Context matching and judgments of recency

An experiment was done to test a context-matching explanation of memory for recency under steady-state conditions. Subjects went through a list of 550 names, in which individual names were repeated at lags of 5–30 other items. The names were shown in two different styles or contexts. An old versus new recognition decision was made on each name, and eachold response was followed by a numerical judgment of recency (JOR). When first- and second-presentation contexts were the same, recognition hit rates were higher, and mean JORs were shorter (more recent), than when the two contexts were different. The JOR result is as predicted by the context-matching hypothesis.     

Mnemonic elaboration and recency judgments in children

Recency judgments in second and fourth grade Ss were examined when contextual or spatial locations were correlated with sequential order. No age differences were apparent when the cues were not available; however, unlike fourth grade Ss, the younger Ss failed to take advantage of the additional cues when they were provided. In Experiment 2, second grade Ss were successfully trained to use the appropriate strategy, suggesting that the age related deficiency was one of production rather than mediation. The effectiveness of mnemonic elaboration as an aid to recall of order information was established, together with the short-term efficiency of training such mnemonic strategies in young children who do not adopt them spontaneously. The data support the hypothesis that memory tasks are developmentally sensitive when a deliberate mnemonic strategy can be applied but insensitive to developmental differences when no strategy is appropriate.     

Memory for psychophysical scaling judgments

In three experiments, we examined memory for responses and stimuli experienced in a single direct psychophysical scaling session in which subjects made absolute magnitude estimations of the loudnesses of pure tones. Recall of scaling responses was found to be accurate for the softest and loudest stimuli, but systematically greater than actual judgments for the intermediate stimulus amplitudes, yielding distorted psychophysical functions for the recall data which nonetheless had the same power function exponent as that for the judged stimuli. Also, memory for the range of stimulus amplitudes was fairly accurate, but subjects could not distinguish between judged and nonjudged amplitudes within that range. The results are consistent with the role of extreme stimuli as anchors for judgment, and indicate that memories for these stimuli and responses made to them can be expected to influence future scaling judgments. These results also are consistent with the uncertainty hypothesis of mnemophysics. The present research was supported by a grant from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada to L.M.W. Thanks to the reviewers for insightful critiques.     

The effects of recency and story content on children's moral judgments

Sixteen stories were read to children at ages 4, 7, and 11 years and to college freshmen (n = 24 per age level) to investigate the effects of recency and specific story content on the development of moral reasoning. The stories consisted of either positive or negative intention and either positive or negative consequence in one of four situations: rule breaking, property damage, property damage with peer interaction, or injury to a person. At each age level, half of the subjects heard the stories with the intention first and the consequence second, and half heard them in the reverse order. Analyses confirmed that in general younger children judged on consequence, whereas older children utilized intention, and that on stories containing intentional injury to a person, the younger child took intention into account. Recency effects were evidenced for both the 4- and 7-year-olds. In the 4-year-old group, however, the recency effects failed to override the salience of negative consequence in contexts of positive intention and negative consequence. This suggests that preschool children may respond primarily to the negative aspect of the story, whether intention or consequence.     

The role of trace strength in recency and frequency judgements by amnesic and control subjects

Amnesic and control subjects were required to judge the recency and frequency of presentation of complex pictures. The pictures were shown either once or three times 10 min or 24 h before testing. In both groups recency judgements were influenced by frequency of presentation, and frequency judgements by recency of presentation. Because the amnesic patients were unable to discriminate between the effects of repeated presentation and recent presentation, it was concluded that their judgements were determined solely by trace strength. Because controls showed some ability to make this discrimination, it was concluded that their judgements were determined jointly by trace strength and specific information about time and frequency of presentation.     

On the importance of looking back: The role of recursive remindings in recency judgments and cued recall

Suppose that you were asked which of two movies you had most recently seen. The results of the experiments reported here suggest that your answer would be more accurate if, when viewing the later movie, you were reminded of the earlier one. In the present experiments, we investigated the role of remindings in recency judgments and cued-recall performance. We did this by presenting a list composed of two instances from each of several different categories and later asking participants to select (Exp. 1) or to recall (Exp. 2) the more recently presented instance. Reminding was manipulated by varying instructions to look back over memory of earlier instances during the presentation of later instances. As compared to a control condition, cued-recall performance revealed facilitation effects when remindings occurred and were later recollected, but interference effects in their absence. The effects of reminding on recency judgments paralleled those on cued recall of more recently presented instances. We interpret these results as showing that reminding produces a recursive representation that embeds memory for an earlier-presented category instance into that of a later-presented one and, thereby, preserves their temporal order. Large individual differences in the probabilities of remindings and of their later recollection were observed. The widespread importance of recursive reminding for theory and for applied purposes is discussed.     

Age dissociates recency and lag recency effects in free recall

The temporal relations among word-list items exert a powerful influence on episodic memory retrieval. Two experiments were conducted with younger and older adults in which the age-related recall deficit was examined by using a decomposition method to the serial position curve, partitioning performance into (a) the probability of first recall, illustrating the recency effect, and (b) the conditional response probability, illustrating the lag recency effect (M. W. Howard & M. J. Kahana, 1999). Although the older adults initiated recall in the same manner in both immediate and delayed free recall, temporal proximity of study items (contiguity) exerted a much weaker influence on recall transitions in older adults. This finding suggests that an associative deficit may be an important contributor to older adults' well-known impairment in free recall.     

Memory strength affects reporting of misinformation

A model of long-term retention was used to examine whether and how the strength of original information (differences in learning and testing time) and the strength of misleading information (differences in timing and frequency) influence 3- to 5-year-olds' memory for an event. In three experiments, preschoolers viewed a slide presentation depicting an event, some of them were asked misleading questions, and memory for event details was tested. There was little evidence of memory impairment, but exposure to misleading information encouraged reporting of this information. Differences in learning influenced reporting in that children exposed to the event once reported more misled details than those who saw the event multiple times. Furthermore, preschoolers who saw the event once were just as susceptible to misleading information whether exposed to misinformation once or three times; however, preschoolers who had seen the event multiple times were susceptible only to repeated presentations of misinformation. Given that the reporting of misinformation is determined by the degree of integrity of both the original and misleading information, it is important to control for differences in trace strength for both types of information in future research.     

Negative recency and event-dependence

In a two-choice situation with event-probabilities of 0.67 and 0.33, recency effects were studied as a function of (a) event-dependence and (b) fore-knowledge of event-probabilities. The following conclusions are drawn: (1) Belief in some kind of event-dependence is a necessary condition for the occurrence of negative recency; (2) Foreknowledge of the event-probabilities does not affect recency phenomena; (3) The behaviour of subjects in the two-choice situation, is less irrational than some writers have claimed.     

The informational basis of social judgments: Memory for informative and uninformative arguments

This study investigates the encoding and retrieval of arguments in an opinion formation task. It is based on a model of opinion formation that partitions the latter process into initial encoding, elaborative encoding, integration, and decision. According to this model elaborative encoding depends on two factors: (i) the informativeness of the arguments and (ii) their thematic relatedness. Since it is reasonably well established that the likelihood of retrieving an argument is an increasing function of the amount of elaboration performed on it, the first hypothesis is straightforward, namely, that the memory for an argument will increase with its informativeness and with its thematic relatedness to other arguments. The second hypothesis assumes that by dint of their closer association with the decision, informative arguments occupy a more central position in the representation of an opinion than uninformative ones. This implies that an informative argument should be accessed and reported prior to an uninformative argument, even when differences in retrievability (i.e., probabilities of recall) are controlled. The findings were consistent with such an analysis.     

Memory strength and the decision process in recognition memory

We investigated the role that memory strength plays in the decision process by examining the extent to which strength is used as a cue to dynamically modify recognition criteria. The study list consisted of strong and weak items, with strength a function of study duration or repetition. The recognition test list was divided into two consecutive blocks; strong items appeared in one block, weak items in the other. If the change in item strength across blocks leads to a shift in criterion, the false alarm rate should change accordingly. In four experiments, the false alarm rates did not change across blocks, even when the difference between the strong and the weak items was magnified and marked with semantic cues. However, the strength of the items in the first test block affected the false alarm rate. Thus, strength cues influence initial criterion placement but fail to induce criterion shifts following permanent and even dramatic changes in item strength. These null findings are contrasted with those in a fifth experiment, in which accuracy feedback produced dynamic criterion shifts.     

Memory accessibility and probability judgments: an experimental evaluation of the availability heuristic.

Consistent with Tversky and Kahneman's (1973, 1974) availability heuristic hypothesis, the current study found a negative correlation between recall latency for past events and the perceived future probability of similar events. Furthermore, when the relative accessibility of memories of positive and negative events was experimentally manipulated using the Velten mood-induction procedure, the perceived future probabilities of similar events also changed in a manner consistent with the availability heuristic account. Reductions in recall latencies resulting from the mood manipulations were, as predicted, related to increases in perceived probability, and vice versa. Partial correlations indicated that this association between the observed patterns of changes in recall latencies and probability judgments could not be accounted for by the existence of independent associations between each of these effects and the magnitude of mood change.     

Metacognition and learning about primacy and recency effects in free recall: The utilization of intrinsic and extrinsic cues when making judgments of learning

Although memory researchers know about primacy and recency effects, it is unclear whether students are aware of these effects and incorporate them when making judgments of learning (JOLs). The present research examined how participants use serial position information (extrinsic cues) when making JOLs after studying each item and showed that participants rely on the intrinsic qualities of the items and underestimate primacy and recency effects. However, when participants made JOLs prior to studying each item and engaged in multiple study-test sessions, their JOLs accurately reflected recall, as well as when serial position information was explicitly provided during the study phase. The findings are interpreted in a cue utilization framework and suggest that under certain conditions, participants can predict primacy and recency effects.     

Associative processes in immediate recency

Some theorists have argued that the immediate recency effect observed in free recall reflects the emptying out of the contents of a short-term memory buffer (Davelaar, Goshen-Gottstein, Ashkenazi, Haarmann, & Usher, 2005). Others have argued that immediate recency reflects the properties of temporal context used to cue free recall (Howard & Kahana, 2002). We examined immediate free recall of lists with an item from the middle of the list repeated at or near the end. If associative processes contribute to immediate recency, as predicted by the temporal context account, the neighbors of the initial presentation of the repeated item should show enhanced recall at the initial stages of immediate recall. Recall transitions early in output--and even the initiation of recall itself-showed evidence for temporally defined associations that resemble those observed in recall from long-term memory. These results have strong implications for models of the immediate recency effect in free recall.     

Memory trace strength and response biasing in short-term motor memory

Two experiments, which attempted to create differential memory trace strengths in a response biasing paradigm, were performed. After the presentation of the criterion location, an interpolated target was presented which was either ±40 deg from the criterion. The S’s task was to attend to both targets and recall each when instructed. The first experiment involved strengthening the criterion trace via repetition (0, 5, or 14 rep.) while the second involved providing additional feedback via visual, auditory, and heightened kinesthetic cues. In the initial experiment, a Repetition by Response Biasing interaction revealed that repetition systematically reduced error shifts at recall. The second experiment found that, in the combined feedback and visual conditions, response biasing was reduced. It seems feasible to suggest that both studies successfully manipulated memory trace strength which appears to be one determiner of error shifts at recall.     

Aging and contextual binding: Modeling recency and lag recency effects with the temporal context model

Normal aging has been shown to spare recency effects in the initiation of free recall while disrupting temporally defined associations. The temporal context model (TCM) explains recency and temporally defined associations as consequences of a gradually changing context signal and recovery of those contextual states, respectively. Here we extend TCM to account for the dissociation between recency and temporally defined associations in younger and older adults. Modeling results suggested that the effect of aging was restricted to a decrement in the ability of items to recover the temporal contexts in which they were presented, a function that has been hypothesized to depend on the hippocampus.