幼儿看图叙述中心理状态术语的使用与错误信念理解关系的短期跟踪研究

摘 要：为探明汉语儿童看图叙述中心理状态术语的应用及与错误信念理解能力的关系,并追踪二者相互作用的方向,本研究以101名3-5岁儿童为研究对象,纵向探查了前后相隔3个月的儿童看图叙述中心理状态术语使用情况和错误信念能力的发展状况,并从横向和纵向两个时间点分别探讨了心理状态术语的运用与错误信念理解的关系。结果表明：3-5岁儿童错误信念理解能力快速发展;儿童看图叙述中使用较多的愿望术语和情绪术语,信念术语应用相对较少,且认知词汇类型较少。控制了一般语言能力和年龄之后,仅在第一次测验上,情绪术语、信念术语仍然与同期及后期错误信念理解能力存在显著相关。     

4岁儿童对他人记忆的评判与错误信念理解的关系

从观点采择的角度考察儿童对他人记忆的评判及其与错误信念理解的关系。与他人分享记忆时,个体需要同时处理自我与他人对过去的表征和看法;而要顺利完成错误信念任务,个体需要同时加工自我的真实信念与他人的错误信念。因此个体对他人记忆的评判能力可能会与其对错误信念的理解相关。40名4岁儿童完成一系列错误信念任务和评判他人记忆是否正确任务,情境包括视觉、意图解释和情绪解释。结果表明,控制年龄、语言和记忆能力等因素后,被试评判他人记忆的成绩仍然可以预测其对错误信念的理解。这些结果为幼儿在回忆叙述中谈及他人越多,其心理理论越好提供了进一步的证据和可能的解释     

纳西族和汉族儿童情绪理解能力的发展

选取3～5岁的纳西族儿童107人,3～5岁的汉族儿童90人,使用情绪理解任务系统地考察了他们情绪理解的发展,同时还测量了两个民族儿童的错误信念理解和语言能力。结果表明,两个民族儿童情绪理解能力具有相似的发展规律,但完成各任务的成绩有显著差异,提示了两个民族儿童情绪理解能力发展的不同步性。研究还发现,心理理论社会知觉成分与认知成分随年龄的增长相互促进和相互制约,并且都与语言能力有关。     

冲突抑制对儿童错误信念理解的影响:参与概念建构

研究探讨了冲突抑制对错误信念的影响.通过设计冲突真实信念任务,采用标准信念、区分信念任务,研究分离了意外地点任务中的四个成分,知道信念导致行为;根据他人的信念推测行为;抑制自己所看到的物体位置;错误信念概念。113名3～6岁儿童完成了四个信念任务和两个冲突抑制任务.随着抑制要求的增加,儿童在信念任务上的成绩逐渐下降;意外地点任务与冲突抑制相关显著.这说明,抑制现实和自己的观点在儿童信念加工中发挥了重要作用;冲突抑制参与建构儿童错误信念概念.     

信念归因的机制:fMRI能告诉我们什么

发展心理学研究表明信念归因与抑制性控制和语言(特别是补充句法,complement syntax)有着密切的联系,儿童抑制性控制能力和补充句法能力与其错误信念任务的表现有较高的相关。但是抑制性控制能力和补充句法能力对于信念归因是不是必须的在发展心理学中并没有得到解决。脑成像研究表明,信念归因与抑制性控制和补充句法有着不同的神经机制,从而在一定程度上表明,至少对于大人,在完成错误信念归因任务过程中可能并不需要抑制性控制和补充句法。     

3～5岁幼儿错误信念理解能力的发展趋势

基于以往支持心理理论执行功能表达论的研究结果,对标准错误信念任务修正后采用阶段性错误信念任务,运用实验法对101名3~5岁儿童进行研究。结果发现:(1)新任务保留了标准错误信念任务的优势,能勾勒出幼儿错误信念理解能力的发展趋势;(2)3~5岁儿童表现出不同层次和水平的错误信念理解能力;(3)具体分析儿童错误信念的理解能力发展的心理模式,发现每一年龄组具有的错误信念理解能力,都是其更高水平能力发展的基础,支持表达论。     

3～6岁儿童情绪伪装认知能力发展及其与错误信念理解的关系

个体的情绪伪装能力是其情绪社会化发展极为重要的方面,选取某幼儿园123名3～6岁儿童为被试,通过“区分外表-真实情绪”任务和“错误信念”任务考察3～6岁儿童情绪伪装认知能力的发展特点,进而探讨情绪伪装认知与错误信念理解的关系.结果表明：（1）儿童情绪伪装认知能力随年龄增长而提高,3～5岁为儿童情绪伪装认知能力的快速发展期;（2）儿童在消极情境下区分内外情绪的能力显著高于在积极情境中的表现;同时,对两种情绪伪装动机（社会适应、自我保护）的认知能力无显著差异;（3）儿童情绪伪装认知和错误信念理解能力显著相关,两种错误信念（意外内容、意外地点）理解都能很好地预测情绪伪装认知能力.     

5～8岁儿童二级信念-愿望推理能力的发展

该研究依据信念(正确-错误)和愿望(接近-回避)对儿童的二级信念-愿望推理能力进行了细分,并据此设计了四个二级信念-愿望任务,探讨了480名5～8岁儿童在四个任务上的表现。结果发现,对儿童而言,不同的二级信念-愿望任务的难度不同,由易到难的顺序依次为:二级真实信念接近愿望、二级错误信念接近愿望、二级真实信念回避愿望、二级错误信念回避愿望。     

3～6岁儿童信念理解能力的发展研究

研究设计了冲突真实信念任务,用于考察儿童对真实信念的理解;并利用区分信念、冲突真实信念和意外地点的错误信念任务,考察儿童理解信念推理基本规则、真实信念和错误信念的发展顺序。97名3~6岁儿童完成了测试。结果显示,3岁儿童能理解信念推理的基本规则,5岁儿童能理解真实信念,6岁儿童能理解错误信念。结果支持了儿童先理解真实信念,后理解错误信念的发展模式;也说明在理解信念以前儿童已能掌握信念推理的基本规则。     

儿童欺骗的情境依赖

采用竞争游戏的方式研究3～6岁儿童在外显和隐蔽情境里的欺骗。结果表明4、5岁儿童行为上的隐蔽欺骗和错误信念理解显著相关;3岁儿童语言上的外显欺骗（说谎）和错误信念理解显著相关;各年龄段儿童行为上的外显欺骗和错误信念理解没有显著相关。和Cartson（1998）的研究结果不一致的是,本研究中4、5、6岁儿童的隐蔽欺骗人数显著超过外显欺骗人数。结果提示,语言上的外显欺骗（说谎）不仅和儿童的执行功能有关,还可能和欺骗时的情境压力有关。     

Theory of mind and epistemological development: the relation between children's second-order false-belief understanding and their ability to reason about evidence

The study investigates the hypothesis that children's ability to attribute second-order beliefs facilitates their understanding of evidence, as seen in the ability to distinguish between causes and reasons. Seventy-four children 5–7 yr old were given belief and evidence tests. The belief tests assessed their ability to represent and reason from second-order false-beliefs, and the evidence tests assessed their ability to distinguish between the cause of a situation and a person's reason for believing it. The relation between performance on the two tests was determined, taking into account general language and non-verbal reasoning abilities. Results show that performance on the belief test and on the evidence part of the evidence test improved significantly over the age range, and that a significant proportion of variance in the evidence test scores is accounted for by second-order false-belief understanding, over and above that accounted for by general language and non-verbal abilities. The argument is made that second-order false-belief understanding is fundamental to children's epistemological development, underlying not just their understanding of evidence, but also their understanding of inference and truth.     

Language Promotes False-Belief Understanding: Evidence From Learners of a New Sign Language

ABSTRACT— Developmental studies have identified a strong correlation in the timing of language development and false-belief understanding. However, the nature of this relationship remains unresolved. Does language promote false-belief understanding, or does it merely facilitate development that could occur independently, albeit on a delayed timescale? We examined language development and false-belief understanding in deaf learners of an emerging sign language in Nicaragua. The use of mental-state vocabulary and performance on a low-verbal false-belief task were assessed, over 2 years, in adult and adolescent users of Nicaraguan Sign Language. Results show that those adults who acquired a nascent form of the language during childhood produce few mental-state signs and fail to exhibit false-belief understanding. Furthermore, those whose language developed over the period of the study correspondingly developed in false-belief understanding. Thus, language learning, over and above social experience, drives the development of a mature theory of mind.     

Fonctions exécutives et théorie de l’esprit chez le jeune enfant : une relation réciproque ?

The aim of this study was to assess the specific relation between 18-month-olds’ performance on tasks measuring language skills, executive function (EF) and theory of mind (ToM). The ToM tasks included measures of intention and false-belief understanding whereas working memory and inhibitory control were assessed with three EF tasks. Expressive vocabulary was assessed with the MacArthur Communicative Development Inventory. The main findings showed that both aspects of ToM are strongly linked at this age to inhibitory control, but not to working memory abilities. Language skills were not associated with either ToM or EF abilities. With regard to inter-tasks coherence within EF and ToM, we replicated previous findings with no consistency across EF tasks but an association between false-belief and intention understanding. Overall, these findings provide evidence for a link between executive function and theory of mind at the youngest age ever tested. They also challenge the view that EF is not required to succeed on the false-belief task based on spontaneous responses.     

儿童二级错误信念认知与二级情绪理解的发展

以来自两所幼儿园的133名儿童为被试,探讨了3~6岁儿童二级错误信念认知和二级情绪理解的发展分化与联系。结果发现,6岁左右是儿童的二级错误信念认知和二级情绪理解发展的关键期;4岁左右的儿童能够掌握二级未知知识,获得情绪解码能力;儿童的二级未知与二级错误信念认知之间,儿童的情绪解码与二级情绪理解之间,在发展上存在1~2年的差距;二级推理能力是儿童进行二级心理状态认知的关键。     

Longitudinal Relations Between 2-Year-Olds' Language and 4-Year-Olds' Theory of Mind

Maternal reports of child vocabulary, utterance length, morpheme usage, and sentence complexity and experimenter-assessed receptive and expressive language were obtained at the end of the 2nd year for European American middle-class toddlers (N = 27). Maternal verbal intelligence and socioeconomic status were also measured. At 48 months of age, children's false-belief understanding and verbal intelligence were evaluated. Individual differences in child language at 24 months and child verbal IQ at 48 months predicted unique variance in performance on the false-belief tasks at 48 months, although only the early language factor findings were statistically significant. These findings demonstrate previously unobserved relations between early language and later acquisition of complex concepts related to mind.     

Thinking while talking: adults fail nonverbal false-belief reasoning

This experiment tested the ability of 81 adult subjects to make a decision on a simple nonverbal false-belief reasoning task while concurrently either shadowing prerecorded spoken dialogue or tapping along with a rhythmic shadowing track. Our results showed that the verbal task, but not tapping, significantly disrupted false-belief reasoning, suggesting that language plays a key role in working theory of mind in adults, even when the false-belief reasoning is nonverbal.     

Executive and theory-of-mind contributions to event-based prospective memory in children: exploring the self-projection hypothesis

In two studies, 4- to 6-year-olds were asked to name pictures of animals for the benefit of a watching hand puppet (the ongoing task) but to refrain from naming and to remove from view any pictures of dogs (the prospective memory [PM] task). Children also completed assessments of verbal ability, cognitive inhibition, working memory, and false-belief understanding (both studies), empathy (Study 1 only), and performance on false-sign tests that matched the false-belief tests in narrative content and structure (Study 2 only). Both studies found that inhibition and false-belief performance made unique contributions to the variance in PM, although in Study 1 the influence of inhibition was evident only when children needed to withhold naming. Study 2 further demonstrated that false-belief performance was the only reliable predictor of whether children remembered to return to the researcher an object that had been loaned to them prior to the picture-naming game. Both experiments uncovered moderate relations between PM and chronological age, but such relations were rarely significant after taking account of cognitive ability. We consider the implications of the findings for (a) current views regarding frontal/executive contributions to PM development and (b) the suggestion that the same brain network underlies various forms of mental self-projection, including envisioning the future and understanding the minds of other people.     

Children's understanding of promising, lying, and false belief

Understanding promising and lying requires an understanding of intention and the ability to interpret mental states. The author examined (a) the extent to which 4- to 6-year-olds focus on the sincerity of the speaker's intention when the 4-to 6-year-olds make judgments about promises and lies and (b) whether false-belief reasoning skills are related to understanding promising and lying. Participants watched videotaped stories and made promise and lie judgments from their own perspective and from the listener-character's perspective. Children also completed false-belief reasoning tasks. Older children made more correct promise judgments from both perspectives. All children made correct lie judgments from the listener's perspective. The author found that Ist-order false-belief reasoning was related to making judgments from the participant's perspective; 2nd-order false-belief reasoning was related to making judgments from the listener-character's perspective. Results suggest that children's understanding of promising and lying moves from a focus on outcome toward a focus on the belief that each utterance is designed to create.     

Are Infants’ Theory-of-Mind Abilities Well Integrated? Implicit Understanding of Intentions,Desires, and Beliefs

The development of theory of mind (ToM) in infancy has been mainly documented through studies conducted on a single age group with a single task. Very few studies have examined ToM abilities other than false belief, and very few studies have used a within-subjects design. During 2 testing sessions, infants aged 14 and 18 months old were administered ToM tasks based on the violation-of-expectation paradigm which measured intention, true belief, desire, and false-belief understanding. Infants’ looking times at the congruent and incongruent test trials of each task were compared, and results revealed that both groups of infants looked significantly longer at the incongruent trial on the intention and true-belief tasks. In contrast, only 18-month-olds looked significantly longer at the incongruent trial of the desire task and neither age group looked significantly longer at the incongruent trial on the false-belief task. Additionally, intertask comparisons revealed only a significant relation between performance on the false-belief and intention task. These findings suggest that implicit intention and true-belief understanding emerge earlier than desire and false-belief understanding and that ToM constructs do not appear to be integrated, as is the case for explicit ToM.     

Infants' Developing Sensitivity to Object Function: Attention to Features and Feature Correlations

In this research we examine the relation between executive function (EF) and false-belief (FB) understanding in young children. Specifically, we proposed that performance on tasks combining 2 executive demands: (a) working memory and (b) inhibitory control would be most predictive of performance on FB tasks. Forty-eight children between the ages of 3 and 5 years were given a battery of EF and FB measures. As predicted we found that performance on executive tasks that combined demands for memory and inhibitory control were highly predictive of performance on FB tasks. To further test the relation of EF and FB understanding we also introduced an experimental manipulation designed to reduce the working memory demands of FB tasks. This manipulation did not significantly improve performance. The results from this study provide support for the relation between EF and FB understanding, although the exact nature of the relation requires further clarification.