Social categorization and fit detection under cognitive load: efficient or effortful?

Participants perceived a discussion between members of two social categories in a name‐matching paradigm. Discussions either exhibited inter‐category fit, defined as a covariation of category membership and the category members' attitude positions, or not. Orthogonally, there was cognitive load at encoding, load at retrieval, or no concurrent load. Memory for the statements and memory for the speaker of a statement were affected by load with little evidence for fit effects. Conversely, category memory, reconstructive category guessing and perceived fit were affected by inter‐category fit with little evidence for load effects. The results suggest that category activation is sensitive to inter‐category fit and that fit detection is robust against moderate amounts of cognitive load. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Accounting for cognitive aging: context processing, inhibition or processing speed?

Age-related deficits in context processing were examined in relationship to two predominant theories of cognitive aging (the Inhibitory Deficit and Processing Speed Models). Older and younger adults completed a measure of context processing (AX Continuous Performance Test (CPT) task) as well as a computerized battery of inhibitory tasks: Stroop, garden path sentences, go no-go, and the stop-signal paradigm. Participants also completed a simple processing speed task. After controlling for baseline differences in processing speed, age effects were detected on the AX-CPT. Smaller, but significant age effects were noted on the Stroop and stop-signal tasks, but no significant age effects were found on the garden path sentence and go no-go tasks. Intertask correlations were weak, providing little evidence for a homogenous or uniform construct of inhibition. The sensitivity of the AX-CPT to cognitive aging is discussed in the context of existing theories of cognitive aging. The authors suggest that deficits in context processing and utilization may underlie cognitive aging phenomena.     

Autism: cognitive deficit or cognitive style?

Autism is a developmental disorder characterized by impaired social and communicative development, and restricted interests and activities. This article will argue that we can discover more about developmental disorders such as autism through demonstrations of task success than through examples of task failure. Even in exploring and explaining what people with autism find difficult, such as social interaction, demonstration of competence on contrasting tasks has been crucial to defining the nature of the specific deficit. Deficit accounts of autism cannot explain, however, the assets seen in this disorder; for example, savant skills in maths, music and drawing, and islets of ability in visuospatial tests and rote memory. An alternative account, reviewed here, suggests that autism is characterized by a cognitive style biased towards local rather than global information processing – termed ‘weak central coherence’. Evidence that weak coherence might also characterize the relatives of people with autism, and form part of the extended phenotype of this largely genetic disorder, is discussed. This review concludes by considering some outstanding questions concerning the specific cognitive mechanism for coherence and the neural basis of individual differences in this aspect of information processing.     

Biased cognitive operations in anxiety: artefact, processing priorities or attentional search?

It has been shown that, under certain circumstances, anxiety is associated with a processing bias favouring threatening information. To explain why this bias is apparent only on certain cognitive tasks, it has recently been proposed that the bias operates only when there is competition for processing resources. The present study sought to replicate previous evidence for the 'competition' hypothesis, while taking into account a potential confounding factor of word categorization in the stimulus materials. Anxious patients and normal controls were compared on their lexical decision times for threatening, categorized neutral and uncategorized neutral words that were presented either alone or accompanied by irrelevant nonword stimuli (i.e. absence vs presence of competition). The results were only partially consistent with previous findings and highlighted the importance of considering separately the effects of word valence and word categorization. When the latter was taken into account, the results indicated that an anxiety-related bias was only evident when there was competition for processing resources and when the information was presented outside the focus of Ss' attention. A modified version of the competition hypothesis was proposed in the light of these results and previous research into attentional biases in anxiety.     

Preattentive processing or prefocal processing?

The concept of preattentive processing is analyzed and alternative views of it are presented. A basic question is whether processing required for preattentive input selection is qualitatively different from post-selection processing. In order to study this, subjects were presented in one set of conditions with one stimulus at either of two locations, and in another set of conditions, simultaneously with two stimuli. The stimuli could be green or red, or large or small. Subjects were asked to indicate the location (or the color, or the size) of the single stimulus in the single-stimulus conditions, or of a predesignated stimulus (say, the red one) in the dual-stimulus conditions. Responses were generally slower in the dual-stimulus conditions. The increases in reaction time were accounted for by the times it takes to process for response selection the properties by which the target stimulus could be selected, as indicated by the results of two control conditions. The results as well as some other considerations do not support the view that preattentive processing is necessarily of a type that qualitatively differs from post-selection processing.     

Do dichotic listening procedures measure lateralization of information processing or retrieval strategy?

The data from two dichotic studies, both of which evaluated spontaneously generated response strategies under free recall and one of which also manipulated retrieval strategy by instruction, supported a conception that what dichotic procedures mostly measure are response strategies—mobile and readily deployed without loss of mnemonic capability. Consequently, competitional methods which are heavily influenced by output factors appear to be unreliable as a means of evaluating input processing dominance.     

Biased cognitive operations in anxiety: Accessibility of information or assignment of processing priorities?

There is considerable evidence that anxiety is associated with a cognitive bias favouring the processing of threat-related information. Bower's (1981) network model attributes this bias to the enhanced availability of mood congruent information from memory. However, certain experimental tasks do not reveal such a bias, when this effect is strongly predicted by the model. We note that all tasks which have demonstrated such mood congruent processing effects in anxious subjects share the requirement that these subjects must assign priorities to simultaneously available, and differentially valenced, alternative processing options. This feature has been consistently lacking in those paradigms we have found insensitive to the influence of anxiety. It is therefore suggested that anxiety is associated with the assignment of high processing priorities to threat-related options, rather than with the facilitated availability of threat-related information from memory. This proposal was experimentally tested using a lexical decision task, which is sensitive to the accessibility of information from memory, under conditions which either do or do not introduce the requirement to assign priorities to alternative processing options. The results indicate that the facilitated processing of threat related stimulus words, shown by generalised anxiety patients, does indeed appear to reflect a bias in the assignment of processing priorities, rather than the enhanced availability of this information from memory.     

Developmental differences in recall: Encoding or retrieval?

First- and fifth-grade children and college adults (ages 6, 10, and 18 years, respectively) were presented a 30-item set of pictures to recall in a 4-trial study-test procedure. The stimuli were presented in one of three ways (encoding condition): randomly, blocked (according to categories), or sort (the subject was given the stimuli in random order and asked to sort them into categories). Recall was either free, cued, or constrained (retrieval condition). Results indicated that maximum adult recall was a function of the interaction of encoding and retrieval conditions, and that first- and fifth-grader's recall was influenced by retrieval conditions but not by encoding conditions. The blocked and sort encoding conditions did result in increased clustering relative to random encoding at all three ages, however. It was concluded that encoding conditions influence recall only as they effect the use of retrieval strategies.     

Recognition vs. recall: Storage or retrieval differences?

Differences between recognition and recall performance may be due to differences in storage processes, differences in retrieval processes, or some combination of both. An attempt was made to determine which process was critical by withholding information, at the time of study of a stimulus-response pair, about how that item was to be tested on its next presentation. It was found that differences between recognition and recall did not depend upon whether or not the subject knew, at time of study, the mode of test to be employed. These results were interpreted as support for the assertion that, in this particular task, differences in retrieval processes were sufficient to account for differences in recognition and recall. It was found that both the direction and magnitude of the recognition-recall difference depended upon the guessing correction employed.     

The face typicality-recognizability relationship: Encoding or retrieval locus?

Using a crossover recognition memory testing paradigm, we tested whether the effects on face recognition of the memorability component of face typicality (Vokey & Read, 1992, 1995) are due primarily to the encoding process occurring during study or to the retrieval process occurring at test. At study, faces were either veridical in form or at moderate (Experiment 1) or extreme (Experiment 2) levels of caricature. The variable of degree of facial caricature at study was crossed with the degree of caricature at test. The primary contribution of increased memorability to increased hit rate was through increased distinctiveness at study. Increased distinctiveness at test contributed to substantial reductions in the false alarm rate, too. Signal detection analyses confirmed that the mirror effects obtained were primarily stimulus/memory-based, rather than decision-based. Contrary to the conclusion of Vokey and Read (1992), we found that increments in face memorability produced increments in face recognition that were due at least as much to enhanced encoding of studied faces as they were to increased rejection of distractor faces.     

Ecological rationality or nested sets? Individual differences in cognitive processing predict Bayesian reasoning

The presentation of a Bayesian inference problem in terms of natural frequencies rather than probabilities has been shown to enhance performance. The effect of individual differences in cognitive processing on Bayesian reasoning has rarely been studied, despite enabling us to test process-oriented variants of the two main accounts of the facilitative effect of natural frequencies: The ecological rationality account (ERA), which postulates an evolutionarily shaped ease of natural frequency automatic processing, and the nested sets account (NSA), which posits analytical processing of nested sets. In two experiments, we found that cognitive reflection abilities predicted normative performance equally well in tasks featuring whole and arbitrarily parsed objects (Experiment 1) and that cognitive abilities and thinking dispositions (analytical vs. intuitive) predicted performance with single-event probabilities, as well as natural frequencies (Experiment 2). Since these individual differences indicate that analytical processing improves Bayesian reasoning, our findings provide stronger support for the NSA than for the ERA.     

How do spatial representations enhance cognitive numerical processing?

Several philosophical theories attempt to explain how actions performed in the world enhance cognitive processing: internalism, active externalism, and cognitive integration. The aim of this paper is to examine whether the use of spatial representations in arithmetic can shed light on this debate. Relying on philosophical analysis, on a discussion of empirical work in the cognitive neuroscience of number, and on a historical case study, I will show that spatial representations of number indicate an integration between internal and external cognitive processes.     

How do spatial representations enhance cognitive numerical processing?

Several philosophical theories attempt to explain how actions performed in the world enhance cognitive processing: internalism, active externalism, and cognitive integration. The aim of this paper is to examine whether the use of spatial representations in arithmetic can shed light on this debate. Relying on philosophical analysis, on a discussion of empirical work in the cognitive neuroscience of number, and on a historical case study, I will show that spatial representations of number indicate an integration between internal and external cognitive processes.     

The plausibility effect: Lexical priming or sentential processing?

Five experiments are reported that investigated whether the plausibility effect is caused by lexical priming resulting from the higher proportion of related words in plausible than in implausible sentences. In Experiment 1, a plausibility effect was demonstrated that was entirely attributable to the way in which lexical items were combined rather than to the properties of individual lexical items. In Experiment 2, the content words from the sentences used in Experiment 1 were shown to produce a similar reaction-time difference in a task in which syntactic processing was disrupted, supporting a lexical priming explanation of the plausibility effect. However, Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrated that, in another task less prone to task-specific strategies but sensitive to plausibility, the disruption of syntactic processing eliminated the effect. In Experiment 5, it was shown that when lexical priming was eliminated, a plausibility effect still occurred. Thus, two separate lines of evidence suggested that the plausibility effect cannot be fully explained in terms of lexical priming.     

Selective target processing: perceptual load or distractor salience?

Perceptual load theory (Lavie, 1995) states that participants cannot engage in focused attention when shown displays containing a low perceptual load, because attentional resources are not exhausted, whereas in high-load displays attention is always focused, because attentional resources are exhausted. An alternative "salience" hypothesis holds that the salience of distractors and not perceptual load per se determines selective attention. Three experiments were conducted to investigate the influence that target and distractor onsets and offsets have on selective processing in a standard interference task. Perceptual load theory predicts that, regardless of target or distractor presentation (onset or offset), interference from ignored distractors should occur in low-load displays only. In contrast, the salience hypothesis predicts that interference should occur when the distractor appears as an onset and would occur for distractor offsets only when the target was also an offset. Interference may even occur in highload displays if the distractor is more salient. The results supported the salience hypothesis.