Empathy and Its Role in Morality

In this paper, I will argue, contra Prinz, that empathy is a crucial component of our moral lives. In particular, I argue that empathy is sometimes epistemologically necessary for identifying the right action; that empathy is sometimes psychologically necessary for motivating the agent to perform the right action; and that empathy is sometimes necessary for the agent to be most morally praiseworthy for an action. I begin by explaining what I take empathy to be. I then discuss some alleged problems for empathy and explain why some argue that empathy is unnecessary and sometimes even problematic in the moral domain. Next, I criticize a prominent alternative to an empathy‐based morality. Finally, I argue that that empathy is sometimes epistemologically and psychologically necessary for doing the right thing and is sometimes necessary for moral worth. I conclude with a discussion of the important role of empathy in our everyday lives.     

Empathy,Embodiment and Interpersonal Understanding: From Lipps to Schutz

When it comes to understanding the nature of social cognition, we have—according to the standard view—a choice between the simulation theory, the theory-theory or some hybrid between the two. The aim of this paper is to argue that there are, in fact, other options available, and that one such option has been articulated by various thinkers belonging to the phenomenological tradition. More specifically, the paper will contrast Lipps' account of empathy—an account that has recently undergone something of a revival in the hands of contemporary simulationists—with various accounts of empathy found in the phenomenological tradition. I discuss the way Lipps was criticized by Scheler, Stein and Husserl, and outline some of the core features of their, at times divergent, alternatives. I then proceed by considering how their basic take on empathy and social cognition was taken up and modified by Schutz—a thinker whose contribution to the analysis of interpersonal understanding has been unjustly neglected in recent years.     

Does Free Will Remain a Mystery? A Response to Van Inwagen

In this paper, I argue against Peter van Inwagen’s claim (in “Free Will Remains a Mystery”), that agent-causal views of free will could do nothing to solve the problem of free will (specifically, the problem of chanciness). After explaining van Inwagen’s argument, I argue that he does not consider all possible manifestations of the agent-causal position. More importantly, I claim that, in any case, van Inwagen appears to have mischaracterized the problem in some crucial ways. Once we are clear on the true nature of the problem of chanciness, agent-causal views do much to eradicate it.     

No Empathy for Empathy: An Existential Reading of Husserl’s Forgotten Question

ABSTRACT

Empathy is a term used to denote our experience of connecting or feeling with an Other. The term has been used both by psychologists and phenomenologists as a supplement for our biological capacity to understand an Other. In this paper I would like to challenge the possibility of such empathy. If empathy is employed to mean that we know another person’s feelings, then I argue that this is impossible. I argue that there is an equivocation in the use of the term ‘empathy’ which conditions the appropriation of the Other as we think that we know how the Other feels. To claim that we do know an Other’s feelings – or any kind of their intentional experience – means to appropriate their experience through our own. I will first reveal the equivocal use of the term ‘empathy’ and, then, I will explore Husserl’s use of the term. In Husserl, the understanding of an Other as empathy is only partial. I shall conclude by reiterating a thesis from philosophy of existence and feminist theory according to which to know another person comes from creating a community with them and not because we have a biological structure that can mirror each other’s feelings.     

Curriculum, Critical Common-Sensism, Scholasticism, and the Growth of Democratic Character

My paper concentrates on Peirce’s late essay, “Issues of Pragmaticism,” which identifies “critical common-sensism” and Scotistic realism as the two primary products of pragmaticism. I argue that the doctrines of Peirce’s critical common-sensism provide a host of commendable curricular objectives for democratic Bildung. The second half of my paper explores Peirce’s Scotistic realism. I argue that Peirce eventually returned to Aristotelian intuitions that led him to a more robust realism. I focus on the development of signs from the vague and indeterminate to the determinate and universal. The primary example will be the evolution of the very idea of number. I believe we will never arrive at the end of number history because we can never fully contain creativity. I draw similar conclusions for the idea of curriculum. Whether or not there is an end to the evolution of signs in Peirce is a matter of debate. I incline toward the opinion there is not, though I am unsure. I conclude by arguing that rationality itself is but the form and structure of poetic creation and that we should embrace paradox and even contradiction rather that become caught in totalizing and totalitarian end of history stories.     

Fusions and Ordinary Physical Objects

In “Tropes and Ordinary Physical Objects”, Kris McDaniel argues that ordinary physical objects are fusions of monadic and polyadic tropes. McDaniel calls his view “TOPO”—for “Theory of Ordinary Physical Objects”. He argues that we should accept TOPO because of the philosophical work that it allows us to do. Among other things, TOPO is supposed to allow endurantists to reply to Mark Heller’s argument for perdurantism. But, we argue in this paper, TOPO does not help endurantists do that; indeed, we argue that anyone who accepts TOPO should reject endurantism.     

Finding Empathy: How Neuroscientific Measures,Evidence and Conceptualizations Interact

ABSTRACT

Questions about how empathy should be conceptualized have long been a preoccupation of the field of empathy research. There are numerous definitions of empathy that have been proposed and that often overlap with other concepts such as sympathy and compassion. This makes communication between research groups or across disciplines difficult. Many researchers seem to see the diversity of definitions as a problem rather than a form of benign pluralism. Within this debate about conceptualization, researchers sometimes suggest that more neuroscientific evidence will make the problem go away – that uncovering the processes underlying empathy will thereby also sort out conceptual difficulties. In this paper, I challenge this assumption by examining how neuroscientists studying empathy use concepts in practice – both in the development of their measures and in the interpretation of their data. I argue that this neuroscientific literature demonstrates that continuity and stability comes from the use of certain established measures, while progress comes from expansion upon those measures and the flexibility of stated concepts. We do not ‘find’ empathy through increased neuroscientific evidence but we do get closer to understanding empathic processes, flexibly understood.     

Should physicians be empathetic? Rethinking clinical empathy

The role and importance of empathy in clinical practice has been widely discussed. This paper focuses on the ideal of clinical empathy, as involving both cognitive understanding and affective resonance. I argue that this account is subject to a number of objections. Affective resonance may serve more as a liability than as a benefit in clinical settings, and utilizing this capacity is not clearly supported by the relevant empirical literature. Instead, I argue that the ideal account of empathy in medicine remains cognitive, though there is a central role for expressing empathic concern toward patients.     

Empathy as a hermeneutic practice

This essay will argue for the centrality of empathy in the doctor-patient relationship — as a core of ethically sound, responsible therapeutics. By “empathy,” I intend an explicitly hermeneutic practice, informed by a reflexive understanding of patient and self. After providing an overview of the history of the concept of empathy in clinical medicine, I discuss current definitions and the use of Balint groups in residency training as a way to develop empathic competence in novice physicians.     

Gadamer and the Otherness of Nature: Elements for an Environmental Education

In this work I search for elements that contribute to the development of the ethical dimension of environmental education. I start with the existence of what C.A. Bowers calls “areas of silence” in the curriculum in both schools and universities. The reason for this silence, I argue, is to be found in the Cartesian conceptual structures of curricula. I suggest that the works of Bacon, Galileo and Descartes provoke a twofold process that I have termed the forgetting of tradition and objectification of nature. As a corrective to this process, I explore the possibilities that the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer opens for rehabilitation of tradition and de-objectification of nature. I work with the concept of the “dignity of things” present in Greek dialectics: that nature is not simply a projection of mind (as the neo-Kantians claim), but something that thought suffers. In my conclusions I argue that for nature to be reinserted into almost all areas of knowledge it is necessary that we respect “the otherness of nature.”     

Cognitive reference points

Two methods were used to test the hypothesis that natural categories (such as colors, line orientations, and numbers) have reference point stimuli (such as focal colors, vertical and horizontal lines, and numbers that are multiples of 10) in relation to which other stimuli of the category are judged. In Experiment I, subjects placed pairs of stimuli into sentence frames consisting of linguistic “hedges” such as “— is essentially—.” Results were that the supposed reference stimuli were most often placed in the second (reference) slot. In Experiment II, the subject placed a stimulus in physical space to represent his feeling of the psychological distance of that stimulus from another spatially fixed stimulus. Results showed that, when supposed reference stimuli were fixed, other stimuli were placed closer to them than vice versa. The results have substantive implications for the understanding of internal structure of categories and methodological implications for the mapping of reference points, quantification of linguistic intuitions, and the assumption of symmetry in psychological distance judgments.     

EMPATHY AND THE EXTENDED MIND

I draw upon the conceptual resources of the extended mind thesis (EM) to analyze empathy and interpersonal understanding. Against the dominant mentalistic paradigm, I argue that empathy is fundamentally an extended bodily activity and that much of our social understanding happens outside of the head. First, I look at how the two dominant models of interpersonal understanding, theory theory and simulation theory, portray the cognitive link between folk psychology and empathy. Next, I challenge their internalist orthodoxy and offer an alternative "extended" characterization of empathy. In support of this characterization, I analyze some narratives of individuals with Moebius syndrome, a kind of expressive deficit resulting from bilateral facial paralysis. I conclude by discussing how a Zen Buddhist ethics of responsiveness is helpful for articulating the practical significance of an extended, body-based account of empathy.     

The False Consensus Effect and Overconfidence: Flaws in Judgment or Flaws in How We Study Judgment?

Thefalse consensus effectand theoverconfidence in judgmenteffect are often referred to as established “facts” of psychology. At present, the empirical support for these effects is inadequate and logically flawed. We argue that, absent other information, using one's own response to a situation as an observation of size 1 could be an effective use of data and could lead to anincreasein the accuracy of predicting others’ behavior. In an empirical examination of such use, we find a robustpositivecorrelation between the degree to which people believe that a majority of others are like them and their accuracy in predicting those others’ responses, whether this correlation is evaluated within items across people, across items within people, or across items across people. In addition, we show that the finding of overconfidence in judgment follows analytically from the functional relationship used to demonstrate it, a “finding” that is easily reversed by considering the inverse relationship. Specifically, we argue that regression effects account for the evidence cited in support of overconfidence. While not definitive, our empirical findings call into the question the acceptance of these two effects—as commonly defined—as facts.     

Xujing (Emptiness and Stillness) in Daoism,Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature,and Environmental Ethics

In this article,I will examine the concept of xujing虛靜 (emptiness and stillness) in Daoism and its relationship with the aesthetic appreciation of nature and environmental ethics.Firstly,I will examine the Chinese philosophical understanding of nature through the concept of qi.I point out that qi is characterized by four interrelated features,which are emptiness,creativity,vitality,and stillness.Xujing are also aesthetically appreciated as the objective features of qi.Secondly,I will discuss why,as the objective features of qi,xujing are considered to be features that have aesthetic value.I argue that empathy is the reason why emptiness as the objective feature of qi is regarded as having aesthetic value.Thirdly,I will discuss how the aesthetic concept of emptiness helps contribute to the construction of place-based environmental ethics.     

A theory of causality: Causality=interaction (as defined by a suitable quantum field theory)

In this paper I put forward a suggestion for identifying causality in micro-systems with the specific quantum field theoretic interactions that occur in such systems. I first argue — along the lines of general transference theories — that such a physicalistic account is essential to an understanding of causation; I then proceed to sketch the concept of interaction as it occurs in quantum field theory and I do so from both a formal and an informal point of view. Finally, I present reasons for thinking that only a quantum field theoretic account can do the job — in particular I rely on a theorem by D. Currie and to the effect that interaction cannot be described in (a Hamiltonian formulation of) Classical Mechanics. Throughout the paper I attempt to suggest that the widespread scepticism about the ability of quantum theory to support a theory of causality is mistaken and rests on several misunderstandings.     

Unsafe Knowledge

Ernest Sosa has argued that if someone knows that p, then his belief that p is “safe”. and Timothy Williamson has agreed. In this paper I argue that safety, as defined by Sosa, is not a necessary condition on knowledge – that we can have unsafe knowledge. I present Sosa’s definition of safety and a counterexample to it as a necessary condition on knowledge. I also argue that Sosa’s most recent refinements to the notion of safety don’t help him to avoid the counterexample. I consider three replies on behalf of the defender of safety, and find them all wanting. Finally, I offer a tentative diagnosis of my counterexample.     

Cognitive and projective measures of differentiation and their relationship to empathy

The present investigation compared cognitive and projective methods of assessing “differentiation,” Witkin's Embedded Figures Test (EFT) and Blatt's Concept of the Object Scale (COS), and reexamined expectations concerning the relationship between level of differentiation and capacity for empathy. Whether lesser or greater differentiation would promote empathy was of specific interest. Two forms of empathy were investigated, an “affective” form assessed by the Mehrabian Empathy Scale and a “cognitive” form assessed by the Hogan Empathy Scale. Expected sex differences in differentiation and empathy were also investigated. Results demonstrated consonance between COS and EFT measures of differentiation within the male sample only (p < .05). Individuals classified by EFT as relatively less differentiated (“field dependent”) produced more part object responses (p < .02) and those classified as more differentiated (“field independent”) showed a trend toward more whole object responses (p < .10) on the COS. Associations between measures of differentiation and empathy reached significance or showed trends in the male group only. Men with relatively lesser differentiation on the EFT (“field dependent”) showed greater “affective empathy” (p < .10) and men with greater differentiation on the COS showed greater “cognitive” empathy (p < .05). Women demonstrated higher levels of “affective” empathy than men (p < .001).     

Children's understanding of interpretation

The prevailing view in the study of children's developing theories of mind is that the 4-year-old's newfound understanding of false belief is the single developmental milestone marking entry into an adult “folk psychology.” We argue instead that there are at least two such watershed events. Children first develop a “copy theory” that equates the mind with a recording device capable of producing either faithful or flawed representations of reality and according to which mental states are determined entirely by the flow of information into the mind. Only later, in the early school years, do children come to appreciate, as do adults, that the mind itself can contribute to the content of mental states. This later-arriving “Interpretive Theory of Mind” allows an appreciation of the capacity for constructively interpreting and misinterpreting reality. The main finding from the six studies reported here is that children who otherwise demonstrate a clear understanding that beliefs can be false (and so deserve to be credited with a theory of mind), can nevertheless fail to appreciate even the most basic aspects of interpretation: that despite exposure to precisely the same information, two persons can still end up holding sharply different opinions about what is the self-same reality. What these studies reveal is that an interpretive theory of mind is different from, and later arriving than, an appreciation of the possibility of false belief, and contrary to competing claims, this interpretive theory actually makes its first appearance during, but not before, the early school years.     

Reproducing gender in counseling and psychotherapy: Understanding the problem and changing the practice

In this article I argue that the concept of gender is misunderstood by the majority of psychologists. Increasingly the term “gender” is mindlessly replacing the term “sex,” obfuscating decades of theory and research that elucidated gender as a complex social-psychological variable rather than a bifurcated individual-difference variable tied to biological sex. As a consequence, gender is largely ignored as an “active” variable in counseling research and practice. Current theory and research on gender as they apply to counseling and psychotherapy are first described. Then ways in which gender processes are often reproduced in counseling and psychotherapy and factors contributing to this practice are illuminated. Finally, areas particularly vulnerable to reproducing gender are described and some examples provided of the reproducing, and the disrupting, of gender processes in counseling.     

What can functional neuroimaging tell the experimental psychologist?

I argue here that functional neuroimaging data—which I restrict to the haemodynamic techniques of fMRI and PET—can inform psychological theorizing, provided one assumes a “systematic” function-structure mapping in the brain. In this case, imaging data simply comprise another dependent variable, along with behavioural data, that can be used to test competing theories. In particular, I distinguish two types of inference: function-to-structure deduction and structure-to-function induction. With the former inference, a qualitatively different pattern of activity over the brain under two experimental conditions implies at least one different function associated with changes in the independent variable. With the second type of inference, activity of the same brain region(s) under two conditions implies a common function, possibly not predicted a priori. I illustrate these inferences with imaging studies of recognition memory, short-term memory, and repetition priming. I then consider in greater detail what is meant by a “systematic” function-structure mapping and argue that, particularly for structure-to-function induction, this entails a one-to-one mapping between functional and structural units, although the structural unit may be a network of interacting regions and care must be taken over the appropriate level of functional/structural abstraction. Nonetheless, the assumption of a systematic function-structure mapping is a “working hypothesis” that, in common with other scientific fields, cannot be proved on independent grounds and is probably best evaluated by the success of the enterprise as a whole. I also consider statistical issues such as the definition of a qualitative difference and methodological issues such as the relationship between imaging and behavioural data. I finish by reviewing various objections to neuroimaging, including neophrenology, functionalism, and equipotentiality, and by observing some criticisms of current practice in the imaging literature.