Conventional Fouls - A Note on Strategic Fouls

ABSTRACT

Strategic fouls (SF) are intentional violations of the rules ‘in which the violator expects to be detected and penalized but expects some benefit to his or her competitive effectiveness’ (Fraleigh 2003, 169). Sometimes SF are widely viewed within a playing practice as acceptable—possibly as legitimate prices) e.g. stopping the clock in Basketball). In other instances, they are considered illegitimate (e.g., handling the ball to prevent a goal in dying minutes of a football match). And of course sometimes the issue is contested (e.g., fouling to stop a counterattack in football). My aim is to defend Converionalsim: Conventionalism: SF of a certain type in a particular sport is justifiable if there is a legitimate agreement or a convention according to which it is legitimate. Simply put, Conventionalism means that stopping the clock in Basketball is justified because there is a convention that it is legitimate. After briefly setting out the initial case in favor of conventionalism, I will utilize some prominent discussions of SF to challenge Conventionalism, and will offer a response to these challenges.     

The Applicability of the Door-in-the Face Technique when Established Behavioral Customs Exist

The applicability of the door-in-the-face technique was tested in a monetary donation context where established behavioral standards exist, and where the target person has standards by which to judge the legitimacy of the solicitor's demand. Based on the proposition that exaggerated initial requests might discredit the solicitor and thereby halt the give-and-take process, it was expected that (a) with legitimate initial requests, the probability of compliance with a request would be greater when preceded by a larger request than if presented alone; and that (b) with illegitimate initial requests, the probability of compliance with a second request would be smaller when preceded by a larger request than if presented alone. On the national collection day for the Association for the Rehabilitation of the Mentally Handicapped, 400 subjects were asked to contribute IL 10, 15, or 20. In the experimental groups, these amounts were preceded with requests for larger sums which were judged previously by a pretest to be considered legitimate or illegitimate. In the control groups, subjects were asked to contribute the same amounts, but no larger amounts were first requested. The replicability of the door-in-the-face technique has been proven with requests for which established customs exist. However, the technique was only effective with legitimate initial requests. With initial requests that were previously judged as unreasonable, the technique had a "boomerang effect" and suppressed compliance.     

Ethnocentrism,Social Contract Liberalism and Positivistic-Conservatism: Rorty's Three Theses on Politics

In this article I argue that Rorty has three separatearguments for liberalism. The pragmatic-ethnocentric argument for liberalism,as a system which works for `us liberals', is rejectedfor entailing relativism. The social contract argument results in an extreme formof individualism. This renders politics redundantbecause there is no need for the (liberal) state toprotect poetic individuals, who are capable ofdefending themselves. Even if the less able areharmed, the state could not prevent this, givenRorty's arguments about discursive enrichment withina language game. Finally, the positivistic-conservative argument legitimisesliberal politics by fiat, and makes normativediscussion about the status quo illegitimate. Herethe argument is that politics is a matter of reactivetechnical piecemeal problem-solving, to restore theharmony of the status quo. As politics deals with`facts', normative `problematisations' of thefunctional status quo are illegitimate (in the public/political sphere). So, either anything goes, andpolitics is redundant, or discussion of politics isdepoliticised and confined to the private sphere.Consequently, Rorty has no way to explore issues ofpower, or normative contestation. Therefore he isunable to address issues of social justice withinliberal democracies, such as feminist arguments aboutan ascribed gender status limiting equalityof opportunity.     

Innovation,illegitimacy, and individualism

Abstract

Simonton has reported an interesting set of findings concerning the relationship between creativity and what he terms social pathology. To speak of social or political pathology is to use a metaphor, the meaning of which would seem to be almost completely relative. For example, democracy is a pathological state for one who believes in the divine right of kings, but the latter belief seems delusional to one who holds democratic principles. Thus, creativity is related to certain social phenomena, but it is not clear if we should classify these phenomena as pathological. In my own research on British history, I have found that an egotistic and asocial emphasis in poetry consistently cooccurs with high rates of scientific and technological innovation, illegitimate births, and industrial productivity. In one way or another all of these phenomena have to do with individualism and independence or nonconformity. Whether such epochs of lessened social solidarity should be called pathological or healthy seems to be a matter of taste rather than fact. The gist of Simonton's explanations of how social factors influence the amount of creativity is reasonable, but some apparent flaws in the details of these explanations are pointed out in this commentary.     

The pathway to accepting derogatory ingroup norms: The roles of compartmentalization and legitimacy

ObjectivesThe current experiment was conducted among ice hockey fans, and brings together theories of intergroup relations and self and identity literature. It investigated if perceiving strong norms in favor of derogating against fans of outgroup teams, and engaging in these behaviors oneself, leads to an increased compartmentalization of these behaviors (i.e., such that they are restricted to a particular compartment within the self). This association was expected to be especially strong when derogatory behaviors are portrayed as illegitimate. We also explored whether this compartmentalization then flows on to vitality as a well-being indicator.Method and designIce hockey fans supporting a diversity of NHL teams were recruited (N = 116). The legitimacy of the derogatory behaviors was manipulated by making salient either: that these behaviors have harmful consequences for outgroup members (illegitimate condition) vs. that such behaviors can benefit the ingroup (legitimate condition).ResultsThe expected mediated model was supported among the entire sample. The association between engaging in the derogatory behaviors and their compartmentalization in the self was also moderated by the experimental manipulation: While participants in the illegitimate condition reported a positive link between engaging in these behaviors and their compartmentalization, participants in the legitimate condition did not show a significant association between these variables, suggesting no need for them to restrict these behaviors within themselves.ConclusionsResults are discussed in light of normative approaches, intergroup theories, and the self.     

Relations between high and low power groups: the importance of legitimacy

Using a social identity perspective, two experiments examined the effects of power and the legitimacy of power differentials on intergroup bias. In Experiment 1, 125 math-science students were led to believe that they had high or low representation in a university decision-making body relative to social-science students and that this power position was either legitimate or illegitimate. Power did not have an independent effect on bias; rather, members of both high and low power groups showed more bias when the power hierarchy was illegitimate than when it was legitimate. This effect was replicated in Experiment 2 (N = 105). In addition, Experiment 2 showed that groups located within an unfair power hierarchy expected the superordinate power body to be more discriminatory than did those who had legitimately high or low power. The results are discussed in terms of their implications for group relations.     

Society’s Symbolic Order and Political Trials: Toward Sacrificing the Self for the “Big Other”

The need to establish a borderline between legitimate and illegitimate political trial is one of the central societal discourses. In this paper the author claims that the issues are complex and that a political trial can remain legitimate as long as it is not dealing with a confrontation with the symbolic order on which the society (and the court itself) is founded and as long as the subject (or action) it is dealing with does not threaten the symbolic order’s (or the “Big Other”) existence. When the symbolic order’s existence is in danger, the court is bound to participate in an act of “sacrifice” that is intended to protect the “order.” The author uses Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory of the “Big Other” (and its development to ideological-political terms) in examining three categories of sacrifice. Through these categories the author claims that in extreme cases of confrontation with the existence of the symbolic order, the court cannot remain objective and it would be difficult to justify the trial as legitimate (especially in historical perspective).     

GM Food Safety: Scientific and Institutional Issues

Abstract

When government and industry elites respond to or anticipate public acceptance issues having to do with industrial innovation, they construct models of the public that have variously been described as imaginaries, discourses, and frames. Because publics are sometimes mobilized in opposition to new technologies, opportunities emerge for bridging science and technology studies and social movement studies. Methodological and conceptual challenges for such syntheses are discussed. First, it is important to disaggregate categories of the public, industrial and political elites, and imaginaries (e.g. as threats, sources of innovation, or legitimate concerns). One solution is to use flexible typologies of the relations, such as industrial opposition movements, justice movements, alternative industrial movements, and regime preservation movements. Second, there is sometimes a tendency for the cultural analysis of imaginaries or discourses to utilize all-encompassing cultural logics and culturalism and to reject nomothetic inquiry, and alternatives are discussed.     

Consumer Boycotts as Instruments for Structural Change

Consumer boycotts have become a frequent form of social protest in the digital age. The corporate malpractices motivating them are varied, including environmental pollution, lack of minimum labour standards, severe mistreatment of animals, lobbying and misinformation campaigns, collaboration or complicity with illegitimate political regimes, and systematic tax evasion and tax fraud. In this article, I argue that organised consumer boycotts should be regarded as a legitimate and purposeful instrument for structural change, provided they conform to a number of normative criteria. In order to show this, the practice and empirical context of consumer boycotts are first outlined. I then lay out and refute three general objections to this practice. Although each of these objections fails, their discussion generates insights concerning the normative standards with which boycotters must comply if they want their campaigns to be both legitimate and successful. These normative criteria are detailed along the lines of two guiding principles, proportionality and transparency. In the final step, I elaborate on structural change as the deeper purpose of consumer boycotts.     

The emergence and effects of deviants in low and high status groups

We test the proposition, derived from social identity theory and the subjective group dynamics model, that a group member who undermines the in-group’s quest for positive status will be perceived as a “deviant.” Using a minimal group paradigm, participants (N=104) were assigned to either a high or a low status group. They were then confronted with an in-group member who claimed that the status differentials were either legitimate or illegitimate. We found that a group member who claimed that the status differences were legitimate in a low status group, or illegitimate in a high status group, was seen as less valuable to the in-group than a more neutral in-group member. Furthermore, such deviants were less likely to be selected for group leadership than neutral group members. Finally, the presence of a deviant undermined the cohesion of the group. The results are discussed in terms of the social functions of deviant rejection for obtaining or preserving positive group distinctiveness.     

Law Without Legitimacy or Justification? The Flawed Foundations of Philosophical Anarchism

In this article, I examine A. John Simmons’s philosophical anarchism, and specifically, the problems that result from the combination of its three foundational principles: the strong correlativity of legitimacy rights and political obligations; the strict distinction between justified existence and legitimate authority; and the doctrine of personal consent, more precisely, its supporting assumptions about the natural freedom of individuals and the non-natural states into which individuals are born. As I argue, these assumptions, when combined with the strong correlativity and strict distinction theses, undermine Simmons’s claim, which is central to his philosophical anarchism, that a state may be justified in enforcing the law, even if illegitimate or unjustified in existing.     

Two Models of Deliberation: Oratory and Conversation in Ratifying the Constitution

In recent years, "deliberation" has become the byword of many political theorists, most of whom identify deliberation with reasoned conversation. Among the most forceful advocates of deliberation as conversation are Jürgen Habermas and, to a greater or lesser extent, his successors who style themselves "deliberative democrats." For them, the more political decision-making approximates the ideal of a reasoned public conversation among free and equal individuals, the more legitimate and rational it will be. "Outcomes," they say are democratically legitimate if and only if they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals. Their deliberative model produces more rational decision-making, they say, because it conveys information, impels individuals to order their preferences coherently, and by making persons articulate good reasons in public leads them "to think from the standpoint of all involved."     

The effects of leader illegitimacy on leaders' and subordinates' responses to relinquishing power decisions

This research examined how leader illegitimacy affects leaders' and subordinates' responses to relinquishing power decisions. The processes underlying responses to leader illegitimacy and relinquishing power were also examined. Across four studies, participants were placed in leader roles (Studies 1a/1b) or subordinate roles (Studies 2a/2b) in an online competition. In Studies 1a/1b, participants assigned a leadership role learned, via a leadership skills test, that their leadership was illegitimate or legitimate. By contrast, in Studies 2a/2b, participants assigned a subordinate role were confronted with either an illegitimate leader who retained their power after performing poorly or a legitimate leader who received the leader role after a poor‐performing leader had relinquished their power. Results demonstrated that leaders who felt they did not belong in their leadership role relinquished more power when their leadership was illegitimate (vs. legitimate) and subordinates who felt less in control and greater anger supported illegitimate (vs. legitimate) leaders less.     

Changing One’s Mind on Moral Matters

Contemporary moral philosophy assumes an account of what it means to legitimately change one’s mind in ethics, and I wish to challenge this account by enlarging the category of the legitimate. I am just as eager to avoid illegitimate mind-changing brought on by deceit or brainwashing, but I claim that legitimacy should be defined in terms of transparency of method. A social reformer should not be embarrassed to admit that he acquired many beliefs about justice while reading Dickens. As such, appeals to the heart and the imagination are just as legitimate, within limits, as appeals to the mind; and showing can be as legitimate as telling. To demonstrate this, I consider the example of a vegetarian trying to ‘convert’ a carnivore. I then ask what it means when the carnivore claims to have been previously mistaken.     

The Empire of Women: Rousseau on Domination and Sexuality

Jean-Jacques Rousseau's works are often a touchstone and inspiration for many when it comes to thinking carefully about domination. We find Rousseau-inspired analyses across a wide range of political theories centering the concept of domination, from republicanism, liberalism, and Marxism to critical theory, feminisms, and beyond. This article aims to raise questions about a powerful, prevailing, and compelling reading of Rousseau's conception of domination. Beyond that, I hope to offer further insight into the components of his view of domination by centering his account of sexuality as a domination/subordination relation. Ultimately, I suggest that Rousseau's considered view is that domination is a matter of being in a dependency relation. In other words, to be dependent upon others (whether a particular other or group of others) is sufficient for being dominated. However, not all domination relations are illegitimate. Both sexuality and the specific case of forming a social compact are sites of domination relations that can be rendered legitimate under certain conditions.     

No Right to Resist? Elise Reimarus's Freedom as a Kantian Response to the Problem of Violent Revolt

One of the greatest woman intellectuals of eighteenth‐century Germany is Elise Reimarus, whose contribution to Enlightenment political theory is rarely acknowledged today. Unlike other social contract theorists, Reimarus rejects a people's right to violent resistance or revolution in her philosophical dialogue Freedom (1791). Exploring the arguments in Freedom, this paper observes a number of similarities in the political thought of Elise Reimarus and Immanuel Kant. Both, I suggest, reject violence as an illegitimate response to perceived political injustice in a way that opposes Locke's strong voluntarism and the absolutism of Hobbes. First, they emphasize the need to maintain the legal state as a precondition for the possibility of external right. Second, they share an optimistic view of the inherently “just” nature of the tripartite republican state. And finally, Reimarus and Kant both outline an alternative, nonviolent response to political injustice that consists in the freedom of public expression and a discourse on the moral enlightenment of man.     

How is justice understood in classic Confucianism?

ABSTRACT

In Sinicized Asia, justice, conceptualized and institutionalized in its current form on a Western mold is part of a singular and ancient Confucian legal tradition.

In this paper, it will be argued that Confucians initially articulated the concept of justice in relation to their own explanation of the world and their ideal, which distinguishes and rewards men’s actions according to their merits and social condition.

It will be shown that Confucius’s thinking is primarily political and suggests ways of harmoniously organizing and reforming society in which justice is conceived both as a principle of government, a principle of social conduct and one of the essential virtues, or a ‘moral sense’ that everyone must possess, while, in practice, Confucian justice will put forward the imperatives of retributive justice. This, despite its philosophical aversion for sanctions and for what upsets harmony.     

“Patriotism à la Carte”: Perceived Legitimacy of Collective Guilt and Collective Pride as Motivators for Political Behavior

Intergroup emotions motivate behavior, yet little is known about how people perceive these emotional experiences in others. In three experiments (Ns = 109, 179, 246), we show that U.S. citizens believe collective guilt is an illegitimate emotional motivator for ingroup political behavior, while collective pride is legitimate. This differential legitimacy is due to the perception that collective guilt violates the norm of group interest, while collective pride adheres to it; those who believe ingroup interests are more important than outgroups’ exhibited this illegitimacy gap. The perception that the intergroup emotion promoted ingroup entitativity mediated the relationship between emotion (pride vs. guilt) and legitimacy; this relationship was especially strong for those high in the belief in the norm of group interest. Collective guilt can have prosocial consequences, yet the perception that it is illegitimate may hinder such consequences from being realized.     

The end of History or the end of Democracy? National identity and the future of the nation‐state

Two alternative scenarios on the future of the nation state are presented in order to discuss the concepts of national identity as well as of political system legitimacy. At the core is the question to what extent the nation state will become obsolescent if not obsolete as a function of international interdependence. Fukuyama considers national identity a cultural phenomenon alien to democracy as the ultimate form of government. Guéhenno, in contrast, believes that the erosion of the nation state and of national identity will bring about the end of democracy. The disagreement rests on the assumption whether the political systems will be able to retain their autonomy allowing them to maintain or expand individual liberty and collective freedom.     

Taking People as They Are?

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