Is culture a problem for social psychology?

Culture has been regarded as an anathema to psychology as an empiricist research tradition. Despite the explosive growth of research on culture and psychology over the last decade of the 20th century and its importance in Asian social psychology, the ontological and epistemological tension between psychology as a science and psychology as a cultural/historical discipline introduced in the writings of the thinkers of the Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment still lingers on in the contemporary discourse of psychology. Clifford Geertz once ominously suggested that cultural psychology may have chewed more than it can. In the present paper, the interpretive turn in social science as exemplified by writings of Charles Taylor and Paul Ricoeur is reviewed and how it may impinge on the practice of Asian social psychology as an empirical science in methodological, epistemological, and ontological respects is discussed. It is argued here that the current practice of Asian social psychology is largely, though not entirely, free of the challenges mounted by these theorists, and that Asian social psychology has an advantage of not being encumbered by this traditional tension due to a monist ontology that is prevalent in Asia.     

“Method and meaning”: Storytelling as decolonial praxis in the psychology of racialized peoples

In psychology, there is a growing recognition of how racialized groups are often dehumanized and pathologized, and how racist and colonial legacies still inform our research and practices today. In order to dismantle racism within academic institutions we must decolonize and indigenize psychological science. One promising strategy is the use of storytelling methodology wherein participants from racialized groups share their lived experiences. However, the process of how storytelling contributes to decolonization is rarely explained, and decolonization is rarely defined. The present paper systematically reviewed studies that examined racialized individuals’ lived experience using storytelling methodology in order to synthesize conceptualizations of decolonization and of how storytelling contributes to decolonizing psychological research. Findings suggest storytelling meaningfully contributes to decolonial praxis in psychology. Researchers must work consciously and collaboratively, center research around liberating racialized communities, and explicitly define how their study decolonizes in order to be accountable to their community of study and to the colonial history of the lands on which they're situated.     

Towards a Philosophy of Chemistry. A short extract of this paper was first read at the 10th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Florence, August 19–25, 1995.

The paper shows epistemological, methodological and ontological peculiarities of chemistry taken as a classificatory science of materials using experimental methods. Without succumbing to standard interpretations of physical science, chemical methods of experimental investigation, classification, reference, theorizing, prediction and production of new entities are developed one by one as first steps towards a philosophy of chemistry. Chemistry challenges traditional concepts of empirical object, empirical predicate, reference frame and theory, but also the distinction commonly drawn between natural science and technology. Due to its many peculiarities, I propose to treat chemistry philosophically as a special type of science, apart from other sciences.     

What is Epistemological Violence in the Empirical Social Sciences?

This article discusses the meaning of epistemological violence in the empirical social sciences. It is argued that the concept is closer to personal than to structural violence in that it has a subject, an object, and an action, even if the violence is indirect and nonphysical: the subject of violence is the researcher, the object is the Other, and the action is the interpretation of data that is presented as knowledge. Using a hypothetical example, the problem of interpretation in empirical research on the Other is discussed. Epistemological violence refers to the interpretation of social-scientific data on the Other and is produced when empirical data are interpreted as showing the inferiority of or problematizes the Other, even when data allow for equally viable alternative interpretations. Interpretations of inferiority or problematizations are understood as actions that have a negative impact on the Other. Because the interpretations of data emerge from an academic context and thus are presented as knowledge, they are defined as epistemologically violent actions. Problems, consequences, and practices surrounding this concept are discussed.     

The convergence of Kuhn and cognitive psychology

Although psychology has been criticized for adhering to outmoded conceptions of knowledge (e.g. logical positivism), the assertion is made that at least one branch of psychology, namely cognitive psychology, is in the position to corroborate and extend contemporary philosophy of science. Kuhn's “learned perception of similarity” and the related notion of exemplar, which serve to exemplify more adequate conceptions of knowledge within the philosophy of science, are shown to converge with cognitive psychology's schema theory. In this way, the schema theory's empirical offspring provide a validation mechanism for Kuhn's notions and thus provide a richer understanding of the scientific enterprise. This convergence is seen as instantiating an epistemological trend towards understanding of limitations and validity of scientific evidence through an understanding of the limitations and validity of the scientist.     

The Place and Role of Psychology in Cognitive Science: An International Survey

This paper reports the results of an international survey on the place and role of psychology in cognitive science (CS). The respondents were psychological societies from 31 countries illustrating a variety of situations, from countries where psychology has been established as a science for a long time to countries where it has been established more recently and is still developing. The paper reviews topics covered by the CS approach, as well as research operations and initiatives taken in this domain. The analysis of responses reflects the belief that psychology, in general, has a central role in CS. This is based on epistemological considerations, as well as on the recognition of the methodological expertise of psychology for collecting and analyzing empirical data. Psychology is reported to have a unique integrative capacity and to take care to maintain the place of the human being at the centre of CS. Limitations and obstacles to the development of pluridisciplinary research on cognition are also reported, and information is provided on the training programmes in CS and the institutions that support research in this domain.     

Yu in the Xunzi: toward a precise understanding

An ongoing dialogue in Xunzi scholarship addresses the role of yu (欲), often rendered as ‘desire,’ in motivation, but little has been said about what yu actually is, or whether the translation of ‘desire’ accurately reflects Xunzi’s use of the term. Employing textual analysis alongside research in cognitive science, most notably work on the so-called ‘wanting-liking’ distinction, I work toward a more precise understanding of Xunzi’s notion of yu and its functions. I suggest that yu be construed as a kind of desire with an emphasis on ‘wanting’ that, while motivational, differs from broader, less precise notions of desire, and that this feature constitutes a distinctive aspect of Xunzi’s philosophy of psychology. In so doing, I propose a particular methodological approach for the interpretation of classical Chinese philosophy: when interpreting concepts that are subjects of empirical inquiry, empirical findings should lead us to favor some interpretations over others.     

Integrated analysis of indigenous psychologies: Comments and extensions of ideas presented by Shams, Jackson, Hwang and Kashima

The purpose of the present paper is to provide an integrated analysis of indigenous psychologies and to outline the epistemological foundation of indigenous psychologies. In the first part of this paper, the authors provide commentary of the four articles in this Special Issue. In the second section, the epistemological foundation of general psychology is reviewed. General psychology has adopted positivism in search of abstract and universal laws of human behavior and eliminated the subjective aspects of human functioning (i.e. agency, meaning, intention and goals) and the influence of context and culture. In the third section, the authors introduce the transactional model of science. In this approach, human beings are viewed as agents of their own action and are motivated to control and manage their environment. In the fourth section, indigenous psychologies and culture are defined. Cultural differences exist due to the diverse goals that cultures pursue, the methods people use to attain the goals, and the differential use of natural and human resources. In the fifth section, a review of empirical studies focusing on academic achievement is provided to highlight the scientific merits of indigenous psychologies. In the final section, the authors distinguish between the speculative analyses of indigenous concepts from systematic indigenous analyses. Indigenous psychologies represent a scientific paradigm in which the goal is to create a more rigorous, systematic and universal science that can be theoretically and empirically verified.     

Epistemological barriers to radical behaviorism

The historian and philosopher of science Gaston Bachelard proposed the concept of epistemological barriers to describe the intellectual challenges encountered by scientists in their work. In order to embrace novel ways of approaching a problem in science, scientists must overcome barriers or obstacles posed by their prior views. For example, Einsteinian physics presents scientists with claims that space is curved and that time and space are on the same continuum. We utilize Bachelard's concept of epistemological barriers to describe the differences between the intellectual journeys students pursuing advanced studies face when attempting to accept cognitive psychology or radical behaviorism. We contend that the folk psychological beliefs that students typically hold when entering these studies pose less challenge to cognitive psychology than to radical behaviorism. We also suggest that these barriers may also partly be involved in the problematic exegesis that has plagued radical behaviorism. In close, we offer some suggestions for dealing with these epistemological barriers.     

Referees' Decision Making in Handball and Transgressive Behaviors: Influence of Stereotypes About Gender of Players?

We offer norm theory as a framework for developing some common ground within both feminist psychology and lesbian and gay psychology about the meaning of empirical differences between social groups. Norm theory is a social cognitive theory that predicts that empirical differences will be consistently explained by taking more typical groups (e.g., men, straight people) as implicit norms for comparison and by attributing differences to less typical groups (e.g., women, lesbians, and gay men). Results of an experiment (N = 114) are presented to show that norms shape interpretations of empirical differences between lesbian/gay and straight persons by (1) leading explanations to focus on attributes of lesbian/gay persons, and (2) leading to judgments that straight persons have less mutable attributes. Stereotypes also affected interpretations; stereotype-consistent results led to more essentialistic explanations and, when targets were female, to higher ratings of the results' importance and fundamentality. We highlight how experiments can be used to understand the process of constructing the meaning of scientific data, and make recommendations for empiricists' interpretive practices and constructionist theories in feminist psychology and lesbian and gay psychology.     

Psychology as a Science of Subject and Comportment,beyond the Mind and Behavior

The turn of qualitative inquiry suggests a more open, plural conception of psychology than just the science of the mind and behavior as it is most commonly defined. Historical, ontological and epistemological binding of this conception of psychology to the positivist method of natural science may have exhausted its possibilities, and after having contributed to its prestige as a science, has now become an obstacle. It is proposed that psychology be reconceived as a science of subject and comportment in the framework of a contextual hermeneutic, social, human behavioral science. Thus, without rejecting quantitative inquiry, psychology recovers territory left aside like introspection and pre-reflective self-awareness, and reconnects with traditions marginalized from the main stream. From this perspective psychology might also recover its credibility as a human science in view of current skepticism.     

Of BOLD Claims and Excessive Fears: A Call for Caution and Patience Regarding Political Neuroscience

Published and informal assessments of the prospects for neuroimaging in political science have tended to range from overexuberant to reflexively dismissive. We seek to present a cautious but fair middle ground in considering this new methodology, primarily from an epistemological perspective. Our examination centers on the relationship between two levels of analysis, focusing on the potential for connection between behavior‐based theories of political psychology and cognition and the neural processes and systems involved in generating behaviors and states of mind. We explore the place of each level of analysis on its own, as well as the potential for the fruitful interaction of the two. This analysis brings together opinions and ideas presented by others in various forums and across multiple disciplines, offers a discussion of the the promises and perils of neuroimaging in its application to social science, as well as some practical thoughts regarding its early‐stage incorporation into political psychology. We argue in favor of proceeding with more substantial incorporation of neuroimaging into political psychology's methodological arsenal, but note that this will initially require both (1) greater acceptance of work more focused on presenting empirical results than on providing dispositive evidence in broader theoretical debates and (2) a commitment on the part of those conducting this research to refrain from overstating the definitiveness of its theoretical implications.     

The epistemological status of a naturalized epistemology

Philosophically inclined psychologists and psychologically inclined philosophers often hold that the substantive discoveries of psychology can provide an empirical foundation for epistemology. In this paper it is argued that the ambition to found epistemology empirically faces certain unnoticed difficulties. Empirical theories concerned with knowledge‐gaining abilities have been historically associated with specific epistemological views such that the epistemology gives preferential support to the substantive theory, while the theory empirically supports the epistemology. Theories attribute to the subject just those epistemic abilities which associated epistemologies attribute to the scientist. The concept of epistemological significance is introduced as the significance a psychological theory can have for modifying the epistemological suppositions with which the theory was originally associated. Substantive psychological theories are strongly constrained by the epistemologies used in their development; the endorsement an epistemology receives from its associated theory should carry no weight. The alliance between psychology and epistemology is not progressive to the development of either field. Alternative sources of progress in epistemology and psychology are suggested.     

Drawing Bridges Between Science and Practice

Comments are offered regarding how Joiner, Schmidt, and Barnett's (1996) and Riethmiller and Handler's (this issue) articles about psychodiagnostic drawings seem to represent different emphases within the science and practice of psychology. Recognizing the distinctions in these perspectives, while working to bridge the gap between them, can lead to better empirical investigations and improved clinical practice.     

The foundations of epistemological probability

Epistemological probability is the kind of probability relative to a body of evidence. Many philosophers, including Henry Kyburg and Roderick Chisholm, hold that all epistemological probabilities reflect a relation between an evidential body of propositions and other propositions. But this article argues that some epistemological probabilities for empirical propositions must be relative to non-propositional evidence, specifically the contents of non-propositional perceptual states. In doing so, the article distinguishes between internalism and externalism regarding epistemological probability, and argues for a version of awareness internalism. The article draws three main concluding lessons. First, epistemological probability is not to be identified with the sort of objective, experience-independent probability that is familiar from statistical and propensity interpretations of probability. Second, it is doubtful that epistemological probability is measurable, in any useful way, by real numbers, even if it admits of comparative assessments. Third, contrary to the familiar claim of C. I. Lewis, epistemological probability should not be viewed as requiring a basis of certainty.     

Psychology and phenomenology: a clarification

Controversies are rampant in contemporary psychology concerning the appropriate method for observing consciousness and the role inner experience should play in psychological theorizing. These conflicting orientations reflect, in part, methodological differences between natural science and human science interpretations of psychology. Humanistic psychology and philosophical phenomenology both employ a human science approach to psychology that seeks to explain behavior in terms of a person's subjective existence. Maslow's and Heidegger's formulations are both fulfillment theories in that they specify moral values that suggest how life ought to be lived. Natural science methodology rejects the possibility that moral imperatives can be validated, whereas human science methodology allows phenomenological convictions to justify recommendations about a fulfilled life and a good society. The social role of psychology is analyzed within the framework of phenomenological convictions and scientific truth.     

Sixth-Grade Students' Epistemologies of Science: The Impact of School Science Experiences on Epistemological Development

Previous studies have documented that middle school students have a limited "knowledge unproblematic" epistemology of science (i.e., scientists steadily amass more facts about the world by doing experiments) with no appreciation of the role played by scientists' ideas in guiding inquiry. An important question concerns to what extent students this age and younger are ready to restructure their epistemological views to focus on more "constructivist" issues: the conjectural, explanatory, testable, and revisable nature of theories. This study tests the claim that even elementary school students can make significant progress in developing a more sophisticated, constructivist epistemology of science, given a sustained elementary school science curriculum that is designed to support students' thinking about epistemological issues. To assess the impact of elementary science experiences on students' epistemological views, 2 demographically similar groups of 6th-grade students were individually interviewed using the Nature of Science Interview developed by Carey and colleagues (Carey, 1991; Carey, Evans, Honda, Jay, & Unger, 1989). Both groups had experienced sustained elementary science instruction; 1 taught from a constructivist perspective and 1 taught from a more traditional perspective. We found that students in the more traditional science classroom had developed a knowledge unproblematic epistemology of the type previously reported by Carey et al. (1989). In contrast, students in the constructivist classroom had developed an epistemological stance toward science that focused on the central role of ideas in the knowledge acquisition process and on the kinds of mental, social, and experimental work involved in understanding, developing, testing, and revising these ideas. We conclude that elementary schoolchildren are more ready to formulate sophisticated epistemological views than many have thought. We discuss how these findings relate to the broader epistemological literature, and the features of the constructivist classroom environment that may have supported the development of these sophisticated understandings.     

Théodule Ribot's ambiguous positivism: philosophical and epistemological strategies in the founding of French scientific psychology

Théodule Ribot (1839-1916) is regarded by many historians of psychology as the "father" of the discipline in France. Ribot contributed to the development of a "new psychology" independent from philosophy, relying on the methods of the natural sciences. However, such an epistemological transition encountered fierce opposition from both the champions of the old-fashioned metaphysical psychology and the representatives of the "scientific spirit." This article focuses on the objections raised by the latter, and especially philosophers of science, against the possibility of a scientific psychology. For instance, according to Auguste Comte, psychology does not satisfy certain basic methodological requirements. To overcome these objections, Ribot, in his La Psychologie Anglaise Contemporaine (1870/1914), devised an epistemological strategy that amounted to invoking criticisms of Comte's views made by other representatives of the positivist school, such as John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer.     

心理学解释的层次与衔接问题

心理学解释(psychological explanation)及其相关问题的探讨,是当代心理学哲学的一个重要论域,也是心理学方法论的核心理论问题。对心理现象的本质、特征及其作用机制的探讨,历来是哲学家与科学家孜孜以求的共同事业。在从不同视角、基点、逻辑理路对心灵及其与大脑的关系进行探析的过程当中,形成了不同的研究范式、概念框架和解释原则。我们既可以从较高的、个人的解释层次