable which requires an additional process of appraisal to produce an emotion; appraisal is a proximal variable which directly influences whether an emotion will be generated, and if so, its kind and intensity.

In this article we examine the distinctions between knowledge and appraisal that are relevant to the emotion process, and how the failure to consider them muddies theoretical and empirical work. We examine a number of putative appraisal dimensions prominent in current theoretical systems, examine why they often constitute knowledge rather than appraisal, and discuss some of the appraisal dimensions in the emotion process. In addition, the major techniques used to study the cognition-emotion relationship are examined and their potential for providing evidence of appraisal rather than knowledge is evaluated.     

基础认知与社会认知中内隐过程及其脑机制*

认知过程及其脑机制是心理学研究的重要内容。社会认知是人们在社会生活中对他人行为的意图及情感的认识,是人际互动的重要方面,具有深刻的理论和实践意义。本文全面深入地对社会认知和基础认知中自动加工过程进行了研究综述,对基础认知与社会认知的研究方式进行了比较。自动加工过程是社会认知和基础认知中都存在的重要过程,从脑机制研究角度,相关的电生理学指标(如N400等)都可以作为研究的指标来考察社会认知中的自动加工过程。本文从社会认知与基础认知的比较入手,介绍了各种领域的研究方法,特别是事件相关电位技术等认知神经科学研究方法。     

Perceptual dimensions differentiate emotions

Individuals often describe objects in their world in terms of perceptual dimensions that span a variety of modalities; the visual (e.g., brightness: dark–bright), the auditory (e.g., loudness: quiet–loud), the gustatory (e.g., taste: sour–sweet), the tactile (e.g., hardness: soft vs. hard) and the kinaesthetic (e.g., speed: slow–fast). We ask whether individuals use perceptual dimensions to differentiate emotions from one another. Participants in two studies (one where respondents reported on abstract emotion concepts and a second where they reported on specific emotion episodes) rated the extent to which features anchoring 29 perceptual dimensions (e.g., temperature, texture and taste) are associated with 8 emotions (anger, fear, sadness, guilt, contentment, gratitude, pride and excitement). Results revealed that in both studies perceptual dimensions differentiate positive from negative emotions and high arousal from low arousal emotions. They also differentiate among emotions that are similar in arousal and valence (e.g., high arousal negative emotions such as anger and fear). Specific features that anchor particular perceptual dimensions (e.g., hot vs. cold) are also differentially associated with emotions.     

Cognition–emotion interactions in schizophrenia: Emerging evidence on working memory load and implicit facial-affective processing

Although much is known about working memory (WM) and emotion perception deficits in schizophrenia, little is known of how these deficits interact. We sought to address this gap by conducting a narrative review of relevant literatures and distilling core themes. First, people with schizophrenia have difficulty with high load and during initial phases of WM (e.g., encoding, early rehearsal), yet are able to activate WM-related prefrontal brain regions to the same maximal degree as comparison controls under certain circumstances. Second, people with schizophrenia have difficulty identifying and expressing facial emotions, yet demonstrate heightened automatic/implicit processing of facial emotions. Third, people with schizophrenia behaviourally demonstrate intact cognition–emotion interactions on laboratory tasks wherein emotional processing is automatic/implicit, yet demonstrate cognition–emotion disconnections in other levels of analysis. Insights are drawn from basic science showing interdependency between WM load and implicit emotion. Future research questions are raised regarding interactions between WM load and implicit facial-affective processing in schizophrenia.     

The metabolic mind: A role for leptin and ghrelin in affect and social cognition

Leptin and ghrelin are metabolic hormones central to energy regulation in the body. Theories of allostasis suggest that metabolism could matter for more than just food intake and weight regulation but also ultimately for psychological processes, such as affect and social cognition. Allostasis is the process by which the brain monitors ongoing physiological states and, in turn, regulates physiology based on expectations about how a given situation will impact the self. Motivated by this allostatic perspective, we argue that leptin and ghrelin may be influenced by and even contribute to psychological processes such as affect and social cognition. Specifically, we review literature suggesting that leptin and ghrelin may be sensitive to social affective signals and related contexts (e.g., social status, and social threat vs. support), given that these signals and contexts may represent access to tangible physical and psychological resources that support allostasis and metabolic needs. We then review literature showing that leptin, ghrelin, and associated metabolic states may feed into the construction of social affective states and behaviors (e.g., emotion and risk taking), in order to motivate behaviors in line with allostatic needs. We close by offering guidelines for researchers interested in contributing to this emerging field and highlight opportunities for future research. We believe that leptin and ghrelin offer exciting new directions for social and affective scientists interested in linking the mind, brain, and body.