Tooley on causation and probabilities

In this paper, I argue that there is an inconsistency between two presentist doctrines: that of ontological symmetry and asymmetry of fixity. The former refers to the presentist belief that the past and future are equally unreal. The latter refers to the A-Theoretic intuition that the past is closed or actual, and the future is open or potential. My position in this paper is that the presentist is unable to account for the temporal asymmetry that is so fundamentally a part of her theory. In Section I, I briefly outline a recent defence of presentism due to Craig, and argue that a flaw in this defence highlights the tension between the presentist's doctrines of ontological symmetry and asymmetry of fixity. In Section II, I undertake an investigation, on the presentist's behalf, in order to determine whether she is capable of reconciling these two doctrines. In the course of the investigation, I consider different asymmetries, other than that of ontology, which might be said fundamentally to constitute temporal asymmetry, and the asymmetry of fixity in particular. In Section III, I also consider whether the presentist is able to avail herself of some of the standard B-Theoretic accounts of the asymmetry of fixity, and argue that she cannot. Finally, I conclude that temporal asymmetry cannot be accounted for (or explained) other than through the postulation of an ontological asymmetry.     

Autonomy and the Moral Symmetry Principle: Reply to Frowe and Tooley

Helen Frowe has recently objected to Michael Tooley’s famous Moral Symmetry Principle, which is meant to show that in themselves killing and letting die are morally equivalent. I argue that her objection is not compelling but a more compelling objection is available. Specifically, Tooley’s rebuttal of a proposed counter-example to his Moral Symmetry Principle has two problematic implications. First, it undercuts the very principle itself. If we reject the proposed counter-example, then any instance of the Moral Symmetry Principle will actually demonstrate the moral in-equivalence of killing and letting die. Second, it commits us to the view, which Tooley wishes to avoid, that we are just as obligated to refrain from doing wrong as we are to prevent others from doing the same. I conclude with a brief discussion of a more general concern regarding Tooley’s basic strategy. My focus here is quite narrow. My claims, if plausible, only show that the Moral Symmetry Principle is unsound and thus cannot serve as a basis for the view that killing and letting die are morally equivalent.     

Forbidding Nasty Knowledge: On the Use of Ill–gotten Information

Some knowledge — most infamously, the Nazi experiments on human subjects — has been acquired by means which cannot be morally condoned however beneficial the knowledge may be. Yet, given that we now have such knowledge, it seems morally questionable to forbid its use where we know it can benefit us. Although a strong utilitarian case exists for deploying such information and although any pragmatic, humane person would use it where it could improve a situation, residual moral qualms remain which are neither the expression of sentimentality nor squeamishness. Given the evil source of the knowledge, can we avoid the charge that we are tied to the evil, and even respectful of the experimenters, by wilfully benefiting from the work? I explore a few arguments meant to remove the moral qualms and show them all to be wanting. However, because we in fact regularly and routinely benefit in countless ways from many systematic evils of the distant past without qualms, we seem to be inconsistently selective when it concerns certain evils. This inconsistency can be explained, if not justified, by appeal to a principle of decent delay which allows us after a time to ignore the origins of our present benefits and so make moral fadeout acceptable. This principle itself is grounded in our natural and increasing forgetfulness of events as they recede in time, an adaptive mechanism which allows us both to carry on our lives in relative decency and yet to maintain a fitting sensitivity to newer, closer evils which affect more immediately our relations with others and our sense of moral integrity.     

Mind Reading Skills and Empathy: Evidence for Nice and Nasty ToM Behaviours in School-Aged Children

We investigated the social use of theory of mind in school-aged children. The expressions Nice Theory of Mind and Nasty Theory of Mind are used to differentiate behaviours requiring a prosocial use and an antisocial use of ToM abilities respectively. Our goals was to investigate whether and how mind reading abilities and empathy affect nice and nasty ToM behaviours. One hundred and ninety-seven children who were fourth and fifth graders took part in this study. Participants were administered stories that assessed cognitive, affective or moral mental state reasoning abilities and they also completed a self-report measure of empathy. Teachers’ rating on children’s prosocial and antisocial behaviours that underpin ToM abilities led us to identify nice and nasty ToM behaviours. We found that children who engage in nasty ToM behaviour showed good abilities to understand others’ thoughts and beliefs. However, children with nice ToM behaviour showed more moral and emotional sensitivity as compared to children who engage in nasty ToM behaviour. Furthermore, the hot component of empathy is stronger in fostering prosocial behaviours and inhibiting antisocial acts than cognitive component.     

Imprecise lexical superiority and the (slightly less) Repugnant Conclusion

Philosophical Studies - Recently, Derek Parfit has offered a novel solution to the “Repugnant Conclusion” that compared with the existence of many people whose quality of life would be...     

Conclusion: Construction sites at the juncture of religion and gender

The articles in this special issue offer fresh definitions of ‘new’ and ‘old’, of ‘local’ and ‘world’ religions. The themes of purity, danger and fundamentalism; female leadership, mediumship, self-sexism; and natalism and nationalism are discussed. This conclusion stresses the ‘folk’ sources of ‘mainstream’ religions, and focuses on the way the articles show women to be at the juncture of changing values concerning religion and gender, reform and fundamentalism.     

关于规范超声影像技术诊断结论的思考

为了提高超声诊断技术的临床价值,对目前超声诊断的地位、诊断结论中存在的不规范问题、如何进行规范和改进等进行分析,提出自己的观点和体会,为今后更进一步规范超声诊断的结论提供参考.     

关于规范超声影像技术诊断结论的思考

为了提高超声诊断技术的临床价值,对目前超声诊断的地位、诊断结论中存在的不规范问题、如何进行规范和改进等进行分析,提出自己的观点和体会,为今后更进一步规范超声诊断的结论提供参考。     

Michael Smith and the rationality of immoral action

Although it goes against a widespread significant misunderstanding of his view, Michael Smith is one of the very few moral philosophers who explicitly wants to allow for the commonsense claim that, while morally required action is always favored by some reason, selfish and immoral action can also be rationally permissible. One point of this paper is to make it clear that this is indeed Smith’s view. It is a further point to show that his way of accommodating this claim is inconsistent with his well-known “practicality requirement” on moral judgments: the thesis that any rational person will always have at least some motivation to do what she judges to be right. The general conclusion is that no view that, like Smith’s, associates the normative strength of a reason with the motivational strength of an ideal desire will allow for the wide range of rational permissibility that Smith wants to capture. Many thanks to Michael Smith for his friendly and helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and for permission to make a very strong and explicit claim on his behalf.     

Michael Hauskeller: Sex and the Posthuman Condition

Science and Engineering Ethics - This new book from Michael Hauskeller explores the currently marketed or projected sex/love products that exhibit some trait of so-called...