Explaining delusions of control: the comparator model 20 years on

Over the last 20 years the comparator model for delusions of control has received considerable support in terms of empirical studies. However, the original version clearly needs to be replaced by a model with a much greater degree of sophistication and specificity. Future developments are likely to involve the specification of the role of dopamine in the model and a generalisation of its explanatory power to the whole range of positive symptoms. However, we will still need to explain why symptoms can be so variable and we still do not understand the origin of the most mysterious symptom of all: thought insertion.     

Mild cognitive impairment: a neuropsychological perspective

Mild cognitive impairment (MCI) is a clinical diagnosis in which deficits in cognitive function are evident but not of sufficient severity to warrant a diagnosis of dementia. For the majority of patients, MCI represents a transitional state between normal aging and mild dementia, usually Alzheimer's disease. Multiple subtypes of MCI are now recognized. In addition to presentations featuring memory impairment, symptoms in other cognitive domains (eg, executive function, language, visuospatial) have been identified. Neuropsychological testing can be extremely useful in making the MCI diagnosis and tracking the evolution of cognitive symptoms over time. A comprehensive test battery includes measures of baseline intellectual ability, attention, executive function, memory, language, visuospatial skills, and mood. Informant-based measures of neuropsychiatric symptoms, behaviors, and competency in instrumental activity are also included. Careful assessment can identify subtle deficits that may otherwise elude detection, particularly in individuals of superior baseline intellectual ability. As we move closer to disease-modifying therapy for Alzheimer's disease, early identification becomes critical for identifying patients who have an opportunity to benefit from treatment.     

The cognitive revolution: a historical perspective

Cognitive science is a child of the 1950s, the product of a time when psychology, anthropology and linguistics were redefining themselves and computer science and neuroscience as disciplines were coming into existence. Psychology could not participate in the cognitive revolution until it had freed itself from behaviorism, thus restoring cognition to scientific respectability. By then, it was becoming clear in several disciplines that the solution to some of their problems depended crucially on solving problems traditionally allocated to other disciplines. Collaboration was called for: this is a personal account of how it came about.     

Human recognition memory: a cognitive neuroscience perspective

For many years the cognitive processes underlying recognition memory have been the subject of considerable interest in experimental psychology. To account for a broad range of behavioral findings, psychologists have put forward a variety of 'dual-process' models, all of which propose that recognition memory is supported by two forms of memory - familiarity and recollection - that differ in their speed of operation and the specificity of the retrieved information. More recently, the dual-process framework has been extended to encompass findings from studies investigating the neural basis of recognition memory. Results from neuropsychological, ERP and functional neuroimaging studies can be accommodated within the framework, and suggest that familiarity and recollection are supported by distinct neural mechanisms.     

Demonstrating specific cognitive deficits: a psychometric perspective

Cognitive deficits associated with psychopathology often do not occur in isolation. Consequently, identifying a specific deficit in a disorder requires comparing the magnitude of group differences on theoretically relevant measures with those on control tasks measuring other constructs. L. J. Chapman and J. P. Chapman (1973) noted that common forms of such Group x Task interactions are theoretically ambiguous unless performance measures have comparable discriminating power. The principles of psychometric matching for discriminating power developed in the Chapmans' research program are reviewed, and both criticisms and alternative psychometric approaches are evaluated. Psychometric matching can be mindful of threats to the construct validity of measures and frequently remains methodologically necessary. Otherwise, interactions involving measures that vary in sensitivity to individual differences may be misinterpreted as evidence for specific deficits.     

Facial expressions of emotion: a cognitive neuroscience perspective

Facial expressions are one example of emotional behavior that illustrate the importance of emotions to both basic survival and social interaction. Basic facial responses to stimuli such as sweet and bitter taste are important for species fitness and governed by simple rules. Even at this basic level, facial responses have communicative value to other species members. During evolution simple facial responses were extended for use in more complex nonverbal communications; the responses are labile. The perception and production of facial expressions are cognitive processes and numerous subcortical and cortical areas contribute to these operations. We suggest that no specific emotion center exists over and above cognitive systems in the brain, and that emotion should not be divorced from cognition.     

Attitudes and evaluations: a social cognitive neuroscience perspective

Automatic evaluations are crucial for survival, but conscious self-reflection enables the formulation of nuanced evaluations to serve long-term goals. To operate effectively, both automatic and reflective evaluative processes need to integrate stored representations from previous experience (attitudes) with current contexts and goals, but contexts and goals have a more prominent role in reflective evaluation. Recent neuroimaging data provide new insights into the structure and function of evaluation and the dynamic ways that attitudes and reflective processing contribute to evaluation. In this paper, we propose a new iterative-reprocessing (IR) model of the neural bases of evaluation that highlights the role of the prefrontal cortex in the reprocessing of evaluative information. This model makes predictions that inform social-cognitive and cognitive-neuroscientific accounts of evaluation.     

Subjective judgements of synergistic risks: a cognitive reasoning perspective

Mounting evidence that certain hazard combinations present synergistic risks for adverse outcomes, including violent crime, cancer, and species extinction, highlights the importance of understanding the risk attributable to combined hazards. However, previous studies indicate that individuals often misjudge synergistic risks as additive or sub-additive risks, and there is little research that explores the cognitive reasoning that may lead individuals to make such judgements. This study aims to fill this gap. Participants were asked to review several scenarios that described the risk magnitude presented by a combined hazard. They were required to judge whether each scenario was possible and to explain the reasoning that led to their judgement. The results show that many participants demonstrated an awareness of synergistic risk and that their reasoning was typically characterized by rudimentary knowledge of an underlying causal mechanism for the increased risk (e.g., a chemical reaction between drugs). Conversely, several participants adopted a line of reasoning that precluded the concept of synergistic risk. Many of these participants appeared to employ an additive model of risk, corresponding to the notion of 'adding' one hazard to another. Contrary to much previous research, we found little evidence to indicate that people tend to employ a sub-additive model of risk for combined hazards. Implications for future research and the improvement of risk communications concerning synergistic risks are discussed.     

Bilinguals who stutter: A cognitive perspective

PurposeBrain differences, both in structure and executive functioning, have been found in both developmental stuttering and bilingualism. However, the etiology of stuttering remains unknown. The early suggestion that stuttering is a result of brain dysfunction has since received support from various behavioral and neuroimaging studies that have revealed functional and structural brain changes in monolinguals who stutter (MWS). In addition, MWS appear to show deficits in executive control. However, there is a lack of data on bilinguals who stutter (BWS). This literature review is intended to provide an overview of both stuttering and bilingualism as well as synthesize areas of overlap among both lines of research and highlight knowledge gaps in the current literature.MethodsA systematic literature review on both stuttering and bilingualism studies was conducted, searching for articles containing “stuttering” and/or “bilingualism” and either “brain”, “executive functions”, “executive control”, “motor control”, “cognitive reserve”, or “brain reserve” in the PubMed database. Additional studies were found by examining the reference list of studies that met the inclusion criteria.ResultsA total of 148 references that met the criteria for inclusion in this paper were used in the review. A comparison of the impact of stuttering or bilingualism on the brain are discussed.ConclusionPrevious research examining a potential bilingual advantage for BWS is mixed. However, if such an advantage does exist, it appears to offset potential deficits in executive functioning that may be associated with stuttering.     

Vulnerability schemas of individuals in couples relationships: a cognitive perspective

The professional literature has recently given attention to addressing individual schemas in couples relationships, with particular emphasis on the fact that individual vulnerability has a significant impact on couples relationships. This article addresses how this vulnerability can be restructured during the course of couples therapy. Case vignettes are used to illustrate how the model can be applied. Some of the implications of this model are considered in the discussion section.Authors note: Portions of this article were published in Norwegian by the first author and appear in Nordby, T.T. (2002): Kognitiv parterapi. En tilnærming som ivaretar betydningen av den individuelle sårbarheten i samspillet. Reprinted by permission of Fokus på familien 30, 46–60.     

Expert systems: A cognitive science perspective

The theory and technology of knowledge-based systems are intrinsically interdisciplinary and are closely related to the formalisms of cognitive psychology. In this paper, strategies of incorporating intelligence into a computer program are described along with a common architecture for expert systems, including choices of representation and inferential methods. The history of the field is traced from its origins in metamathematics and Newell and Simon’s (1961) GENERAL PROBLEM SOLVER to the Stanford Heuristic Programming Project that produced DENDRAL and MYCIN (Buchanan & Shortliffe, 1984). MYCIN gave rise to EMYCIN and a shell technology that has radically reduced the development time and cost of expert systems. Methodology and concepts are illustrated by transactions with a shell developed for graduate education and a demonstration knowledge base for the diagnosis of senile dementia. Knowledge-based systems and conventional programs are compared with respect to formalisms employed, applications, program characteristics, procedures supplied by the development environment, consistency, certainty, flexibility, and programmer’s viewpoint. The technology raises basic questions for cognitive psychology concerning knowledge and expertise.     

The genetics of cognitive impairment in schizophrenia: a phenomic perspective

Cognitive impairments are central to schizophrenia and could mark underlying biological dysfunction but efforts to detect genetic associations for schizophrenia or cognitive phenotypes have been disappointing. Phenomics strategies emphasizing simultaneous study of multiple phenotypes across biological scales might help, particularly if the high heritabilities of schizophrenia and cognitive impairments are due to large numbers of genetic variants with small effect. Convergent evidence is reviewed, and a new collaborative knowledgebase - CogGene - is introduced to share data about genetic associations with cognitive phenotypes, and enable users to meta-analyze results interactively. CogGene data demonstrate the need for larger studies with broader representation of cognitive phenotypes. Given that meta-analyses will probably be necessary to detect the small association signals linking the genome and cognitive phenotypes, CogGene or similar applications will be needed to enable collaborative knowledge aggregation and specify true effects.     

认知负荷视角下的知识反转效应

知识反转效应研究始于20世纪90年代中期, 在认知负荷的框架下对学习者先备知识与教学方法有效性之间的交互作用进行研究, 其研究范式起源于能力倾向与教学处置交互作用模型。认知负荷理论认为知识反转效应的产生是由于高先备知识者接受冗余教学而产生了额外的认知负荷, 动机理论却认为, 高先备知识者由于冗余的认知加工而产生的负荷可能是一种动机资源负荷。在优化外在认知负荷与相关认知负荷的教学设计中发现了大量知识反转效应的实验证据, 其教学的启示意义在于需要随着学习者领域知识的不断变化适宜性地调整教学方法。未来需要在完善研究方法、拓展研究领域的基础上, 整合研究成果以建立效应发生与发展的理论模型。     

Religious delusions and filicide: a psychodynamic model

In this article, we present a psychodynamic explanation for the complex crime of filicide motivated by religious delusions. To begin, we provide an overview of filicide, including its typology and epidemiology. Second, we examine the psychoanalytic theories of Heinz Kohut and Otto Kernberg so as to better understand how family-of-origin experiences add to the ways in which psychotic disorders later take shape in filicide cases. Third, we offer an explication of the psychology of religion, including the role that religious defences and religious delusions play in cases involving filicide. Ultimately, we hypothesise that mothers with religious delusions commit acts of filicide due to the dynamic and reciprocal interaction between mental illness, psychological functioning, and the psychological role played by religion. We conclude our article with a case illustration to demonstrate our theoretical model.     

Cognitive functioning in delusions: a longitudinal analysis

BACKGROUND: This study explored the longitudinal course of the relationship between delusions and different aspects of cognitive functioning. METHODS: Deluded patients were compared to psychiatric and non-clinical controls on three tasks: negative priming, a probabilistic judgement task (the 'beads' task), and the pragmatic inference task (PIT). All groups were tested at two time points, once when actively symptomatic, and once when in remission. RESULTS: Deluded individuals exhibited a 'jump-to-conclusions' (JTC) reasoning bias: i.e., they made decisions on the basis of limited evidence and were more likely to revise their estimates when faced with disconfirmatory evidence. This JTC bias remained stable over time, although probability judgments seemed to normalise in remission. No deficits in cognitive inhibition were found on negative priming. The deluded group displayed an excessive self-focus on the PIT at both time points, but did not show a depressive attributional style. Only a small sub-sample, characterised by the "bad-me" type of paranoia [Trower & Chadwick, 1995 Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 2, 263-278.], demonstrated depressive schemas when symptomatic, but no longer did so when remitted. Few relationships were found between tasks, suggesting that different areas of functioning are relatively independent. The only measures associated with delusion symptom scores were from the 'beads' task. CONCLUSIONS: Overall these findings suggest that the JTC bias is a stable factor associated with delusional thinking, while the depressive attributional style characteristic of a small sub-sample of paranoid patients fluctuates with delusional course.     

The cognitive miser's perspective: Social comparison as a heuristic in self-judgements

The metaphor of the cognitive miser is a milestone in the development of social cognitive research. It highlights the limited cognitive resources of the social thinker and the demand for fast and efficient processing of information. In marked contrast to the impact of this metaphor on social cognition research in general, it has so far been mostly overlooked in research on social comparison. In this article we want to lay out the potential of social comparison research if one takes on the perspective of a cognitive miser. Specifically, we consider social comparison as a heuristic for evaluating the self. First, we look for evidence for the ease of comparative self-evaluations. Second, we analyse the standard selection process and identify routine standards that facilitate the comparison process. Third, we investigate the cognitive mechanisms in social comparisons and suggest that comparison mechanisms leading to assimilation are more efficient than mechanisms leading to contrast effects.     

The promise of a cognitive perspective on jury deliberation

Despite much psychological research regarding jury decision making, surprisingly little is known about the deliberation process that gives rise to jury verdicts. We review classic jury decision-making research regarding the importance of deliberation and more recent research, investigating deliberation and hung juries, that challenges the view that deliberation does not have an important impact on verdicts. We advocate greater attention to potential cognitive processes during deliberation that might explain the transition between predeliberation preferences and a jury’s ultimate verdict. We then review cognitive work in the group context generally, and the jury context specifically, illustrating the promise of a cognitive perspective on jury deliberation. Finally, we identify cognitive phenomena likely to be particularly valuable in illuminating deliberation behavior.     

A cognitive perspective on mindfulness

Mindfulness, the core teaching of the Buddhist tradition, has been receiving serious attention from the West in recent decades as evidence of the efficacy of mindfulness‐based interventions for emotional distress have become available. Although traditional Buddhist texts have described the mechanisms of mindfulness and the way to cultivate it in great detail, much is still not known from the perspective of Western science. In particular, there is no general agreement on the conceptualization and operationalization of mindfulness. Several conceptual models of mindfulness (referred to as “state” or “trait”) have been put forward to elucidate different aspects of this phenomenon, but none has gained sufficient empirical validation. This article proposes a new cognitive model of mindfulness. It has been our goal to describe and interrelate a relatively comprehensive group of determinants of a state of mindfulness, the consequences of its regular practicing, the mechanisms responsible for its beneficial effects, and the feedback mechanisms operating between the various constituents of the model. Within this model, the primary emphasis has been placed on understanding the cognitive processes shaping a state of mindfulness (i.e., the links between consciousness, meta‐awareness and the unconscious), and on their determinants (i.e., the executive functions of attention and the components of working memory). A metacognitive system promoting mindfulness, as well as the general capability of the central executive system, is suggested as a factor explaining individual differences in mindfulness, whereas decentering, self‐compassion, and reduction of self‐focused attention are proposed as mechanisms mediating beneficial changes. We hope that the model presented will encourage further discussion and orient future studies in the area of mindfulness.     

Stroop-like effects in a new-code learning task: A cognitive load theory perspective

To determine whether and how learning is biased by competing task-irrelevant information that creates extraneous cognitive load, we assessed the efficiency of university students with a learning paradigm in two experiments. The paradigm asked participants to learn associations between eight words and eight digits. We manipulated congruity of the digits’ ink colour with the words’ semantics. In Experiment 1 word stimuli were colour words (e.g., blue, yellow) and in Experiment 2 colour-related word concepts (e.g., sky, banana). Marked benefits and costs on learning due to variation in extraneous cognitive load originating from processing task-irrelevant information were evident. Implications for cognitive load theory and schooling are discussed.