On motivational influences,moving beyond valence,and integrating dimensional and discrete views of emotion

ABSTRACT

The field of cognition and emotion has grown considerably over the past 30 years, with an increased emphasis on the relationships between emotional and motivational components and how they contribute to basic perceptual, cognitive, and neural processes. For instance, research has revealed that emotion often influences these processes via emotion’s relationship with motivational dimensions, as when positive emotions low versus high in approach motivational intensity have different influences on attentional and other cognitive processes. Research has also revealed that motivational direction (approach vs. withdrawal) and affective valence (positive vs. negative) are not as closely related as once was theorised; that is, positive affect is not inevitably associated with approach motivation and negative affect is not inevitably associated with withdrawal motivation. These and other lines of research with anger have suggested that the field needs to move beyond a focus on affective valence and it needs to consider an integration of dimensional and discrete models of emotion. The article also includes some suggestions for improving methods of measuring and inducing emotions and some recommendations for future researchers.     

Positive Emotion Differentiation: A Functional Approach

While positive emotion can be conceptualized broadly as a response to the potential for reward, the environment offers different kinds of rewards, and these are best approached in somewhat different ways. A functional approach to positive emotion differentiation distinguishes among several different types of rewards with strong implications for adaptive fitness and posits the existence of “discrete” positive emotions that promote an adaptive response to each reward. A taxonomy of eight positive emotions, dubbed the “PANACEAS” taxonomy based on an acronym of the first letter of each of the eight constructs, is presented as an example of this approach. Positive emotion constructs defined through functional analyses are useful for guiding empirical research, especially for identifying prototypical eliciting stimuli, and generating hypotheses about the implications of different positive emotions for a variety of outcomes. Research findings are reviewed that support the importance of positive emotion differentiation in understanding the effects of positive emotions on cognition, physiology, and behavior. Advantages of the functional approach are discussed, as well as implications of the approach for evaluating major theories of the structure of emotion.     

Toward a consensual taxonomy of emotions

ABSTRACT

In this article, I chart certain origins of the science of emotion back to the cognitive revolution. I then highlight new developments in the field – the influences of emotion upon cognition, the focus on over 20 emotions, the expanding emphasis on positive emotion, and an abiding interest in the functions emotions serve. I close by arguing for the need for the field to move toward a conceptual taxonomy of emotions, to move beyond decades of terminological debates about what emotions are to a convergent effort to understand what emotions do for people.     

Revisiting the past and back to the future: Horizons of cognition and emotion research

ABSTRACT

To commemorate that Cognition & Emotion was established three decades ago, we asked some distinguished scholars to reflect on past research on the interface of cognition and emotion and prospects for the future. The resulting papers form the Special Issue on Horizons in Cognition and Emotion Research. The contributions to Horizons cover both the field in general and a diversity of specific topics, including affective neuroscience, appraisal theory, automatic evaluation, embodied emotion, emotional disorders, emotion-linked attentional bias, emotion recognition, emotion regulation, lifespan development, motivation, and social emotions. We hope that Horizons will spark constructive debates, while offering guidance for the future growth and development of research on the interface between cognition and emotion. Finally, we provide an update on how Cognition & Emotion has fared over the past year, and announce some changes in editorial policies and the editorial board.     

Basic emotions,rationality, and folk theory

Abstract

Answering the question of whether there are basic emotions requires considering the functions of emotions. We propose that just a few emotions are basic and that they have functions in managing action. When no fully rational solution is available for a problem of action, a basic emotion functions to prompt us in a direction that is better than a random choice. We contrast this kind of theory with a componential approach which we argue is either a version of the theory of basic emotions or else leads to the doctrine that emotions are mistaken tenets of folk psychology. We defend the psychological reality of the folk theory of emotions, and we argue that universal basic emotions make it possible to understand people from distant cultures, and to translate emotional terminology from one language to another. Finally, we show how theories of basic emotions can be tested, and indicate the kinds of empirical result that can bear on the issue.     

Basic Emotions, Natural Kinds, Emotion Schemas, and a New Paradigm

ABSTRACT— Research on emotion flourishes in many disciplines and specialties, yet experts cannot agree on its definition. Theorists and researchers use the term emotion in ways that imply different processes and meanings. Debate continues about the nature of emotions, their functions, their relations to broad affective dimensions, the processes that activate them, and their role in our daily activities and pursuits. I will address these issues here, specifically in terms of basic emotions as natural kinds, the nature of emotion schemas, the development of emotion–cognition relations that lead to emotion schemas, and discrete emotions in relation to affective dimensions. Finally, I propose a new paradigm that assumes continual emotion as a factor in organizing consciousness and as an influence on mind and behavior. The evidence reviewed suggests that a theory that builds on concepts of both basic emotions and emotion schemas provides a viable research tool and is compatible with more holistic or dimensional approaches.     

Does emotion influence visual perception? Depends on how you look at it

ABSTRACT

One of the biggest challenges in the study of emotion–cognition interaction is addressing the question of whether and how emotions influence processes of perception as distinct from other higher-level cognitive processes. Most theories of emotion agree that an emotion episode begins with a sensory experience – such as a visual percept – that elicits a cascade of affective, cognitive, physiological, and/or behavioural responses (the ordering and inclusion of those latter components being forever debated). However, for decades, a subset of philosophers and scientists have suggested that the presumed perception → emotion relationship is in fact bidirectional, with emotion also altering the perceptual process. In the present review we reflect on the history and empirical support (or, some might argue, lack thereof) for the notion that emotion influences visual perception. We examine ways in which researchers have attempted to test the question, and the ways in which this pursuit is so difficult. As is the case with the ongoing debate about the cognitive penetrability of perception, we conclude that nothing is conclusive in the debate about the emotional penetrability of perception. We nonetheless don rose-coloured glasses as we look forward to the future of this research topic.     

Consequences of specific processing of emotional information: Impact of general versus specific autobiographical memory priming on emotion elicitation

The relation between emotion intensity and the voluntary activation of personal memories was investigated in 2 experiments. Two hypotheses were compared: the specificity hypothesis, which states that emotion intensity is positively related to the specificity of personal memories, and the strategic inhibition hypothesis, which postulates that specifying past experiences requires the inhibition of emotion. Study 1 showed that priming a specific (vs. overgeneral) access mode to autobiographical memory results in less emotion during a subsequent mental imagery trial. Study 2 replicated Study 1 with a wider array of emotions and a different method of emotion induction (films). Overall, results support the strategic inhibition hypothesis. The notion of specificity is discussed as well as implications for cognitive theories of emotion and their clinical applications.     

A multiple‐method analysis of appraisal–emotion relationships: The case of the prosocial intergroup emotions

Despite its status as a prominent set of theories for explaining the elicitation and differentiation of emotions, much appraisal theory and research offer little indication of the nature of the relationship expected between appraisals and emotions. Here, we present a three‐study, multiple‐method analysis in which we examine numerous ways of testing appraisal–emotion relationships using the “prosocial” intergroup emotions—sympathy, anger, and guilt—as an example. Results show that the set of appraisal dimensions that appears strongly characteristic of an emotion varies depending on the kind of appraisal—emotion relationship hypothesised and the experimental methodology/statistical analysis used. These findings demonstrate the utility of explicit theorising about the nature of the relationship between emotions and appraisals, and show how the hypothesised appraisal–emotion relationship and choice of methodology can affect the structure of appraisal theories. We recommend an analysis across multiple methods to provide a more complete picture of a given set of appraisal–emotion relationships.     

The Role of Bodily Perception in Emotion: In Defense of an Impure Somatic Theory

In this paper, we develop an impure somatic theory of emotion, according to which emotions are constituted by the integration of bodily perceptions with representations of external objects, events, or states of affairs. We put forward our theory by contrasting it with Prinz's (2004) pure somatic theory, according to which emotions are entirely constituted by bodily perceptions. After illustrating Prinz's theory and discussing the evidence in its favor, we show that it is beset by serious problems—i.e., it gets the neural correlates of emotion wrong, it isn't able to distinguish emotions from bodily perceptions that aren't emotions, it cannot account for emotions being directed towards particular objects, and it mischaracterizes emotion phenomenology. We argue that our theory accounts for the empirical evidence considered by Prinz and solves the problems faced by his theory. In particular, we maintain that our theory gives a unified and principled account of the relation between emotions and bodily perceptions, the intentionality of emotions, and emotion phenomenology.     

Modeling of emotion elicitation conditions for a cognitive-emotive architecture

To cater to the need of embodying emotional behavior in an autonomous agent, there is a need for modeling computationally apt definitions of emotions. A number of emotion theories have been developed that provide an understanding of human psychology and their emotional behaviors, but it is difficult to directly decipher a theory into a computational model of emotion. Nevertheless, these theories together can serve as the theoretical foundation for designing a model for emotion-eliciting conditions. In this study, the salient features of OCC, Scherer, and Roseman theories of emotions are identified, which complement each other. The features are unified and standardized to bring consistency in deriving the computationally apt definition of five emotions viz. Happiness/Joy, Sadness, Fear, Anger, and Surprise. The objective of this hybridization is to set a ground framework for appraising the emotion-triggering cues (e.g., an event) for a simple, flexible and tolerant computational model of emotions. The underlying emotion-eliciting processes are designed using Fuzzy Logic. Fuzzy rules are framed to model the conditions behind emotion elicitation. Furthermore, the ISEAR data set and the real test-case scenarios are used to validate the accuracy of emotion prediction and rule fulfillment respectively.     

The Construct Of Personality In Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (Rebt) Theory

In this article it is argued that, if Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT) is to survive and prosper in the next century, it will require a more comprehensive and detailed theory of personality at its base. Ideally, REBT personality theory preferably should avoid certain basic shortcomings of other personality theories. Toward these ends, an explicit definition of the term personality is proposed for REBT theory emphasizing psychological individuality, cognition, emotion, and behavior, and their interrelationships. The central concepts in the proposed definition are then explored along with related broad-based hypotheses generally amenable to empirical test. Finally, some implications of the proposed definition of personality for treatment are then discussed.     

Alternatives to the fixed-set model: A review of appraisal models of emotion

Over several decades, appraisal theory has emerged as a prominent theoretical framework explaining the elicitation and differentiation of emotions, and has stimulated a great deal of theorising and empirical research. Despite the large amount of research in this area, there are many aspects of appraisal theory and research that remain unclear or problematic. In this review, we identify a common assumption of many appraisal theories—the fixed appraisal set—and argue that this assumption, combined with a lack of explicit theorising about the predicted relationship between appraisals and emotions, leads to a lack of clarity in both appraisal models and the empirical testing of those models. We recommend that appraisal theorists move in a direction already taken by a small number of theorists, and adopt the starting assumption of a variable appraisal set. We further suggest that theories of concepts and categorisation may inform theorising about appraisal–emotion relationships.     

Semantic primitives for emotions: A Reply to Ortony and Clore

Abstract

We respond to four criticisms by Ortony and Clore (1989) of our semantic analysis of English emotion terms (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989). We clarify how our theory enables people to speak of certain emotions that they experience without knowing their cause. We explain why emotions are best regarded as mental states with distinctive phenomenal tones—not “just” feelings, and how emotion terms can relate to terms denoting moods. Finally, we discuss an issue that distinguishes our theory from other contemporary cognitive theories: We claim that there is a small number of discriminably different basic emotions, and that the semantics of English emotion terms is comprehensible if these basic states are taken as unanalysable primitives.     

Implicit theories of emotion shape regulation of negative affect

Implicit theories of emotion—assumptions about whether emotions are fixed (entity theory) or malleable (incremental theory)—have previously been shown to influence affective outcomes over time. We examined whether implicit theories of emotion also relate to the immediate regulation of negative affect. Consistent with our hypotheses, we found that the more students endorsed an entity theory of emotion, the more discomfort they reported while watching an aversive movie clip, the more they avoided affective stimuli in this movie clip, the more negative affect they reported after the clip, and the less likely they were to watch the same clip again to learn about its ending. These findings suggest that implicit theories of emotion might produce poor affective outcomes immediately as well as over time. They also offer insight into why some people avoid negative affect while others confront it.     

Emotion as patheception

Emotions cannot be fully understood in purely cognitive terms. Nor can they be fully understood as mere feelings with no content. But it has not been easy to give an account of the relation of affect and cognition in a way that preserves the perceived unity of emotional experience. Consequently, emotion theories tend to lean either toward cognitivism, or, alternatively, the view that emotions are basically non-cognitive affairs. The aim of this paper is to argue for an account of emotion as a unity of affect and cognition. Emotions, it will be suggested, do not combine, blend, add, or causally relate cognition to affect, or affect to cognition, but are rather original unities which should be viewed as coordinate with, rather than subordinate to, either cognition, perception, feeling, or any other basic mental category.     

Prolegomenon to the structure of emotion: Gleanings from neuropsychology

Abstract

This article presents a model of the structure of emotion developed primarily from a consideration of neuropsychological evidence and behavioural data which have bearing on neuropsychological theories. Valence is first considered and highlighted as a defining characteristic of emotion. Next, the use of facial behaviour and autonomic nervous system patterns as defining characteristics of discrete emotions is questioned on empirical and conceptual grounds. The regulation of emotion is considered and proposed to affect the very structure of emotion itself. If there is an invariant pattern of biological activity across different instantiations of the same emotion, it is likely to be found in higher-order associative networks of central nervous system activity, the very same networks that subserve goal-directed behaviour and other cognitive functions. Drawing upon evolutionary considerations, it is argued that what is basic about emotion are the dimensions of approach and withdrawal. The nature of the linkage between such action tendencies and emotion is discussed.     

Context matters: the benefits and costs of expressing positive emotion among survivors of childhood sexual abuse

Positive emotions promote adjustment to aversive life events. However, evolutionary theory and empirical research on trauma disclosure suggest that in the context of stigmatized events, expressing positive emotions might incur social costs. To test this thesis, the authors coded genuine (Duchenne) smiling and laughter and also non-Duchenne smiling from videotapes of late-adolescent and young adult women, approximately half with documented histories of childhood sexual abuse (CSA), as they described the most distressing event of their lives. Consistent with previous studies, genuine positive emotional expression was generally associated with better social adjustment two years later. However, as anticipated, CSA survivors who expressed positive emotion in the context of describing a past CSA experience had poorer long-term social adjustment, whereas CSA survivors who expressed positive emotion while describing a nonabuse experience had improved social adjustment. These findings suggest that the benefits of positive emotional expression may often be context specific.     

决策中情绪作用机制的理论研究述评

决策研究领域日益重视情绪的作用,情绪的认知评估理论、道德情绪理论及动机维度模型等新兴情绪观使研究者对决策机制的认识不断深化,出现了解释情绪在各类决策中作用机制的理论成果：情绪浸润模型、风险决策感知与评估双系统模型、情绪即社会信息模型、神经情感决策理论。未来尚需加强作用机制的验证研究,从情绪具身角度进行思考,基于知情交互的角度整合理论体系,重视神经生理机制理论及模型建构。并简要分析了理论成果的启示。