Escaping mental fixation: Incubation and inhibition in creative problem solving

The inhibition underlying retrieval-induced forgetting has been argued to play a crucial role in the ability to overcome interference in memory and cognition. Supporting this conjecture, recent research has found that participants who exhibit greater levels of retrieval-induced forgetting are better at overcoming fixation on the Remote Associates Test (RAT) than are participants who exhibit reduced levels of retrieval-induced forgetting. If the ability to inhibit inappropriate responses improves the ability to solve fixated RAT problems, then reducing the fixation caused by inappropriate responses should reduce the correlation between retrieval-induced forgetting and problem solving. We tested this hypothesis by inserting an incubation period between two 30-second problem-solving attempts: half of the participants were given an incubation period (distributed condition), half were not (continuous condition). In the continuous condition retrieval-induced forgetting correlated positively with problem-solving performance during both the initial and final 30 seconds of problem solving. In the distributed condition retrieval-induced forgetting only correlated with problem-solving performance during the first 30 seconds of problem solving. This finding suggests that incubation reduces the need for inhibition by reducing the extent to which problem solvers suffer fixation.     

Chasing red herrings: Memory of distractors causes fixation in creative problem solving

Two experiments tested the red herring retrieval hypothesis, which states that fixation in creative problem solving is worse when memory for red herrings (i.e., inappropriate or incorrect solutions) is strengthened. In Experiment 1, when associations between Remote Associates Test (RAT) problem words (e.g., COTTAGE, SWISS, CAKE) and related red herring words (e.g., hut, chocolate, icing) were strengthened via repetition, an encoding variable, fixation was found to increase. In Experiment 2, when associations were formed between RAT problem contexts and red herrings, then subsequent reinstatement of problem contexts during RAT problem solving trials (as compared with showing new contexts) also worsened fixation effects. Our results add to the increasing body of research that connects memory with creative problem solving, and they suggest possible ways for overcoming fixation effects.     

Epistemology and the theory of problem solving

Problem solving has recently become a central topic both in the philosophy of science and in cognitive science. This paper integrates approaches to problem solving from these two disciplines and discusses the epistemological consequences of such an integration. The paper first analyzes problem solving as getting a true answer to a question. It then explores some stages of cognitive activity relevant to question answering that have been delineated by historians and philosophers of science and by cognitive psychologists and artificial intelligencers. The traditional opposition between discovery and justification is challenged. It is suggested that epistemology may be conceptualized, in part, as the critical assessment of problem-solving strategies.     

Imagery in thinking and problem solving

The possible role of imagery in thinking and problem solving was examined by giving 20 subjects a practical construction test (Maier's hat rack problem). 5 men and 4 women solved the problem. Posttest questioning indicated two distinct types of imagery were used to solve the problem, imagination or memory in imagery. The solvers tended to use imagination in imagery and the nonsolvers memory in imagery. In Exp. 2, 40 subjects were specifically instructed to use one or another of these strategies. Those using imagination in imagery were more likely to solve the problem than those using memory in imagery. The conclusion was drawn that imagination in imagery favours and memory in imagery impedes the solving of this problem.     

Analogical problem solving

The use of an analogy from a semantically distant domain to guide the problemsolving process was investigated. The representation of analogy in memory and processes involved in the use of analogies were discussed theoretically and explored in five experiments. In Experiment I oral protocols were used to examine the processes involved in solving a problem by analogy. In all experiments subjects who first read a story about a military problem and its solution tended to generate analogous solutions to a medical problem (Duncker's “radiation problem”), provided they were given a hint to use the story to help solve the problem. Transfer frequency was reduced when the problem presented in the military story was substantially disanalogous to the radiation problem, even though the solution illustrated in the story corresponded to an effective radiation solution (Experiment II). Subjects in Experiment III tended to generate analogous solutions to the radiation problem after providing their own solutions to the military problem. Subjects were able to retrieve the story from memory and use it to generate an analogous solution, even when the critical story had been memorized in the context of two distractor stories (Experiment IV). However, when no hint to consider the story was given, frequency of analogous solutions decreased markedly. This decrease in transfer occurred when the story analogy was presented in a recall task along with distractor stories (Experiment IV), when it was presented alone, and when it was presented in between two attempts to solve the problem (Experiment V). Component processes and strategic variations in analogical problem solving were discussed. Issues related to noticing analogies and accessing them in memory were also examined, as was the relationship of analogical reasoning to other cognitive tasks.     

Self-appraised social problem solving abilities, emotional reactions and actual problem solving performance

Self-report measures of social problem solving abilities have yet to be associated with objective problem solving performance in any consistent manner. In the present study, we investigated the relation of social problem solving abilities--as measured by the Social Problem Solving Skills Inventory--Revised (SPSI-R [Maydeu-Olivares, A. & D'Zurilla, T. J. (1996). A factor analytic study of the Social Problem Solving Inventory: an integration of theory and data. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 20, 115-133])--to performance on a structured problem solving task. Unlike previous studies, we examined the relation of problem solving skills to performance curves observed in repeated trials, while controlling for affective reactions to each trial. Using hierarchical modeling techniques, a negative problem orientation was significantly predictive of performance and this effect was not mediated by negative affectivity. Results are discussed as they pertain to contemporary models of social problem solving.     

Control mechanisms in problem solving

Hypothesis-testing theories and information processing theories have both been used to explain the results of problem solving experiments. The theories have, in general, been applied to different classes of problems, resulting in little overlap or interaction between them. Information processing theories have tended to emphasize problems in which the problem solver’s primary source of information concerning the correctness of his moves is the problem goal and, as a result, the goal plays a major role in the control mechanisms determining moves. Hypothesis theories have emphasized problems in which direct feedback is the primary control mechanism available. It is suggested that altering a problem solver’s major source of information from a goal to feedback or vice versa will have important implications for the course of problem solving and what is learned during the solution process. Specifically, changes in the information feedback and/or goal-specificity characteristics of a problem should, in a predictable fashion, alter problem solving strategies, which should, in tum, through the presence or absence of information compression devices such as rule induction, strongly affect transfer. Experiments using the Tower of Hanoi and visual maze-tracing problems indicated that altering the density of subgoals resulted in alterations in subsequent transfer performance.     

Apperception in primed problem solving

Mental representation is a central theoretical concept in modern cognitive psychology. However, its investigation has been predominantly based on inapt perceptualist concepts, which presume that information contents in them, i.e., mental contents, solely arise from stimulus. This is in spite of the evidence that much in human thought does not have any sensory equivalence. Consequently, we make a difference between perception and apperception, as e.g., Kant and Wundt did, and argue in favor of a detailed analysis of this mental process that is responsible for the construction of representations. We present here five primed problem solving experiments. The basic idea was to demonstrate that depending on priming information people represent perceptually identical stimuli very differently, i.e., they ascribe different uses and meanings to objects and they integrate them differently to compose distinct solutions. In this vein, we demonstrate that people regularly rely on information, which is not or cannot be perceived in principle. On the ground of our empirical findings, we resurrect the issue on why the difference between perception and apperception is theoretically adequate and introduce some central concepts for the theoretical analysis of apperception such as "seeing as" and functional binding.     

Pupil size and problem solving

Pupil size changes were monitored during the solution of various types of problems. A number of solution and response strategies were required of the subject. There was strong confirmation of the theory that this autonomic index can provide a sensitive measure of the fluctuating levels of attention and arousal, which are associated with the various aspects of information processing and response.     

Achievement motivation and problem solving

Abstract.— The relationships between achievement motivation and problem solving were discussed. It was suggested that problem solving may be differentially related to achievement motivation in high and low ability groups. In a group of 46 male students, scoring high on a test of intellectual flexibility, a positive relationship was found between a projective measure of fear of failure and solution of the Hatrack Problem. In a group of 49 male subjects with low flexibility scores, fear of failure was negatively related to problem solving. The results were taken to indicate that the ability measure represented general self confidence and expectancy. Thus subjects with high self confidence might attempt to avoid failure by trying hard to succeed, while a more probable strategy for subjects with low expectancy would be to exert little effort. A test of this hypothesis was made by analyzing a measure of overt activity in the Hatrack situation across high/low motivational and ability groups. Whereas in the high ability group subjects with high fear of failure showed a high level of activity, high fear of failure subjects in the low ability group showed a low level of activity, thus supporting the hypothesis.     

Dynamics and constraints in insight problem solving

This article reports 2 experiments that investigated performance on a novel insight problem, the 8-coin problem. The authors hypothesized that participants would make certain initial moves (strategic moves) that seemed to make progress according to the problem instructions but that nonetheless would guarantee failure to solve the problem. Experiment 1 manipulated the starting state of the problem and showed that overall solution rates were lower when such strategic moves were available. Experiment 2 showed that failure to capitalize on visual hints about the correct first move was also associated with the availability of strategic moves. The results are interpreted in terms of an information-processing framework previously applied to the 9-dot problem. The authors argue that in addition to the operation of inappropriate constraints, a full account of insight problem solving must incorporate a dynamic that steers solution-seeking activity toward the constraints.     

Intuition in insight and noninsight problem solving

People’s metacognitions, both before and during problem solving, may be of importance in motivating and guiding problem-solving behavior. These metacognitions could also be diagnostic for distinguishing among different classes of problems, each perhaps controlled by different cognitive processes. In the present experiments, intuitions on classic insight problems were compared with those on noninsight and algebra problems. The findings were as follows: (1) subjective feeling of knowing predicted performance on algebra problems but not on insight problems; (2) subjects’ expectations of performance greatly exceeded their actual performance, especially on insight problems; (3) normative predictions provided a better estimate of individual performance than did subjects’ own predictions, especially on the insight problems; and, most importantly, (4) the patterns-of-warmth ratings, which reflect subjects’ feelings of approaching solution, differed for insight and noninsight problems. Algebra problems and noninsight problems showed a more incremental pattern over the course of solving than did insight problems. In general, then, the data indicated that noninsight problems were open to accurate predictions of performance, whereas insight problems were opaque to such predictions. Also, the phenomenology of insight-problem solution was characterized by a sudden, unforeseen flash of illumination. We propose that the difference in phenomenology accompanying insight and noninsight problem solving, as empirically demonstrated here, be used to define insight.     

Interactive insight problem solving

Insight problem solving was investigated with the matchstick algebra problems developed by Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, and Rhenius (1999 Knoblich, G., Ohlsson, S., Haider, H. and Rhenius, D. 1999. Constraint relaxation and chunk decomposition in insight problem solving. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 25: 1534–1555. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). These problems are false equations expressed with Roman numerals that can be made true bymoving one matchstick. In a first group participants examined a static two-dimensional representation of the false algebraic expression and told the experimenter which matchstick should be moved. In a second group, participants interacted with a three-dimensional representation of the false equation. Success rates in the static group for different problem types replicated the pattern of data reported in Knoblich et al. (1999 Knoblich, G., Ohlsson, S., Haider, H. and Rhenius, D. 1999. Constraint relaxation and chunk decomposition in insight problem solving. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 25: 1534–1555. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). However, participants in the interactive group were significantly more likely to achieve insight. Problem-solving success in the static group was best predicted by performance on a test of numeracy, whereas in the interactive group it was best predicted by performance on a test of visuo-spatial reasoning. Implications for process models of problem solving are discussed.     

Giving up problem solving

How do people decide to abandon a problem? Participants were presented with unsolvable water jar problems, having been accurately informed of the prior probability of solvability. Across three experiments, we discovered effects of prior probability of solvability and of problem size (number of distinct problem states) on measures of effort and confidence. If a problem is more likely to be solvable and allows more problem states, a problem solver spends longer trying to solve the problem. Giving-up decisions are informed by the same judgments of probability of success and costs of solution that inform move-choice in a rational model of problem solving.     

Theory of constructions and set in problem solving

Hierarchically organized knowledge about actions has been postulated to explain planning in problem solving. Perdix, a simulation of problem solving in geometry with schematic planning knowledge, is described. Perdix’s planning knowledge enables it to augment the problem space it is given by constructing auxiliary lines. The planning system also provides a mechanism that can result in problem solving set. Results of three experiments involving set and constructions seem consistent with the kinds of knowledge structures hypothesized in the model. Protocols given during solution of 11 geometry problems showed general agreement with the explanation of constructions and set based on planning knowledge, but they also indicated processes of human problem solving not represented in the model. Finally, the explanation of constructions is discussed in relation to the general question of ill-structured problems and creativity, and the explanation of set is discussed in relation to other phenomena in the problem solving literature, including functional fixedness.