Is awareness of bodily change in emotion related to awareness of other bodily processes?

To what extent is reported attentiveness to bodily responses in emotion predicted by a general disposition to be attentive to one's normal, nonemotive bodily processes? University undergraduates (373 women and 167 men) completed the modified Autonomic Perception Questionnaire (APQ-R; Mandler, Mandler, & Uviller, 1958; Shields, 1984) for one of two target emotions, anger and transient anxiety, and the Body Awareness Questionnaire (BAQ; Shields, Mallory, & Simon, 1989), a measure of attentiveness to nonemotive bodily processes. In addition, the Body subscale, part of a Love Symptom Checklist concerning symptoms of romantic love was completed by 246 of these subjects. We predicted that the two measures of attentiveness to bodily response in emotion would be more strongly related to each other than to the BAQ. Significant low positive correlations between APQ-R and BAQ scores were obtained for each sex for both anger and anxiety. Correlations between the Body subscale and the APQ-R were high, positive, and significant, but correlations with the BAQ were near zero. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses showed that of the three variables entered (subject sex, Body subscale scores, and BAQ scores), the greatest change in explained APQ-R variance was accounted for by the Body subscale scores. This pattern of results was replicated in a second study of 56 women and 42 men. Results are discussed with reference to detected arousal in emotion and beliefs about emotion symptoms.     

Explicit or implicit situation awareness? Measuring the situation awareness of train traffic controllers

Previous research on situation awareness (SA) predominantly focused on its explicit, reasoned, conscious features rather than on the implicit, intuitive, unconscious aspects that are often identified with expert operators. This research investigated implicit levels of SA of train traffic controllers (TTCs) in order to contribute to the body of knowledge on rail human factors research and SA. A novel approach was used to uncover levels of implicit SA through a set of three analyses: (1) fairly low SAGAT values with correlations between SAGAT scores and multiple performance indicators; (2) negative correlations between work experience and SAGAT scores; and (3) structurally lower level-1 SA (perception) scores in comparison to level-2 SA (comprehension) scores in accordance with Endsley’s three-level model. Two studies were conducted: A pilot study – which focused on SA measurements with TTCs in a monitoring mode (N = 9) – and the main study, which involved TTCs from another control center (N = 20) and three different disrupted conditions. In the pilot study, SA was measured through the situation-awareness global assessment technique (SAGAT), perceived SA and observed SA, and performance was measured through punctuality and unplanned stops of trains before red signals. In the main study, SA was measured through SAGAT, and perceived SA and multiple performance indicators, such as arrival and departure punctuality and platform consistency, were assessed. In both studies, the set of three analyses showed consistent and persistent indications of the presence of implicit SA. Endsley’s three-level model and related SAGAT method can be constrained by the presence of these intuitive, unconscious processes and inconsistent findings on correlations between SAGAT scores and performance. These findings provide insights into the SA of TTCs in the Netherlands and can support the development of training programs and/or the design of a new traffic management system.     

What is it to be aware of your awareness of red? A review essay of Michelle Montague’s The Given

In this review essay of Michelle Montague’s The Given we focus on the central thesis in the book: the awareness of awareness thesis. On that thesis, a state of awareness constitutively involves an awareness of itself. In Section 2, we discuss what the awareness of awareness thesis amounts to, how it contrasts with the transparency of experience, and how it might be motivated. In Section 3, we discuss one of Montague’s two theoretical arguments for the awareness of awareness thesis. A view that accepts the awareness of awareness thesis, Montague argues, is to be preferred over competing views because it outperforms them in accounting for the property attributions one makes in perceptual experience. We suggest that it is not clear that this argument for the awareness of awareness thesis is successful. Finally, in Section 4 we consider the relation between Montague’s view of color experience and what she calls Strawson’s datum, arguing that Montague may not be able to explain this datum as straightforwardly as she supposes. This, we suggest, threatens Montague’s second theoretical argument for the awareness of awareness thesis.     

The earliest electrophysiological correlate of visual awareness?

To examine the neural correlates and timing of human visual awareness, we recorded event-related potentials (ERPs) in two experiments while the observers were detecting a grey dot that was presented near subjective threshold. ERPs were averaged for conscious detections of the stimulus (hits) and nondetections (misses) separately. Our results revealed that hits, as compared to misses, showed a negativity around 180-350 ms at occipital and posterior temporal sites. It was followed by a positive wave after 400-500 ms, peaking at parietal sites. These correlates were not affected by a manipulation of attention. The early negativity, called 'visual awareness negativity' (VAN), may be a general, primary electrophysiological correlate of visual awareness. The present data show that it can be observed in response to appearance of a stimulus in visual awareness and that it generalizes across different manipulations of stimulus visibility.     

Can you feel the beat? Interoceptive awareness is an interactive function of anxiety- and depression-specific symptom dimensions

Delineating the differential effects of anxiety versus depression on patterns of information processing has proved challenging. The tripartite model of mood disorders (Clark & Watson, 1991) suggests that one way forward is to adopt a dimensional rather than categorical approach, making it possible to explore the main and interaction effects of depression- and anxiety-specific symptoms on a given cognitive-affective process. Here we examined how the interplay of anxiety-specific arousal and depression-specific anhedonia symptoms in the same individuals relate to interoceptive (bodily) awareness. 113 participants with varying levels of mood disorder symptoms completed a heartbeat perception task to assess interoceptive accuracy. Superior interoception was associated with anxiety-specific arousal symptoms, and this relationship held when controlling for depression-specific anhedonia symptoms and shared general distress symptoms. This main effect was qualified by an interaction between anhedonia and arousal. As anhedonia symptoms increased in severity, the relationship between arousal and interoceptive accuracy became less strong. These results further validate the tripartite framework, help clarify the mixed existing literature on interoception in mood disorders, and suggest that considering the unique and interactive effects of different symptom dimensions is a useful strategy to help identify the cognitive-affective profiles associated with anxiety and depression.     

Does awareness of speech as a sequence of phones arise spontaneously?

It was found that illiterate adults could neither delete nor add a phone at the beginning of a non-word; but these tasks were rather easily performed by people with similar environment and childhood experiences, who learned to read rudimentarily as adults. Awareness of speech as a sequence of phones is thus not attained spontaneously in the course of general cognitive growth, but demands some specific training, which, for most persons, is probably provided by learning to read in the alphabetic system.     

Are awareness questionnaires valid? Investigating the use of posttest questionnaires for assessing awareness in implicit memory tests

Two experiments--one employing a perceptual implicit memory test and the other a conceptual implicit memory test--investigated the validity of posttest questionnaires for determining the incidence of awareness in implicit memory tests. In both experiments, a condition in which none of the studied words could be used as test responses (i.e., the none-studied condition) was compared with a standard implicit test condition. Results showed that reports of awareness on the posttest questionnaire were much less frequent in the none-studied condition than in the standard condition. This was especially true after deep processing at study. In both experiments, 83% of the participants in the none-studied condition stated they were unaware even though there were strong demands for claiming awareness. Although there was a small bias in the questionnaire (i.e., 17% of the participants in the none-studied condition stated they were aware), overall, there was strong support for the validity of awareness questionnaires.     

Children’s awareness and understanding of dangers at home

This study concerns children’s awareness and understanding of dangers at home. Children aged five to seven years responded to photographs depicting child models exposed to a range of dangers which may be encountered at home—involving the road, a cooker (stove), a knife, electricity, fire, medicine and climbing. Generally, the children were found to be well aware of the dangers in all the circumstances, with small age effects noted for the road, medicine, climbing, cooker and knife situations. Understanding of the consequences of exposure to danger varied across situations and a tendency to underestimate the seriousness of the potential harm was noted. This research was conducted while the author was a Visiting Research Fellow at the Department of Psychology, University of Leeds and was supported by a University of Leeds Senate Research Grant to Professor A.J. Chapman.     

In search of the optimal measure of awareness: Discrete or continuous?

Studies of perceptual awareness require sensitive measures reflecting subjective judgments of visibility. Two scales have been proposed for this purpose: the Continuous Scale (CS) and the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS). Here we compare the scales in the context of the Gabor patch orientation discrimination task and propose a Continuous Perceptual Awareness Scale (C-PAS) that aims to combine their advantages. The results of the study shown no differences in sensitivity between the scales. However, we observed differences between the scales in awareness ratings frequencies and accuracy associated with the lowest ratings. We concluded that visibility ratings are often biased, and thus, the scale sensitivity may not be optimal. Furthermore, based on the additional analyses, we argued that there is an advantage of using C-PAS over CS. The scale allows to use an additional variability of judgment within PAS categories and thus it may enable more fine-grained measurement of visibility at near-threshold conditions.     

Does awareness of penalties influence deterrence mechanisms? A study of young drivers’ awareness and perceptions of the punishment applying to illegal phone use while driving

This research implemented both qualitative and quantitative methods to 1) explore young drivers’ (aged between 17 and 25 years) awareness and perceptions of legal sanctions associated with phone use while driving and 2) identify whether the accuracy of their knowledge influences deterrence-related perceptions. In the qualitative phase, 60 Queensland motorists participated in focus groups. The findings of the focus groups highlighted that greater awareness of the penalty for phone use while driving would enable this punishment to act as a more salient deterrent. More specifically, the penalty for hands-free phone use was considered too high, whereas when the penalty was applied to hand-held phone use it was considered reasonable, with some commenting that increasing the fine could be a greater deterrent. However, the penalty also appeared to be linked to the perceived legitimacy of the rule. The quantitative phase utilised a cross-sectioanl survey design and consisted of 503 drivers. Overall, more participants appear to be underestimating (63% underestimated the fine and 37% underestimated the demerit points) as opposed to overestimating (14% overestimated the fine and 22% overestimated the demerit points) the penalty for phone use while driving. As expected, compared to those who accurately estimated the extent of the punishment (both the monetary sanction and the number of demerit points) associated with phone use while driving, drivers who underestimated the phone punishment (points and fine) had significantly lower perceptions of the severity of punishment. These findings suggest that some young drivers do not have sufficient knowledge of mobile phone sanctions, which has significant implications for ongoing attempts to maximise deterrent mechanisms.     

Discrimination without awareness?

The fate of the unattended message in dichotic listening experiments is a much disputed issue. Moray (1969) proposes that there is no processing of the unattended message, whereas Norman (1969) has suggested that it is analyzed to the level of meaning. In order to test these alternative hypotheses an experiment was performed in which galvanic skin responses (GSR) were conditioned to a word (CS) by pairing it with shock. The word was then included in passages of prose presented to subjects as the attended and unattended messages in a dichotic listening task. GSR's were obtained to the occurrence of CS in the unattended message and also to words acoustically similar to CS and to synonyms of CS. The probability of obtaining a GSR to the occurrence of an accoustically similar word was increased by placing that word in a context appropriate to CS. These results suggest that the unattended message can be processed to a level at which semantic information is extracted without the subject's reported awareness.     

Where am I looking? The accuracy of video-mediated gaze awareness

Participants worked in pairs, with one person gazing at a flat horizontal stimulus between them. The other participant estimated where the gazer was looking. Experiment 1 used linear scales as gaze targets. The mean root mean square error of estimation equates to 3.8 degrees of head-and-eye pan and 2.6 degrees of tilt. This small error of estimation was essentially the same in a video-mediated condition and in one in which a procedure that did not allow the estimator to see the head-and-eye movement to the target position was used. Experiment 2 obtained comparable gaze estimation performance in face-to-face and video-mediated conditions, using a combined pan-and-tilt grid. It is concluded that people are very good at estimating what someone else is looking at and that such estimations should be practical during video-mediated conversation.     

Young children's awareness of socially mediated rejection of food: Why is food dropped at the table “dirty”?

We sometimes drop food at mealtimes. Once dropped, the food becomes dirty or inedible not only in a physical but also in a social sense. Even without physical contact with contaminants, we may not eat fallen food in some social contexts, e.g., a high-quality restaurant. Such thinking is referred here as “socially mediated rejection.” In Study 1, Japanese children were observed during mealtimes at home and at school. Even 2-year-olds reacted to fallen food differently between at school and home. In Study 2, 4- and 6-year-olds and adults were presented several stories in an experiment, and were asked to predict the story character's bodily and emotional reactions to eating fallen food. Preschoolers noticed that physically contaminated food would cause bodily harm more than socially rejected food.     

Know versus Familiar: Differentiating states of awareness in others’ subjective reports of recognition

In the Remember–Know paradigm whether a Know response is defined as a high-confidence state of certainty or a low-confidence state based on familiarity varies across researchers and can influence participants’ responses. The current experiment was designed to explore differences between the states of Know and Familiar. Participants studied others’ justification statements to “Know” recognition decisions and separated them into two types. Crucially, participants were not provided definitions of Know and Familiar on which to sort the items—their judgements were based solely on the phenomenology described in the justifications. Participants’ sorting decisions were shown to reliably map onto expert classification of Know and Familiar. Post-task questionnaire responses demonstrated that both the level of memory detail and confidence expressed in the justifications were central to how participants categorised the items. In sum, given no instructions to do so, participants classify Familiar and Know according to two dimensions: confidence and amount of information retrieved.     

Unconscious perception or not? An evaluation of detection and discrimination as indicators of awareness

Most investigations of unconscious perception use a dissociation design in which an awareness variable (e.g., detection) is compared with a perceptual processing variable (e.g., identification). Unconscious perception is inferred when the awareness variable lacks sensitivity to the stimulus but evidence of perceptual processing is still obtained. In two studies we examined the relationship between word identification and detection (Study 1) or discrimination (words vs. nonwords; Study 2) with a variety of techniques. In both studies, dissociations suggestive of unconscious perception occurred when the data were examined with subjective threshold approaches, but these differences disappeared when the variables were compared with techniques derived from signal detection theory (SDT). These results do not support unconscious perception in subjective threshold paradigms. In addition, detection appears to be the most sensitive and appropriate task for assessing stimulus awareness, provided that several SDT assumptions are met.     

Why did I do that? Explaining actions activated outside of awareness

We review the latest research investigating how people explain their own actions when they have been activated nonconsciously. We will discuss evidence that when nonconsciously activated behavior is unexpected (e.g., norm- violating, against self -standards), negative affect arises and triggers confabulations aimed to explain the behavior. Nonconsciously activated behaviors may provide a window into everyday confabulation of (erroneous) explanations for behavior, which may also affect self-knowledge. Implications for self-concept formation and intentionality are discussed.     

Does contingency awareness mediate the influence of emotional learning on the cueing of visual attention?

Previous research has indicated that conditioning depends on contingency awareness (CA). However, we argue that these studies have examined this issue under methodological conditions that might be insensitive to associative learning without CA. In the present study we examined the effect of an experimental manipulation of CA on attentive processing of classically conditioned stimuli, which is sensitive to associative learning with and without CA. We found that aversive conditioning with additional contingency instructions modulated visual attention, in the sense that the conditioned cues captured and held attention more strongly than the non-conditioned cues. Surprisingly, conditioning under conditions of restricted CA yielded a response pattern that was different from that under full CA. These findings suggest that conditioning with full and restricted CA can lead to qualitatively different effects on attention.     

Who is Afraid of Figure of Speech?

Aristotle's illustrations of the fallacy of Figure of Speech (or Form of Expression) are none too convincing. They are tied to Aristotle's theory of categories and to peculiarities of Greek grammar that fail to hold appeal for a contemporary readership. Yet, upon closer inspection, Figure of Speech shows many points of contact with views and problems that inhabit 20th-century analytical philosophy. In the paper, some Aristotelian examples will be analyzed to gain a better understanding of this fallacy. The case of the Third Man argument and some modern cases lend plausibility to the claim that Figure of Speech is of more interest as a type of fallacy than has generally been assumed. Finally, a case is made for the view that Figure of Speech, though listed among the fallacies dependent upon language, is not properly classified as a fallacy of ambiguity. More likely, it should be looked upon as a type of non sequitur. This has important consequences for the profile of dialogue associated with this fallacy.