Truth,Predication and a Family of Contingent Paradoxes

In truth theory one aims at general formal laws governing the attribution of truth to statements. Gupta’s and Belnap’s revision-theoretic approach provides various well-motivated theories of truth, in particular T* and T#, which tame the Liar and related paradoxes without a Tarskian hierarchy of languages. In property theory, one similarly aims at general formal laws governing the predication of properties. To avoid Russell’s paradox in this area a recourse to type theory is still popular, as testified by recent work in formal metaphysics by Williamson and Hale. There is a contingent Liar that has been taken to be a problem for type theory. But this is because this Liar has been presented without an explicit recourse to a truth predicate. Thus, type theory could avoid this paradox by incorporating such a predicate and accepting an appropriate theory of truth. There is however a contingent paradox of predication that more clearly undermines the viability of type theory. It is then suggested that a type-free property theory is a better option. One can pursue it, by generalizing the revision-theoretic approach to predication, as it has been done by Orilia with his system P*, based on T*. Although Gupta and Belnap do not explicitly declare a preference for T# over T*, they show that the latter has some advantages, such as the recovery of intuitively acceptable principles concerning truth and a better reconstruction of informal arguments involving this notion. A type-free system based on T# rather than T* extends these advantages to predication and thus fares better than P* in the intended applications of property theory.

     

Fiction,Pleasurable Tragedy,and the HOT Theory of Consciousness

Abstract

The ‘feeling fiction problem’ asks: is it rational to be moved by what happens to fictional characters? The so-called ‘paradox of tragedy’ is embodied in the question: Why or how is it that we take pleasure in artworks which are clearly designed to cause in us such feelings as sadness and fear? My focus in this paper is to examine these problems from the point of view of the so-called ‘higher-order thought theory of consciousness’ (HOT theory) which says that the best explanation for what makes a mental state conscious is that it is accompanied by a thought that one is in that state. I examine the feeling fiction problem in light of the HOT theory and through a critique of Colin Radford's view. For example, I argue that Radford equivocates in his use of the term ‘aware’ in his response to some of the proposed solutions to the feeling fiction problem. Finally, I show how Susan Feagin's approach to the paradox of tragedy can be analysed and supported by the HOT theory.     

Toward an ethic of the biosphere

This article consists of three parts. The first explores the relation between paradox, de-paradoxication, and time, which I hold to be a relatively unattended yet very important tandem of concepts in Luhmann's work (Luhmann, 1993, 1995; Rasch, 2000). The second part will try to theoretically think through (de-paradoxicalize) a conundrum of present time: globalization and its opponents. In the third and last part, I briefly explore the paradox of conscious evolution, taking into account the specifics of the relations between social systems of communication and individual psychic systems in Luhmann's theory.     

The individualization of conscience: what Daybreak (9, 10, 544) and The Gay Science (117) tell us about the sovereign individual

ABSTRACT

The figure of the sovereign individual has stood for about two decades at the center of an exegetical debate concerning its identity and ideality. What is often lost sight of in these debates is the role of the sovereign individual in Nietzsche’s genealogy of guilt and bad conscience in the Genealogy’s second essay. I argue for the following claims. First, that the figure of the sovereign individual is not a singular occurrence in Nietzsche’s published writings but is present in sections from Daybreak and The Gay Science that have not been pursued in this context in the Anglophone literature; sections that shed new light on the sovereign individual. Second, that examination of these texts reveals that the sovereign individual is for Nietzsche embodied by Socrates and the Socratic individual. Third, and most importantly, that with the sovereign individual there emerges individualized conscience – the capacity for self-laceration that concerns one’s misdeeds alone and involves the belief that one’s misdeeds are entirely one’s own individual fault, rather than the fault of the community or the gods. A fourth, rather negative consequence, is that at the end of the day Nietzsche, in the Genealogy, does not manage to provide us with a genealogy of moral guilt.     

Rule Following,Error Theory and Eliminativism

Abstract

In this paper, I argue for three main claims. First, that there are two broad sorts of error theory about a particular region of thought and talk, eliminativist error theories and non-eliminativist error theories. Second, that an error theory about rule following can only be an eliminativist view of rule following, and therefore an eliminativist view of meaning and content on a par with Paul Churchland’s prima facie implausible eliminativism about the propositional attitudes. Third, that despite some superficial appearances to the contrary, non-eliminativist error theory does not provide a plausible vehicle for understanding the ‘sceptical solution’ to the sceptical paradox about rule-following developed in Saul Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.     

Dionysian Spirit as “The Social Self”: Alfred Schutz’s Insightful (Mis)use of Nietzsche

ABSTRACT

Recent publications on Alfred Schutz suggest the importance of his musical thought for understanding his general viewpoint on intersubjectivity. Developing this proposition further, my article focuses on one aspect of Schutz’s writings on music: his attempts to amalgamate the aesthetic oppositions of the Dionysian/Apollonian by Friedrich Nietzsche and inner duration/spatialized time by Henri Bergson. Despite the seeming distortion of the initial meaning of the Dionysian impulse, I suggest that Schutz’s employment remains faithful to the aesthetic and cognitive theory of early Nietzsche. To substantiate this, I draw a link between Nietzsche’s early theory of aesthetic cognition and the neurophysiology of the mid-nineteenth century. Furthermore, the way Schutz applied the Dionysian/Apollonian opposition to the problem of musical communication made his musical thought prefigure some neuro-scientifically inspired discussions of the present-day, like the one on joint attention. Schutz tackled the key paradox: why the experience of music can be shared but not directly communicated.     

Investigating how ostracizing others affects one’s self-concept

Abstract

Social relationships are connected with an individual’s self-concept, so events that influence one’s relationships subsequently influence one’s self-concept. Ostracism, being excluded and ignored, is an aversive experience involving both a target (the one being ostracized) and source (the one ostracizing). We will discuss previous limitations of source paradigms and how we addressed them when developing our paradigms. We will also highlight current source research, from a co-edited special issue, and how this research is relevant to an individuals’ self-concept. Lastly, we will suggest how cognitive dissonance work can ground source research within a larger theoretical framework and inspire future research. We consider how one’s self-concept influences cognitive dissonance related to knowingly harming others through ostracism.     

The No-No Paradox Is a Paradox

The No-No Paradox consists of a pair of statements, each of which ‘says’ the other is false. Roy Sorensen claims that the No-No Paradox provides an example of a true statement that has no truthmaker: Given the relevant instances of the T-schema, one of the two statements comprising the ‘paradox’ must be true (and the other false), but symmetry constraints prevent us from determining which, and thus prevent there being a truthmaker grounding the relevant assignment of truth values. Sorensen's view is mistaken: situated within an appropriate background theory of truth, the statements comprising the No-No Paradox are genuinely paradoxical in the same sense as is the Liar (and thus, on Sorensen's view, must fail to have truth values). This result has consequences beyond Sorensen's semantic framework. In particular, the No-No Paradox, properly understood, is not only a new paradox, but also provides us with a new type of paradox, one which depends upon a general background theory of the truth predicate in a way that the Liar Paradox and similar constructions do not.     

The lesson of Newcomb’s paradox

In Newcomb’s paradox you can choose to receive either the contents of a particular closed box, or the contents of both that closed box and another one. Before you choose though, an antagonist uses a prediction algorithm to accurately deduce your choice, and uses that deduction to fill the two boxes. The way they do this guarantees that you made the wrong choice. Newcomb’s paradox is that game theory’s expected utility and dominance principles appear to provide conflicting recommendations for what you should choose. Here we show that the conflicting recommendations assume different probabilistic structures relating your choice and the algorithm’s prediction. This resolves the paradox: the reason there appears to be two conflicting recommendations is that the probabilistic structure relating the problem’s random variables is open to two, conflicting interpretations. We then show that the accuracy of the prediction algorithm in Newcomb’s paradox, the focus of much previous work, is irrelevant. We end by showing that Newcomb’s paradox is time-reversal invariant; both the paradox and its resolution are unchanged if the algorithm makes its ‘prediction’ after you make your choice rather than before.     

Books Received

Abstract

Social identity theory was applied in group therapy for adults with mild mental retardation. Social identity theory suggests that social group membership, also called collective identity, has an impact on self-esteem. Individuals will try to maintain self-esteem by viewing their social groups positively. This may not be possible for individuals who are members of a stigmatized group. However, it may be possible to enhance self-esteem by broadening one’s awareness of collective identity. Furthermore, being able to positively view other individuals who are co-members of one’s own stigmatized group can also have positive consequences for self-esteem. A clinical vignette demonstrates this process in group therapy. Results are discussed as being applicable to members of various stigmatized groups.     

Abnormal Certainty: Examining the Epistemological Status of Delusional Beliefs

ABSTRACT

This article intends to reconsider the epistemological status of delusional beliefs on the basis of Wittgenstein’s conception of certainty. Several works over the last two decades have compared delusional beliefs with so-called hinge propositions, which – according to Wittgenstein – function as expressions of objective certainty. This gives rise to a paradox. On the one hand, delusions are compatible to Wittgensteinian certainties in some respects; on the other hand, they contradict beliefs shared by other members of the community, which makes them different from ‘normal’ certainties. In order to address this issue, I use Moyal-Sharrock’s taxonomy of hinge propositions. This taxonomy allows one to distinguish between different types of hinge propositions; all types share the same features, but these features are manifested in a variety of ways. Thus, delusional beliefs might also be regarded as constituting a specific type of hinge propositions. This move makes it possible to resolve the paradox and to identify the special epistemic features of delusional beliefs.     

Do I need ethnic culture to be free? A critique of Will Kymlicka’s liberal nationalism

Abstract

As part of a vigorous debate about the politics of multiculturalism, Will Kymlicka has sought to find grounds within liberal political theory to defend rights for cultural groups. Kymlicka argues that the individual’s ability to choose the good life necessarily takes place in a cultural context such that access to one’s ethnic or national culture constitutes a condition of autonomy. Thus, in liberal societies where the culture of minority ethnic groups or nations is under threat, these groups should enjoy certain special rights so as to uphold the autonomy of their individual members. However, Kymlicka’s ‘liberal nationalist’ argument relies on a problematic isomorphism between culture and identity. Very simply, I shall argue that an individual’s culture is not necessarily given by their membership of an ethnic group or nation, thus breaking the link between individual autonomy and rights for ethnic groups or nations.     

Sedimentation and elaborative choice

Abstract

Choice is an essential feature in personal construct psychology, and arguably the main task of the personal construct is to clarify why the person chooses one course of action rather than another. Yet the choice corollary appears to be in danger of being tautological, saying that whatever the person did constituted the elaborative choice. G. A. Kelly proposed the choice corollary as a useful heuristic device to counter external observers' beliefs that they can know what is best for the person. However, there is a danger in overcorrecting, in assuming that every action of the person constitutes an elaborative choice. This is most likely to occur in the neurotic paradox, where clients experience self-definition as problematic for them. I argue that we should emphasize construing as inseparable from action. This leads us to a phenomenological rather than a cognitive reading of construct theory. M. Merleau-Ponty's (1962) concept of sedimentation is then helpful in understanding the type of self-definition that is characterized in the neurotic paradox. The implications of this position for psychological reconstruction are briefly discussed.     

Making snacking less sinful: (Counter-)moralising obesity in the public discourse differentially affects food choices of individuals with high and low perceived body mass

Objective: As public discourse surrounding obesity highlights the societal costs of obesity and individual’s own responsibility for their weight, being overweight is often framed as immoral. Such ‘moralizing’ messages about being overweight may be a psychological threat for those with high body mass. Attempting to counter-moralise the public discourse (i.e. actively arguing that there is nothing ‘immoral’ about being overweight) may relieve this threat, inducing people, especially those with higher (perceived) weight, to engage in healthier behaviours.

Method: Two experiments were performed among Dutch and US participants. (Counter-)moralisation was manipulated. Body mass and weight-related self-perceptions were measured. The dependent variable was healthy vs. unhealthy snack choice.

Results: (Counter-)moralisation and (perceived) overweight jointly predicted snack choice: counter-moralising messages induced healthy snacking, but only among those who regarded themselves to have a high body mass.

Conclusions: The effects of moralising vs. counter-moralising obesity depended on one’s (perceived) overweight. This suggests that, for people with relatively high weight, the current moralising public discourse on obesity works in counterproductive ways. Campaigns that ‘counter-moralize’ obesity (i.e. that refute moralising messages) are more productive, although they should be tailored to those who see themselves as being overweight.     

Rosser-Type Undecidable Sentences Based on Yablo’s Paradox

It is widely considered that Gödel’s and Rosser’s proofs of the incompleteness theorems are related to the Liar Paradox. Yablo’s paradox, a Liar-like paradox without self-reference, can also be used to prove Gödel’s first and second incompleteness theorems. We show that the situation with the formalization of Yablo’s paradox using Rosser’s provability predicate is different from that of Rosser’s proof. Namely, by using the technique of Guaspari and Solovay, we prove that the undecidability of each instance of Rosser-type formalizations of Yablo’s paradox for each consistent but not Σ₁-sound theory is dependent on the choice of a standard proof predicate.     

The pessimistic origin of Nietzsche’s thought of eternal recurrence

ABSTRACT

In this article I argue that we should understand Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal recurrence as the ideal of life affirmation opposed to philosophical pessimism, the view that life is not worth living. I first articulate Nietzsche’s psychological account of pessimism as a vengeful focus on the past and an aversion to time understood as transience. I then consider the question of why a person with the opposite psychological orientation – a creative relation to the future and an endorsement of time – would will the eternal recurrence of all things. My answer appeals to Nietzsche’s notions of will to power and the redemption of the past from its senselessness. The interpretation of eternal recurrence that emerges from this approach takes Nietzsche’s vision of a great, world-redeeming individual to be integral to his doctrine of eternal recurrence. This is just one way in which it differs from common interpretations of eternal recurrence as a cosmological theory or thought experiment.     

The challenges of choosing and explaining a phenomenon in epidemiological research on the “Hispanic Paradox”

According to public health data, the US Hispanic population is far healthier than would be expected for a population with low socioeconomic status. Ever since Kyriakos Markides and Jeannine Coreil highlighted this in a seminal 1986 article, public health researchers have sought to explain the so-called “Hispanic paradox.” Several candidate explanations have been offered over the years, but the debate goes on. This article offers a philosophical analysis that clarifies how two sets of obstacles make it particularly difficult to explain the Hispanic paradox. First, different research projects define the Hispanic paradox phenomenon in substantially different ways. Moreover, using Bas van Fraassen’s pragmatic theory of explanation and Sean Valles’s extension of it with the concept of “phenomenon choice,” it also becomes clear that there are also multiple ways of explaining each individual definition of the phenomenon. A second set of philosophical and methodological challenges arises during any attempt to study “Hispanic” phenomena, with one key challenge being that the “Hispanic” panethnic concept was intentionally made vague as it was developed and popularized during the 1960s–1970s. After comparing this case with similar cases in the philosophical literature, the article concludes with observations on what makes this problem unique, particularly its ethical features.     

The Vulnerability of Giving: Ethics and the Generosity of Receiving

ABSTRACT

In this article, I describe how the interchange of giving and receiving is centrally implicated in the developmental/ethical journey from holding on to oneself toward a receptive embrace of a different Other. Since people’s lives are shaped by an inherent passion of offering one’s expressive contributions to the larger world, the challenge of the ethical turn requires a generous humility of receiving what others have to offer. When an individual has attained a sense of belonging because of being received himself/herself by significant persons, he/she is better able to mobilize the graciousness of welcoming the gifts of others. Finally, I emphasize the clinical import of the therapist being sufficiently open as a person so as to provide the patient with the opportunity and dignity to give of himself/herself as well.     

Caregiving styles and anxiety among couples: coping versus not coping with cardiac illness

Background and Objectives: partners’ caregiving efforts are not always beneficial to both recipient and provider. Bowlby’s conceptualization of caregiving style as a stable predisposition may clarify such caregiving effects. The relationship between caregiving style (compulsive and sensitive) and anxiety among couples coping with cardiac illness and a matching control group not coping with cardiac illness were assessed. We hypothesized that one’s compulsive caregiving would associate positively, and one’s sensitive caregiving would associate negatively, with one’s and one’s partner’s anxiety across contexts (cardiac and non-cardiac) and gender. Design: A comparative design of 131 couples with a diagnosis of husbands’ acute cardiac syndrome and 68 matched couples in the community was applied. Methods: The Adult Caregiving Questionnaire and the Brief Symptoms Inventory were administered. Results: Structural equation modeling revealed that one’s compulsive caregiving was positively associated with one’s anxiety, across most contexts. Multi-group analyses revealed that the associations between one’s compulsive caregiving and one’s partner’s anxiety levels differed depending on gender and context. Conclusions: The distress which emerges in an individual who takes on a caregiving role and in his/her partner seems to result not only from the demands of the concrete caregiving situation but also from one’s and one’s partner’s developmental history.     

A Lewisian Semantics for S2

This paper sets out a semantics for C.I. Lewis's logic S2 based on the ontology of his 1923 paper ‘Facts, Systems, and the Unity of the World’. In that article, worlds are taken to be maximal consistent systems. A system, moreover, is a collection of facts that is closed under logical entailment and conjunction. In this paper, instead of defining systems in terms of logical entailment, I use certain ideas in Lewis's epistemology and philosophy of logic to define a class of models in which systems are taken to be primitive elements but bear certain relations to one another. I prove soundness and completeness for S2 over this class of models and argue that this semantics makes sense of at least a substantial fragment of Lewis's logical theory.