Why we are fairer than others

Subjects wrote lists of either fair or unfair things that they or others did. A pervasive tendency was found for subjects to associate themselves with fair behaviors and others with unfair behaviors. When different subjects rated samples of the written behaviors for fairness and frequency we found that fair behaviors were rated as more frequent than unfair behaviors and self-ascribed behaviors were rated as fairer than behaviors ascribed to others. These findings and others are shown to result from a tendency for subjects to perceive a stronger link between the fairness and frequency of their own behavior than between the fairness and frequency of the behavior of other people. A final analysis showed that the subcategories of unfair behavior that subjects associated with others were different from those associated with themselves.     

Why epistemologists are so down on their luck

It is nearly universally acknowledged among epistemologists that a belief, even if true, cannot count as knowledge if it is somehow largely a matter of luck that the person so arrived at the truth. A striking feature of this literature, however, is that while many epistemologists are busy arguing about which particular technical condition most effectively rules out the offensive presence of luck in true believing, almost no one is asking why it matters so much that knowledge be immune from luck in the first place. I argue that the best explanation for the consensus that luck undermines knowledge is that knowledge is, complications aside, credit-worthy true believing. To make this case, I develop both the notions of luck and credit, and sketch a theory of knowledge in those terms. Furthermore, this account also holds promise for being able to solve the “value problem” for knowledge, and it explains why both internal and external conditions are necessary to turn true belief into knowledge. The arguments and ideas in this paper have been in development for a while, and I would like to thank a number of people for their contribution to that development. For many helpful discussions on these topics, In d’like to thank Steve Ellis, Linda Zagzebski and the students in my graduate epistemology seminar—Mary Gwin, Ben Hagy, Matthew Hodge, Robert Johnson and Shyam Patwardhan. And thanks to Karen Antell for her comments on an earlier draft     

Why we Believe

The radical probabilist counsels the prudent never to put away uncertainty, and hence always to balance judgment with probabilities of various sizes. Against this counsel I shall advise in favor of the practice of full belief — at least for some occasions. This advice rests on the fact that it is sometimes in a person's interests to accept certain propositions as a means of bringing it about that others recognize oneself as having accepted those propositions. With the pragmatists, therefore, I shall reject the view that belief formation must in every instance be a truth-directed affair. Unlike the pragmatists, however, I shall conclude that the enterprise of belief formation is not directed exclusively, or even primarily, at attaining knowledge. In other words, pursuit of that which it profits to believe, on the one hand, and pursuit of knowledge on the other, are distinct enterprises, which overlap (when they do) only accidentally. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Why there are no good arguments for any interesting version of determinism

This paper considers the empirical evidence that we currently have for various kinds of determinism that might be relevant to the thesis that human beings possess libertarian free will. Libertarianism requires a very strong version of indeterminism, so it can be refuted not just by universal determinism, but by some much weaker theses as well. However, it is argued that at present, we have no good reason to believe even these weak deterministic views and, hence, no good reason—at least from this quarter—to doubt that we are libertarian free. In particular, the paper responds to various arguments for neural and psychological determinism, arguments based on the work of people like Honderich, Tegmark, Libet, Velmans, Wegner, and Festinger.     

Why we walk the way we do

By using inverse dynamics and forceplate recordings, this study established the principle of oscillating systems and the influence of gravity and body parameters on the programming of the gait parameters, step frequency and length. Calculation of the ratio of the amplitude of the center of mass (CM) and the center of foot pressure (CP) oscillations yielded an equation and established a biomechanical constant, the natural body frequency (NBF). NBF appears to be an absolute invariant parameter, specific to human standing posture and gait in terrestrial gravity, which influences the relative positions of CM and CP and whose value separates the frequency bands of standing posture from those for gait. This equation was tested by using the experimental paradigm of stepping in place and then used in calculating the magnitude of CM oscillations during gait. The biomechanical analysis of the experimental observations allows one to establish the relationships between body parameters and gravity and the central programming of locomotor parameters.     

伪科学何以如此猖獗?

在科学昌明的今天,前些年,伪科学在中国大地上甚嚣尘上,公然登堂入室,在煌煌党刊泱泱大报上屡见报道,诸如“耳朵识字”、“伪气功”、“水变油”等等,凡此种种不一而足。为什么会出现这种情况呢?大致有如下一些原因:     

Why good guys wear white

Affect is a somewhat abstract concept that is frequently linked to physical metaphor. For example, good is often depicted as light (rather than dark), up (rather than down), and moving forward (rather than backward). The purpose of our studies was to examine whether the association between stimulus brightness and affect is optional or obligatory. In a series of three studies, participants categorized words as negative or positive. The valence of the words and the brightness of the letters were varied orthogonally. In Studies 1, 2, and 3, we found that categorization was inhibited when there was a mismatch between stimulus brightness (e.g., light) and word valence (e.g., negative). Studies 4 and 5 reveal boundary conditions for the effect. The studies suggest that, when making evaluations, people automatically assume that bright objects are good, whereas dark objects are bad.     

Why we can't get along

The author examines various arguments to explain the internal conflicts and schisms that have afflicted depth psychology since its beginnings. These arguments include the inevitable splits that occur in the course of institutional development, the inheritance of family schisms within the profession, historical, geographical and political influences, Freud's notion of the 'narcissism of minor differences' along with Gordon's idea of the need for enemies in establishing identity, and the impact of market forces. The author refutes these arguments and postulates instead that the profession attracts narcissistically disturbed members who have not been or cannot be sufficiently analysed. The profession needs to address this endemic narcissism in order to prevent further splitting and to establish a more ecumenical framework.     

Coordinated policy action and flexible coalitional psychology: How evolution made humans so good at politics

The observation that politics makes strange bedfellows may be hackneyed, but it is also often true: Politicians and other actors in the policy process routinely align themselves on specific issues with actors with whom they otherwise have broad disagreements. This fits with social psychological research showing that humans have a coalitional psychology that is remarkably flexible, allowing us to feel strong bonds toward the coalitions to which we belong but to also break those bonds and move on to new coalitions when circumstances change. How is this flexibility possible? Here we examine the possible ways in which evolutionary forces helped shape our species’ trademark flexible coalitional psychology, focusing in particular on gene-culture coevolution and cultural group selection. We conclude with some examples of coordinated policy action among erstwhile foes in contemporary politics.     

And so indeed are perfect cheat

Ethical discourse and fallacy theory come together in a natural way over concepts such as bias, prejudice, preconceived opinion, prototypical and stereotypical thinking, dogmatism and loyalty. By and large, these are concepts that have not been sufficiently worked up to bear the theoretical weight either of ethics or of logic. The present paper seeks to ameliorate this situation. It proposes that situations describable by any such concepts partition into (a) the rationally and morally regrettable and (b) the rationally and morally impeccable, and in any event, unavoidable. Finding (b) will come as a surprise to some theorists.[A]ll the artificial and figurative application of Words Eloquence hath invented are for nothing else but to insinuate wrongIdeas, move the Passions, and thereby mislead the Judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheat; And therefore, however laudable or allowable Oratory may render them in Harangues and popular Addresses, they are certainly, in all Discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided. ...John Locke,Essay on Human Understanding, Book III.     

Why stereotypes don't even make good defaults

Many concepts have stereotypes. This leaves open the question of whether concepts are stereotypes. It has been argued elsewhere that theories that identify concepts with their stereotypes or with stereotypical properties of their instances (e.g., Rosch, E. (1978). Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch & B. B. Lloyd (Ed.), Cognition and Categorization. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates; Smith, E. E., Medin, D. L. (1981). Categories and Concepts. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.) fail to provide an adequate account of the compositionality of concepts (Fodor, J., Lepore, E. (1996). The red herring and the pet fish: Why concepts still cannot be prototypes. Cognition, 58, 253-270.; Fodor, J. (1998). Concepts: Where cognitive science went wrong. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.). This paper extends this argument and reports an experiment suggesting that participants do not assume, even as a default strategy, that complex concepts inherit the stereotypes of their constituents. Thus propositions such as "Baby ducks have webbed feet" were judged to be less likely to be true than propositions like "Ducks have webbed feet." Moreover, manipulation of the type and number of noun phrase modifiers revealed a systematic departure from the unmodified noun's stereotype both with the addition of stereotypical modifiers ("Quacking ducks have webbed feet" versus "Ducks have webbed feet") and with the addition of a second modifier ("Baby Peruvian ducks have webbed feet" versus "Baby ducks have webbed feet"). Thus, in the general case the stereotypical properties of a head noun are systematically discounted when that head noun combines with modifiers. This effect represents a general principle of conceptual combination that argues against the inheritance of stereotypical features of concepts as a default strategy. Instead, we advocate a model of conceptual combination where concepts remain inert under combination, supported by a separate machinery that introduces pragmatic and knowledge-dependent inferences.