Drives and objects - notes on the change of drive theory

Freud’s drive theory has been questioned since the 1940s when Fairbairn created a metaphor of the mind that is not based on the tripartite model and drive theory. His work inspired others to elaborate on the significance of internal object relationships. According to the object relation theory, internal object relations are dynamic structures capable of generating meanings and action. Consequently, two distinct metapsychologies were created.The aim of this article is to show how the interaction of theories has initiated revisions of classic drive theory. Freud’s concept of drive and three synthesizing viewpoints between the two perspectives are discussed. Otto Kernberg addresses affects as a primary motivational system; the mother–infant relationship organizes affects to drives. Joseph Sandler adheres to classic drive theory but proposes that the ego’s attempt to protect the mind against psychic pain is as important as drive derivatives in motivating the mind. Laplanche proposes that the unconscious of the care-giving adult is the crucial factor for the constitution of an infant’s unconscious and drives. For Freud and Klein, drive is inherent. Contemporary writers, like Loewald and Laplanche, conceive drive as a function of the mind that is born out of the same matrix of interaction with the other elements of the mind.     

Aristotle's Metaphysics: Form,Matter and Identity

ABSTRACT

The example of the Spanish poet’s amnesia, mentioned by Spinoza in the scholium of proposition 39 of part IV of the Ethics in order to elucidate his conception of death, has given rise to many controversies in the scholarly interpretations, which in most cases maintain that the poet dies and that Spinoza himself thought this way. However, the matter is more complex than it at first appears and in this article I take a different path by reconstructing this scholium anew and providing an alternative interpretation. The comparison with selected passages of part V highlights the presence of a bi-conditional between the ratio of motion and rest that a body possesses, and its aptitude to be affected and affect in many more ways. In particular, the latter allows us to acknowledge the continuity of the poet’s individuality, expressed in his mind–body union grounded by the parallelism theory. As a result, the poet case has a crucial explanatory role for Spinoza’s theory of the eternity of the human mind and if one misunderstands the former, the latter is also misconceived.     

Sub-Abstract Bodies: The Epistemic and Ethical Role of the Body-Mind Relationship in Adorno’s Philosophy

Abstract

The aim of this paper is threefold. In the first place, I should like to show that Adorno’s philosophy is dependent, to a degree perhaps not always directly recognized in the literature, on a deeply contentious view on the relationship between the mind and the body. In order to show this, I explore and bring out the epistemic and ethical stakes for Adorno’s theory of the relationship between mind and body. Secondly, I move to better articulate precisely what Adorno’s view on the nature of this relationship is. I hold that his position revolves around positing a porous boundary between the domains of the somatic and the cognitive. In closing, I show that Adorno’s account relies on this domain boundary being unidirectionally porous, in that determination of somatic impulses by cognitive content does not seem a live option for Adorno. I go on to note that this smuggles in a dubious position which does a lot of unearned work. The stakes which his implicit account of the body and mind relationship served to secure thereby come once more to look highly vulnerable.     

Heidegger’s Nietzsche

ABSTRACT

Heidegger maintained that Nietzsche was a metaphysical thinker. What did he mean by that? Not that Nietzsche advanced purely theoretical doctrines that might be perfected or refuted by rational argument. Instead, he meant that Nietzsche’s thinking is a ‘representational thinking’ (vorstellendes Denken) that preserves a commitment to a conception of truth as correctness (Richtigkeit). Nietzsche’s apparent denials of the intelligibility of truth, Heidegger argues, are in fact expressions of our growing insensitivity to truth understood as unconcealment (Unverborgenheit). Nietzsche’s thinking is thus deeply attuned to metaphysics as Heidegger came to understand it in the late 1930s, namely as a forgetting of being (Seinsvergessnheit), beginning with Plato. His interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought, particularly the idea of eternal recurrence, changed less because he changed his mind about Nietzsche than because he reconceived the philosophical tradition since Plato as metaphysical, and so reframed his own project as an attempt to think beyond metaphysics.     

Developing a Capacity for Bodily Concern: Antonio Damasio and the Psychoanalysis of Body–Mind Relationship

ABSTRACT

The author starts from the assumption that the body is the mind’s primary object. He explores the link between his clinical research about the Body–Mind relationship and neuroscience, by focusing particularly on the contribution by Antonio Damasio who has emphasized the importance of the bodily roots of mental functioning. In many patients nowadays, developing a capacity for “concern for one’s own body” is a stepping stone toward a genuine non-imitative mental functioning. This perspective contrasts with psychoanalytic orientations that give priority to recognition of the other and intersubjective dynamics.     

Why aggression?2

On the basis of a formalised view of metapsychology, the author briefly considers the problems inherent in the Freudian notion of a death drive or aggressive drive and then goes on to develop a new theoretical conception of aggression. Aggression is understood as an affect, action or affective action and, in relation to these, as an expression of the intensity with which a drive'whether it be the sexual drive with its libidinal cathexes or the self‐preservative drive with its lethic cathexes'seeks to attain its object. In this context the author regards the regulation of closeness and distance with respect to the ‘psychogeometric locus’ of the relevant drive object as being of central importance. She contends that neurotic personalities suffer from specific distortions in the perception of the psychogeometric locus of their drive objects, which may give rise to an intensification of the drive tendencies prevailing in these individuals at any given time so that these tendencies take on an aggressive character. The author presents two clinical vignettes to show how her approach allows aggression and its occurrence to be conceptualised without resorting to the idea of a primary aggressive drive, and draws attention to the resulting technical consequences for interpretation.     

Hermeneutics and historical consciousness: An appraisal of the contribution of Hans-Georg Gadamer

Abstract

In this introductory article to the volume of the South African Journal of Philosophy in tribute of Hans-Georg Gadamer, the author, first, makes a few remarks about the nature of hermeneutics and Gadamer’s views on the universality of the hermeneutical experience. This universality is, in particular, explained from the perspective of the “linguistic turn” in Gadamer’s thought. Secondly, there is a brief discussion of certain particular aspects of Gadamer’s contribution. Aspects of that contribution that are emphasized are: Gadamer’s reevaluation of prejudice, authority and tradition, his idea of “Wirkungsgeschichte”, his idea of meaning as a process rather than a given entity, his analogy between game-playing and the interpretation of art, and his dialogical conception of interpretation. The author concludes by developing his own estimate of the main thrust of Gadamer’s contribution. This contribution consists of the way in which Gadamer’s thought, on the one hand, represents a demonstration and embodiment of the kind of historical consciousness so typical of our times, but, on the other hand, also accomplishes this exemplification of historical consciousness while imaginatively avoiding the kind of relativistic historicism so typical of many other manifestations of the same trend.     

Aristotle’s Notion of ‘Place’ in the Context of Present-day Physics

The article deals with Aristotle’s conception of ‘place’, which is of cruсial importance for his theory of motion. It is shown that in the physics of Aristotle there is no concept of spасe; instead, there is the notion of ‘place’ of a body (topos). Aristotle considered ‘place’ as the first boundary of a body embracing (containing) the body in question. The author shows the incommensurability between the spatial ideas of the Stagirite and the similar ideas of Newtonian physics. The article states that in order to give an adequate reconstruction of Aristotle’s concept of ‘place’ we need to take into account two different levels of consideration: local and global. Places locally separable (from bodies) cannot be separated on the global level. In Newtonian physics, bodies are separable from places on both levels. The nature of parallelism of ideas between Aristotle’s conception of ‘place’ and the notions of space in present-day physics is analysed.     

Between memory and destiny: Repetition1

This essay focuses mainly on the topic of repetition (agieren)—on its metapsychological, clinical, and technical conceptions. It contains a core problem, that is, the question of the represented, the nonrepresented, and the unrepresentable in the psyche. This problem, in turn, brings to light the dialectical relation between drive and object and its specific articulation with the traumatic. The author attributes special significance to its clinical expression as ‘destiny’. He points out a shift in the theory of the cure from recollection and the unveiling of unconscious desire, to the possibility of understanding ‘pure’ repetition, which would constitute the very essence of the drive. The author highlights three types of repetition, namely, ‘representative’ (oedipal) repetition, the repetition of the ‘nonrepresented’ (narcissistic), which may gain representation, and that of the ‘unrepresentable’ (sensory impressions, ‘lived experiences from primal times,’‘prelinguistic signifiers,’‘ungovernable mnemic traces’). The concept‐the metaphor‐drive embryo brings the author close to the question of the archaic in psychoanalysis, where the repetition in the act would express itself. ‘Another unconscious’ would zealously conceal the entombed (verschüttet) that we are not yet able to describe‐the ‘innermost’ rather than the ‘buried’ (untergegangen) or the ‘annihilated’ (zugrunde gegangen)‐through a mechanism whose way of expression is repetition in the act. With ‘Constructions in analysis’ as its starting point, this paper suggests a different technical implementation from that of the Freudian construction; its main material is what emerges in the present of the transference as the repetition of ‘something’ lacking as history. The memory of the analytic process offers a historical diachrony whereby a temporality freed from repetition and utterly unique might unfold in the analysis. This diachrony would no longer be the historical reconstruction of material truth, but the construction of something new. The author briefly introduces some aspects of his conception of the psyche and of therapeutic work in terms of what he has designated as psychic zones. These zones are associated with various modes of becoming unconscious, and they coexist with different degrees of prevalence according to the psychopathology. Yet each of them will emerge with unique features in different moments of every analysis, determining both the analyst's positions and the very conditions of the analytic field. The zone of the death drive and of repetition is at the center of this essay. ‘Pure’ repetition expresses a time halted by the constant reiteration of an atemporal present. In this case, the ‘royal road’ for the expression of ‘that’ unconscious will be the act. The analyst's presence and his own drive wager will be pivotal to provide a last attempt at binding that will allow the creation of the lost ‘psychic fabric’ and the construction, in a conjectural way, of some sort of ‘history’ that may unravel the entombed (verschüttet) elements that, in these patients' case, come to the surface in the act. The analysand's ‘pure’ repetition touches, resonates with something of the new unconscious of the analyst. All of this leads the author to underline once again the value of the analyst's self‐analysis and reanalysis in searching for connections and especially in differentiating between what belongs to the analyst and what belongs to the analysand. A certain degree of unbinding ensures the preservation of something ungraspable that protects one from the other's appropriation.     

Heidegger and Post-Cartesian Psychoanalysis: My Personal,Psychoanalytic, and Philosophical Sojourn

The dual aim of this article is to show both how Heidegger's existential philosophy enriches post-Cartesian psychoanalysis and how post-Cartesian psychoanalysis enriches Heidegger's existential philosophy. Characterized as a phenomenological contextualism, post-Cartesian psychoanalysis finds philosophical grounding in Heidegger's ontological contextualism, condensed in his term for the human kind of Being, Being-in-the-world. Specifically, Heidegger provides philosophical support (a) for a theoretical and clinical shift from mind to world, from the intrapsychic to the intersubjective; (b) for a shift from the motivational primacy of drives originating in the interior of a Cartesian isolated mind to the motivational primacy of relationally constituted affective experience; and (c) for contextualizing and grasping the existential significance of emotional trauma, which plunges us into a form of Being-toward-death. Post-Cartesian psychoanalysis, in turn, (a) relationalizes Heidegger's conception of finitude, (b) expands Heidegger's conception of relationality, and (c) explores some ethical implications of our kinship-in-finitude.     

Arnauld's Verbal Distinction between Ideas and Perceptions

In his dispute with Malebranche about the nature of ideas, Arnauld endorses a form of direct realism. This appears to conflict with views put forward by Arnauld and his collaborators in the Port-Royal Grammar and Logic where ideas are treated as objects in the mind. This tension can be resolved by a careful examination of Arnauld's remarks on the semantics of ‘perception’ and ‘idea’ in light of the Port-Royal theory of language. This examination leads to the conclusion that Arnauld's ideas really are objects in the mind, and not perceptual acts as many commentators hold. What Arnauld denies is that these mental objects are really distinct from the external objects they represent. Instead, Arnauld holds that, by the act of conception, the external objects themselves—not copies—come to be present in the mind and are therefore called ‘ideas’.     

From one room to the other: a story of contamination. The relationship between child and adult analysis

Does the analyst who works with both children and adults using ostensibly the same theoretical model perform similar mental operations in these two fields? The author suggests that child analysis is rooted in a different creative process from that of adults. Comparing the analysis of children to painting and that of adults to writing, and making use of the debate between Virginia Woolf and her sister Vanessa Bell on the relative merits of words and images, the author explores the psychoanalytic debate on the role of child analysis in the development of psychoanalytic theory and practice. Child analysis, initially regarded as an application of psychoanalysis, ended up acting as a catalyst for a true epistemological revolution in the 20th century through the work of Klein and Bion. Playing is not only an alternative medium to words for representing the unconscious but a different method for giving shape to representations through a specific creative process. The reverie which is born in the child analyst’s consulting room reproduces itself through the body’s actions during play, whereas in the adults’ consulting room the analyst’s capacity to dream presupposes the suspension of action. Child analysis, deploying a distinctive creative process that makes use of the body and serves itself of action in its development, may be said to rest on a similar creative process to that of figurative art. For this reason, the child analyst’s mind relates to objects in a different way, being in a more prolonged state of fusion with these as a result of ‘concentration of the body’. The significance of the unspeakable things that take place can often only be conceptualized in après‐coup. Although this difference in the development of the process suggests a significant distinction between the two ‘arts’ of child and adult analysis, the aesthetic sensitivity acquired through child analysis can be profitably used with adults, as will be demonstrated with the help of several clinical examples.     

On the Contradiction in Conception Test of the Categorical Imperative

Abstract

The author argues against Christine Korsgaard’s influential interpretation of Kant’s contradiction in conception test of the categorical imperative. Korsgaard’s rejection of the ‘teleological’ interpretation is shown to be based on a misunderstanding of the role that teleology plays for Kant in ruling out immoral maxims, and her defence of the ‘practical’ interpretation is shown to be less faithful to the text than the competing ‘logical’ interpretation. The works of Barbara Herman and Allen Wood are also discussed and evaluated.     

A psychoanalytic interpretation of bipolar disorder

Abstract

The author proposes viewing mania as a form of defense against the state of depression resulting from “narcissistic overidentification with the depressive object” (i.e., the object in relation to which the depressive state developed), rather than as a periodic rebellion against such an internalized object. An account of the analytic psychotherapy of a clinical case of bipolar depression serves to illustrate this point of view, linked to the author’s specific conception of the dynamics of depression.     

Revised Provisional Diagnostic Profile: 2016

ABSTRACT

In Anna Freud’s and other previous versions of the diagnostic profile, drive theory and the structural model were the central organizing concepts. Though these are retained in the current version, greater emphasis has been made of other conceptual perspectives. In particular, the importance of understanding the impact of the child’s external world and the child’s attachment security; also the central importance of affects, both their recognition and management. These changes are seen in such sections as those on the ego which has been expanded to include a section on play and affects. The developmental line of anxiety and the concept of theory of mind have also been added.     

Intermingling and confusion

Abstract

An understanding of Descartes’ concept of ‘confusion’ is important both for making sense of his epistemological enterprise and for grasping his doctrine of the union of mind and body. An analysis of Descartes’ notion of confusion is offered which is grounded in the (more or less controversial) theses that confused thoughts are thoughts, that confusion is confusion by a thinker of one thought with another, and that confusion both can and should be avoided or ‘undone’. This analysis takes its rise from his contrast between ‘confused’ and ‘distinct’ : it exhibits confusion as a failure to distinguish between meanings of systematically ambiguous expressions. This failure is sometimes due to ‘bad intellectual habits’ which in his view ought to be broken, sometimes to ‘nature’ (where the confusion is in general beneficial to our welfare). Paradigmatically these are expressions which refer ambiguously to substances (i.e. mind and body) which are ‘really distinct’. Moreover, his ‘disambiguations’ indicate a central but neglected aspect of his aim in philosophizing: he can be seen as engaged in a moral project of ‘philosophical therapy’.     

Moral Obligation and Everyday Advice

Abstract

Alfred Schütz’s investigation of the temporal structure of consciousness in The Phenomenology of the Social World leads him to conceive action as antecedently projected behaviour. Schütz presents his conception of action as resolving a problem in Weber’s discussion of meaningful behaviour in the opening pages of Economy and Society. It serves that aim well, but also has independent value. The antecedently projected form of action necessitates a biographical conception of human agency. Schütz’s conception of action thus reinstates the biographical nature of agency ignored in contemporary analytical philosophy of action. Furthermore, Marx is committed to exactly this conception of action. It founds his further claim that action and history mutually presuppose one another.     

Conceptualizing the ‘female’ soul – a study in Plato and Proclus

ABSTRACT

Within the Platonic (or Neoplatonic) dualistic conception of body and soul the difference between maleness and femaleness might appear to be a difference which only concerns the body, that is a difference which is not essential for determining who (or what) a certain human is. One might argue that, since humans are essentially their souls and souls are genderless, men and women are essentially equal. As my paper shows, though, Plato's and Proclus’ writings set out two ways of conceptualizing human souls themselves as ‘sexed’ and of doing this in a way that female souls are determined to be inferior to male souls. By Plato's account, souls are indeed genderless in terms of their essence, but they attain maleness through virtuous and femaleness through vicious activities. Proclus, by contrast, conceptualizes souls as essentially ‘male’ or ‘female’. A soul in whose essence the Different predominates is female, while a soul in whose substance the Same predominates is male. And since the attainment and preservation of virtue depend on the strength of the Same, female souls are not vicious by Proclus’ account, but they bear a higher risk of becoming vicious.     

The ‘Compositional Rigidity’ of Recognitionality

Abstract

Empiricist philosophers of mind have long maintained that the possession conditions of many concepts include recognitional abilities. One of Jerry Fodor's recent attacks on empiricist semantics proceeds by attempting to demonstrate that there are no such, ‘recognitional’ concepts. His argument is built on the claim that if there were such concepts, they would not compose: i.e., they would exhibit properties which are not in general ‘inherited’ by complex concepts of which they are components. Debate between Fodor and his critics on this issue has focused on his construal of compositionality, the critics in effect advocating a weaker conception than that assumed by Fodor. I argue that the critics' contention is under-motivated, and in the current context ad hoc. But there is something else wrong with Fodor's argument. He misidentifies the notion of recognitionality in which the empiricist should trade. A proper understanding of recognitionality allows us to disarm Fodor's argument without resolving the question about compositionality that divides Fodor and his critics. I end with two very general remarks. First a contention about the motivation for empiricist semantics, and second, a suggestion that my proposal about recognitionality may be extended to disarm a more familiar and influential type of concern about their viability.