Making Pacifism Plausible

The ethics of war is a minefield. It is a morass of conceptual unclarity, contentious assumptions, impassioned arguments, unexploded myths, and the injured defenders of indistinct positions. My aim is to help to make the minefield (conceptually) safe, and to assist that most vulnerable party to the dispute, the pacifist. In this paper I explore the possibility that, farfrom being naïve or outlandish, pacifism might follow from a widely-held and fundamental intuition about the moral status of persons [hereafter MSP]. In Section 1 I describe MSP, and suggest how we might draw implications from it about the ethics of war. In Section 2, I argue that a ‘presumption of war-ism’ has distorted debate in the ethics of war: to arrive at a balanced view, we need distinguish two sets of moral questions. First, can the development and maintenance of the means to make war be justified? Second, can the use of those means ever be justified? I sketch some strategies which might be developed in addressing the first question, concentrating on what MSP suggests might be wrong with setting up a war-machine, and with being or employing a soldier. In Section 3 I argue that even if considerations from Section 2 are insufficient to establish that we must dismantle our war-machines, facts about war which conflict with MSP do establish that we must never use them.     

ON THE POSSIBILITY OF FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY

Abstract: In this article, I propose one way of understanding the expression "feminist epistemology." I begin from the premise that improper philosophical attention has been paid to the implications of what I call The Fact of Preconditions for Agency: that moral and rational agents become such only through a long, deliberate, and intensive process of intervention and teaching, a process that requires commitments of time, effort and emotion on the part of other agents. I contend that this is a sufficiently important aspect of what it is to be a person that accounting for its philosophical implications may have repercussions not only for moral and political theory, but for epistemology as well. I contend further that, given the current configuration of social possibilities, a theory that acknowledges this Fact might appropriately be deemed "feminist."
My argument is presented in four segments. In Section II, I show how such a theory could be feminist by providing a discussion of categories of social identity; in Section III, I show how such a theory could be epistemology by describing a strategy of argument from parity. In Section IV, I apply this strategy to a case from political philosophy to show why its counter-intuitive implications do not provide good grounds for rejecting the suggested redistricting. And in Section V, I apply the same strategy to a case from epistemology to bring out how it might lead to a theory that might legitimately claim to be feminist epistemology.     

On Davidson and interpretation

Davidson's theory of interpretation, I argue, is vulnerable to a number of significant difficulties, difficulties which can be avoided or resolved by the more Quinean approach which I develop. In Section 1 I note difficulties which apply to T-theories but are avoided by translation manuals. In Section 2 I show how to construct what I call T-manuals, which are like T-theories in requiring Tarskian structure, but like translation manuals in avoiding the difficulties discussed in Section 1. In Section 3 I show that the approach using T-manuals does at least as well as Davidson's with respect to a number of other concerns of his. In Section 4 I show that it does better than Davidson's with respect to reporting interpretations, especially where demonstrative utterances are concerned. In Section 5 I argue for (somewhat modified) Quinean empirical constraints, which go with manuals, as superior to the empirical constraints Davidson imposes, which go with T-theories. In Section 6 I show that Davidson is unable to offer an adequate account of what an interpreter knows; and propose a more acceptable theory of language mastery which gives a central role to the requirement that the interpreter's language usage satisfy the refined and amplified Quinean empirical constraints of Section 5.I wish to thank Susan Haack for her help in turning a draft into the present paper.     

Guilty or Innocent? Women's Reliance on Inadmissible Evidence in a Simulated Rape Case

This study investigated the extent to which women disregard inadmissible evidence in a simulated rape case as a function of when they receive a judge's global legal instructions concerning presumption of innocence, burden of proof, reasonable doubt, and inadmissible evidence. We hypothesized that participants would be more likely to disregard incriminating inadmissible evidence when the instructions were given before rather than after the trial. Participants listened to audiotaped excerpts from a rape trial. They were given pretrial, predeliberation, or both sets of instructions; and received admissible or inadmissible avidence or no prior rape testimony, after which they made judgments. The results supported hypothesis that pretrial instructions are more effective than predeliberation instructions in allowing participants to disregard inadmissible evidence.
One cannot unring a bell; after the thrust of a saber, it is difficult to say forget the wound; and finally, if you throw a skunk into the jury box, you can't instruct the jury not to smell it ( Dunn v. United States , 1962 , p. 886).     

Rethinking the presumption of atheism

Is there—or rather, ought there to be—a presumption of atheism, as Antony Flew (1923–2010) so famously argued nearly half a century ago? It is time to revisit this issue. After clarifying the concept of a presumption of atheism (which includes clarifying the concept of a presumption), I take up the evaluative question of whether there ought to be a presumption of atheism, focusing on Flew’s arguments for an affirmative answer. I conclude that Flew’s arguments, one of which rests on an analogy with the (legal) presumption of innocence, fail.     

Recognizing the Threat Posed by an Incestuous Parent to the Victim's Siblings. Part II: Improving Legal Responses

Many courts refuse to protect the siblings of an incest victim even when faced with unmistakable evidence that they are at risk, arguing that no one can predict what will happen. For instance, some courts believe that a parent who molests his stepchild is unlikely to victimize biological offspring, while others believe that a father who violates a daughter will not also victimize sons. Although judges have relied principally on intuition, a substantial body of empirical studies can help them to better assess a sibling's risk. In Part I, I argued that once a parent establishes the first sexual relationship, other children in the family should be considered at risk. Nonetheless, not all children in the household face identical risks of molestation. In this paper, I continue this theme and argue that a legal presumption should arise that other children are endangered. Further, I maintain that offenders should have an opportunity to rebut this presumption. Without this opportunity, a child who never faced a significant risk of abuse may be removed from his home or unnecessarily lose his ties to a parent. In order to better protect children, I outline how legal decisions can better reflect what is known about child victimization.     

Children and the Limits of Paternalism

Philosophers disagree about what precisely makes an act paternalistic, and about whether, when, and why paternalistic acts are morally objectionable. Despite these disagreements, it might seem uncontroversial to think that it is permissible to paternalize children. When paternalism seems morally objectionable, that is usually because an adult has been treated in a way that seems appropriate only for children. But, we might think, there can be nothing morally objectionable about treating children as children. In this paper, however, I argue that there are limits to how we may permissibly paternalize children. I begin in Section 1 by describing and endorsing Jonathan Quong’s account of paternalism, which defines paternalistic acts as those that involve particular kinds of judgments that the paternalizer makes about the capacities of the paternalizee. In Section 2, I identify a distinction between two kinds of paternalism: ‘compensatory’ paternalism, and ‘non-compensatory’ paternalism. In Section 3, I argue that compensatory paternalism is usually permissible in the case of children. In section 4, I argue that non-compensatory paternalism is much harder to justify than compensatory paternalism, and because of this, it is sometimes impermissible even when directed at children.     

Paraconsistent Logic

In some logics, anything whatsoever follows from a contradiction; call these logics explosive. Paraconsistent logics are logics that are not explosive. Paraconsistent logics have a long and fruitful history, and no doubt a long and fruitful future. To give some sense of the situation, I’ll spend Section 1 exploring exactly what it takes for a logic to be paraconsistent. It will emerge that there is considerable open texture to the idea. In Section 2, I’ll give some examples of techniques for developing paraconsistent logics. In Section 3, I’ll discuss what seem to me to be some promising applications of certain paraconsistent logics. In fact, however, I don’t think there’s all that much to the concept ‘paraconsistent’ itself; the collection of paraconsistent logics is far too heterogenous to be very productively dealt with under a single label. Perhaps that will emerge as we go.     

The meaning of malingering data: further applications of Bayes' theorem

A previous Behavioral Sciences and the Law article (Mossman & Hart, 1996) asserted that information from malingering tests is best conceptualized using Bayes' theorem, and that courts therefore deserve Bayesian interpretations when mental health professionals present evidence about malingering. Mossman and Hart gave several examples of estimated Bayesian posterior probabilities, but they did not systematically address how one constructs confidence intervals for these estimates. This article explains how the usually imperfect nature of humanly created diagnostic tests mandates Bayesian interpretations of test results, and describes methods for generating confidence intervals for posterior probabilities. Sample calculations show that Bayesian reasoning is quite feasible and would not require investigators to expend unusual efforts when constructing and validating malingering instruments. Bayesian interpretations most accurately capture what malingering tests do: provide information that alters one's beliefs about the likelihood of malingering.     

Terrorism,War, and The Killing of the Innocent

Commonsense moral thought holds that what makes terrorism particularly abhorrent is the fact that it tends to be directed toward innocent victims. Yet contemporary philosophers tend to doubt that the concept of innocence plays any significant role here, and to deny that prohibitions against targeting noncombatants can be justified through appeal to their moral innocence. I argue, however, that the arguments used to support these doubts are ultimately unsuccessful. Indeed, the philosophical positions in question tend to misunderstand the justification of both the prohibition against targeting noncombatants, and that of the permission to attack combatants, for which the paper offers a new account. Such misunderstandings make it all too easy to justify both terrorist actions and morally objectionable actions on the part of nations at war. Taking proper account of the role of innocence in the context of armed conflict will alter our ordinary ways of thinking about the ethics of war, with respect to both jus in bello and jus ad bellum.

Direct perception and the predictive mind

Predictive approaches to the mind claim that perception, cognition, and action can be understood in terms of a single framework: a hierarchy of Bayesian models employing the computational strategy of predictive coding. Proponents of this view disagree, however, over the extent to which perception is direct on the predictive approach. I argue that we can resolve these disagreements by identifying three distinct notions of perceptual directness: psychological, metaphysical, and epistemological. I propose that perception is plausibly construed as psychologically indirect on the predictive approach, in the sense of being constructivist or inferential. It would be wrong to conclude from this, however, that perception is therefore indirect in a metaphysical or epistemological sense on the predictive approach. In the metaphysical case, claims about the inferential properties of constructivist perceptual mechanisms are consistent with both direct and indirect solutions to the metaphysical problem of perception (e.g. naïve realism, representationalism, sense datum theory). In the epistemological case, claims about the inferential properties of constructivist perceptual mechanisms are consistent with both direct and indirect approaches to the justification of perceptual belief. In this paper, I demonstrate how proponents of the predictive approach have conflated these distinct notions of perceptual directness and indirectness, and I propose alternative strategies for developing the philosophical consequences of the approach.     

Feature inference and the causal structure of categories

The purpose of this article was to establish how theoretical category knowledge-specifically, knowledge of the causal relations that link the features of categories-supports the ability to infer the presence of unobserved features. Our experiments were designed to test proposals that causal knowledge is represented psychologically as Bayesian networks. In five experiments we found that Bayes' nets generally predicted participants' feature inferences quite well. However, we also observed a pervasive violation of one of the defining principles of Bayes' nets-the causal Markov condition-because the presence of characteristic features invariably led participants to infer yet another characteristic feature. We argue that this effect arises from a domain-general bias to assume the presence of underlying mechanisms associated with the category. Specifically, people take an exemplar to be a "well functioning" category member when it has most or all of the category's characteristic features, and thus are likely to infer a characteristic value on an unobserved dimension.     

Legal and Philosophical Fictions: At the Line Where the Two Become One

Anti-foundationalism is a central topic in recent legal scholarship. The critical legal studies movement (CLS) has mounted a strong challenge to the traditional belief that legal materials (constitutions, statutes, and precedents) determine legal outcomes and constrain judicial decision making. This scholarship has overlooked, however, the degree to which the debate between traditional legal determinacy and anti-foundational indeterminacy is yet another manifestation of a continuous debate in Western thought – one that has its roots in pre-Socratic rhetoric and philosophy.This paper traces the indeterminacy thesis back to the contest of ideas between Protagoras and Plato. I examine two well-known and elated Protagorean notions: first, that two arguments (logoi) are always set in opposition to one another with regard to every matter and, second, that the rhetorician can always make the weaker argument the stronger. I contend that taking these Protagorean notions seriously – perhaps even more seriously than self-avowed anti-foundationalists customarily do – leads paradoxically to a modified endorsement of foundationalism that is nevertheless wholly consistent with the Protagorean project. Calling upon texts by Aristotle, Seneca and René Girard, I focus upon how fictionality in representations of Platonically conceived Truth reveals a binarization in thought that is simultaneously untenable and unavoidable.     

POLITICAL LIBERALISM,BASIC LIBERTIES,AND LEGAL PATERNALISM

This essay argues that neutral paternalism (NP) is problematic for antiperfectionist liberal theories. Section 2 raises textual evidence that Rawlsian liberalism does not oppose and may even support NP. In section 3, I cast doubt on whether NP should have a place in political liberalism by defending a partially comprehensive conception of the good I call “moral capacity at each moment,” or MCEM, that is inconsistent with NP. I then explain why MCEM is a reasonable conception on Rawls's account of reasonableness. In section 4, I handle concerns that showing NP fails the test of Rawlsian public justification is a nonstarter since NP does not threaten any of our basic liberties. I sketch an argument that, if this is so, the burden is on political liberalism to defend its particular account of basic liberties, since MCEM is reasonable on Rawlsian grounds. More precisely, MCEM is a conception that challenges the way Rawls characterizes basic liberties; that is, his list of basic liberties should be more inclusive by political liberalism's own structural commitments, including Rawls's “liberal principle of legitimacy.” On this revised account, political liberalism can mount a strong opposition to hard legal paternalism.     

Constructing worlds

You and I can differ in what we say, or believe, even though the things we say, or believe, are logically equivalent. Discussing what is said, or believed, requires notions of content which are finer-grained than sets of (metaphysically or logically) possible worlds. In this paper, I develop the approach to fine-grained content in terms of a space of possible and impossible worlds. I give a method for constructing ersatz worlds based on a theory of substantial facts. I show how this theory overcomes an objection to actualist constructions of ersatz worlds and argue that it naturally gives rise to useful notions of fine-grained content.     

Evidence and the Assessment of Causal Relations in the Health Sciences

This contribution claims that the two fundamental notions of causation at work in the health sciences are manipulative and mechanistic, and investigates what kinds of evidence matter for the assessment of causal relations. This article is a development of our 2007 article, ‘Plurality of Causality’, where we argue for a pluralistic account of causation with an eye to econometrics and a single medical example. The present contribution has a wider focus, and considers the notion of evidence within a whole range of disciplines belonging to the health sciences. Section 1 addresses the relations between kinds of evidence and causal accounts, and it is shown how different notions of causation can be employed in various medical cases. Section 2 calls attention to issues crucial for any adequate epistemological theory of causation, such as the distinctions between types and tokens, observational and experimental regimes, explanation and prediction. Lastly, the notion of context is articulated, highlighted in its role in the assessment of causal links. All these issues are tackled in the framework of what we label a ‘bottom–up’ epistemology.     

In the Field – The Development of Reasons in Criminal Proceedings

This paper is concerned with argumentation in legal proceedings, namely in criminal cases. My interest is to explore how in the legal realm different argumentation fields interact, the juridical field being just one of them. The paper lays out an approach of studying argumentation in the legal realm in the framework of an ethnographic methodology by identifying the “topical rules” the participants in criminal trials adhere to. Suggesting the notion of field-dependence as a good starting point for the analysis of legal argumentation, I will give several examples of different fields of argumentation interacting in criminal proceedings. The examination of what counts as a good reason and how arguments are employed, negotiated, and evaluated within a criminal proceeding might shed light on the practice of constructing facts and arriving at decisions in court. It can furthermore point at the constitution of legal rationality and how it is produced in criminal trials. I argue that rationality in criminal proceedings is interactively accomplished by negotiating different standards of validity.     

The Case for Pacifism

ABSTRACT I present the case for pacifism by formulating what I take to be the most plausible version of the idea of respect for human life. This generates a very strong, though not necessarily absolute, moral presumption against killing, in war or any other situation. I then show how difficult it is for this presumption to be overridden, either by the considerations invoked in 'just war'theory, or by consequentialist claims about what can be achieved through war.
Despite the strength of the moral case against war, people sometimes say that they have no choice but to fight. In the concluding section of the paper I attempt to identify the relevant sense in which this could be said, and I discuss briefly how this affects the case for pacifism.     

The Euthanasia Debate in Germany - What's the Fuss?

ABSTRACT Both opponents and proponents of Singer's right to speak about euthanasia have concentrated on the tenability of his claims. They have ignored the question of what legitimate grounds there are for suppressing academic discussion, and have failed to take into account the discussion of freedom of speech in recent legal theory. To do this is the aim of my paper. Section I claims that Singer's position is immoral. Section 2 turns to the question of whether it is protected by freedom of speech, irrespective of its merits. I reject two lines of defence for Singer's opponents, that they had no opportunity to present their case, and the Kantian idea of the primacy of practical reason. Section 3 turns to a defence from legal theory. It argues that Singer's views do not pose the kind of threat to other legal and moral values which would license a suspension of his freedom of expression. I conclude that it is illegitimate to silence Singer, since he does not deny the right to live of his disabled opponents, but legitimate to protest against him, since he denies that some of their lives are worth living, in disregard of their own preferences.