Why are rocks pointy? Children's preference for teleological explanations of the natural world

Teleological explanations are based on the assumption that an object or behavior exists for a purpose. Two studies explored the tendency of adults and first-, second-, and fourth-grade elementary-school children to explain the properties of living and nonliving natural kinds in teleological terms. Consistent with the hypothesis that young children possess a promiscuous teleological tendency, Study 1 found that children were more likely than adults to broadly explain the properties of both living and nonliving natural kinds in teleological terms, although the kinds of functions that they endorsed varied with age. Study 2 was an attempt to reduce children's broad teleological bias by introducing a pretrial that described, in nonteleological terms, the physical process by which nonliving natural kinds form. In spite of this attempt, Study 2 replicated the effects of Study 1, with only fourth graders showing any shift in preference for teleological explanation.     

4～5岁儿童对社会事件记忆的消极偏向

消极偏向是指相对于积极或中性的刺激,消极刺激能够获得更多的注意和认知加工。本研究采用故事法通过三个实验考察4~5岁儿童对社会事件的记忆是否存在消极偏向。实验一发现幼儿对威胁行为的回忆成绩显著优于对中性行为和助人行为的回忆成绩。实验二发现幼儿对悲伤事件的回忆成绩显著优于对中性和愉快事件的回忆成绩。实验三发现幼儿对威胁行为的前瞻记忆成绩显著优于中性和助人行为的前瞻记忆成绩。研究说明无论事件是威胁性的还是非威胁性的,无论是回溯记忆还是前瞻记忆,4~5岁儿童的记忆都表现出消极偏向。     

Children's reliance on creator's intent in extending names for artifacts

When children learn a name for a novel artifact, they tend to extend the name to other artifacts that share the same shape—a phenomenon known as the shape bias. The present studies investigated an intentional account of this bias. In Study 1, 3-year-olds were shown two objects of the same shape, and were given an explanation for why the objects were the same shape even though they were intended to be different kinds. The shape bias disappeared in children provided with this explanation. In Study2, 3-year-olds were shown triads of objects, and were either given no information about the function of a named target object, told the function that object could fulfill, or told the functions all three objects were intended to fulfill. Only in the third condition did children overcome a shape bias in favor of a function bias when extending the name of the target object. These findings indicate that 3-year-olds' shape bias results from intuitions about what artifacts were intended to be.     

Overoptimism about future knowledge: Early arrogance?

Abstract

Three studies explored whether young children (5–7 years) have more optimistic views of their future knowledge than older children (8–12 years) and adults. In Study 1, younger children were more likely than older children and adults to expect greater knowledge in both young and mature protagonists. Both groups of children saw knowledge rising at a faster rate into adulthood than adult participants did. All ages judged moral knowledge as much easier to acquire than other types of knowledge, such as artifacts. In Study 2, all children saw their own future knowledge in especially optimistic terms in comparison to ratings by adults, and the older children exhibited a self-enhancement bias. Study 3 found an overall preference for the acquisition of positively valenced future knowledge, particularly for the 8- to 12-year olds and in the domain of morality, suggesting pragmatic underpinnings for these judgments.     

Children Apply Principles of Physical Ownership to Ideas

Adults apply ownership not only to objects but also to ideas. But do people come to apply principles of ownership to ideas because of being taught about intellectual property and copyrights? Here, we investigate whether children apply rules from physical property ownership to ideas. Studies 1a and 1b show that children (6–8 years old) determine ownership of both objects and ideas based on who first establishes possession of the object or idea. Study 2 shows that children use another principle of object ownership, control of permission—an ability to restrict others’ access to the entity in question—to determine idea ownership. In Study 3 , we replicate these findings with different idea types. In Study 4 , we determine that children will not apply ownership to every entity, demonstrating that they do not apply ownership to a common word. Taken together, these results suggest that, like adults, children as young as 6 years old apply rules from ownership not only to objects but to ideas as well.     

Young children follow pointing over words in interpreting acts of reference

Adults refer young children's attention to things in two basic ways: through the use of pointing (and other deictic gestures) and words (and other linguistic conventions). In the current studies, we referred young children (2- and 4-year-olds) to things in conflicting ways, that is, by pointing to one object while indicating linguistically (in some way) a different object. In Study 1, a novel word was put into competition with a pointing gesture in a mutual exclusivity paradigm; that is, with a known and a novel object in front of the child, the adult pointed to the known object (e.g. a cup) while simultaneously requesting 'the modi'. In contrast to the findings of Jaswal and Hansen (2006) , children followed almost exclusively the pointing gesture. In Study 2, when a known word was put into competition with a pointing gesture – the adult pointed to the novel object but requested 'the car'– children still followed the pointing gesture. In Study 3, the referent of the pointing gesture was doubly contradicted by the lexical information – the adult pointed to a known object (e.g. a cup) but requested 'the car'– in which case children considered pointing and lexical information equally strong. Together, these findings suggest that in disambiguating acts of reference, young children at both 2 and 4 years of age rely most heavily on pragmatic information (e.g. in a pointing gesture), and only secondarily on lexical conventions and principles.     

Mad enough to see the other side: Anger and the search for disconfirming information

The current research explored the effect of anger on hypothesis confirmation—the propensity to seek information that confirms rather than disconfirms one's opinion. We argued that the moving against action tendency associated with anger leads angry individuals to seek out more disconfirming information than sad individuals, attenuating the confirmation bias. We tested this hypothesis in two studies of experimentally primed anger and sadness on the selective exposure to hypothesis confirming and disconfirming information. In Study 1, participants in the angry condition were more likely to choose disconfirming information than those in the sad or neutral condition when given the opportunity to read more about a social debate, and reading the disconfirming information affected their subsequent attitude. Study 2 measured participants' opinions and information selection about the 2008 US Presidential Election and their desire to “move against” a person or object. Participants in the angry condition reported a greater tendency to oppose a person or object, which resulted in the attenuation of the confirmation bias.     

Mad enough to see the other side: anger and the search for disconfirming information

The current research explored the effect of anger on hypothesis confirmation-the propensity to seek information that confirms rather than disconfirms one's opinion. We argued that the moving against action tendency associated with anger leads angry individuals to seek out more disconfirming information than sad individuals, attenuating the confirmation bias. We tested this hypothesis in two studies of experimentally primed anger and sadness on the selective exposure to hypothesis confirming and disconfirming information. In Study 1, participants in the angry condition were more likely to choose disconfirming information than those in the sad or neutral condition when given the opportunity to read more about a social debate, and reading the disconfirming information affected their subsequent attitude. Study 2 measured participants' opinions and information selection about the 2008 US Presidential Election and their desire to "move against" a person or object. Participants in the angry condition reported a greater tendency to oppose a person or object, which resulted in the attenuation of the confirmation bias.     

Children use nonverbal cues from an adult to evaluate peers

What factors contribute to children’s tendency to view individuals as having different traits and abilities? The present research tested whether young children are influenced by adults’ nonverbal behaviors when making inferences about peers. In Study 1, participants (aged 5–6 years) viewed multiple videos of interactions between a “teacher” and two “students”; all individuals were unfamiliar to participants. In each clip, the students behaved similarly, but the teacher did not: She either smiled, nodded, touched, or shook her head at one student, and she looked at the other student with a neutral expression. In Study 1, children tended to infer that students who received more positive behaviors from the teacher were smarter, nicer, and stronger. Study 2 pitted differences in the teacher’s behavior against differences in the students’ performance. When asked who was smarter, children selected lower-performing students who received more positive nonverbal cues from the teacher rather than higher-performing students who received less positive cues. These findings indicate that an authority figure’s nonverbal behaviors can influence children’s inferences about others and shed light on one mechanism guiding young children’s evaluations of people in their social world.     

幼儿友好型内隐联想测验的建构及有效性

本研究依据经典IAT (Implicit Association Test)的核心原理构建了幼儿友好型内隐联想测验(Preschooler-friendly Implicit Association Test, PSF-IAT)。它由两部分联结任务组成, 以反应时为指标, 通过对概念刺激和属性刺激之间自动化联系的评估进而对幼儿的内隐态度进行间接测量。本研究采用两种方式对PSF-IAT范式的适用性进行验证：首先, 将PSF-IAT用于测试幼儿对花和虫的态度, 检验该范式在非社会范畴概念态度研究中的可行性; 其次, 将PSF-IAT用于测试幼儿内隐种族态度, 并验证其与另一种幼儿内隐态度测试方法间结果的相关性, 检验该范式在社会范畴概念态度研究中的可行性。研究结果表明, PSF-IAT符合学前儿童认知发展与行为反应的特点, 能有效测量幼儿的内隐态度。     

Test sample selection by preschool children: Honoring diversity

In a test of an inductive inference, preschool children's selection of objects was examined. In Experiment 1, 4-year-olds selected diverse objects first in sequential selections; in Experiment 2, adults and 4-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, made similar selections under the same conditions. A defective object led subjects in all age groups to test a similar object. In Experiment 3, 4-year-olds chose to test a pair of dissimilar objects rather than a pair of similar objects, but 3-year-olds did not. Three-year-olds' selections were independent of diversity. In Experiment 4, we attempted to emphasize the diversity of objects for 3-year-olds. Their first task was to select an object that was the same as or different from a target object. The subjects responded correctly in this task but did not prefer to test diverse objects. Experiment 5 showed that neither 3- nor 4-year-olds have a bias to select nondiverse objects in a nontest context. The findings indicate that children as young as 4 years old value diverse evidence in induction.     

Blind to Bias? Young Children Do Not Anticipate that Sunk Costs Lead to Irrational Choices

Young children anticipate that others act rationally in light of their beliefs and desires, and environmental constraints. However, little is known about whether children anticipate others’ irrational choices. We investigated young children's ability to predict that sunk costs can lead to irrational choices. Across four experiments, 5- to 6-year-olds (total N = 185) and adults (total N = 117) judged which of two identical objects an agent would keep, one obtained at a high cost or one obtained at a low cost. In Experiment 1, adults predicted that the agent would choose the high-cost object over the low-cost one, whereas children responded at chance. Experiment 2 replicated these findings in children, but also included another condition which showed they were sensitive to future costs. They predicted that an agent would be more likely to seek out a low-cost item than a high-cost item. Experiments 3 and 4 then found that children do not anticipate the sunk cost bias in first person scenarios, or in interpersonal sunk cost scenarios, where costs are sunk by others. Taken together, our findings suggest that young children may struggle to understand and predict irrational behavior. The findings also reveal an asymmetry between how they consider sunk costs and future costs in understanding actions. We propose that this asymmetry might arise because children do not consider sunk costs as wasted.     

How special are objects? Children's reasoning about objects, parts, and holes

Discrete physical objects have a special status in cognitive and linguistic development. Infants track and enumerate objects, young children are biased to construe novel words as referring to objects, and, when asked to count an array of items, preschool children tend to count the discrete objects, even if explicitly asked to do otherwise. We address here the question of whether discrete physical objects are the only entities that have this special status, or whether other individuals are salient as well. In two experiments, we found that 3-year-olds are just as good at identifying, tracking, and counting certain nonobject entities (holes in Experiment 1; holes and parts in Experiment 2) as they are with objects. These results are discussed in light of different theories of the nature and development of children's object bias.     

Developing symbolic capacity one step at a time

The present research examines the ability of children as young as 4 years to use models in tasks that require scaling of distance along a single dimension. In Experiment 1, we found that tasks involving models are similar in difficulty to those involving maps that we studied earlier (Huttenlocher, J., Newcombe, N., & Vasilyeva, M. (1999). Spatial scaling in young children. Psychological Science, 10, 393-398). In Experiment 2, we found that retrieval tasks, where children indicate the location of a hidden object in an actual space are substantially more difficult than placement tasks, where children put a visible object in a particular location in an actual space. We discuss possible implications of the differential difficulty of retrieval and placement tasks for the understanding of symbolic development.     

Individual differences in the shape bias in preschool children with specific language impairment and typical language development: theoretical and clinical implications

We investigated whether preschool children with specific language impairment (SLI) exhibit the shape bias in word learning: the bias to generalize based on shape rather than size, color, or texture in an object naming context (‘This is a wek; find another wek’) but not in a non‐naming similarity classification context (‘See this? Which one goes with this one?’). Fifty‐four preschool children (16 with SLI, 16 children with typical language [TL] in an equated control group, and 22 additional children with TL included in individual differences analyses but not group comparisons) completed a battery of linguistic and cognitive assessments and two experiments. In Experiment 1, children made generalization choices in object naming and similarity classification contexts on separate days, from options similar to a target object in shape, color, or texture. On average, TL children exhibited the shape bias in an object naming context, but children with SLI did not. In Experiment 2, we tested whether the failure to exhibit the shape bias might be linked to ability to detect systematicities in the visual domain. Experiment 2 supported this hypothesis, in that children with SLI failed to learn simple paired visual associations that were readily learned by children with TL. Analyses of individual differences in the two studies revealed that visual paired‐associate learning predicted degree of shape bias in children with SLI and TL better than any other measure of nonverbal intelligence or standard assessments of language ability. We discuss theoretical and clinical implications.     

Person‐centred positive emotions,object‐centred negative emotions: 2‐year‐olds generalize negative but not positive emotions across individuals

Prior work suggests that young children do not generalize others' preferences to new individuals. We hypothesized (following Vaish et al., 2008, Psychol. Bull., 134, 383–403) that this may only hold for positive emotions, which inform the child about the person's attitude towards the object but not about the positivity of the object itself. It may not hold for negative emotions, which additionally inform the child about the negativity of the object itself. Two‐year‐old children saw one individual (the emoter) emoting positively or negatively towards one and neutrally towards a second novel object. When a second individual then requested an object, children generalized the emoter's negative but not her positive emotion to the second individual. Children thus draw different inferences from others' positive versus negative emotions: Whereas they view others' positive emotions as person centred, they may view others' negative emotions as object centred and thus generalizable across people. The results are discussed with relation to the functions and implications of the negativity bias.     

Weight bias as a function of person variables and contact experiences

ABSTRACT

We tested a mediation model of weight bias that considers person attributes and contact experiences with overweight individuals. In Study 1, we administered a survey to assess Openness, Agreeableness, Attributional Complexity, contact experiences with overweight individuals, and weight bias. Mediation analyses found that Agreeableness predicted less weight bias through contact experiences. In Study 2, we asked participants to interact with a peer whose weight and attributions regarding the weight were experimentally manipulated. We then measured acceptance of the peer. Agreeableness was found to indirectly predict more acceptance of an overweight peer through Empathy and contact experiences. These results show that contact theory is applicable to the domain of weight bias, and support person-situation approaches to prejudice.     

More than just another face in the crowd: superior detection of threatening facial expressions in children and adults

Threatening facial expressions can signal the approach of someone or something potentially dangerous. Past research has established that adults have an attentional bias for angry faces, visually detecting their presence more quickly than happy or neutral faces. Two new findings are reported here. First, evidence is presented that young children share this attentional bias. In five experiments, young children and adults were asked to find a picture of a target face among an array of eight distracter faces. Both age groups detected threat‐relevant faces – angry and frightened – more rapidly than non‐threat‐relevant faces (happy and sad). Second, evidence is presented that both adults and children have an attentional bias for negative stimuli overall. All negative faces were detected more quickly than positive ones in both age groups. As the first evidence that young children exhibit the same superior detection of threatening facial expressions as adults, this research provides important support for the existence of an evolved attentional bias for threatening stimuli.     

Late talkers show no shape bias in a novel name extension task

By 2½ years of age, children typically show a shape bias in object naming – that is, they extend object names mostly to new instances with the same shape. The acquisition of a shape bias is related to a marked increase in the rate of object name learning. This study asks whether, conversely, children who do not readily acquire new object names lack a shape bias. Twelve 2- to 3-year-old ‘late talkers’– children whose total vocabularies rank below the 30th percentile for their age – were compared with age-matched children with larger vocabularies in a novel object name extension task. The controls extended novel names across novel objects with the same shape. The late talkers showed no group perceptual bias, but many individuals extended novel names across objects with the same surface texture. The implications of the results both for the role of attentional biases in object name learning and for the etiology of some late talking are discussed.      

Atypical shape bias and categorization in autism: Evidence from children and computational simulations

The shape bias, a preference for mapping new word labels onto the shape rather than the color or texture of referents, has been postulated as a word‐learning mechanism. Previous research has shown deficits in the shape bias in children with autism even though they acquire sizeable lexicons. While previous explanations have suggested the atypical use of color for label extension in individuals with autism, we hypothesize an atypical mapping of novel labels to novel objects, regardless of the physical properties of the objects. In Experiment 1, we demonstrate this phenomenon in some individuals with autism, but the novelty of objects only partially explains their lack of shape bias. In a second experiment, we present a computational model that provides a developmental account of the shape bias in typically developing children and in those with autism. This model is based on theories of neurological dysfunctions in autism, and it integrates theoretical and empirical findings in the literature of categorization, word learning, and the shape bias. The model replicates the pattern of results of our first experiment and shows how individuals with autism are more likely to categorize experimental objects together on the basis of their novelty. It also provides insights into possible mechanisms by which children with autism learn new words, and why their word referents may be idiosyncratic. Our model highlights a developmental approach to autism that emphasizes deficient representations of categories underlying an impaired shape bias.