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以往研究表明, 社会价值取向对社会困境中合作行为变异的解释量不高。本研究指出, 初始资源配置导致个体处于某种优劣势位置上, 从而影响社会价值取向不同的个体的合作行为。研究设置了两人互动和多人互动两种情境, 通过变化被试所拥有的初始资源的相对价值或相对数量来操作优势差异, 检验亲社会者和亲自我者在社会困境中的心理与行为差异。研究结果表明, 在初始资源处于相对劣势位置时, 亲社会者比亲自我者表现出更高的合作水平。 相似文献
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本研究采用连续式公共物品困境,考察不同类型的个体在同伴遵守和违反均等规范两种条件下合作的前后变化及其可能的机制。结果发现:(1)依据行为决策对被试进行的分类与其社会价值取向之间不存在相关;(2)一人违反均等条件下被试的合作水平高于多人违反均等条件下的合作水平;(3)高贡献者在前后两次互动中维持较高的合作水平和信念水平;(4)低贡献者第二次决策时比第一次决策时更合作,这可能是由于他们的合作信念提高。 相似文献
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为揭示双人社会困境中合作行为的影响因素,选取四种不同类型的双人社会困境,采用实验法考察社会价值取向与损失情境对不同时间压力下合作行为的影响。结果显示,亲社会个体的合作率显著高于亲自我个体的合作率,收益情境下的合作率显著高于损失情境下的合作率,在社会困境中双方冲突程度越大合作率越低;此外,高时间压力提升了亲自我个体在囚徒困境以及收益情境下信任困境中的合作率,同时降低了亲自我个体在损失情境下最大差异困境中的合作率。结果表明,社会价值取向、收益损失情境以及困境冲突程度均对合作行为的发生具有影响作用,而时间压力对合作行为的作用也同样受到三者的影响。这些发现能够为合作行为自动性的理论分歧提供新的证据。 相似文献
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通过两项研究考查大学生在社会困境中的行为决策及公平感体验,检验社会价值取向的影响作用,有效被试分别为85名和84名。结果表明:(1)亲社会者比亲自我者更倾向做公平决策;信息对称比不对称条件更促进被试做公平决策;女生比男生更倾向做公平决策。(2)性别在社会价值取向与信息对称性对公平决策的影响中起调节作用,社会价值取向显著影响男生的公平决策,信息对称性显著影响女生的公平决策。(3)社会价值取向显著影响个体对不公平的容忍度,亲社会者更不容忍不公平行为。(4)对于利己的不公平行为,被试都倾向接受,亲社会者并不比亲自我者体验到更强的内疚情绪;对于不利己的不公平行为,被试都倾向拒绝,且产生较强的不公平感及气愤情绪。 相似文献
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高龄、且长期罹患多种疾病的患者,病情一旦进展到必须接受有创机械通气的阶段,则康复机会极小,生存质量极差,不应划入急性可逆性范畴;而应转入社区医疗,加强现代健康观、死亡观教育,提供多种解决方案,不必一概纳入全方位支持监护系统,更不应常规给予有创机械通气、CRRT、亚低温治疗、肠内及肠外营养作为长期替代治疗. 相似文献
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高龄、且长期罹患多种疾病的患者,病情一旦进展到必须接受有创机械通气的阶段,则康复机会极小,生存质量极差,不应划入急性可逆性范畴;而应转入社区医疗,加强现代健康观、死亡观教育,提供多种解决方案,不必一概纳入全方位支持监护系统,更不应常规给予有创机械通气、CRRT、亚低温治疗、肠内及肠外营养作为长期替代治疗。 相似文献
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为了探究个体自身与他人的社会阶层对个体在社会困境中合作行为的影响及其作用机制,本研究通过问卷和实验研究来考察自身阶层的行为效应、互动对象阶层的调节效应以及信任有中介的调节作用。研究发现:(1)低阶层者倾向于比高阶层者表现出更多的合作行为;(2)感知到的互动对象阶层对不同阶层个体的合作行为存在显著的调节效应;(3)个体对互动对象的信任水平(即对他人合作行为的预期)对此调节效应起到中介作用。 相似文献
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Probst TM Carnevale PJ Triandis HC 《Organizational behavior and human decision processes》1999,77(3):5-191
Do cultural values influence the manner in which people cooperate with one another? This study assessed cultural characteristics of individuals and then related these characteristics to cooperative behavior in social dilemmas. Participants were assessed for their degree of vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism, cultural values identified by Triandis (1995). They made choices in either a single-group or an intergroup social dilemma. The single-group dilemma entailed a three-person dilemma; the intergroup dilemma was identical but added subgroup competition, i.e., an opposing three-person group. The results indicated an interaction between cultural characteristics and type of dilemma for cooperation. The single-group versus intergroup effect reported by Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) was replicated, but only for vertical individualists. The vertical individualists were least cooperative in the single-group dilemma but were more cooperative in the intergroup dilemma-where cooperation with the group maximized personal outcomes. The vertical collectivists were most cooperative in the single-group dilemma but were less cooperative in the intergroup dilemma- where group defection resulted in maximum group outcomes. The horizontal individualists and collectivists exhibited an intermediate level of cooperation, with no differences in cooperation between the single-group and intergroup dilemmas. Taken together, the results suggest that the relationship between cultural values and cooperation, in particular with reference to vertical and horizontal components of individualism and collectivism, is more complex than has been suggested in past research. Copyright 1999 Academic Press. 相似文献
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In mixed‐motive interactions, defection is the rational and common response to the defection of others. In some cases, however, group members not only cooperate in the face of defection but also compensate for the shortfalls caused by others' defection. In one field and two lab studies, we examined when group members were willing to compensate for versus match defection using sequential dilemmas. We found that the level of identification with the broader group increased willingness to compensate for intragroup defection, even when it was personally costly. Compensating for a defecting partner's actions, however, is not an act of unconditional cooperation: It is accompanied by a lack of trust in the errant group member and a desire to be perceived as more ethical. Cooperation by others, on the other hand, is matched independent of whether the cooperator was an in‐group or out‐group member. We find similar patterns of compensation and matching when the personal cost involved contributing money or effort. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Jan Luca Pletzer Daniel Balliet Jeff Joireman D. Michael Kuhlman Sven C. Voelpel Paul A.M. Van Lange 《欧洲人格杂志》2018,32(1):62-83
Interdependent situations are pervasive in human life. In these situations, it is essential to form expectations about the others' behaviour to adapt one's own behaviour to increase mutual outcomes and avoid exploitation. Social value orientation, which describes the dispositional weights individuals attach to their own and to another person's outcome, predicts these expectations of cooperation in social dilemmas—an interdependent situation involving a conflict of interests. Yet, scientific evidence is inconclusive about the exact differences in expectations between prosocials, individualists, and competitors. The present meta‐analytic results show that, relative to proselfs (individualists and competitors), prosocials expect more cooperation from others in social dilemmas, whereas individualists and competitors do not significantly differ in their expectations. The importance of these expectations in the decision process is further highlighted by the finding that they partially mediate the well‐established relation between social value orientation and cooperative behaviour in social dilemmas. In fact, even proselfs are more likely to cooperate when they expect their partner to cooperate. Copyright © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology 相似文献
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In social dilemmas, verbal communication of one's intentions is an important factor in increasing cooperation. In addition to verbal communication of one's intentions, also the communication of emotions of anger and happiness can influence cooperative behavior. In the present paper, we argue that facial expressions of emotion moderate verbal communication in social dilemmas. More specifically, three experiments showed that if the other person displayed happiness he or she was perceived as honest, trustworthy, and reliable, and cooperation was increased when verbal communication was cooperative rather than self‐interested. However, if the other person displayed anger, verbal communication did not influence people's decision behavior. Results also showed interactive effects on people's perceptions of trustworthiness, which partially mediated decision behavior. These findings suggest that emotion displays have an important function in organizational settings because they are able to influence social interactions and cooperative behavior. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Decentralized punishment can maintain contributions to a public good at a high level. This positive effect holds even for situations involving inequality in punishment power, meaning that the relative costs for punishment differ between persons. We extend this line of research by examining the additional influence of instability of and thus potential competition for punishment power in public good experiments. As in previous research, inequality is operationalized by assigning the role of a ‘strong player’ to one group member, who can punish others at a reduced cost compared to other players. Instability is operationalized by the fact that the role assignment can change across rounds and is contingent on behavior in previous rounds. Three experiments show that under unequal, unstable (punishment‐) power, individuals behave more competitively and engage in a race for power resulting in detrimental effects for the group. Specifically, we find that (i) unstable power goes along with a disproportionate use of punishment; (ii) not inequality by itself but rather the combination of instability and inequality causes this effect; and (iii) this excessive use of punishment is found not only when the role of the strong player is assigned to individuals who previously behaved rather selfishly but also when prosocial behavior leads to the top, speaking for a generalizability of our findings. Implications for organizational settings are discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献