Categorization,attitude and memory for the source of attitude statements

In a study of factors influencing recognition-memory for the sources of attitude statements, a final sample of 107 subjects, aged 15–16, first rated their agreement with 24 statements concerning drug-use, 12 of which were attributed to one, and 12 to another, fictitiously named newspaper. Later, the statements were re shown to subjects with half the names altered, and subjects had to indicate which names were correct (i.e., unaltered). Discrimination sensitivity was very significantly higher in a condition where the initial relationship between the sources and the statements was systematic, so that the 12 most pro-drug statements were attributed to one newspaper and the 12 most anti-drug statements to the other, than in two conditions where the initial relationship was random, in which discrimination was at chance level. In the first of these conditions, subjects were also more likely to claim that the attributed source was correct if they had previously agreed with the statement. overall, subjects were more accurate in discriminating correct and incorrect sources for statements to which they had previously given a more moderate, or a more negative response on the agreement scale.     

Initial attitude,source credibility,and involvement as factors in persuasion

Source credibility was manipulated in factorial combination with the measured variables of initial attitude, issue involvement, and sex, using Japanese university students as subjects. A significant credibility × initial attitude interaction replicated previous findings and was attributed to disparagement of the less credible of two communicators by subjects whose initial attitudes were extremely discrepant from the position advocated. The significant involvement × initial attitude interaction reflected the greater resistance of highly involved subjects to persuasion under extreme rather than under moderate communicator-recipient discrepancy.     

Self-esteem, attitude similarity, and attraction

Subjects evaluated three stimulus persons on several rating scales who were either 10%, 50%, or 90% similar to themselves in attitudes Subjects were divided into low, moderate, and high self-esteem groups on the basis of an earlier Q sort The results showed a strong positive relation between perceived similarity and positive attribution for each of the dependent variables, including liking, sophisticated, intelligent, sincere, happy, and a social distance scale A negative relation was obtained for two undesirable traits, arrogant and cynical Self-esteem interacted with similarity on several of the measures The difference between self-esteem groups was largely restricted to highly dissimilar stimulus persons Moderate esteem subjects were more favorable toward dissimilar persons than either of the other two groups, and the high and low groups tended to resemble each other more than either group resembled the moderate esteem group These results were discussed in terms of the relation between self-esteem and adjustment, and in terms of McGuire's (1968) theory that predicts a nonmonotonic relation between self-esteem and attitudes.     

Narcissism,confidence, and risk attitude

The present research addresses whether narcissists are more overconfident than others and whether this overconfidence leads to deficits in decision making. In Study 1, narcissism predicted overconfidence. This was attributable to narcissists' greater confidence despite no greater accuracy. In Study 2, participants were offered fair bets on their answers. Narcissists lost significantly more points in this betting task than non‐narcissists, due both to their greater overconfidence and greater willingness to bet. Finally, in Study 3, narcissists' predictions of future performance were based on performance expectations rather than actual performance. This research extends the literature on betting on knowledge to the important personality dimension of narcissism. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Matching the message source to attitude functions: Implications for biased processing

A study was conducted to examine the hypothesis that matching (vs. mismatching) the source of a persuasive message to the functional basis of recipients’ attitudes may lead to positively biased processing. Under conditions conducive to effortful processing, high and low self-monitors were presented with a persuasive message ascribed to a source that either matched or mismatched the functional basis of their attitudes (i.e., an expert source for low self-monitors and an attractive source for high self-monitors). The message content was either unambiguous strong, unambiguous weak, or ambiguous. As predicted, given an ambiguous message biased processing led to more agreement when the source matched (vs. mismatched) attitude functions. In contrast, an unambiguous strong message led to more agreement than an unambiguous weak message regardless of source matching (unbiased processing). Results are discussed with respect to the role of the activation and use of heuristics in biased processing.     

Unpacking attitude certainty: attitude clarity and attitude correctness

Attitude certainty has been the subject of considerable attention in the attitudes and persuasion literature. The present research identifies 2 aspects of attitude certainty and provides evidence for the distinctness of the constructs. Specifically, it is proposed that attitude certainty can be conceptualized, and empirically separated, in terms of attitude clarity (the subjective sense that one knows what one's attitude is) and attitude correctness (the subjective sense that one's attitude is correct or valid). Experiment 1 uses factor analysis and correlational data to provide evidence for viewing attitude clarity and attitude correctness as separate constructs. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate that attitude clarity and attitude correctness can have distinct antecedents (repeated expression and consensus feedback, respectively). Experiment 4 reveals that these constructs each play an independent role in persuasion and resistance situations. As clarity and correctness increase, attitudes become more resistant to counterattitudinal persuasive messages. These findings are discussed in relation to the existing attitude strength literature.     

Salience of initial attitude,magnitude of incentive,and attitude change in a forced compliance paradigm

To examine the application of interpersonal simulation findings to cognitive dissonance and incentive theories of attitude change in the forced compliance paradigm, 60 Ss were paid 50 cents or $2.50 to write counterattitudinal essays with salient or nonsalient initial attitudes. Findings showed that the larger incentive yielded greater change for salient pretest attitudes but that the smaller incentive led to more change of nonsalient pretest attitudes. Measures of error in attitude recall and a correlational analysis between pretest, posttest, and recalled attitudes were also consistent with Bem's (1967) hypothesis of isomorphism between the attributions of Ss and observers. It is proposed that remaining simulation data reported in the cognitive dissonance/self-perception controversy may identify additional parameters of attitude changes in forced compliance experiments.     

Persistence of attitude change and attitude–behavior correspondence based on extensive processing of source information

A three‐phase longitudinal study (spread over a month's time) was carried out to investigate attitude's persistence and linkage to behavior as it may be affected by the processing of information about the communication source. The following three independent variables were manipulated: (i) contents of the source of information (implying the communicator to be expert or inexpert on the topic of the communication); (ii) length of the source information (brief versus lengthy); and (iii) message recipients' involvement in the issue at hand (high versus low). Replicating prior research when the source information was brief, it exerted greater persuasive impact under low versus high involvement, and when it was lengthy, it exerted greater persuasive impact under high versus low involvement. Of greater importance, the newly acquired attitudes were more persistent and were linked more strongly to actual behavior when the source information was lengthy (versus brief) provided the recipients had high (versus low) involvement in the issue. These findings were interpreted to mean that just like with the message/issue information in prior research, when processed extensively, source information, too, may contribute to the formation of persistent and behavior‐driving attitudes. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.