I’m curious,I’m open to it,I test it,I trust it! A focus groups study to understand a-priori trust in automated buses

Trust is regarded as one of the main predictors for adopting automated buses (ABs). However, theories about trust (development) in technology generally vary and an in-depths study about trust in ABs specifically is still outstanding. The present study fills this gap by presenting results from focus group interviews to trust (development) in shared automated buses prior to exposure. The objectives of this study are to contrast participants’ naïve concepts of trust with theory and to identify underlying factors influencing a-priori trust in ABs. Results show that the N = 21 focus group participants use different strategies to familiarise themselves with the new technology of ABs, e.g., comparisons with familiar technologies, fundamental tendencies to approach or avoid, additional information seeking, or anthropomorphisation. These strategies largely support existing theories on trust (development) in technology. Differences between naïve interpretations of trust and its theoretical assumptions were found in focus group debates where more control over technology limited uncertainty and led to more trust. While theories suggest control and trust to be incompatible opposites, participants see control as a way to enhance trust. We provide starting points for further theory development and expansion and stress the importance of explanations in emerging technologies for trust and acceptance building.     

Forecasting outcomes of the World Cup 2006 in football: Performance and confidence of bettors and laypeople

ObjectivesMotivated by a paucity of research on sports forecasting, this paper examines how well individuals with varying degrees of relevant knowledge predict football (soccer) and how much confidence they have in their predictions.Design and procedureThree groups of participants (110 art students, 81 sports students, and 85 bettors) representing three levels of knowledge (poor, moderate, and expert) performed five forecasting tasks with relation to the outcome of the first round of the World Cup 2006. The tasks were assumed to reflect different degrees of complexity. About half of the participants obtained relevant information (world rankings). The participants stated their confidence in connection to conducting those tasks.ResultsWhereas the groups had roughly similar levels of performance in three tasks (i.e., predicting the teams qualifying for the second round as well as two types of match statistics), the knowledgeable and expert participants were better at predicting scores and percentage of ball possession in the matches than the naïve participants. Relatively few participants performed better than the simple rule that followed world rankings. Regardless of task complexity, the knowledgeable and expert participants were found to be significantly more confident about their forecasts than the naïve participants. Access to information had limited influence on forecasting performance and confidence.ConclusionThe present study shows that the forecasting performance of football experts and laypeople varies dependent on task. For easy tasks, they tend to predict equally well, partly because laypeople might use well-adapted heuristics. Once the prediction tasks become more difficult, the experts may take advantage of their domain-specific skills and produce forecasts that excel those of the laypeople.     

Taking a naïve other's perspective to debias the hindsight bias: Did it backfire?

Hindsight bias is a phenomenon that occurs when outcome knowledge interferes with the ability to accurately recall judgments made in a previous, naïve state. Also known as the “knew it all along” bias, we aimed to diminish the bias by having individuals take the perspective of a naïve other, as a way of encouraging acceptance that they had, in fact, not known it all along. Adult participants were given blurry-to-clear images incrementally until they were able to identify the object and were then re-presented with the same sequence of images and asked to make a judgment about when they had identified the item correctly the first time. They were also asked to judge when they thought a naïve peer (Experiments 1 and 2), or a naïve child (Experiment 2) could identify the objects. Results showed a robust hindsight bias in all perspectives, and sporadic success at eliminating the bias. When taking the perspective of a naïve peer, there were failures and successes; when taking the perspective of a naïve child, there was an ultra-debiasing, or a reverse hindsight bias. However, did the manipulation backfire? We conclude that while the manipulation of thinking like a naïve child may have eliminated the bias, participants seemed to use an “adults know best” rule rather than accepting past naivete for themselves.     

Children and adolescents’ understandings of family resemblance: A study of naïve inheritance concepts

This paper aims to provide developmental data on two connected naïve inheritance concepts and to explore the coherence of children's naïve biology knowledge. Two tasks examined children and adolescents’ (4, 7, 10, and 14 years) conceptions of phenotypic resemblance across kin (in physical characteristics, disabilities, and personality traits). The first task required participants to predict and explain feature outcomes in both an offspring and a sibling, in a modified version of the phenotypic similarity task. In the second task, participants offered explanations for instances of parent‐offspring dissimilarity and grandparent‐offspring resemblance (phenotypic difference task). The inclusion of two tasks and a broad age range revealed significant age trends between 4 and 10 years in naïve inheritance concepts. However, there was little consistency in children's inheritance explanations within or across tasks. The findings are discussed with reference to debates concerning the development and structure of naïve biology concepts.     

Naïve realism: a simple approach

Naïve realism is often characterized, by its proponents and detractors alike, as the view that for a subject to undergo a perceptual experience is for her to stand in a simple two-place acquaintance relation toward an object. However, two of the leading defenders of naïve realism, John Campbell and Bill Brewer, have thought it necessary to complicate this picture, claiming that a third relatum is needed to account for various possible differences between distinct visual experiences of the same object (for example, differences that result from changes in the object’s spatial orientation relative to the subject, or from changes in the intensity with which the subject focuses her attention on the object). This, I argue, is a mistake. Once it is acknowledged that a subject’s visual experience acquaints her with more than just a single object, all of the relevant facts can be explained from within the simpler naïve realist framework.

     

Naïve Groups Can Solve the Hidden‐Profile Problem

Research involving hidden‐profile tasks suggests that groups typically fail to detect hidden profiles. In previous studies, group members always considered the alternatives in the choice tasks prior to joining the group and, thus, entered discussions with preformed preferences (predecided groups). We set up a new condition, in which group members received their information regarding the choice alternatives at the beginning of their group session (naïve groups). When information was provided in the form of common rather than in the form of unique cues, naïve groups detected the hidden profile throughout. The results indicate that naïve groups are able to detect hidden profiles.     

Why Externalist Representationalism is a Form of Disjunctivism

Externalist representationalism is touted as a superior rival to naïve realism, and yet a careful analysis of the externalist representationalist's analysis of our ordinary perceptual experiences shows the view to be far closer to naïve realism than we might have expected. One of the central advertised benefits of representationalist views in general is that they are compatible with the idea that ordinary, illusory and hallucinatory perceptual experiences are of the same fundamental kind. Naïve realists are forced to deny the ‘common fundamental kind claim’ and adopt disjunctivism. However, I argue that externalist representationalism is also a version of disjunctivism. Consequently, one of the main rivals to naïve realism turns out not to be a rival at all.     

The Value of Perception

This paper develops a form of transcendental naïve realism. According to naïve realism, veridical perceptual experiences are essentially relational. According to transcendental naïve realism, the naïve realist theory of perception is not just one theory of perception amongst others, to be established as an inference to the best explanation and assessed on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis that weighs performance along a number of different dimensions: for instance, fidelity to appearances, simplicity, systematicity, fit with scientific theories, and so on. Rather, naïve realism enjoys a special status in debates in the philosophy of perception because it represents part of the transcendental project of explaining how it is possible that perceptual experience has the distinctive characteristics it does. One of the potentially most interesting prospects of adopting a transcendental attitude towards naïve realism is that it promises to make the naïve realist theory of perception, in some sense, immune to falsification. This paper develops a modest form of transcendental naïve realism modelled loosely on the account of the reactive attitudes provided by Strawson in ‘Freedom and Resentment’, and suggests one way of understanding the claim that naïve realism is immune to falsification.     

什么是智力？成年人的朴素智力理论

朴素智力理论是没有系统学习科学智力理论的成年人对智力的经验性认识。对成年人朴素智力理论的研究有助于了解个体如何建立对客观世界的理解。本文从对智力本质的理解、朴素智力理论的影响因素、对自己或他人智商的估计三个视角介绍了有关成年人朴素智力理论的研究。成人对智力本质的理解有跨文化的一致性,大多包括问题解决、言语能力、社会能力三个方面,这与科学智力理论有一定的相似;成人的朴素智力理论也受到环境、文化、“聪明人”原型年龄的影响;成人对智商的估计有中等程度的准确性。总的来说,成年人对智力的朴素认识是比较准确的。不同层面的个体经验很可能塑造了智力的朴素理论。     

Introspection and Primacy of Perception: A Critical Reflection on Naïve Realism

A fundamental issue in philosophy of perception is to understand the nature of experience and the relation of the experience with objects or states of affairs that is experienced. A prominent philosophical issue here is posed by the possibility of hallucinatory experiences, which are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perception for the experiencer. The philosophical views in this matter can be grouped into three major positions on the basis of the nature of the subjective experience and relation of the subjective experience with the object. These are the sense-data theories—which consider that the objects of perception are mental entities; the representative theories—according to which perception is a representation of the objects in the external world; and the naïve realist theories—which proclaim that the external objects are constitutive of the very perceptual experience and not a representation of it. Naïve realism claims it is the defence of common-sense notion regarding experience i.e. how experience seems to the experiencer upon introspective reflection on it. This position has a growing number of proponents in philosophy especially in the last two decades. But it also entails radical departure of established philosophical views regarding the nature of experience, the phenomenal character of experience, and the experiencer–object relation. In this paper, we critically examine naïve realism from two crucial aspects pertaining to it—the question of introspection being basis of naïve realist thesis, and the notion of primacy of perception over non-veridical forms of experiences. We find that there are significant problems which weaken the naïve realist thesis.

     

The effects of positive patient testimonials on PTSD treatment choice

Despite the existence of effective treatment options for PTSD, these treatments are failing to reach those that stand to benefit from PTSD treatment. Understanding the processes underlying an individual's treatment seeking behavior holds the potential for reducing treatment-seeking barriers. The current study investigates the effects that positive treatment testimonials have on decisions regarding PTSD treatment. An undergraduate (N = 439) and a trauma-exposed community (N = 203) sample were provided with videotaped treatment rationales for prolonged exposure (PE) and sertraline treatments of PTSD. Half of each sample also viewed testimonials, detailing a fictional patient's treatment experience. All participants then chose among treatment options and rated the credibility of – and personal reactions toward – those options. Among treatment naïve undergraduates, testimonials increased the proportion choosing PE alone; and among treatment naïve members of the trauma-exposed community sample, testimonials increased the proportion choosing a combined PE plus sertraline treatment. These effects were not observed for those with prior history of either psychotherapeutic or pharmacological treatment. Major barriers exist that prevent individuals with PTSD from seeking treatment. For a critical unreached treatment sample, those who are treatment naïve, positive patient testimonials offer a mechanism in which to make effective treatments more appealing and accessible.     

The usual and the unusual suspects: level of suspicion and counter-interrogation tactics

The present study investigated guilty mock-suspects' counter-interrogation tactics with respect to the disclosure of possibly self-incriminating information, specifically, to what extent the disclosure of this information was moderated by (1) the suspects' criminal experience (naïve versus experienced) and (2) the degree of suspicion directed towards the suspects (low versus high). We found that experienced (versus naïve) suspects volunteered less self-incriminating information in an initial free recall phase. In a similar vein, when asked crime-specific questions, naïve (versus experienced) suspects admitted having committed more actions fitting with the crime under investigation. Furthermore, experienced suspects' willingness to report information was not affected by the degree of suspicion, whereas naïve suspects in a high-suspicion (versus low-suspicion) condition were more willing to report information. The results were discussed in the light of the psychology of guilt, the Strategic Use of Evidence technique for detecting deception, and the (over)use of naïve suspects as mock-suspects in psycho-legal research. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Eye gaze patterns reveal how we reason about fractions

ABSTRACT

Fractions are defined by numerical relationships, and comparing two fractions’ magnitudes requires within-fraction (holistic) and/or between-fraction (componential) relational comparisons. To better understand how individuals spontaneously reason about fractions, we collected eye-tracking data while they performed a fraction comparison task with conditions that promoted or obstructed different types of comparisons. We found evidence for both componential and holistic processing in this mixed-pairs task, consistent with the hybrid theory of fraction representation. Additionally, making within-fraction eye movements on trials that promoted a between-fraction comparison strategy was associated with slower responses. Finally, participants who performed better on a non-numerical test of reasoning took longer to respond to the most difficult fraction trials, which suggests that those who had greater facility with non-numerical reasoning attended more to numerical relationships. These findings extend prior research and support the continued investigation into the mechanistic links between numerical and non-numerical reasoning.     

Naïve realism and capturing the “wisdom of dyads”

Two studies provided evidence for the role of naïve realism in the failure of individuals to give adequate weight to peer input, and explored two strategies for reducing the impact of this inferential bias. Study 1 demonstrated that dyad members see their own estimates as more “objective” than those of their partners and that this difference in perceived objectivity predicts the degree of underweighting. Compelling participants to assess their own versus their partners' objectivity prior to revising estimates decreased underweighting, an effect that was mediated by differences in perceived objectivity. Study 2 showed that the increase in accuracy that results from requiring dyad members to offer joint estimates via discussion is largely retained in subsequent individual estimates. Both studies showed that underweighting is greater when dyad members disagree on the issue about which they are making consensus estimates—a finding that further supports a “naïve realism” interpretation of the phenomenon.     

Effects of Personal Epistemology on the Understanding of Multiple Texts

We examined whether the text understanding of students holding naïve and sophisticated epistemological beliefs was differentially affected by text format, also controlling for effects of gender, word decoding, and prior knowledge on understanding. The participants were 39 Norwegian first-year teacher students, and the topic of reading was attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). It was found that only readers holding sophisticated epistemological beliefs displayed adequate understanding when reading multiple, partly conflicting, texts about ADHD, whereas students holding naïve epistemological beliefs gained better understanding when reading a single textbook-like source with identical content. This finding, however, depended on the level of understanding being measured by the criterial task, with only the task measuring deeper situational text understanding showing an interaction between epistemological beliefs and text format. This study provides evidence that not only knowledge itself, but also personal beliefs about knowledge, may enhance or constrain deeper understanding of multiple texts.     

The intuitive case for naïve realism

Naïve realism, the view that perceptual experiences are irreducible relations between subjects and external objects, has intuitive appeal, but this intuitive appeal is sometimes thought to be undermined by the possibility of certain kinds of hallucinations. In this paper, I present the intuitive case for naïve realism, and explain why this intuitive case is not undermined by the possibility of such hallucinations. Specifically, I present the intuitive case for naïve realism as arguing that the only way to make sense of the phenomenal character associated with perceptual experiences is by means of a naïve realist ontology. I then explain why this intuitive argument is not undermined by the possibility of hallucinatory experiences that possess the phenomenal character associated with perceptual experiences but, being hallucinations, do not have the ontological nature specified by naïve realism.     

Spatial memory and explicit knowledge: An effect of instruction on representational momentum

Freyd (1987; Finke & Freyd, 1985) suggested that representational momentum (i.e., forward displacement in memory for the location of a moving target) is impervious to error feedback (i.e., is modular or cognitively impenetrable), but studies supporting this claim might not have allowed sufficient opportunity for learning to occur. In the experiment reported here, participants were (a) naïve regarding representational momentum, (b) informed about representational momentum but not instructed to counteract it, or (c) informed about representational momentum and instructed to counteract it. All participants exhibited significant displacement. However, participants informed about representational momentum exhibited less forward displacement than did naïve participants due to a greater tendency to respond same to probes behind the true–same position. Possible mechanisms of compensation and the notion that displacement reflects both modular (cognitively impenetrable) and nonmodular (cognitively penetrable) components are addressed.     

Subjectivity in heterophenomenology

I distinguish between naïve phenomenology and really existing phenomenology, a distinction that is too often ignored. As a consequence, the weaknesses inherent in naïve phenomenology are mistakenly attributed to phenomenology. I argue that the critics of naïve phenomenology have unwittingly adopted a number of precisely those weaknesses they wish to point out. More precisely, I shall argue that Dennett’s criticism of the naïve or auto-phenomenological conception of subjectivity fails to provide a better understanding of the intended phenomenon.