When is Death Bad,When it is Bad?

Philosophia - On a view most secularists accept, the deceased individual goes out of existence. How, then, can death be a bad thing for, or harm, the deceased? I consider the doctrine of...     

Is Retirement Good or Bad for Subjective Well-Being?

Retirement has been viewed either as a transition that is accompanied by psychological distress or as a time of continued, or even enhanced, subjective well-being. Existing evidence is mixed, with some studies reporting retirement as positively related to well-being and others reporting a negative relationship or none at all. Our research indicates that developmental and social contexts shape an individual’s retirement decisions and experiences, so that retirement should be studied in its ecological and life-course context. Research on marital quality and subjective well-being in retirement has demonstrated both similarities and differences between men and women, as well as the need to consider couples conjointly (rather than viewing individuals in isolation). Future research focusing on the retirement process as it unfolds over time and in ecological context can serve to illuminate the circumstances under which retirement promotes or detracts from the quality of life.     

How Bad Is Rape?

I argue that to be compelled to do routine work is to be gravely harmed. Indeed, that pink-collar work is a more serious harm to women than rape. My purpose is to urge politically active feminists and feminist organizations to arrange their priorities accordingly and devote most of their resources to working for the elimination of sex segregation in employment.     

Who Is Afraid of Death? Religiousness,Spirituality, and Death Anxiety in Late Adulthood

SUMMARY

Data from a sample of predominantly white, Christian men and women born in Northern California in the 1920s (N = 155) were used to test the hypothesis that traditional, church-centered religiousness and de-institutionalized spiritual seeking exemplify distinct, but equally adaptive, ways of approaching fear of death in old age. Although both religiousness and spirituality were related to positive psychosocial functioning (an integrated identity and involvement in everyday activities), only religiousness served as a buffer against the fear of death. This effect was consistent with the greater emphasis on conventionality and acceptance of social norms that characterized individuals high in religiousness. The absence of a relation between spirituality and fear of death reflected the spiritual individual's emphasis on personal searching, creativity, and the positive use of reminiscence. The implications of the findings for the management of death anxiety in old age are discussed.     

Who Is I?

Whilst it may seem strange to ask to whom I refers, we show that there are occasionswhen it is not always obvious. In demonstratingthis we challenge Kaplan's assumptionthat the utterer, agent and referent of I arealways the same person.We begin by presenting what weregard to be the received view about indexicalreference popularized by David Kaplan in hisinfluential 1972 Demonstratives before goingon, in section 2, to discuss Sidelle'sanswering machine paradox which may be thoughtto threaten this view, and his deferredutterance method of resolving this puzzle. Insection 3 we introduce a novel version of theanswering machine paradox which suggests that,in certain cases, Kaplan's identification ofutterer, agent and referent of I breaks down.In the fourth section we go on to consider arecent revision of Kaplan's picture by Predelliwhich appeals to the intentions of the utterer,before arguing that this picture is committedto unacceptable consequences and, therefore,should be avoided if possible. Finally, insection 5, we present a new revision ofKaplan's account which retains much of thespirit of his original proposal whilst offeringa intuitively acceptable way to explain all ofthe apparently problematic data. In doing so,we also show how this picture is able toexplain the scenario which motivated Predelli'saccount without appealing to speakerintentions.     

Who Speaks for the Community?1

A survey in an unincorporated urban area compared the major community problems of concern to two groups: (a) a randomly selected sample of listed telephone subscribers, and (b) community leaders identified through nominations and reputational methods. In addition to asking about the major problems of the community, the randomly selected telephone subscribers were also asked to indicate for each problem (a) the persons or organizations to whom they looked for information and advice, (b) whom they considered qualified to speak for them, and (c) whom they expected to act in their behalf in the solution of these problems. The results of these surveys showed a large divergence of concerns expressed by the random samples and the reputed community leaders, as well as a striking number of respondents who felt themselves to be without spokesmen.     

When Can One Requirement Override Another?

I argue that any theory of moral obligation must be able toexplain two things: why we cannot be thrust into a moraldilemma through no fault of our own, and why we can get intoa moral dilemma through our own negligence. The most intuitivetheory of moral obligation cannot do so. However, I offer atheory of moral obligation that satisfies both of these criteria,one that is founded on the principle that if you are required todo something, then you would be blameworthy for failing to do it.I conclude by relating these results to the current literatureon moral dilemmas.     

When Is More Better?

Abstract— We examine three determinants of the relationship between the magnitude of a stimulus and a person's subjective "value" of that stimulus: the process by which value is assessed (either by feeling or by calculation), the evaluability of the relevant magnitude variable (whether the desirability of a given level of that variable can be evaluated independently), and the mode of evaluation (whether stimuli are encountered and evaluated jointly or separately). Reliance on feeling, lack of evaluability, and separate evaluation lead to insensitivity to magnitude. An analysis invoking these factors provides a novel account for why people typically become less sensitive to changes in the magnitude of a stimulus as magnitude increases.     

Where Is the Information for Affordances?

Two questions have priority for a perception psychologist: What is perceived, and what is the information for it? What we perceive are the affordances of the world. Because perception is prospective and goes on over time, the information for affordances is in events, both external and within the perceiver. Hence, we must study perception of events if we would understand how affordances are perceived.     

Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Wind? Origins of Severe Weather Phobia

Natural Environment phobia include fears cued by events such as severe weather. Given the limited research in this area, the present study sought to assess the prevalence and learning history origins of these fears, as well as their relation to anxiety sensitivity (AS). Study One participants included 533 (66%F) undergraduates who completed the Weather Experiences Questionnaire. Overall, 42?% reported exposure to a severe weather event (e.g., hurricanes); 16?% reported high- and 44?% low-fear about weather. Thirty-three from each group participated in Study Two, wherein one high-fear participant approximated the diagnostic criteria for severe weather phobia. High-fear participants cited direct conditioning (43?%) followed by vicarious conditioning (39?%) as the most common learning pathways. The remaining18% could not recall the source of their fear and none identified operant conditioning. One-third cited mothers (versus 8?% fathers) as sharing similar fears. Most had not witnessed parents hurt, frightened, or distressed by severe weather but claimed parents had warned them about severe weather. High- (vs. low-) fear participants revealed more AS-somatic versus AS-cognitive or AS-social concerns. The importance of such research in light of the increasing frequency of severe weather events is discussed.     

Good to Bad or Bad to Bad? What is the relationship between valence and the trait content of the Big Two?

In this article we directly assessed the relationship between valence and relevant traits of the Big Two dimensions (i.e., communion and agency). Drawing on previous research, we expected that the relationship with valence would be less monotonous and more variable in direction across agency-related traits, compared to communion-related traits. In three repeated measures studies we assessed the perceived valence of each trait dimension on a continuum of seven points. Studies 1 and 2 defined each continuum verbally. In Study 3 each continuum was defined by facial features. Results across these studies show that valence is linearly and more consistently related with communion-related traits than with agency-related traits. Within agency, however, competence established a positive linear relationship with valence, whereas dominance showed a target-sensitive relationship with valence: quadratic in evaluation of trait concepts, and negative and linear in face evaluation. We discuss the implications of these data for Big Two-related research.