Developing/development cyborgs

The paper takes as its starting point Donna Haraway’s suggestion, “The actors are cyborg, nature is coyote, and the geography is elsewhere”. It discusses first the understanding of the cyborg promoted by Haraway as illustrating an ontological non-humanist disposition, rather than a periodizing claim. The second part of the paper examines some instances of low-tech cyborg identities, which have emerged in developing countries (elsewhere) as a consequence of development initiatives. The paper argues that the quite literal attempts to develop cyborgs in such countries gives rise to developments not foreseen or controllable by the development industries. If cyborg identities are developing and minds and bodies shaped in the frictions between culture, technology, economy, and development projects and activities then what are the implications for cognitive studies. In the final part of the paper this question is considered and it is suggested that cognitive studies would do well to expand their analytical foci to take into account cyborg bodies and minds found “elsewhere”.

The Mind and the Machine. On the Conceptual and Moral Implications of Brain-Machine Interaction

Brain-machine interfaces are a growing field of research and application. The increasing possibilities to connect the human brain to electronic devices and computer software can be put to use in medicine, the military, and entertainment. Concrete technologies include cochlear implants, Deep Brain Stimulation, neurofeedback and neuroprosthesis. The expectations for the near and further future are high, though it is difficult to separate hope from hype. The focus in this paper is on the effects that these new technologies may have on our ‘symbolic order’—on the ways in which popular categories and concepts may change or be reinterpreted. First, the blurring distinction between man and machine and the idea of the cyborg are discussed. It is argued that the morally relevant difference is that between persons and non-persons, which does not necessarily coincide with the distinction between man and machine. The concept of the person remains useful. It may, however, become more difficult to assess the limits of the human body. Next, the distinction between body and mind is discussed. The mind is increasingly seen as a function of the brain, and thus understood in bodily and mechanical terms. This raises questions concerning concepts of free will and moral responsibility that may have far reaching consequences in the field of law, where some have argued for a revision of our criminal justice system, from retributivist to consequentialist. Even without such a (unlikely and unwarranted) revision occurring, brain-machine interactions raise many interesting questions regarding distribution and attribution of responsibility.     

Connectionist representation,semantic compositionality,and the instability of concept structure

Summary In the present paper connectionist approaches to the problem of internal representation and the nature of concepts are discussed. In the first part the concept of representation that underlies connectionist modeling is made explicit. It is argued that the connectionist view of representation relies on a correlational theory of semantic content- i.e., the covariation between internal and external states is taken as the basis for ascribing meaning to internal states. The problems and virtues of such a correlational approach to internal representation are addressed. The second part of the paper is concerned with whether connectionism is capable of accounting for the apparent productivity and systematicity of language and thought. There is an evaluation of the recent arguments of Fodor and Pylyshyn, who claim that systematicity can only be explained if one conceives of mental representations as structured symbols composed of context-free constituents. There is a review of empirical evidence that strongly suggests that concepts are not fixed memory structures and that the meaning of constituent symbols varies, depending on the context in which they are embedded. On the basis of this review it is concluded that the meaning of a complex expression is not computed from the context-free meanings of the constituents, and that strong compositionality, as endorsed by Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988), seems implausible as a process theory for the comprehension of complex concepts. Instead, the hypothesis is endorsed that constraint satisfaction in distributed connectionist networks may allow for an alternative account of weak compositionality compatible with the context sensitivity of meaning. In the final section, it is argued that neither mere implementation of a language of thought in connectionist networks nor radical elimination of symbol systems seems to be a fruitful research strategy, but that it might be more useful to discuss how connectionist systems can develop the capacity to use external symbol systems like language or logic without instantiating symbol systems themselves.     

Neuroscience and nanotechnologies in Japan--beyond the hope and hype of converging technologies

Nanotechnologies are often said to be "converging" with other technologies like biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science. And so-called "NBIC convergence" is thought to enable "enhancement" of human performance. First, I classify various kinds of enhancement. Second, I focus on the "cybernetic enhancement," to which nanotechnologies are supposed to contribute, and analyze the connection and integration of humans with machines, which could lead to the cyborgization of human beings. Third, I examine the portrayal of robot/cyborg technology in Japanese popular media, point out the tendency to empathy or ensoulment concerning robots/cyborgs, and raise the question of "ethical issues of ethical enhancement." Fourth, I compare nanotechnologies with neurotechnology and criticize the hype of "converging technologies."     

Professional Politics and the Concepts of Family Therapy, Family Consultation, and Systems Consultation

At a time when an increasing number of professionals are calling themselves "family therapists," many teachers and theorists in this field are troubled that the term "family therapy" no longer adequately characterizes the concepts or activities of the field. Recently, clinical, political, and economic circumstances have emerged that suggest the need for alternatives to the role of "family therapist." By adding the roles of family consultant and systems consultant, we can open up new options for ourselves and our clients. During initial contacts with families, agencies, and other professionals, we can heighten our therapeutic potential by proceeding with consultative stocktaking, not starting with therapy. Family consultation also can assist in redirecting therapy when a new problem or an impasse develops, in focusing on competency rather than on pathology, and in engaging constructively with families that have a physically or mentally ill member.     

Imaging God: Cyborgs, Brain‐Machine Interfaces, and a More Human Future

Abstract:  Recent developments in the neurosciences have made possible the advent of brain‐machine interfaces, potentially altering our understanding of our relationship with technology and even the very meaning of what it is to be human. This article briefly examines some of the recent developments in neuroengineering and considers the ethical implications. Working from Jesus' miracles as well as from a dynamic understanding of the image of God, I argue that the categories of healing and transformation should be employed in thinking through the implications of brain‐machine interfaces specifically and neuroengineering generally. Although the vocabulary of the cyborg may represent the newfound freedom that this technology can bring, the category of the face may serve as a reminder of the boundedness of human nature.     

Eschatological perspectives on aging

Focus is on the reality of aging as the concrete expression of our common human experience of ourselves as temporal beings. The analysis appeals to resources from a philosophical interpretation of temporality and a Christian theological interpretation of the central symbols of eschatology. Both resources provide positive approaches and clarifications of that aging process. Three eschatological symbol systems are noted: the traditional (past-orientation); the prophetic (present-orientation) and the apocalyptic (future-orientation). Each is analyzed as articulating a distinct authentic possibility for a person or a culture involved in the aging process. Symbols help orientate us in a positive way toward the process of aging.     

Cyborgs in the Everyday: Masculinity and Biosensing Prostate Cancer

Abstract

An in vivo biosensor is a technology in development that will assess the biological activity of cancers to individualise external beam radiotherapy. Inserting such technology into the human body creates cybernetic organisms; a cyborg that is a human–machine hybrid. There is a gap in knowledge relating to patient willingness to allow automated technology to be embedded and to become cyborg. There is little agreement around what makes a cyborg and less understanding of the variation in the cyborgisation process. Understanding the viewpoint of possible beneficiaries addresses such gaps. There are currently three versions of ‘cyborg’ in the literature (i) a critical feminist STS concept to destabilise power inherent in dualisms, (ii) an extreme version of the human/machine in science-fiction that emphasises the ‘man’ in human and (iii) a prediction of internal physiological adaptation required for future space exploration. Interview study findings with 12 men in remission from prostate cancer show a fourth version can be used to describe current and future sub-groups of the population; ‘everyday cyborgs'. For the everyday cyborg the masculine cyborg status found in the fictionalised human–machine related to issues of control of the cancer. This was preferred to the felt stigmatisation of being a ‘leaker and bleeder’. The willingness to become cyborg was matched with a having to get used to the everyday cyborg's technological adaptations and risks. It is crucial to explore the everyday cyborg's sometimes ambivalent viewpoint. The everyday cyborg thus adds the dimension of participant voice currently missing in existing cyborg literatures and imaginations.     

Am I a Cyborg? Are You?

Philosophia - The term “cyborg” is being used in a surprising variety of ways. Some authors argue that the human being as such is—and has always been—a cyborg (Clark,...     

THE EMPATHIC EMOTIONS AND SELF-LOVE IN BISHOP JOSEPH BUTLER AND THE NEUROSCIENCES

In Joseph Butler, we have an account of human beings as moral beings that is, as this essay demonstrates, being supported by the recently emerging findings of the neurosciences. This applies particularly to Butler's portrayal of our empathic emotions. Butler discovered their moral significance for motivating and guiding moral decisions and actions before the neurosciences did. Butler has, in essence, added a sixth sense to our five senses: this is the moral sense by means of which we perceive what we ought or ought not do. The moral sense yields relatively reliable moral perceptions when we love our neighbors as ourselves, and when our love for ourselves is genuine. Accurate moral perceptions will be thwarted by self-deceit—that is, by a self-partiality devoid of neighbor love, a condition that thwarts genuine self-love. This essay explores the parallels between Butler's understanding of self-deceit and Robert J. Lifton's understanding of "doubling."     

A moratorium on cyborgs: Computation,cognition, and commerce

By examining the contingent alliance that has emerged between the computational theory of mind and cyborg theory, we discern some questionable ways in which the literalization of technological metaphors and the over-extension of the “computational” have functioned, not only to influence conceptions of cognition, but also by becoming normative perspectives on how minds and bodies should be transformed, such that they can capitalize on technology’s capacity to enhance cognition and thus amend our sense of what it is to be “human”. We consider “a moratorium on cyborg discourse” as a way of focusing the conceptual and social–political problems posed by this alliance.     

Donna Haraway's Cyborg Touching (Up/On) Luce Irigaray's Ethics and the Interval Between: Poethics as Embodied Writing

In this article, I argue that Donna Haraway's figure of the cyborg needs to be reassessed and extricated from the many misunderstandings that surround it. First, I suggest that we consider her cyborg as an ethical concept. I propose that her cyborg can be productively placed within the ethical framework developed by Luce Irigaray, especially in relationship to her concept of the “interval between.” Second, I consider how Haraway's “cyborg writing” can be understood as embodied ethical writing, that is, as a contemporary écriture feminine. I believe that this cyborgian “writing the body” offers us a way of both creating and understanding texts that think through ethics, bodies, aesthetics, and politics together as part of a vital and relevant contemporary feminist ethics of embodiment. I employ the term “poethics” as a useful way to describe such a practice.     

Human, transhuman, posthuman. Representations of the body between incompleteness and enhancement

"Posthuman" is often used to indicate some position, practice, perspective and vision concerning the future of human beings closely related to the use of contemporary technologies. This contribution would like to analyze some conceptions of the notion of posthuman and to present it as a possible form of "non-anthropocentric" thought which considers technological changes as non-human realities strictly involved in the construction and the definition of what constitutes a human being (and his body) and its predicates. Contrary to anthropocentrism which has characterized Western thought from humanism up to the extreme outcomes of transhumanism, non-anthropocentric posthumanism shows how the human being, who has always been the product of hybridization with the non-human (environment, animals and techniques), is built not only by his own strength but always through his partnership and his environment. The idea of enhancement of the body by technology to reach another stage of human evolution is one of the constant elements characterizing transhumanism. Posthumanism suggests no longer considering the interface with technology as an ergonomic relationship with an external tool that just extends the human body, but as a hybrid, or interpenetration that questions the separation of the body and its centrality. In this perspective, the question is not of simply establishing which is a good use of a technology but, every time, of redefining ourselves in our perspectives and our predicates with regard to what a technology allows and opens up to us.     

The frozen cyborg: A reply to Selinger and Engström

Selinger and Engstrom, A moratorium on cyborgs: Computation, cognition and commerce, 2008 (this issue) urge upon us a moratorium on ‘cyborg discourse’. But the argument underestimates the richness and complexity of our ongoing communal explorations. It leans on a somewhat outdated version of the machine metaphor (exemplified perhaps by a frozen 1970’s Cyborg). The modern cyborg, informed by an evolving computational model of mind, can play a positive role in the critical discussions that Selinger and Engstrom seek.     

Reverence and Cheng-Zhu Ecology

The Cheng-Zhu 程朱 school of Confucianism congealed from the larger Learning of the Way school in the 11th and 12th centuries. In contrast to Buddhist conceptions of human nature, Cheng-Zhu advocates claimed an understanding that gave a significant role to the natural world. Addressing the ecology of the human organism in its relationship with the natural environment revealed a complex moral psychology that characterized human beings. Self-cultivation was indispensable for connecting to our inborn nature that revealed no separation between ourselves and nature. Cultivating the mental state of maintaining reverence (chi jing 持敬) was an indispensable form of self-cultivation. This mental state initially expressed itself in courteous and caring behavior that could be taught to the young; but, when more highly developed, reverent attention was disciplined, focused thinking that revealed the mind of the Way. A new single-mindedness might then be maintained as the master of one’s actions. The morally perfected states of being called humaneness and sagehood confirmed that one was in touch with one’s inborn connection to nature.     

A critical examination of existential feeling

Matthew Ratcliffe (2008, 2015) has argued that existential feelings form a distinct class of bodily and non-conceptual feelings that pre-intentionally structure our intentional experience of others, the world, and ourselves. In this article, I will identify and discuss three interrelated areas of concern for Ratcliffe’s theory of existential feelings. First, the distinct senses in which existential feelings are felt as background bodily feelings and as spaces of possibility calls for further clarification. Second, the nature of the suggested bi-directional relationship between existential feelings and intentional experience remains ambiguous. Third, viewed in light of existential guilt, the categorically non-conceptual nature of existential feelings may not be as definite as presumed. The aim of the article is to draw critical attention to aspects of the theory that would benefit from further development, and therefore, to advance the ongoing discussion about existential feelings.     

Technological Presence: Actuality and Potentiality in Subject Constitution

Technical mediation shapes our experience of the world, but it also shapes our experience of ourselves. In this paper, I argue that in order to understand the latter aspect of technical mediation, we need to expand on notions of technical mediation that focuses on actual use, and bring in possible use as well. The concept of technical mediation must therefore be grounded in a more general concept of technological presence. This concept indicates that technology harbours both actuality and potentiality, the latter denoting that technologies offer possible actions, through which we realise specific actions, and, more importantly, realise ourselves; it is through the technological presence in our lifeworld we are able to recognise our own possibilities to be in and act in the lifeworld. The technologically revealed possibilities enable the subject to be constituted in a temporal forward-directedness, so that technological potentiality becomes co-constitutive of the subjects that we are and may become.     

Understanding Real and Fictional Persons: Narrative Negotiations Seen Through Cognitive Poetics

Narrative theories of personal identity have traditionally taken literary characters as models to better understand how our identities are constituted through the narratives of our lives. However, there have been several recent criticisms of these comparisons, showing that philosophers of personal identity paid no attention to the nature of literary characters, and consequently, these philosopher’s comparisons were under-motivated. In the present article, I rely on a cognitive framework to define literary characters. From that point of view, I assert that it is fruitful to compare ourselves with literary characters to understand the role that the narratives told by others about ourselves play in the constitution of our own personal identities.     

No place to hide: the group leader's moments of shame

Shame is a powerful, universal experience; yet because of its painful, secretive nature, it often remains an underground affect for many therapists. On behalf of our patients and ourselves, we must de-stigmatize it. My aim is to further a dialogue among group therapists about processing our own shame, by openly discussing the phenomenology and dynamics of shame. Such discussion is not easy, as shame by its nature seems almost unspeakable; yet leaders, due to the group setting, are especially at risk of having shame activated. Using a self-psychological/intersubjective approach, this paper suggests how we as therapists can become cognizant of and work with our own shame. Given the dearth of experience-near accounts of the group therapist's own shame, the author provides detailed vignettes of her own experiences with shame in the clinical setting.