Quasi-miracles,typicality, and counterfactuals

If one flips an unbiased coin a million times, there are 2^1,000,000 series of possible heads/tails sequences, any one of which might be the sequence that obtains, and each of which is equally likely to obtain. So it seems (1) ‘If I had tossed a fair coin one million times, it might have landed heads every time’ is true. But as several authors have pointed out, (2) ‘If I had tossed a fair coin a million times, it wouldn’t have come up heads every time’ will be counted as true in everyday contexts. And according to David Lewis’ influential semantics for counterfactuals, (1) and (2) are contradictories. We have a puzzle. We must either (A) deny that (2) is true, (B) deny that (1) is true, or (C) deny that (1) and (2) are contradictories, thus rejecting Lewis’ semantics. In this paper I discuss and criticize the proposals of David Lewis and more recently J. Robert G. Williams which solve the puzzle by taking option (B). I argue that we should opt for either (A) or (C).     

Age,Emotion Regulation Strategies,Temperament, Creative Drama,and Preschoolers' Creativity

Based on Yeh's (2004) Ecological Systems Model of Creativity Development, this study investigated the effects that age, the use of emotion regulation strategies, temperament, and exposure to creative drama instruction have on the development of creativity among preschool children. Participants were 1164‐ to 6‐year‐old preschool children. This study categorized the emotion regulation strategies used by preschool children and developed a creativity test which includes the measurement of usefulness, an indicator of creativity that has, until now, been ignored. The main findings are that (a) 6‐year‐olds outperform 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds in terms of creativity; (b) emotion regulation strategies as well as a positive temperament have positive effects on children's creativity; (c) creative drama instruction contributes to children's creativity; and (d) age group, emotion regulation strategies, temperament, and creative drama instruction can collectively predict children's creativity.     

Acceptibility, Evidence, and Severity

The notion of a severe test has played an important methodological role in the history of science. But it has not until recently been analyzed in any detail. We develop a generally Bayesian analysis of the notion, compare it with Deborah Mayo’s error-statistical approach by way of sample diagnostic tests in the medical sciences, and consider various objections to both. At the core of our analysis is a distinction between evidence and confirmation or belief. These notions must be kept separate if mistakes are to be avoided; combined in the right way, they provide an adequate understanding of severity. Those who think that the weight of the evidence always enables you to choose between hypotheses “ignore one of the factors (the prior probability) altogether, and treat the other (the likelihood) as though it ...meant something other than it actually does. This is the same mistake as is made by someone who has scruples about measuring the arms of a balance (having only a tape measure at his disposal ...), but is willing to assert that the heavier load will always tilt the balance (thereby implicitly assuming, although without admitting it, that the arms are of equal length!). (Bruno de Finetti, Theory of Probability)²     

Arguments,Meta-arguments,and Metadialogues: A Reconstruction of Krabbe,Govier, and Woods

Krabbe (2003, in F.H. van Eemeren, J.A. Blair, C.A. Willard and A.F. Snoeck Henkemans (eds.), Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation, Sic Sat, Amsterdam, pp. 641–644) defined a metadialogue as a dialogue about one or more dialogues, and a ground-level dialogue as a dialogue that is not a metadialogue. Similarly, I define a meta-argument as an argument about one or more arguments, and a ground-level argument as one which is not a meta-argument. Krabbe (1995, in F.H van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J.A. Blair, C.A. Willard and A.F. Snoeck Henkemans (eds.), Proceedings of the Third ISSA Conference on Argumentation, Sic Sat, Amsterdam, pp. 333–344) showed that formal-fallacy criticism (and more generally, fallacy criticism) consists of metadialogues, and that such metadialogues can be profiled in ways that lead to their proper termination or resolution. I reconstruct Krabbe’s metadialogical account into monolectical, meta-argumentative terminology by describing three-types of meta-arguments corresponding to the three ways of proving formal invalidity he studied: the trivial logic-indifferent method; the method of counterexample situation; and the method of formal paraphrase. A fourth type of meta-argument corresponds to what Oliver (1967, Mind 76, 463–478), Govier (1985, Informal Logic 7, 27–33), and Copi (1986) call refutation by logical analogy. A fifth type of meta-argument represents my reconstruction of arguments by parity of reasoning studied by Woods and Hudak (1989, Informal Logic 11, 125–139). Other particular meta-arguments deserving future study are Hume’s critique of the argument from design in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and Mill’s initial argument in The Subjection of Women about the importance of established custom and general feeling vis-à-vis argumentation.     

Eta,disco, odisco,andF

Two coefficients are proposed for measuring the extent of overlap in distributions as a direct function of the variance between the arithmetic means (“disco” and “odisco”). They are designed to answer such questions as: “Given the value of a numerical variablex, to which population should an individual be assigned so that minimum error would be incurred?” This is just the reverse of the question addressed by ANOVA. These coefficients are shown to be analytic inx and they are related to Pearson's eta and Fisher'sF. Extensions of these coefficients (designed for univariate, one-way discrimination) tok-way and multivariate discriminant analysis and measurement of “interaction” are suggested.     

Intuition, reason, and metacognition

Dual Process Theories (DPT) of reasoning posit that judgments are mediated by both fast, automatic processes and more deliberate, analytic ones. A critical, but unanswered question concerns the issue of monitoring and control: When do reasoners rely on the first, intuitive output and when do they engage more effortful thinking? We hypothesised that initial, intuitive answers are accompanied by a metacognitive experience, called the Feeling of Rightness (FOR), which can signal when additional analysis is needed. In separate experiments, reasoners completed one of four tasks: conditional reasoning (N = 60), a three-term variant of conditional reasoning (N = 48), problems used to measure base rate neglect (N = 128), or a syllogistic reasoning task (N = 64). For each task, participants were instructed to provide an initial, intuitive response to the problem along with an assessment of the rightness of that answer (FOR). They were then allowed as much time as needed to reconsider their initial answer and provide a final answer. In each experiment, we observed a robust relationship between the FOR and two measures of analytic thinking: low FOR was associated with longer rethinking times and an increased probability of answer change. In turn, FOR judgments were consistently predicted by the fluency with which the initial answer was produced, providing a link to the wider literature on metamemory. These data support a model in which a metacognitive judgment about a first, initial model determines the extent of analytic engagement.     

Propositions, semantic values, and rigidity

Jeffrey King has recently argued: (i) that the semantic value of a sentence at a context is (or determines) a function from possible worlds to truth values, and (ii) that this undermines Jason Stanley's argument against the rigidity thesis, the claim that no rigid term has the same content as a non-rigid term. I show that King's main argument for (i) fails, and that Stanley's argument is consistent with the claim that the semantic value of a sentence at a context is (or determines) a function from worlds to truth values.     

The neural, evolutionary, developmental, and bodily basis of metaphor

We propose that there are four fundamental kinds of metaphor that are uniquely mapped onto specific brain “networks” and present preliterate (i.e., evolutionary, including before the appearance of written language in the historical record), prelinguistic (i.e., developmental, before the appearance of speech in human development), and extralinguistic (i.e., neuropsychological, cognitive) evidence supportive of this view. We contend that these basic metaphors are largely nonconceptual and entail (a) perceptual-perceptual, (b) cross-modal, (c) movement-movement, and (d) perceptual-affective mappings that, at least, in the initial stages of processing may operate largely outside of conscious awareness. In opposition to our basic metaphor theory (B_mT), the standard theory (S_mT) maintains that metaphor is a conceptual mapping from some base domain to some target domain and/or represents class-inclusion (categorical) assertions. The S_mT captures aspects of secondary or conceptual metaphoric relations but not primary or basic metaphoric relations in our view. We believe our theory (B_mT) explains more about how people actually recognize or create metaphoric associations across disparate domains of experience partly because they are “pre-wired” to make these links.     

Ethics,Brain Injuries,and Sports: Prohibition,Reform, and Prudence

Abstract

In this paper, we explore the issue of the elimination of sports, or elements of sports, that present a high risk of brain injury. In particular, we critically examine two elements of Angelo Corlett’s and Pam Sailors’ arguments for the prohibition of football and Nicholas Dixon’s claim for the reformation of boxing to eliminate blows to the head based on (a) the empirical assumption of an essential or causal connection between brain injuries incurred in football and the development of a degenerative brain disease known as chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE); and (b) John Stuart Mill’s rejection of consensual domination (ie voluntary enslavement). We present four arguments to contest the validity of Corlett, Dixon’s and Sailor’s positions. Specifically, we argue that (i) certain autonomy-based arguments undermine paternalist arguments for reform; (ii) the nature of the goods people pursue in their lives might justify their foregoing (degrees of) future autonomy; (iii) Mill’s argument against consensual domination draws on ambiguous and arbitrary distinctions; (iv) the lack of consensus and empirical evidence regarding CTE arising from brain injuries in sport underdetermines calls for reform. We conclude that these proposals for reforming or eliminating sports with high risks of brain injuries are not well founded.     

Truth Values,Neither-true-nor-false,and Supervaluations

The first section (§1) of this essay defends reliance on truth values against those who, on nominalistic grounds, would uniformly substitute a truth predicate. I rehearse some practical, Carnapian advantages of working with truth values in logic. In the second section (§2), after introducing the key idea of auxiliary parameters (§2.1), I look at several cases in which logics involve, as part of their semantics, an extra auxiliary parameter to which truth is relativized, a parameter that caters to special kinds of sentences. In many cases, this facility is said to produce truth values for sentences that on the face of it seem neither true nor false. Often enough, in this situation appeal is made to the method of supervaluations, which operate by “quantifying out” auxiliary parameters, and thereby produce something like a truth value. Logics of this kind exhibit striking differences. I first consider the role that Tarski gives to supervaluation in first order logic (§2.2), and then, after an interlude that asks whether neither-true-nor-false is itself a truth value (§2.3), I consider sentences with non-denoting terms (§2.4), vague sentences (§2.5), ambiguous sentences (§2.6), paradoxical sentences (§2.7), and future-tensed sentences in indeterministic tense logic (§2.8). I conclude my survey with a look at alethic modal logic considered as a cousin (§2.9), and finish with a few sentences of “advice to supervaluationists” (2.10), advice that is largely negative. The case for supervaluations as a road to truth is strong only when the auxiliary parameter that is “quantified out” is in fact irrelevant to the sentences of interest—as in Tarski’s definition of truth for classical logic. In all other cases, the best policy when reporting the results of supervaluation is to use only explicit phrases such as “settled true” or “determinately true,” never dropping the qualification.     

Methodological appraisals, advice, and historiographical models

In the paper I examine (Section I) the best defense for the claim that methodologies shouldnot function heuristically (thesis-LW) as it appears in John Worrall. I then evaluate (Section II) his proposal of a criterion^* M which is offered as a criterion for evaluating competing methodologies such as falsificationism, conventionalism, methodology of research programmes. etc. Finally, I consider (Section III) the consequences of arguments presented earlier (Section I and II) as they bear on the problem of selecting a historiographical model.I argue, among other things, (I) that thesis-LW is defended on some very dubious assumptions; (II) that Worrall's criterion^* M falters under three clear cases two of which at least^*M should accomodate, and that part of^* M's failure can be linked to its being hooked to thesis-LW. By arguments analogous to the ones which serve^* M, I show thatcontra John Worrall and John Watkins, thesis-LW is testable; finally, (III) if we accept arguments for thesis-LW and^* M we are left with a skeptical conclusion with respect to the choice of a historiographical model which Worrall by parity of reasoning should accept, but does not.     

Behavioral comparisons of nervous,stable, and crossbred pointers at ages 2, 3, 6, 9, and 12 months

To clarify some effects of inheritance on abnormal behavior we have maintained by line breeding and selective matingnervous (E) andstable (A) strains within the pointer breed of dogs. We now have comparable measures on behavioral tests of brief activity, startle reactions to a 122-decibel hom, and reactions to humans (Effect of Person) at ages 2, 3, 6, 9, and 12 months, for the two strains as well as for 26 crossbred offspring. In spite of the small crossbred (AE) sample size and limitations of a general nature, the offspring performances are surprisingly like the nervous side of their ancestry, suggesting dominant inheritance.     

Crime,drug abuse,mental illness,and homelessness

In this project, 345 homeless persons were interviewed during the period from May, 1985 to May, 1986 in Richmond, Virginia. Data reveal that current afflictions (e.g., hallucinations) are related to major life events in the past (i.e., psychiatric hospitalizations). Further, certain experiences prior to adulthood (e.g., drug use) predict these major life events (e.g., crime). Thus, the data support a general “drift down” hypothesis as a useful explanation of homeless for future theory development. Some policy implications are given.     

Form symbolism, analogy, and metaphor

Simple forms, such as a square and a circle, can be symbolic; for example, a square can be deemed to behard and a circle to besoft. The relation between form symbolism and the comprehension of metaphors and analogies was studied in three experiments. Subjects were asked to rate matches between terms such assoft andhard andcircle andsquare as symbols (Experiment 1), metaphors (Experiment 2), and analogies (Experiment 3). The results show that a highly rated symbolic relation could be a poorly rated metaphorical relation. Ratings of analogies were similar to ratings of symbols. We argue that apt metaphors, analogies, and symbolic forms claim that the vehicle and the topic of the comparisons have common features, but that metaphoric representation entails more common features than does either symbolism or analogy, because metaphor requires that the vehicle be an especially apt example of a superordinate class. Thus, metaphor is a particularly strong claim about common features shared by the topic and the vehicle.     

Evolution,Suffering, and Eschatological Redemption: Sollereder,Southgate, and Russell on Theodicy

Two new books helpfully refine the position vaunted by Theistic Evolution. These two books will garner the interest especially of the proleptic school within Theistic Evolution, which affirms (1) the long history of evolution as God's creative work; (2) the Theology of the Cross wherein God shares in the sufferings and even death of all creatures, animals included; (3) Jesus’ Easter resurrection as a prolepsis of the eschatological new creation; and (4) the coincidence of creation with redemption. These two provocative new works are Bethany Sollereder's God, Evolution, and Animal Suffering: Theodicy without a Fall, along with Christopher Southgate's Theology in a Suffering World: Glory and Longing. This article tackles a problem surfacing in the work of both Sollereder and Southgate: when eliminating the fall, the combination of redemption and creation becomes incoherent. Robert John Russell's “fall without a fall” provides greater coherence in the proleptic version of Theistic Evolution.     

Performance,incentives, and needs for autonomy,competence, and relatedness: a meta-analysis

Although self-determination theory (SDT) is one of the most widely cited theories of human motivation and function, critics have questioned the practical utility of its three needs (i.e., autonomy, competence, and relatedness) in performance contexts. We conduct a meta-analysis (k = 108, N = 30,648) to explore the magnitude and boundary conditions of need satisfaction and performance. As expected, autonomy (ρ = .28), competence (ρ = .37), and relatedness (ρ = .25) predict performance. Incentivization per se has little impact on need-satisfaction: instead, the need satisfaction → performance relationship is moderated by incentive salience. Consistent with a crowding-out hypothesis, need satisfaction matters less to performance when incentives are directly salient (ρ = .22) and more when indirectly salient (ρ = .45). Our meta-analysis demonstrates that indirectly salient incentives and need-satisfaction are indeed compatible, providing a direct response to criticisms of SDT in performance contexts. Additional unexpected findings and future directions are discussed.     

Money,moral transgressions,and blame

Two experiments tested participants' attributions for others' immoral behaviors when conducted for more versus less money. We hypothesized and found that observers would blame wrongdoers more when seeing a transgression enacted for little rather than a lot of money, and that this would be evident in observers' hand-washing behavior. Experiment 1 used a cognitive dissonance paradigm. Participants (N = 160) observed a confederate lie in exchange for either a relatively large or a small monetary payment. Participants blamed the liar more in the small (versus large) money condition. Participants (N = 184) in Experiment 2 saw images of someone knocking over another to obtain a small, medium, or large monetary sum. In the small (versus large) money condition, participants blamed the perpetrator (money) more. Hence, participants assigned less blame to moral wrong-doers, if the latter enacted their deed to obtain relatively large sums of money. Small amounts of money accentuate the immorality of others' transgressions.     

Ethicism, Interpretation, and Munich

abstract   The paper, using Spielberg's Munich as a test case, argues that the theory of ethicism – the view that a work of art's moral point of view affects the work's overall aesthetic evaluation – has serious restricted applicability owing to a number of reasons. Ethicism does not apply to works of art (1) that have no moral content; (2) that do have moral content but whose prescribed responses are non-moral; (3) whose prescribed moral responses do not ask the audience to accept or reject the moral claim but merely to contemplate or entertain it; (4) whose prescribed moral responses assert moral claims that are indeterminate; and (5) whose prescribed moral responses are embodied in equally plausible or true but incompatible interpretations.     

Suffering, Prayer, and Miracles

Unrelieved suffering leads many to ask, “How can I trust a miracle-working God, who will not help me or my loved ones?” From brief exegeses of Jesus' healing of a man born blind (Jn 9) and of Jesus' response to Pilate's murderous oppression (Lk 13), I argue that (1) God uses suffering to call its witnesses to repentance and to acts of steadfast love that fulfill the creation of humanity; (2) miracles are real, rare, and ambiguous; (3) God is good and powerful enough to deliver everyone decisively, but God's patient commitment to human freedom and universal reconciliation preclude it; (4) all suffering is sacrificial and will become meaningful; and that (5) there are at least three faithful and coordinate responses to suffering.