The Moral Virtue of Being Understanding

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - Being understanding is a moral virtue. But what exactly is it that an understanding person does excellently? And what exactly makes it a moral virtue, rather...     

The Conflation of Moral and Epistemic Virtue

Abstract: Accounts of virtue suffer a conflation problem when they appear unable to preserve intuitive distinctions between types of virtue. In this essay I argue that a number of influential attempts to preserve the distinction between moral and epistemic virtues fail, on the grounds that they characterize virtuous traits in terms of ‘characteristic motivation’. I claim that this does not distinguish virtuous traits at the level of value‐conferring quality, and I propose that the best alternative is to distinguish them at the level of good produced. It follows from this that a consequentialist account is best placed to avoid a conflation of moral and epistemic virtue.     

The Idea of Moral Progress

This paper shows that moral progress is a substantive and plausible idea. Moral progress in belief involves deepening our grasp of existing moral concepts, while moral progress in practices involves realizing deepened moral understandings in behavior or social institutions. Moral insights could not be assimilated or widely disseminated if they involved devising and applying totally new moral concepts. Thus, it is argued, moral failures of past societies cannot be explained by appeal to ignorance of new moral ideas, but must be understood as resulting from refusals to subject social practices to critical scrutiny. Moral philosophy is not the main vehicle for disseminating morally progressive insights, though it has an important role in processes that lead to moral progress. Yet we have grounds for cautious optimism, since progressive moral insights can be disseminated and can, sometimes, have constructive social effects.     

Moral Ideals and Virtue Ethics

There have traditionally been two schools of thought regarding moral ideals and their relationship with moral duty. First, many have held that moral agents at all times have a duty or obligation to realize or attain moral ideals, or at least they have a duty to strive to realize or attain them. A second school of thought has maintained that attaining or pursuing moral ideals is supererogatory or beyond the call of duty. Recently a third school of thought has been articulated by Robert Audi in his essay “Wrongs Within Rights.” In this paper I express agreement with Audi, and it will be my suggestion that the resources of virtue ethics can profitably be employed to illustrate how his view avoids problems which plague the two traditional schools of thought.     

麦金太尔美德思想的新进展

麦金太尔是和当代西方著名的哲学家哈贝马斯、罗尔斯等齐名的哲学家和伦理学家,是当代西方美德伦理学派的中心人物,也是我国学术界熟知的学者.麦金太尔在20世纪的重要影响是从1981年出版名著<追寻美德>开始的.自此至1990年,他又连续发表了<谁之正义?何种合理性?>和<三种对立的道德探究观>,形成了他对现代西方伦理困境反思的三部曲.1999年,他在70岁高龄又推出了重要新作<依赖性的理性动物--人为什么需要美德>(Dependent Rational Animals--Why Human Beings Need Virtue).在这本书中,他从人类生物学形而上学意义上将美德立足于人天生的脆弱性与依赖性存在状态,并赋予美德以新的功能.     

The Alliance of Virtue and Vanity in Hume's Moral Theory

In this article I argue that vanity, the desire for and delight in the favorable opinion of others, plays a fundamental role in Hume's account of moral motivation. Hume says that vanity and virtue are inseparable, though he does not explicitly say how or why this should be. I argue that Hume's account of sympathy can explain this alliance. In resting moral sentiment on sympathy, Hume gives a fundamental role to vanity as it becomes either a mediating motive to virtue or else strengthens the otherwise weak motive of moral sentiment.     

Common-Sense Virtue Ethics and Moral Luck

Moral luck poses a problem for out conception of responsibility because it highlights a tension between morality and lack of control. Michael Slote’s common-sense virtue ethics claims to avoid this problem. However there are a number of objections to this claim. Firstly, it is not clear that Slote fully appreciates the problem posed by moral luck. Secondly, Slote’s move from the moral to the ethical is problematic. Thirdly it is not clear why we should want to abandon judgements of moral blame in favour of judgements of ethical deplorability. Finally this paper defends an alternative solution to the problem of moral luck, which focuses on judgements of probability, but which has been rejected by Slote.     

Against Moral Character Evaluations: The Undetectability of Virtue and Vice

I defend the epistemic thesis that evaluations of people in terms of their moral character as good, bad, or intermediate are almost always epistemically unjustified. (1) Because most people are fragmented (they would behave deplorably in many and admirably in many other situations), one’s prior probability that any given person is fragmented should be high. (2) Because one’s information about specific people does not reliably distinguish those who are fragmented from those who are not, one’s posterior probability that any given person is fragmented should be close to one’s prior—and thus should also be high. (3) Because being fragmented entails being indeterminate (neither good nor bad nor intermediate), one’s posterior probability that any given person is indeterminate should also be high—and the epistemic thesis follows. (1) and (3) rely on previous work; here I support (2) by using a mathematical result together with empirical evidence from personality psychology.     

Virtue,Norm, and Moral Practice

Virtue, as a tendency toward goodness, has an interrelated structure made up of a stable disposition of intentions and emotions on the one hand and the ability to make rational analysis and obtain moral knowledge on the other. All these elements of knowing, feeling, and willing in the structure of virtue cannot be fully understood merely from a psychological perspective. Emotion, will, and rationality in virtue always have certain moral content. Virtue, as a structure with good disposition, constitutes a moral agent and consequently an intrinsic foundation for moral practice. Of course, virtue is not a priori. On the contrary, its development is closely associated with an individual’s social and historical background. Because of virtue, an agent goes beyond the rational compulsion and intended efforts into a realm of nature.     

斯洛特的美德伦理学及其心理学预设

作为当代美德伦理学界的重要思想者,迈克尔·斯洛特的美德理论典型地代表了美德伦理学对道德心理问题的重视.依据斯洛特的新近作品与思想发展,本文对斯洛特的两种理论,即,常识美德伦理学和基于行为者的美德伦理学分别予以分析和评论,并具体揭示了其背后的心理学预设及叙述.斯洛特的美德理论及其心理学基础向我们突出了道德心理问题的重要性,展示了美德伦理学关注人的内在品质和动机的显著特征.     

正义与美德——道德哲学的结构及其内在张力

正义与美德是西方道德哲学的核心观念,从更广的视域看,二者也构成中国传统道德哲学的逻辑基础。质言之,正义与美德各自具有自己相对独立的意义形式和逻辑面向,标示了两种截然不同、有时竟相互抵牾的道德规范模式。近年来,尤其是随着规范伦理学在现代人类社会普遍注重法制建设的社会历史背景之下的迅速发展,有两个问题越来越突出,即规范伦理学由于过度追求自身形式的精密化而逐渐减蚀其合理性内核和基础;再者,美德伦理学因过度诉求善良意志的纯粹性而拒绝随社会实践的发展将自身现实化或曰显像化,从而造成正义与美德体用殊绝,亦即二者结构的严重失衡及其内在逻辑张力的断裂。道德主体行动判断力和价值观的减弱亦可在这一背景下解释。     

Kohlberg and Moral Education: Back to Virtue

Lickona describes his first encounters with Kohlberg and how Kohlberg's approach has been blended with other approaches in the development of Lickona's work on the moral education of children.     

《管子》"刑、德"思想述论

“刑、德”命题是古代政治法律思想中近乎永恒的命题。《管子》中有丰富、深刻的刑德思想：《管子》肯定刑在治国施政中的必要性,却大抵主张轻刑;《管子》更重视德,倡导以利民、惠民、养民为内容的德政及以“礼义廉耻”为主要特色的德教。其刑德兼施、先德后刑思想,可谓远绍周、吕,近承管、晏,下启苟、董,在中国古代正统刑德法律思想发展史上是重要一环。《管子》刑德思想还打上了齐地阴阳五行学说的烙印,具有浓厚的齐学色彩。