Representations gone mental

Many philosophers and psychologists have attempted to elucidate the nature of mental representation by appealing to notions like isomorphism or abstract structural resemblance. The ‘structural representations’ that these theorists champion are said to count as representations by virtue of functioning as internal models of distal systems. In his 2007 book, Representation Reconsidered, William Ramsey endorses the structural conception of mental representation, but uses it to develop a novel argument against representationalism, the widespread view that cognition essentially involves the manipulation of mental representations. Ramsey argues that although theories within the ‘classical’ tradition of cognitive science once posited structural representations, these theories are being superseded by newer theories, within the tradition of connectionism and cognitive neuroscience, which rarely if ever appeal to structural representations. Instead, these theories seem to be explaining cognition by invoking so-called ‘receptor representations’, which, Ramsey claims, aren’t genuine representations at all—despite being called representations, these mechanisms function more as triggers or causal relays than as genuine stand-ins for distal systems. I argue that when the notions of structural and receptor representation are properly explicated, there turns out to be no distinction between them. There only appears to be a distinction between receptor and structural representations because the latter are tacitly conflated with the ‘mental models’ ostensibly involved in offline cognitive processes such as episodic memory and mental imagery. While structural representations might count as genuine representations, they aren’t distinctively mental representations, for they can be found in all sorts of non-intentional systems such as plants. Thus to explain the kinds of offline cognitive capacities that have motivated talk of mental models, we must develop richer conceptions of mental representation than those provided by the notions of structural and receptor representation.     

Real Interval Representations

This paper presents several necessary and sufficient conditions for real interval representability of biorders, interval orders, and semiorders. Let A and X be nonempty sets. We consider two types of interval representations for P⊂A×X. The first concerns the existence of two mappings, F: A→J_↓ and F: X→J_↑, such that, for all (a, x)∈A×X, (a, x)∈P⇔F(a)∩F (x)= ∅, where J_↓ and J_↑ respectively denote the set of all real intervals that are unbounded below and the set of all real intervals that are unbounded above. The second yields two mappings, F: A→J_↓ and G: X→J_↓, such that, for all (a, x)∈A×X, (a, x)∈P⇔F(a)⊂G(x). Specializations of those representations include the cases of A=X for interval orders and semiorders.     

Favor Referential Representations

Avrutin and Hickok (1993) argue that agrammatic patients have the ability to represent nonreferential or "government" chains ("who... e") but not referential or "binding" chains ("which girl... e"). By contrast, we propose the "referential representation hypothesis," which suggests that agrammatics attempt to cope with their well-known capacity limitations by favoring referential or content-based representations. This predicts that agrammatic patients′ performance should degrade noticeably as task demands increase, and referential demands should take priority over computational ones. In a semantic task, referential phrases should lead to better or more accurate performances. In syntactic tasks, the availability of a referential or content-based representation will interfere with the development of a syntactic representation, resulting in worse syntactic performance on the referential phrases than on nonreferential ones. This predicts that agrammatic patients should incorrectly accept (resumptive) pronoun sentences with a referential wh-phrase because the pronouns will find the semantic or discourse referent of the referential wh-phrase and take it as an antecedent for the pronoun. However, they should reject a (resumptive) pronoun in a sentence with the nonreferential question constituent "who" or "what." "Who" and "what" will remain in syntactic form, since they have only grammatical content and therefore will have only a "nonreferential" syntactic representation. Consequently, they cannot serve as the antecedent of the pronoun. These predictions were largely confirmed by the results of a grammaticality judgement study. Agrammatics performed well on questions with pragmatic biases but failed to distinguish reliably between grammatical and ungrammatical questions where pragmatic biases were neutralized. They assigned especially low ratings to object gap sentences with referential wh-constituents, as predicted. They assigned relatively high ratings to ungrammatical subject pronoun sentences with either type of wh-constituent. The agrammatics accepted ungrammatical reflexive sentences even though syntactic number and gender features alone could have been used to correctly judge the sentences. We attribute this, too, to the unavailability of a reliable syntactic representation of those phrases with referential or extragrammatical semantic content.     

要点表征与字词表征在错误再认中的作用

关键诱词是指在学习中没有出现的、跟所学单词有一定关联的词。学习者对关键诱词提取时错误再认率(即虚报率)较高,这被称之为错误再认现象。有人认为是要点表征导致了错误记忆,但也有人认为记忆中是字词表征起主要作用。本研究针对要点表征和字词表征对中学生英语单词学习中错误再认的影响进行了2×7的混合设计,分别考查了分类分组呈现单词和随机呈现单词对中学生英语单词再认的影响,同时考查了关键诱词的虚报率与学习次数的关系。发现:(1)学习分类分组呈现单词的被试,对关键诱词的虚报率明显高于学习随机呈现单词的被试,说明要点表征在错误再认中起着重要作用;(2)对关键诱词的虚报率与学习次数之间呈现倒V型的关系,说明在学习初始阶段,要点表征在错误再认中起主要作用;但在学习的后期,字词表征在再认中的作用占据了主要地位。     

Expressions and their Representations

It is plausible to think that our knowledge of linguistic types can bejustified by what we know about the tokens of these types. But one then hasto explain what it is about the relation a type bears to its tokens that makespossible the move from knowledge of the concrete to knowledge of theabstract. I argue that the standard solution to this difficulty, that the relevant relation is instantiation and that the transition is inductive generalization, is inadequate. I propose an alternative, according to which tokens are representations of the type they belong to. I also defend this view against the charge that it cannot account for the systematic ambiguity of expressions like 'word' or 'sentence', and the objection that it leads to an implausible form of Platonism.     

Visualizing and Visualizing Representations

Opponents of “the dependency thesis” (the view that when we visualize an F what we do is imagine seeing an F) have used an analogy between visualizing and viewing visual representations to bolster their skepticism. This article explores this analogy and argues that when we set out to visualize an F, sometimes what we visualize is either (1) influenced by our prior exposure to visual representations of an F or (2) best described as a visual representation of an F. The ramifications of this are explored, both in the light of arguments over the dependency thesis, and also in the light of the surprising data that suggest that at least during the 1940s and 1950s, people dreamed in black and white.     

Representations In The Brain

The representation of objects and faces by neurons in the temporal lobe visualcortical areas of primates has the property that the neurons encode relativelyindependent information in their firing rates. This means that the number ofstimuli that can be encoded increases exponentially with the number of neuronsin an ensemble. Moreover, the information can be read by receiving neurons thatperform just a synaptically weighted sum of the firing rates being received. Someways in which these representations become grounded in the world are described.The issue of syntactic binding in representations, and of its value for a higher orderthought system, is discussed.     

Representations from the Past: Social Relations and the Devolution of Social Representations

Psychological life is subject to the influence of a constructed and potentially reconstituted past, as well as to future anticipated outcomes and expectations. Human behaviour occurs along a temporal trajectory that marks the projects individuals adopt in their quests of human action. Explanations of social behaviour are limited insofar as they exclude a historical concern with human purpose. In this paper, we draw on Bartlett??s notion of collective remembering to argue that manifest social relations are rooted in past events that give present behaviours meaning and justification. We further propose an epidemiological time-series framework for social representations, that are conceptualised as evolving over time and that are subject to a ??ratchet effect?? that perpetuates meaning in a collective. We argue that understanding forms of social behaviour that draw on lay explanations of social relations requires a deconstructive effort that maps the evolutionary trajectory of a representational project in terms of its adaptation over time. We go on to illustrate our proposal visiting data that emerged in an inquiry investigating Maltese immigrants?? perspectives towards their countries of settlement and origin. This data reveals an assimilationist acculturation preference amongst the Maltese in Britain that seems incongruous with the current climate of European integration and Maltese communities in other countries around the world. We demonstrate that a historical concern with regard to this apparent behaviour helps explain how Maltese immigrants to Britain opt for certain forms of intercultural relations than others that are normally preferable. We demonstrate that these preferences rely on an evolved justification of the Maltese getting by with foreign rulers that other scholars have traced back to the medieval practice of chivalry.     

Images, Spaces, Representations

The contribution deals with some key problems of cognitive science, whose plurality transcends the boundaries of the disciplines drawn by classical epistemology. In particular, it addresses the issues of mental images, spaces of representation, and the architecture of cognitive processes in vision theory. The thesis presented is that a proper treatment of vision within psychophysics entails an analysis of a series of interconnected spaces, objects and methodologies, from psychophysics to the many virtual realities of representation.     

Scientific Representations as Limiting Cases

In this essay, I shall show that the so-called inferential (Suárez 2003 and 2004) and interpretational (Contessa 2007) accounts of scientific representation are respectively unsatisfactory and too weak to account for scientific representation (pars destruens). Along the way, I shall also argue that the pragmatic similarity (Giere 2004 and Giere 2010) and the partial isomorphism (da Costa and French 2003 and French 2003) accounts are unable to single out scientific representation. In the pars construens I spell out a limiting case account which has explanatory surplus vis à vis the approaches which I have previously reviewed. My account offers an adequate treatment of scientific representation, or so I shall try to argue. Central to my account is the notion of a pragmatic limiting case, which will be characterized in due course.     

Iconic Representations and Representative Practices

I develop an account of scientific representations building on Charles S. Peirce's rich, and still underexplored, notion of iconicity. Iconic representations occupy a central place in Peirce's philosophy, in his innovative approach to logic and in his practice as a scientist. Starting from a discussion of Peirce's approach to diagrams, I claim that Peirce's own representations are in line with his formulation of iconicity, and that they are more broadly connected to the pragmatist philosophy he developed in parallel with his scientific work. I then defend the contemporary relevance of Peirce's approach to iconic representations, and specifically argue that Peirce offers a useful ‘third way’ between what Mauricio Suárez has recently described as the ‘analytical’ and ‘practical’ inquiries into the concept of representation. As a philosophically minded scientist and an experimentally inclined philosopher, Peirce never divorced the practice of representing from questions about what counts as a representation. I claim that his account of iconic representations shows that it is the very process of representing, construed as a practice which is coextensive with observing and experimenting, that casts light on the nature of representative relations.     

Reduced Memory Representations for Music

We address the problem of musical variation (identification of different musical sequences as variations) and its implications for mental representations of music. According to reductionist theories, listeners judge the structural importance of musical events while forming mental representations. These judgments may result from the production of reduced memory representations that retain only the musical gist. In a study of improvised music performance, pianists produced variations on melodies. Analyses of the musical events retained across variations provided support for the reductionist account of structural importance. A neural network trained to produce reduced memory representations for the same melodies represented structurally important events more efficiently than others. Agreement among the musicians' improvisations, the network model, and music-theoretic predictions suggest that perceived constancy across musical variation is a natural result of a reductionist mechanism for producing memory representations.     

Representations in Distributed Cognitive Tasks

In this article we propose a theoretical framework of distributed representations and a methodology of representational analysis for the study of distributed cognitive tasks—tasks that require the processing of information distributed across the internal mind and the external environment. The basic principle of distributed representations Is that the representational system of a distributed cognitive task is a set of internal and external representations, which together represent the abstract structure of the task. The basic strategy of representational analysis is to decompose the representation of a hierarchical task into its component levels so that the representational properties at each level can be independently examined. The theoretical framework and the methodology are used to analyze the hierarchical structure of the Tower of Hanoi problem. Based on this analysis, four experiments are designed to examine the representational properties of the Tower of Hanoi. Finally, the nature of external representations is discussed.     

Representations of motion and direction

In 6 experiments, incidental memory was tested for direction of motion in an old-new recognition paradigm. Ability to recognize previously shown directions depended greatly on motion type. Memory for translation and expansion-contraction direction was highly veridical, whereas memory for rotation direction was conspicuously absent. Similar results were obtained in conditions in which motions were illustrated with pictures. Results suggest that explicit representations of direction in long-term memory are not so much related to motion per se as to the consequences of motion, the displacements of objects. Memory for all motions following circular pathways was found to be corrupted by a generic bias to regard the clockwise direction as familiar. Assessment of memory in these cases required disentangling familiarity bias for the clockwise direction from explicit recognition of direction.