Rationalizing flow: agency in skilled unreflective action

In recent work, Peter Railton, Julia Annas, and David Velleman aim to reconcile the phenomenon of “flow”—broadly understood as describing the “unreflective” aspect of skilled action—with one or another familiar conception of agency. While there are important differences between their arguments, Railton, Annas, and Velleman all make, or are committed to, at least one similar pivotal claim. Each argues, directly or indirectly, that agents who perform skilled unreflective actions can, in principle, accurately answer “Anscombean” questions—”what” and “why” questions— about what they do. I argue against this claim and explore the ramifications for theories of skilled action and agency.     

Automatic keypress activation in skilled typing

The assumption that letters automatically activate corresponding keypresses in skilled typing was investigated. Participants responded to the color of letters (congruent condition: responding finger was the one usually used to type the letter). Participants skilled in typing showed a congruency effect: unskilled participants did not (Experiment 1). The automatic activation included characteristics of the movement usually performed to type the letters (Experiment 2). Responding with crossed hands on an external response device (Experiment 3) provided evidence for effector-dependent representations only, whereas responding on a keyhoard (Experiment 4) resulted in evidence for effector-dependent and spatial representations. Thus, motoric skill proficiency is accompanied by automatic activation processes that probably contribute to high performance levels.     

Memory for meaning in skilled and unskilled readers

Skilled and unskilled readers from grades 3, 5, and 7 (9, 11, and 13 years of age, respectively) performed one of three memory tasks on a randomized list of primary word associates. One group rated each word as “good” or “bad” (incidental semantic task), another group produced a rhyming word for each list word (incidental rhyming task), and a third group attempted to memorize the list (intentional learning task). The recall results indicated equivalent recall for skilled and unskilled readers at all grades on the rhyming and intentional tasks; whereas, skilled readers were superior to unskilled readers on the semantic task. A clustering analysis produced a similar effect as skilled readers, who performed the semantic task, tended to cluster semantically-associated words together during recall more readily than unskilled readers. The results were construed as evidence for reading-skill differences in the semantic encoding of individual words.     

A Dual Process Account of Coarticulation in Motor Skill Acquisition

Many tasks, such as typing a password, are decomposed into a sequence of subtasks that can be accomplished in many ways. Behavior that accomplishes subtasks in ways that are influenced by the overall task is often described as “skilled” and exhibits coarticulation. Many accounts of coarticulation use search methods that are informed by representations of objectives that define skilled. While they aid in describing the strategies the nervous system may follow, they are computationally complex and may be difficult to attribute to brain structures. Here, the authors present a biologically- inspired account whereby skilled behavior is developed through 2 simple processes: (a) a corrective process that ensures that each subtask is accomplished, but does not do so skillfully and (b) a reinforcement learning process that finds better movements using trial and error search that is not informed by representations of any objectives. We implement our account as a computational model controlling a simulated two-armed kinematic “robot” that must hit a sequence of goals with its hands. Behavior displays coarticulation in terms of which hand was chosen, how the corresponding arm was used, and how the other arm was used, suggesting that the account can participate in the development of skilled behavior.     

Halving and doubling isometric force: Evidence for a decelerating psychophysical function consistent with an equilibrium-point model of motor control

Several previous investigations have measured accelerating psychophysical functions for perceived force with exponents of about 1.7. Two halving and doubling experiments presented here imply a psychophysical function for perceived force with an exponent between 0.6 and 0.8. That is, more than a doubling of force was needed to double the sensation, and similarly for halving. In the first experiment, subjects squeezed rigid instrumented cylinders between the thumb and first two fingers of each hand. They generated and released a reference force with one hand, and then squeezed the opposite hand to produce a sensation magnitude equal to, twice that, or half that of the reference. An analysis using a model that accounted for compression bias yielded average psychophysical functions with exponents of 0.58 and 0.59 (nondominant and dominant hands, respectively). The second experiment was an attempt to replicate earlier results and to reconcile them with the first experiment by using a paradigm duplicated from a previous study. Subjects in the second experiment made unilateral halving and doubling judgments of handgrip while squeezing a hand dynamometer. Again, the halving and doubling judgments yielded decelerating functions with exponents of 0.75 and 0.80 (nondominant and dominant hands, respectively). Even though the results of the first two experiments contradict earlier investigations, they can be explained by an equilibrium model of motor control assuming that subjects halve and double the central motor command rather than the sensation of force. The force is simply the result of the mechanical equilibrium established between the load and the compliant effector (the hand). The predicted relationship between the motor command judgments, the compliance of the hand, and the resultant forces was confirmed in a third experiment in which the mechanical compliance of the three-finger pinch was measured by using a pneumatic manipulandum to apply force perturbations in a “do-notintervene” paradigm. The measured compliance characteristic was accelerating, just as predicted by the model, in order to produce a decelerating psychophysical function for “perceived force.” In this experiment, then, judgments of perceived force appear to be judgments of the central motor command.     

The re-emergence of emergence,and the causal role of synergy in emergent evolution

Despite its current popularity, “emergence” is a concept with a venerable history and an elusive, ambiguous standing in contemporary evolutionary theory. This paper briefly recounts the history of the term and details some of its current usages. Not only are there radically varying interpretations about how to define emergence but “reductionist” and “holistic” theorists hold very different views about the issue of causation. However, these two seemingly polar positions are not irreconcilable. Reductionism, or detailed analysis of the parts and their interactions, is essential for answering the “how” question in evolution—how does a complex living system work? But holism is equally necessary for answering the “why” question—why did a particular arrangement of parts evolve? In order to answer the “why” question, a broader, multi-leveled paradigm is required. The reductionist approach to explaining emergent complexity has entailed a search for underlying “laws of emergence.” In contrast, the “Synergism Hypothesis” focuses on the “economics”—the functional effects produced by emergent wholes and their selective consequences in evolutionary change. This paper also argues that emergent phenomena represent, in effect, a subset of a larger universe of cooperative, synergistic effects in the natural world.     

Movement and Meaning

Movement analysis receives a new and useful examination in this paper. The fact (hat all of us always “read” each other's movement behavior as a matter of course is taken for granted. Our verbal language is rife with allusions to bodily behavior, suggesting that there really is such a thing as a language of the body. But one and the same movement can represent many differing aspects of behavior and is heavily dependent on its context. What we experience nonverbally vis-à-vis another person is the executive function of body language like, for instance, “wringing one's hands” or having “shaky knees.” Usually, people will convey nonverbally how they feel about the situation they find themselves in while the other—the recipient of the message—will convey understanding equally nonverbally. Thus, it is always (he representation of something that we experience—an embodiment of intent, not language itself. It therefore becomes necessary to distinguish between the implementation and movement itself. These abstractions become helpful in the understanding of many phenomena during treatment situations as demonstrated here.     

Embodied preference judgments: can likeability be driven by the motor system?

Can covert sensorimotor simulation of stimulus-relevant actions influence affective judgments, even when there is no intention to act? Skilled and novice typists picked which of two letter dyads they preferred. In each pair, one dyad, if typed using standard typing methods, would involve the same fingers (e.g., FV); the other would be typed with different fingers (e.g., FJ). Thus, if typed, dyads of the former kind should create more motor interference than dyads of the latter kind. Although individuals could not explain how the dyads differed, skilled typists preferred those typed with different fingers. Novices showed no preference. Moreover, a motor task performed while making dyad preference judgments attenuated skilled typists' preference--but only when the motor task involved the specific fingers that would be used to type the dyads. These findings suggest that in skilled typists, perceiving letters prompts covert sensorimotor simulation of typing them, which in turn influences affective judgments about this information.     

Attention to the hands disrupts skilled typewriting: The role of vision in producing the disruption

Drawing typists' attention to their hands by asking them to type only letters assigned to the left or the right hand disrupts their performance, slowing the rate of typing and increasing errors. In this article we test the hypothesis that slowing occurs because typists watch their hands to determine which hand types which letter. Skilled typists were cued to type letters of one hand or of both hands while they could view their hands on the keyboard and while their vision was blocked by a box placed over the keyboard. Typing was slower when letters of one hand were typed than when letters of both hands were typed, and the slowing was greater when the hands were covered than when they were not. This supports the hypothesis that slowing occurs because typists watch their hands. However, typists were able to type letters of one hand when the keyboard was covered, so typists must have monitored kinesthetic information as well.     

The Left Hand Doesn't Know What the Right Hand Is Doing: The Disruptive Effects of Attention to the Hands in Skilled Typewriting

ABSTRACT— Everyone knows that attention to the details disrupts skilled performance, but little empirical evidence documents this fact. We show that attention to the hands disrupts skilled typewriting. We had skilled typists type words preceded by cues that told them to type only the letters assigned to one hand or to type all of the letters. Cuing the hands disrupted performance markedly, slowing typing and increasing the error rate (Experiment 1); these deleterious effects were observed even when no keystrokes were actually inhibited (Experiment 3). However, cuing the same letters with colors was not disruptive (Experiment 2). We account for the disruption with a hierarchical control model, in which an inner loop controls the hands and an outer loop controls what is typed. Typing letters using only one hand requires the outer loop to monitor the inner loop's output; the outer loop slows inner-loop cycle time to increase the likelihood of inhibiting responses with the unwanted hand. This produces the disruption.     

Functional cerebral lateralization in subtypes of disabled readers

This study investigated the functional cortical organization of reading-disabled boys and age-matched normal readers. Subjects were initially classified according to E. Boder's (1971a. In B. Bateman (Ed.), Learning disorders. Seattle: Special Child Publications. Vol. 4.) distinction between dysphonetic children (who make nonphonetic, bizarre spelling errors), dyseidetic children (who make phonetically acceptable errors, but do not respond to some words as “wholes”), and children who display normal error patterns (who make phonetically acceptable errors and respond to words as “wholes”). It was hypothesized that different types of reading disability would be associated with different patterns of lateralized brain function. This proposal was examined by testing subjects on three experimental neuropsychological measures—hemispheric time-sharing, conjugate lateral eye movements, and tactile directional perception. Conjugate lateral eye movements were disregarded as the control subjects failed to show predicted asymmetries on this measure. The two other measures were considered valid and demonstrated atypical lateralization in the reading-disabled groups. Lateralization of verbal and/or spatial functiosn differed among the reading-disabled groups and an attempt was made to relate these atypical patterns to the type of reading difficulties presented.     

Bartlett's schema theory: The unreplicated “portrait d'homme” series from 1932

In 1932, Frederic Bartlett laid the foundation for the later schema theory. His key assumption of previous knowledge affecting the processing of new stimuli was illustrated in the famous “portrait d'homme” series. Sequenced reproductions of ambiguous stimuli showed progressive object-likeness. As Bartlett pointed out, activation of specific schemata, for instance “the face schema”, biases memory retrieval towards such schemata. In five experiments (Experiment 1, n?=?53; Experiment 2, n?=?177; Experiment 3, n?=?36; Experiment 4, n?=?6; Experiment 5, n?=?2), we tested several factors potentially influencing retrieval biases—for example, by varying the general procedure of reproduction (repeated vs. serial) and by omitting versus providing visual or semantic cues for activating face schemata. Participants inspected face-like stimuli with the caption “portrait of the human” and reproduced them repeatedly under specific conditions. None of the experiments revealed a systematic tendency towards Bartlett's described case, even when the participants were explicitly instructed to draw “a face” like the previously inspected one. In one of the “serial reproduction” experiments, we even obtained contrary effects with decreasing face-likeness over the reproduction generations. A close analysis of the original findings raises questions about the replicability of Bartlett's findings, qualifying the “portrait d'homme” series more or less as an illustrative example of the main idea of reconstructive memory.     

The humanities and gross anatomy: Forgotten alternatives

Researchers in medical education have extensively studied negative reactions to gross anatomy, sometimes grouped under the term “the cadaver experience.” Although there has been disagreement about the extent and importance of such phenomena, several attempts at curricular reform have been designed to “humanize” the student-cadaver encounter. However, some obvious sources linking gross anatomy and the humanities have been consistently overlooked. Such sources—from the history of art, the history of anatomy, and autobiographical and imaginative literature—not only bear witness to the “cadaver experience” for anatomists of the past, but also offer forgotten alternatives for placing present-day reactions in perspective. Former methods of teaching which used such material might serve as models for reintegrating the humanities into the study of gross anatomy as a possible humanizing force.     

Eye movements and performance during bilateral tracing tasks

To examine the role of current visual monitoring in the between-hand differences in skilled movements, eye movements and errors during bilateral tracing tasks were analyzed in 10 subjects. When subjects traced a horizontal course abductively with both hands, the subject's gaze followed the movement of the right hand, and more errors were observed on the left hand. When subjects traced a vertical course, where fine motor control for alteration of movement direction was necessary, more errors were shown on the left hand despite the alternate visual scan of the two hands. The results were interpreted as showing that the between-hand differences in skilled movements are primarily due to the left hand's poor ability in motor output, and that the differential efficiency in the use of visual monitoring becomes an important factor in the between-hand differences when symmetrical movements of both hands with a low degree of difficulty are required.     

Should We All be Scientists? Re-thinking Laboratory Research as a Calling

In recent years there have been major shifts in how the role of science—and scientists—are understood. The critical examination of scientific expertise within the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) are increasingly eroding notions of the “otherness” of scientists. It would seem to suggest that anyone can be a scientist—when provided with the appropriate training and access to data. In contrast, however, ethnographic evidence from the scientific community tells a different story. Scientists are quick to recognize that not everyone can—or should—be a scientist. Appealing to notions such as “good hands” or “gut feelings”, scientists narrate a distinction between good and bad scientists that cannot be reduced to education, access, or opportunity. The key to good science requires scientists to express an intuitive feeling for their discipline, but also that individuals derive considerable personal satisfaction from their work. Discussing this personal joy in—and “fittingness” of—scientific occupations using the fields of STS, ethics and science policy is highly problematic. In this paper we turn to theology discourse to analyze the notion of “callings” as a means of understanding this issue. Callings highlight the identification and examination of individual talents to determine fit occupations for specific persons. Framing science as a calling represents a novel view of research that places the talents and dispositions of individuals and their relationship to the community at the center of flourishing practices.     

Conflictual Moralities,Ethical Torture: Revisiting the Problem of “Dirty Hands”

The problem of “dirty hands” has become an important term, indeed one of the most important terms of reference, in contemporary academic scholarship on the issue of torture. The aim of this essay is to offer a better understanding of this problem. Firstly, it is argued that the problem of “dirty hands” can play neither within rule-utilitarianism nor within absolutism. Still, however, the problem of “dirty hands” represents an acute, seemingly irresolvable, conflict within morality, with the moral agent understood, following Nagel, as necessarily holding mixed, absolutist-consequentialist moral intuitions, pulling in opposite directions. Secondly, a distinction is drawn between real situations of “dirty hands,” and other conflictual scenarios, which are commonly, but unjustifiably placed under the metaphorical title of “dirty hands.” Finally, it is suggested - utilizing Nagel’s own ideas, as developed in his later work, and Sen’s notion of evaluator relativity—that the moral “blind alley” manifested in the problem of “dirty hands” may not be totally blind after all, at least from the situated agent’s own internal point of view (as opposed to that of an external observer trying to put herself in the agent’s position by way of moral simulation). Thus, contrary to Walzer’s approach, it is possible for a person (politician) acting in a situation of “dirty hands,” not to believe herself to be guilty, but still be a moral person.     

The minimal self hypothesis

For millennia self has been conjectured to be necessary for consciousness. But scant empirical evidence has been adduced to support this hypothesis. Inconsistent explications of “self” and failure to design apt experiments have impeded progress. Advocates of phenomenological psychiatry, however, have helped explicate “self,” and employed it to explain some psychopathological symptoms. In those studies, “self” is understood in a minimalist sense, sheer “for-me-ness.” Unfortunately, explication of the “minimal self” (MS) has relied on conceptual analysis, and applications to psychopathology have been hermeneutic, allowing for many degrees of interpretive latitude. The result is that MS’s current scientific status is analogous to that of the “atom,” at the time when “atom” was just beginning to undergo transformation from a philosophical to a scientific concept. Fortunately, there is now an opportunity to promote a similar transformation for “MS.” Discovery of the brain’s Default Mode Network (DMN) opened the door to neuroimaging investigations of self. Taking the DMN and other forms of intrinsic activity as a starting point, an empirical foothold can be established, one that spurs experimental research and that enables extension of research into multiple phenomena. New experimental protocols that posit “MS” can help explain phenomena hitherto not thought to be related to self, thereby hastening development of a mature science of self. In particular, targeting phenomena wherein consciousness is lost and recovered, as in some cases of Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome (UWS), allow for design of neuroimaging probes that enable detection of MS during non-conscious states. These probes, as well as other experimental protocols applied to NREM Sleep, General Anesthesia (GA), and the waking state, provide some evidence to suggest that not only can self and consciousness dissociate, MS might be a necessary precondition for conscious experience. Finally, these findings have implications for the science of consciousness: it has been suggested that “levels of consciousness” (LoC) is not a legitimate concept for the science of consciousness. But because we have the conceptual and methodological tools with which to refine investigations of MS, we have the means to identify a possible foundation—a bifurcation point—for consciousness, as well as the means by which to measure degrees of distance from that foundation. These neuroimaging investigations of MS position us to better assess whether LoC has a role to play in a mature science of consciousness.     

Asymmetric division of labor in human skilled bimanual action: the kinematic chain as a model

This article presents a tentative theoretical framework for the study of asymmetry in the context of human bimanual action. It is emphasized that in man most skilled manual activities involve two hands playing different roles, a fact that has been often overlooked in the experimental study of human manual lateralization. As an alternative to the current concepts of manual preference and manual superiority-whose relevance is limited to the particular case of unimanual actions-the more general concept of lateral preference is proposed to denote preference for one of the two possible ways of assigning two roles to two hands. A simple model describing man's favored intermanual division of labor in the model are the following. 1) The two hands represent two motors, that is, decomplexity is ignored in the suggested approach. 2) In man, the two manual motors cooperate with one another as if they were assembled in series, thereby forming a kinematic chain: In a right-hander allowed to follow his or her lateral preferences, motion produced by the right hand tends to articulate with motion produced by the left. It is suggested that the kinematic chain model may help in understanding the adaptive advantage of human manual specialization.     

Learning on a response continuum: Comparison of a linear change and a functional learning model

Two reinforcement schedules were used to compare the predictive validity of a linear change model with a functional learning model. In one schedule, termed “convergent,” the linear change model predicts convergence to the optimum response, while in the other, termed “divergent,” this model predicts that a subject's response will not converge. The functional learning model predicts convergence in both cases. Another factor that was varied was presence or absence of random error or “noise” in the relationship between response and outcome. In the “noiseless” condition, in which no noise is added, a subject could discover the optimum response by chance, so that some subjects could appear to have converged fortuitously. In the “noisy” conditions such chance apparent convergence could not occur.The results did not unequivocally favor either model. While the linear change model's prediction of nonconvergence in the divergent conditions (particularly the “noisy” divergent condition) was not sustained, there was a clear difference in speed of convergence, counter to the prediction inferred from the functional learning model. Evidence that at least some subjects were utilizing a functional learning strategy was adduced from the fact that subjects were able to “map out” the relation between response and outcome quite accurately in a follow-up task. Almost all subjects in the “noisy” conditions had evidently “learned” a strong linear relation, with slope closely matching the veridical one.The data were consistent with a hybrid model assuming a “hierarchy of cognitive strategies” in which more complex strategies (e.g., functional learning) are utilized only when the simpler ones (e.g., a linear change strategy) fail to solve the problem.     

Against “Transracialism”: Revisiting the Debate

This article critically reflects on some of the themes and assumptions at stake in the “transracialism” controversy, and connects them to important works in critical race theory: namely Rey Chow's notion of “coercive mimeticism” and Sara Ahmed's critique of white liberal multiculturalism. It argues that the analytic account of “race” that Tuvel draws upon in her article—Sally Haslanger's—is politically problematic, both on its own terms and in light of broader reflections on racialized and gendered power relations. In particular, I critique Haslanger's assumption that all racial identities exist on the same conceptual plane: that a single variable definition of “race” can be applied to any particular racialized group—including white and nonwhite racial identities. This erases racialized power relations, especially where, in liberal “multicultural” nations, whiteness constitutes the implied standard against which an appearance of “racial difference” is conjured. Finally, I extend my argument to the issue of treating “race” and gender analogously. Rejecting this move, I propose an alternative way of conceptualizing these as analytically distinct, yet constitutively interdependent, phenomena. In order to situate the debate historically, I consider an example of “racial transgression” from twentieth‐century China.