No Empathy for Empathy: An Existential Reading of Husserl’s Forgotten Question

ABSTRACT

Empathy is a term used to denote our experience of connecting or feeling with an Other. The term has been used both by psychologists and phenomenologists as a supplement for our biological capacity to understand an Other. In this paper I would like to challenge the possibility of such empathy. If empathy is employed to mean that we know another person’s feelings, then I argue that this is impossible. I argue that there is an equivocation in the use of the term ‘empathy’ which conditions the appropriation of the Other as we think that we know how the Other feels. To claim that we do know an Other’s feelings – or any kind of their intentional experience – means to appropriate their experience through our own. I will first reveal the equivocal use of the term ‘empathy’ and, then, I will explore Husserl’s use of the term. In Husserl, the understanding of an Other as empathy is only partial. I shall conclude by reiterating a thesis from philosophy of existence and feminist theory according to which to know another person comes from creating a community with them and not because we have a biological structure that can mirror each other’s feelings.     

The Empathetic Soldier

ABSTRACT

Empathy’s relation to the conduct of war is ambiguous. It is mentioned sporadically in international relations theory and, perhaps surprisingly, in official military doctrine. Yet empathy’s role in the military profession remains obscure, partly because it sits uneasily in military culture. Many military professionals struggle with how it is to be integrated with other, more clearly martial, virtues. Add to this struggle the confusion over what empathy actually is, and it quickly becomes easier to dismiss it or keep it at the fringes of consideration. It is my intent to clarify the concept of empathy in light of recent scholarship, and then to show the relevance of empathy to the tactical and strategic demands of war. Empathy bolsters soldiers’ understanding of human actors in the operational environment and it improves soldiers’ overall intentions. These benefits derive from the nature of empathy as an understanding of another’s experience, including emotions, beliefs, perspectives, or intentions, and the incorporation of this knowledge into further deliberation, especially important moral judgments.     

The phenomenology of empathy: a Steinian emotional account

This paper presents a phenomenological account of empathy inspired by the proposal put forward by Edith Stein in her book On the Problem of Empathy, published originally 1917. By way of explicating Stein’s views, the paper aims to present a characterization of empathy that is in some aspects similar to, but yet essentially different from contemporary simulationist theories of empathy. An attempt is made to show that Stein’s proposal articulates the essential ingredients and steps involved in empathy and that her proposal can be made even more comprehensive and elucidating by stressing the emotional aspect of the empathy process. Empathy, according to such a phenomenological proposal, is to be understood as a perceptual-imaginative feeling towards and with the other person’s experiences made possible by affective bodily schemas and being enhanced by a personal concern for her. To experience empathy does not necessarily or only mean to experience the same type of feeling as the target does; it means feeling alongside the feeling of the target in imagining and explicating a rich understanding of the experiences of the very person one is facing.     

Echoing the emotions of others: empathy is related to how adults and children map emotion onto the body

ABSTRACT

Empathy involves a mapping between the emotions observed in others and those experienced in one’s self. However, effective social functioning also requires an ability to differentiate one’s own emotional state from that of others. Here, we sought to examine the relationship between trait measures of empathy and the self-other distinction during emotional experience in both children and adults. We used a topographical self-report method (emBODY tool) in which participants drew on a silhouette of a human body where they felt an emotional response while watching film and music clips, as well as where they believed the character in the film or performer was feeling an emotion. We then assessed how the degree of overlap between the bodily representation of self versus other emotions related to trait empathy. In adults, the degree of overlap in the body maps was correlated with Perspective Taking. This relationship between cognitive empathy and degree of overlap between self and other was also found with children (8–11 years old), even though children performed worse on the task overall. The results suggest that mapping emotions observed or imagined in other’s bodies onto our own is related to the development of empathy.     

Humanistic psychologists decline to be guests in the medical household

Abstract

It is theorized that affirmation of the self by another makes it possible for the self to know itself, be the author of its own discourse, genuinely listen to another, move toward another as in empathy, as well as experience having another person live within one's self. Affirmation, moreover, allows one to distinguish between the self and sources of self‐satisfaction, and take responsibility for another, thereby preventing premeditated violent acts, which it is argued, are the product of dis‐affirmations of the self. The birth of affirmation, it is postulated, derives from the gaze of the other, the domain, as Levinas stated, of concrete existence. It is here that a person is granted his or her right, simply, to be.     

The impact of empathy and reappraisal on emotional intensity recognition

Empathy represents a fundamental ability that allows for the creation and cultivation of social bonds. As part of the empathic process, individuals use their own emotional state to interpret the content and intensity of other people’s emotions. Therefore, the current study was designed to test two hypotheses: (1) empathy for the pain of another will result in biased emotional intensity judgment; and (2) changing one’s emotion via emotion regulation will modulate these biased judgments. To test these hypotheses, in experiment one we used a modified version of a well-known task that triggers an empathic reaction We found that empathy resulted in biased emotional intensity judgment. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of a bias in the recognition of emotional facial expressions as a function of empathy for pain. In experiment two, we replicated these findings in an independent sample, and further found that this biased emotional intensity judgment can be moderated via reappraisal. Taken together, our findings suggest that the novel task used here can be employed to further explore the relation between emotion regulation and empathy.     

Intellectual humility and prosocial values: Direct and mediated effects

Abstract

Research has established links between humility and prosocial outcomes. This study examined, with self-report data, whether humility with regard to one’s knowledge would be predictive of prosocial values. Consistent with hypotheses, intellectual humility was associated with higher levels of empathy, gratitude, altruism, benevolence, and universalism, and lower levels of power seeking. Analyses supported empathy and gratitude as mediators between intellectual humility and prosocial values. These findings leave open the possibility that intellectual humility may be a precursor to links previously established between empathy and gratitude and prosocial outcomes. Characteristics of intellectual humility such as recognizing one’s cognitive limits, having a non-defensive stance toward one’s beliefs, and respecting others’ viewpoints may put one in a unique position to experience empathy and gratitude, and by extension, a host of prosocial values. Future research would be required to examine whether intellectual humility is a possible point of intervention for promoting positive social interactions.     

Empathy and emotional dissonance: Impact on organizational citizenship behaviors

IntroductionThe ability of nurses to hold competing emotions is at the heart of a number of recent studies. Empathy is an emotional resource in nurse-patient interactions and promotes positive experiences at work. On the contrary, emotional dissonance resulting from nurse/patient interactions is usually considered to lead to negative outcomes, such as job dissatisfaction (Brotherigde & Grandey, 2002).ObjectiveThe aim of this study is to investigate the extent to which empathy and emotional dissonance are associated with organizational citizenship behavior among a group of Italian nurses.MethodA questionnaire was distributed to 222 nurses, working in two multidisciplinary hospitals in a North region of Italy.ResultsResults support the hypothesis that both cognitive and emotional empathy have significant effects on nurses’ organizational citizenship behavior directed at the organization. Cognitive empathy explained significant variance in organizational citizenship directed only at specific individuals.ConclusionThese findings confirm that cognitive and emotional empathy have different impact on nurses’ organizational citizenship behavior. Further studies are required to inform education or for application in clinical settings.     

In Defense of the Moral Significance of Empathy

It is commonly suggested that empathy is a morally important quality to possess and that a failure to properly empathize with others is a kind of moral failure. This suggestion assumes that empathy involves caring for others’ well-being. Skeptics challenge the moral importance of empathy by arguing that empathy is neither necessary nor sufficient to care for others’ well-being. This challenge is misguided. Although some forms of empathy may not be morally important, empathy with another’s basic well-being concerns is both necessary and sufficient to care for another’s well-being, provided that one’s empathy is both cognitive and affective. I further defend the idea that empathy of this form is a moral virtue. In doing so, I address three challenges to empathy’s status as a virtue: (1) that empathy is unnecessary for being ethical, (2) that it is not useful for promoting ethical behavior, and (3) that an empathetic person can lack other traits central to being virtuous, such as being motivated by the moral good and being disposed to do virtuous things whenever appropriate opportunities arise. I argue that these challenges are mistaken.     

Edith Stein’s phenomenology of sensual and emotional empathy

This paper presents and explicates the theory of empathy found in Edith Stein’s early philosophy, notably in the book On the Problem of Empathy, published in 1917, but also by proceeding from complementary thoughts on bodily intentionality and intersubjectivity found in Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities published in 1922. In these works Stein puts forward an innovative and detailed theory of empathy, which is developed in the framework of a philosophical anthropology involving questions of psychophysical causality, social ontology and moral philosophy. Empathy, according to Stein, is a feeling-based experience of another person’s feeling that develops throughout three successive steps on two interrelated levels. The key to understanding the empathy process á la Stein is to explicate how the steps of empathy are attuned in nature, since the affective qualities provide the energy and logic by way of which the empathy process is not only inaugurated but also proceeds through the three steps and carries meaning on two different levels corresponding to two different types of empathy: sensual and emotional empathy. Stein’s theory has great potential for better understanding and moving beyond some major disagreements found in the contemporary empathy debate regarding, for instance, the relation between perception and simulation, the distinction between what is called low-level and high-level empathy, and the issue of how and in what sense it may be possible to share feelings in the empathy process.     

Empathy,Respect, and Vulnerability

ABSTRACT

This paper reconsiders Heather Battaly’s argument that empathy is not a virtue. Like Battaly, I argue that empathy is a disposition that includes elements of virtue acquisition, but is not in itself a virtue in the Aristotelian sense. Unlike Battaly, however, I propose a distinction between care and respect. Drawing on Darwall’s view of recognition respect as well as on phenomenologically inspired views of empathy, I argue that respect can be regarded as the moral feeling that is distinctive of empathy. In my view, the feeling of respect towards another’s situated experience grants epistemic dignity, which is the recognition of the intrinsic significance of subjective experience. By way of conclusion, I suggest that the relation between empathy and respect can be relevant for an account of vulnerability that is not opposed to autonomy.     

Disembodied Souls or Soul-Less Bodies: Spirituality as Fragmentation

SUMMARY

‘Soul’ and ‘body’ are two linguistic expressions of one and the same reality, the human being. In pastoral care, aged care, and palliative care the stated aim is always to care for the whole person. An increasing focus on ‘spirituality’ has also led to objectifying and measuring what is ultimately beyond calculation. To care for each person as an ‘ensouled body’ and ‘embodied soul’ is to acknowledge we are in the service of one another. In entering one another's stories, words like impose, define, and manage are replaced by trust, love, and faithfulness. Measurable outcomes are then replaced by risk, ambiguity, and mystery: the heart and soul and body of human care.     

Emotional Communication and the Unconscious in the Analytic Setting

ABSTRACT

One type of unconscious communication is conceptualized as a form of emotional communication, the channel of communication that conveys information about a person’s emotional state through the nonsymbolic expression of feelings and is experienced as feeling in the receiver. Some of the analyst’s feelings are attuned responses to the patient’s unconscious communications; others are disjunctive and related only to the analyst’s unconscious. Attuned feelings can be identified by their congruence—similarities, consistencies, and analogies—with the patient’s verbal material, which reveals the meaning that the analyst’s feeling has within the patient’s subjectivity. Attuned feelings also have a meaning within the analyst’s subjectivity. Two cases are discussed, one in which the analyst experiences the patient’s unconscious communication within the symbolism of one of her own childhood memories. The other illustrates the risk of confusing disjunctive feelings emanating from the analyst’s own unconscious with unconscious communication from the patient.     

Empathy and transformative experience without the first person point of view (a reply to L. A. Paul)1

Abstract

In her very interesting ‘First-personal modes of presentation and the problem of empathy’ (2017, 315–336), L. A. Paul argues that the phenomenon of empathy gives us reason to care about the first person point of view: that as theorists we can only understand, and as humans only evince, empathy by appealing to that point of view. We are skeptics about the importance of the first person point of view, although not about empathy. The goal of this paper is to see if we can account for empathy without the ideology of the first person. We conclude that we can.     

Why the Capacity to Pretend Matters for Empathy

A phenomenological insight in the debate on empathy is that it is possible to directly perceive other people’s emotions in their expressive bodily behaviour. Contrary to what is suggested by many phenomenologists, namely that this perceptual skill is immediately available if one has vision, this paper argues that the perceptual skill for empathy is acquired. Such a skill requires that we have undergone certain emotional experiences ourselves and that we have had the experience of seeing the world differently, which is a form of pretence. By investigating how we retain knowledge of what is real while pretending, that is, how we anchor the experience of pretence in something that is not pretended, the paper argues that we split our experiential perspective into a double perspective, which differs from the cognitive act of understanding what a perspective is. With this notion in hand, we can return to the debate on empathy. It is argued that in order to have the capacity for direct empathic perception, one must have undergone experiences involving a double perspective.     

Countertransference and changes in the conception of the psychoanalytic relationship

Abstract

The concept of countertransference has a long history in psychoanalysis. This paper sketches the phenomenon referred to by countertransference and the development of the concept, from being signs of disturbance in the analyst to an important road to knowledge about the patient's inner life. The complexity of the questions discussed today – how to understand the concepts of neutrality, abstinence, and empathy; the relative subjective mutuality and symmetry of the analytic situation; the analyst's enactments and self-disclosure of feelings – reflects the complexity of the contemporary view of the patient–analyst relationship. In conclusion, the author presents a model illustrating the disturbing and informative aspects of countertransference together with the conceptual relationship between countertransference on the one hand and empathy and projective identification on the other. Finally, by differentiating between intuitive and irrational levels of functioning, an integrated model for countertransference is presented, synthesising the essence of the concept as it is used today.     

Einfühlung as the breath of art: six modes of embodiment

Robert Vischer’s concept of Einfühlung, feeling-into, translated as empathy, serves as the departure point for a proposal about viewing art using the body for a non-imitative form of empathy termed a transomatization and for other embodied operations. A transomatization occurs when viewers reinterpret a component or process of their own bodies to serve as a non-imitative stand-in, or correlate, for something outside of the self, specifically, some quality of an art work or its production. This creates an overlap of the self and other that might be experienced subjectively as a feeling of projection, an operation characteristic of empathy. Transomatizations and other embodied experiences are grounded in empathic, intersubjective modes of engaging others that begin in early life. As applications of the proposed concepts, six different embodiments of the viewer’s breathing are explored in regard to Friedrich E. Church’s 1848 oil painting Morning, Looking East over the Hudson Valley from the Catskill Mountains. Support for elements of the proposed concepts and applications is drawn from research in the biological and social sciences and from first person, embodied accounts of viewing.     

Investigating the role of alexithymia on the empathic deficits found in schizotypy and autism spectrum traits

Alexithymia, the inability to identify and describe one’s emotional experience, is elevated in many clinical populations, and related to poor interpersonal functioning. Alexithymia is also associated with empathic deficits in individuals with autism spectrum disorders. Accordingly, a better understanding of alexithymia could elucidate the nature of social-cognitive deficits transdiagnostically. We investigated alexithymia and components of empathy in relation to schizotypal and autism spectrum traits in healthy college students. Specifically, we examined higher-order components of empathic processing that involve perspective taking and other-oriented concern, which are reduced in alexithymia.Higher-order empathic processing was inversely correlated with both schizotypal and autism spectrum traits. Bootstrapping techniques revealed that alexithymia had a significant indirect effect on the relationship between higher-order empathy and these personality traits; thus, alexithymia contributes uniquely to their relationship. These findings suggest alexithymia represents one possible mechanism for the development of empathic deficits in these populations.These results are consistent with the perspective that awareness of one’s own emotional state may predicate a successful empathic response to another’s. This work highlights the importance of a consideration of alexithymia in elucidating the nature of empathic deficits in various clinical populations, and points to a potential point of social intervention.     

The Relational Value of Empathy

ABSTRACT

Philosophers and scholars from other disciplines have long discussed the role of empathy in our moral lives. The distinct relational value of empathy, however, has been largely overlooked. This article aims to specify empathy’s distinct relational value: Empathy is both intrinsically and extrinsically valuable in virtue of the pleasant experiences we share with others, the harmony and meaning that empathy provides, the recognition, self-esteem, and self-trust it enhances, as well as trust in others, attachment, and affection it fosters. Once we better understand in what ways empathy is a uniquely relational phenomenon, we can unveil its relevance to morality, which avoids the strictures of both partiality and impartiality. On the one hand, it is the relational value of empathy that grounds defeasible reasons to empathize insofar as empathy is morally called for by a particular relationship (or if we have defeasible reasons to establish a relationship by empathy). On the other hand, it is precisely empathy’s relational value that allows us to show that it can be kept within bounds. To realize empathy’s relational value, we are not constantly required to empathize. Instead, once we properly appreciate empathy’s distinct relational value, we can show that this leaves us room to respond to impartialist concerns.