Util-izing animals

ABSTRACT Biomedical experimentation on animals is justified, researchers say, because of its enormous benefits to human beings. Sure, animals suffer and die, but that is morally insignificant since the benefits of research incalculably outweigh the evils. Although this utilitarian claim appears straightforward and relatively uncontroversial, it is neither straightforward nor uncontroversial. This defence of animal experimentation is likely to succeed only by rejecting three widely held moral presumptions. We identify these assumptions and explain their relevance to the justification of animal experimentation. We argue that, even if non-human animals have considerably less moral worth than humans, experimentation is justified only if the benefits are overwhelming. By building on and expanding on arguments offered in earlier papers, we show that researchers cannot substantiate their claims on behalf of animal research. We conclude that there is currently no acceptable utilitarian defence of animal experimentation. Moreover, it is unlikely that there could be one. Since most apologists of animal experimentation rely on utilitarian justifications of their practice, it appears that biomedical experimentation on animals is not morally justified .     

Causing People to Exist and Saving People’s Lives

Most people are skeptical of the claim that the expectation that a person would have a life that would be well worth living provides a reason to cause that person to exist. In this essay I argue that to cause such a person to exist would be to confer a benefit of a noncomparative kind and that there is a moral reason to bestow benefits of this kind. But this conclusion raises many problems, among which is that it must be determined how the benefits conferred on people by causing them to exist weigh against comparable benefits conferred on existing people. In particular, might the reason to cause people to exist ever outweigh the reason to save the lives of existing people?     

Job insecurity and the benefits of work

The presented study combines conservation of resource theory with latent deprivation theory to explain the negative relationship between job insecurity and mental health. Specifically, we propose that people who face the threat of job insecure would perceive worse access to the benefits of work, which would explain the negative effect of job insecurity on mental health. In a two-wave study, employees rated their perceived job insecurity, their access to the benefits of work, and their mental health. Cross-sectional multiple mediation analysis at Time 1 (n = 295) and Time 2 (n = 236) showed that the negative relationship between job insecurity and mental health was partly due to a perceived lack of the benefits of work. Longitudinal results (n = 173) revealed that job insecurity was related to a decrease in financial benefits, which in turn predicted mental health. However, this effect was only visible if it was not controlled for prior levels of the benefits of work. The results are discussed with regards to conservation of resource theory and latent deprivation theory and the potential of this framework for explaining negative mental health effects of job insecurity.     

Mental Exercise and Mental Aging

ABSTRACT— It is widely believed that keeping mentally active will prevent age-related mental decline. The primary prediction of this mental-exercise hypothesis is that the rate of age-related decline in measures of cognitive functioning will be less pronounced for people who are more mentally active, or, equivalently, that the cognitive differences among people who vary in level of mental activity will be greater with increased age. Although many training studies, and comparisons involving experts, people in specific occupations, and people whose mental activity levels are determined by their self-reports, have found a positive relation between level of activity and level of cognitive functioning, very few studies have found an interactive effect of age and mental activity on measures of cognitive functioning. Despite the current lack of empirical evidence for the idea that the rate of mental aging is moderated by amount of mental activity, there may be personal benefits to assuming that the mental-exercise hypothesis is true.     

An age-embedding effect: time sensitivity and time insensitivity when pricing health benefits

Benefits are often extended over time. One determinant of this benefit duration is how long a person will live to enjoy them. In four studies, we investigated whether people are sensitive to age when pricing benefits that will last for the remainder of one's life. In Study 1 drivers gave their willingness-to-pay (WTP) to cure a medical condition which would stop them from driving. Results showed an age-embedding effect: WTP was unrelated to the estimated number of driving years left. Study 2 tested whether age-embedding arose because people have a lot of information about themselves which dilutes the impact of age on their valuations. In Studies 3 and 4 we investigated whether people believed that age was an important consideration, or if they failed to properly incorporate it into their judgment. Results indicate that little weight is given to age when making individual pricing decisions, although people did not believe it was normatively irrelevant.     

In Defence of QALYs

ABSTRACT A recent article has claimed that one of the significant benefits which people in the UK derive from the existence of the National Health Service must be lost if the Service adopts the QALY maximisation principle to allocate medical resources. The argument fails, partly because its author conflates two distinct benefits. The first is almost certainly important, but there is no reason to believe that it would be lost if the principle were introduced (while there is some reason to believe that the benefit would actually be greater). The second, once it is isolated from others with which it may be confused, is much less obviously important; and in any case there is again no reason to believe that it would be lost. Moreover, to argue against the principle on the ground that the second benefit would disappear is really to beg the question against the principle. We could not justify our rejection of the principle on the ground that the principle's adoption would mean that we lost the second benefit.     

Moral Enhancement

abstract   Opponents of biomedical enhancement often claim that, even if such enhancement would benefit the enhanced, it would harm others. But this objection looks unpersuasive when the enhancement in question is a moral enhancement — an enhancement that will expectably leave the enhanced person with morally better motives than she had previously. In this article I (1) describe one type of psychological alteration that would plausibly qualify as a moral enhancement, (2) argue that we will, in the medium-term future, probably be able to induce such alterations via biomedical intervention, and (3) defend future engagement in such moral enhancements against possible objections. My aim is to present this kind of moral enhancement as a counter-example to the view that biomedical enhancement is always morally impermissible.     

Limits on risks for healthy volunteers in biomedical research

Healthy volunteers in biomedical research often face significant risks in studies that offer them no medical benefits. The U.S. federal research regulations and laws adopted by other countries place no limits on the risks that these participants face. In this essay, I argue that there should be some limits on the risks for biomedical research involving healthy volunteers. Limits on risk are necessary to protect human participants, institutions, and the scientific community from harm. With the exception of self-experimentation, limits on research risks faced by healthy volunteers constitute a type of soft, impure paternalism because participants usually do not fully understand the risks they are taking. I consider some approaches to limiting research risks and propose that healthy volunteers in biomedical research should not be exposed to greater than a 1% chance of serious harm, such as death, permanent disability, or severe illness or injury. While this guideline would restrict research risks, the limits would not be so low that they would prevent investigators from conducting valuable research. They would, however, set a clear upper boundary for investigators and signal to the scientific community and the public that there are limits on the risks that healthy participants may face in research. This standard provides guidance for decisions made by oversight bodies, but it is not an absolute rule. Investigators can enroll healthy volunteers in studies involving a greater than 1% chance of serious harm if they show that the research addresses a compelling public health or social problem and that the risk of serious harm is only slightly more than 1%. The committee reviewing the research should use outside experts to assess these risks.     

Iffy beliefs: Conditional thinking and belief change

The ability to entertain possibilities and draw inferences about them is essential to human intelligence. We examine the hypothesis that conditional if-then statements trigger a mental simulation process in which people suppose the antecedent (if statement) to be true and evaluate the consequent (then statement) in that context. On the assumption that supposing an event to be true increases belief that the event has occurred or will occur, this hypothesis is consistent with the claim that evaluating a conditional will heighten belief in its antecedent more than in its consequent. Two experiments, employing conditionals of the form If animal A has property X, then animal B will have property X, in which X was a property that people could not readily relate to the animals, supported this claim. The effect was stronger following the evaluation of conditionals with dissimilar animal categories.     

Complexity and the Value of Lives—some philosophical dangers for mentally handicapped people

ABSTRACT In his book The End of Life James Rachels argues that in a situation of forced choice if we must choose between a more and a less complex human being we have good reason to choose in favour of the normal human. He argues also that since some humans have less complex mental abilities than some animals it will sometimes be right to choose a non-human animal in preference to a human being.
I do not consider Rachels'belief that sometimes non-human animals are to be preferred to retarded humans; I focus rather on the seemingly less contentious belief that in situations of forced choice, we should choose human beings with more rather than less complex lives. I reject this contention both because Rachels does not seem to have offered a worthwhile argument in its favour and also because I find his cavalier approach to the lives of people with intellectual disabilities morally offensive. En route I argue against his simplistic separation of human lives into the categories 'simple'and 'complex'on the basis of whether the individuals in question fall into what he seems to take as given—the clear cut categories 'mentally retarded'and 'normal'[1] [2].     

They Don't Do It Often,But They Do It Well: Exploring the relationship between applicant mental abilities and faking

Despite its scientific and practical importance, relatively few studies have been conducted to investigate the relationship between job applicant mental abilities and faking. Some studies suggest that more intelligent people fake less because they do not have to. Other studies suggest that more intelligent people fake more because they have increased capacity to fake. Based on a model of faking likelihood, we predicted that job candidates with a high level of mental abilities would be less likely to fake a biodata measure. However, for candidates who did exhibit faking on the biodata measure, we expected there would be a strong positive relationship between mental abilities and faking, because mental abilities increase their capacity to fake. We found considerable support for hypotheses on a large sample of job candidates (N=17,368), using the bogus item technique to detect faking.     

Does the Total Principle have any Repugnant Implications?

On the Total Principle, the best state of affairs ( ceteris paribus ) is the one with the greatest net sum of welfare value. Parfit rejects this principle, because he believes that it implies the Repugnant Conclusion, the conclusion that for any large population of people, all with lives well worth living, there will be some much larger population whose existence would be better, even though its members all have lives that are only barely worth living. Recently, however, a number of philosophers have suggested that the Total Principle does not imply the Repugnant Conclusion provided that a certain axiological view (namely, the 'Discontinuity View') is correct. Nevertheless, as I point out, there are three different versions of the Repugnant Conclusion, and it appears that the Total Principle will imply two of the three even if the Discontinuity View is correct. I then go on to argue that one of the two remaining versions turns out not to be repugnant after all. Second, I argue that the last remaining version is not, as it turns out, implied by the Total Principle. Thus, my arguments show that the Total Principle has no repugnant implications.     

Companion Animals and Vulnerable Youth: Promoting Engagement between Youth and Professional Service Providers

Vulnerable youth have fewer social ties as a result of inadequate housing and a lack of social support. It is well established that many of these youth tend to underutilize mental health, medical, and social services. Among marginalized and stigmatized populations, the affirming and nonjudgmental presence of companion animals appears to be important for developing collaborative relationships between youth and professional service providers. This paper reviews literature on the benefits of companion animals for assisting providers in their attempts to help youth find a stable living environment. Recommendations are made for providers considering incorporating therapy animals into their existing services.     

明知故犯？故意不道德行为的影响因素和心理过程

故意不道德行为是指个体在明知行为违背了道德规范,但仍采取的不道德行为。研究表明,故意不道德行为存在众多诱发因素,尤其是道德自我概念具有重要的自我调节作用,在行为发生前后都产生重要影响。本文对故意不道德行为的影响因素进行了梳理,探索其行为发生前后的心理过程,并对既有的研究框架进行了整合。未来可以更关注无意识因素和心理动机因素对不道德行为的影响和作用机制,并尝试探索网络情境中的不道德行为。     

Schizophrenia and Moral Responsibility: A Kantian Essay

In this paper, I give a Kantian answer to the question whether and why it would be inappropriate to blame people suffering from mental disorders that fall within the schizophrenia spectrum. I answer this question by reconstructing Kant’s account of mental disorder, in particular his explanation of psychotic symptoms. Kant explains these symptoms in terms of various types of cognitive impairment. I show that this explanation is plausible and discuss Kant’s claim that the unifying feature of the symptoms is the patient’s inability to enter into an exchange of reasons with others. After developing a Kantian Quality of Will Thesis, I analyze some real life cases. Firstly, I argue that delusional patients who are unable to enter into an exchange of epistemic reasons are exempted from doxastic rather than moral responsibility. They are part of the moral community and exonerated from moral blame only if their actions do not express a lack of good will. Secondly, I argue that disorganized patients who are unable to form intentions and to make plans are exempted from moral responsibility because they do not satisfy the conditions for agency.     

Poverty and Mental Health: Underclaiming of Welfare Benefits

The study undertaken by a local MIND welfare benefits service found that 51% of people attending a local mental health resource centre were not receiving the welfare benefits to which they were entitled. Being in receipt of correct benefit entitlement was found to be unaffected by: whether a person had a long history of using mental health services; whether they had a care manager; or whether they had previously been given benefits advice. Women were less likely to be receiving their correct benefit entitlement than men. It is argued that the only way to guarantee that people receive their full benefit entitlement is to ensure that highly trained and experienced welfare benefits advisers are readily accessible to all people who use mental health services.     

Single payers and multiple lists: must everyone get the same coverage in a universal health plan?

In spite of recent political setbacks for the movement toward universal health insurance, considerable support remains for the idea. Among those supporting such plans, most assume that a universal insurance system, especially if it is a single-payer system, would offer a single list of basic covered services. This paper challenges that assumption and argues for the availability of multiple lists of services in a universal insurance system. The claim is made that multiple lists will be both more efficient and more fair. Any single list will fund some services that are quite attractive to some people, but only marginally attractive to others. Thus any single-list plan will fund some services that produce only marginal benefit for the resources used. Moreover, since some people will hold values quite compatible with the single list and others will hold values leading to preferences for unfunded services, some people will get much more benefit from any single list than other people will. Fairness and efficiency require providing an entitlement to universal access to health insurance that could be purchased by typical consumers for a fixed price of perhaps $3500. By permitting everyone to pick their preferred list of services available at that price, each person will efficiently use his or her entitlement while getting more equal opportunity for benefits.     

心理治疗与普通医疗的平等性

心理治疗与普通医疗的平等性是美国心理健康服务系统面临的一个主要政策问题,强调健康保险应为心理健康和物质滥用障碍提供与普通医疗相同的承保范围。近20年来,平等性立法在美国得到了较快发展,并取得了一定效果。但由于立法本身存在的局限性及心理健康服务需求与提供双方的多重因素影响,平等性立法的实施及对其效果的评估仍存在一定困难。借鉴平等性立法的经验,得出了一些关于我国心理健康服务发展的启示。