Truth,authority and epistemological individualism in new age thought

Several problems are involved in studying the New Age, ranging from mapping its enormous diversity of beliefs and practices to locating it with reference to the conditions of modernity and postmodernity. With the latter issue in mind, the article is an analysis of understandings of truth and authority in the New Age. Against the assumption of some theorists, one of the central aims of the discussion is to demonstrate that, epistemologically speaking, the New Age is essentially a manifestation of modernity rather than postmodernity. Having established that, it is also shown that there are certain postmodern elements within the New Age network, as well as a superficial embracing of postmodernity and an emerging postmodern critique, all of which produce increasingly apparent tensions and confusion. The final section provides a critique of some of the principal problem areas.     

试论语义悖论的弗完全理论

弗完全理论通过限制排中律的使用,弱化经典逻辑,采用非经典的三值语言来处理语义悖论,最终使得形式语言能够一致地包含自身的真谓词。文中我们讨论了弗完全理论的两种基本形式——基础的弗完全理论和高级的弗完全理论。基础的弗完全理论引入了＂真值空缺＂的思想,认为句子除了真假之外还有＂既不真也不假＂的第三值,像说谎者这样的语义悖论语句就落在真假之空缺中,该理论借助于对不动点的归纳构造过程证明了形式语言中真谓词的存在性。高级弗完全理论在前者的基础上引入一个适当的条件句,定义了一个＂更强的真＂,发展出了既满足真的素朴模式又具有不动点解释的、一致的高级弗完全理论。     

“Everything starts within”: New Age Values,Images, and Language in Israeli Advertising

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on the appropriation of New Age values, images, and language by different sectors of the mainstream in a Western society—in Israel. The findings support earlier research about the shift in values in the mainstream of Western societies. Specifically, this is a shift towards the admiration of nature, Far Eastern lore, a search for a ‘balanced’ way of life, and so on, in accordance with New Age values. This article analyzes how, and for what purpose, mainstream advertisements appropriate New Age elements. The analysis of about 100 advertisements from the last decade leads to the conclusion that all mainstream sectors, including relatively conservative ones (such as academic institutions), borrow elements from New Age, but differ in the intensity and form of appropriation: some are interested in simply attracting attention, while others directly appropriate New Age values. This article discusses the differentiation between the receptivity of specific sectors to New Age and explores possible motivations for the use of New Age elements, such as the more conservative sectors’ use of esoteric elements of New Age.     

Paradoxes and Failures of Cut

This paper presents and motivates a new philosophical and logical approach to truth and semantic paradox. It begins from an inferentialist, and particularly bilateralist, theory of meaning—one which takes meaning to be constituted by assertibility and deniability conditions—and shows how the usual multiple-conclusion sequent calculus for classical logic can be given an inferentialist motivation, leaving classical model theory as of only derivative importance. The paper then uses this theory of meaning to present and motivate a logical system—ST—that conservatively extends classical logic with a fully transparent truth predicate. This system is shown to allow for classical reasoning over the full (truth-involving) vocabulary, but to be non-transitive. Some special cases where transitivity does hold are outlined. ST is also shown to give rise to a familiar sort of model for non-classical logics: Kripke fixed points on the Strong Kleene valuation scheme. Finally, to give a theory of paradoxical sentences, a distinction is drawn between two varieties of assertion and two varieties of denial. On one variety, paradoxical sentences cannot be either asserted or denied; on the other, they must be both asserted and denied. The target theory is compared favourably to more familiar related systems, and some objections are considered and responded to.     

Spirituality: The Emergence of a New Cultural Category and its Challenge to the Religious and the Secular

The present article examines spirituality as an emergent new cultural category that challenges the binary opposition of the religious and secular realms of life. The article probes the cultural significance of the popular phrase ‘spiritual, but not religious’ and examines the emergence of New Age spirituality within the framework of late capitalism and postmodern culture. It offers a new perspective on the debate of the secularization theory and re-examines the notions upon which this debate hinges. The article also examines the assessment of New Age spirituality as disguised neo-liberal ideology and proposes that the disparaging condemnations of contemporary spirituality can be seen as a response to its challenge to the entrenched notion that the religious and the secular are universal distinct categories.     

The No-No Paradox Is a Paradox

The No-No Paradox consists of a pair of statements, each of which ‘says’ the other is false. Roy Sorensen claims that the No-No Paradox provides an example of a true statement that has no truthmaker: Given the relevant instances of the T-schema, one of the two statements comprising the ‘paradox’ must be true (and the other false), but symmetry constraints prevent us from determining which, and thus prevent there being a truthmaker grounding the relevant assignment of truth values. Sorensen's view is mistaken: situated within an appropriate background theory of truth, the statements comprising the No-No Paradox are genuinely paradoxical in the same sense as is the Liar (and thus, on Sorensen's view, must fail to have truth values). This result has consequences beyond Sorensen's semantic framework. In particular, the No-No Paradox, properly understood, is not only a new paradox, but also provides us with a new type of paradox, one which depends upon a general background theory of the truth predicate in a way that the Liar Paradox and similar constructions do not.     

The Paradox of Belief Instability and a Revision Theory of Belief

The epistemic paradox of 'belief instability' has recently received notable attention from many philosophers. In this paper I offer a new proposal, which I call a 'revision theory of belief'. This theory is in many respects an application of Gupta's and Belnap's revision theory of truth. They argue that the Liar paradox arises because our notion of truth is circular. I offer a similar proposal for handling the paradox of belief instability. In particular, I argue that our notion involved in the paradox of belief instability is circular, and this circularity of belief is the source of the paradox.     

Beyond the Spiritual Supermarket: The Social and Public Significance of New Age Spirituality

This article argues that New Age spirituality is substantially less unambiguously individualistic and more socially and publicly significant than today's sociological consensus acknowledges. Firstly, an uncontested doctrine of self-spirituality, characterised by sacralisation of the self and demonisation of social institutions, provides the spiritual milieu with ideological coherence and paradoxically accounts for its overwhelming diversity. Secondly, participants undergo a process of socialisation, gradually adopting this doctrine of self-spirituality and eventually reinforcing it by means of standardised legitimations. Thirdly, spirituality has entered the public sphere of work, aiming at a reduction of employees’ alienation to increase both their happiness and organisational effectiveness. A radical ‘sociologisation’ of New Age research is called for to document how the doctrinal ideal of self-spirituality is socially constructed, transmitted, and reinforced and critically to deconstruct rather than reproduce sociologically naive New Age rhetoric about the primacy of personal authenticity.     

Keeping ‘True’: A Case Study in Conceptual Ethics

Suppose our ordinary notion of truth is ‘inconsistent’ in the sense that its meaning is partly given by principles that classically entail a logical contradiction. Should we replace the notion with a consistent surrogate? This paper begins by defusing various arguments in favor of this revisionary proposal, including Kevin Scharp’s contention that we need to replace truth for the purposes of semantic theorizing (and thus, in particular, to formulate the inconsistency theory of truth itself). Borrowing a certain conservative metasemantic principle from Matti Eklund, the article goes on to build a positive case for the opposite policy: retaining truth as-is. The thought is basically that bivalence for the bulk of what we say in the course of ordinary, scientific, and philosophical inquiry should suffice to justify keeping ‘true’. Two versions of the story are told: one more philosophical, drawing on an analogy to Lewis’ response to Putnam’s paradox; the other more technical, invoking a deviant strand of mathematical work on the semantic paradoxes.     

The Infirmity Debate: On the Viability of New Age Spiritualities of Life

The ‘infirmity debate’ is becoming increasingly lively. On the one hand, scholars argue that New Age spiritualities of life are in a ‘poor’ condition; on the other hand, scholars argue that they are in a good state of ‘health’. Drawing on key publications, including articles from the Journal of Contemporary Religion, the argument is couched in terms of ‘the turn to the self’—more specifically ‘the massive subjective turn of modern culture’. How do New Age spiritualities of life fare in the context of this development? Concentrating on activities found in the holistic milieu which is to be found in many countries today, the argument is that activities like yoga or spiritual aromatherapy serve as ‘intermediary institutions’, successfully negotiating a path between antinomian freedom and social conformism.     

The Good of New Age Goods

Critical writing on cultural appropriation and commodification is often predicated on the assumption that the transformation of cultural goods into commodities is essentially a process of alienation: of consumers from themselves and of indigenous people from their cultural products. The consumption of indigenous practices and images by practitioners of New Age and alternative spiritualities has been the subject of particularly harsh criticism, with ‘New Agers’ excoriated as exploitative culture thieves. In this paper, I draw on ethnographic research into the use of commodified images of Australian Aboriginal people by practitioners of New Age and alternative spiritualities—and by Aboriginal people themselves—to suggest that the producers and consumers of such goods, and indeed the goods themselves, have a greater agency than is commonly recognised. I argue that, many critics of cultural and spiritual commodification fail to recognise or fail to take seriously, the meaning cultural goods can acquire when removed from the market place and personalised by their consumers. More to the point, the suggestion that such transformations are inherently alienating tends to elide the involvement of indigenous people in the production of imagery that complements (as well as competes with) New Age representations.     

Non‐Classical Knowledge

The Knower paradox purports to place surprising a priori limitations on what we can know. According to orthodoxy, it shows that we need to abandon one of three plausible and widely‐held ideas: that knowledge is factive, that we can know that knowledge is factive, and that we can use logical/mathematical reasoning to extend our knowledge via very weak single‐premise closure principles. I argue that classical logic, not any of these epistemic principles, is the culprit. I develop a consistent theory validating all these principles by combining Hartry Field's theory of truth with a modal enrichment developed for a different purpose by Michael Caie. The only casualty is classical logic: the theory avoids paradox by using a weaker‐than‐classical K₃ logic. I then assess the philosophical merits of this approach. I argue that, unlike the traditional semantic paradoxes involving extensional notions like truth, its plausibility depends on the way in which sentences are referred to—whether in natural languages via direct sentential reference, or in mathematical theories via indirect sentential reference by Gödel coding. In particular, I argue that from the perspective of natural language, my non‐classical treatment of knowledge as a predicate is plausible, while from the perspective of mathematical theories, its plausibility depends on unresolved questions about the limits of our idealized deductive capacities.     

Death in the new age

Modern death is characterized by secularization, and the related features of medical‐ization, privatization and individualism, and is increasingly criticized from an expressivist position. This is the context in which a considerable volume of New Age writing on death and dying has emerged. The article explores New Age concepts of the soul and of reincarnation, the basis for these beliefs and the effect they have on care of the dying, the willingness of New Age carers to let the dying person be him or herself, and New Age theodicies. It is concluded that the New Age concern with the soul of the dying represents a significant attempt to reverse the secularization of death, though the success of this endeavour may be undermined by emphasis on the variety of personal experience and meaning.     

The revenger's paradox

Conclusion Unlike the more commonly discussed paradoxes of deontic logic, the revenger's paradox is present not only in strong logics such as SDL, but also in much weaker logics that have been constructed to avoid the paradoxes of SDL. The paradox shows that any deontic logic with intersubstitutivity makes counter-intuitive truth assignments to some deontic expressions.However, the revenger's paradox does not pose as serious a problem as does Ross's paradox to the logics in which it occurs. A deontic logic in which Ross's paradox does not arise is preferable to one in which it does arise, even if the latter is subject to the revenger's paradox.     

Deutscher's problem is not Popper's problem

The so-called knowability paradox results from Fitch's argument that if there are any unknown truths, then there are unknowable truths. This threatens recent versions of semantical antirealism, the central thesis of which is that truth is epistemic. When this is taken to mean that all truths are knowable, antirealism is thus committed to the conclusion that no truths are unknown. The correct antirealistic response to the paradox should be to deny that the fundamental thesis of the epistemic nature of truth entails the knowability of all truths. Correctly understood, the antirealistic conditions on a proposition's truth do not require that the proposition possess a verification-procedure which, when executed under the given conditions, issues in an agent's recognition of truth, but merely that there be a verification-procedure which, under these conditions, takes the value true. The knowability paradox and the related idealism problem (that antirealism seems, but is not, committed to the necessary existence of an epistemic agent) draw attention to the fact that certain propositions, those that are about verification-procedures themselves, may under certain conditions take the value true despite their unperformability under these circumstances. Thus these propositions' procedures can only be performed when the propositions are false, and they gain the appearance of antirealistic impossibility (e.g., that there is an unknown truth). This differs from the unperformability that antirealists object to, pertaining merely to matters of execution rather than to the logical structure of the procedures themselves. The force of antirealism's notion of epistemic truth is piecemeal, rather than consisting in a blanket characterization of truth as knowable.     

A Lottery Paradox for Counterfactuals Without Agglomeration

We will present a new lottery‐style paradox on counterfactuals and chance. The upshot will be: combining natural assumptions on (i) the truth values of ordinary counterfactuals, (ii) the conditional chances of possible but non‐actual events, (iii) the manner in which (i) and (ii) relate to each other, and (iv) a fragment of the logic of counterfactuals leads to disaster. In contrast with the usual lottery‐style paradoxes, logical closure under conjunction—that is, in this case, the rule of Agglomeration of (consequents of) counterfactuals—will not play a role in the derivation and will not be entailed by our premises either. We will sketch four obvious but problematic ways out of the dilemma, and we will end up with a new resolution strategy that is non‐obvious but (as we hope) less problematic: contextualism about what counts as a proposition. This proposal will not just save us from the paradox, it will also save each premise in at least some context, and it will be motivated by independent considerations from measure theory and probability theory.     

Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of changing stakes

One of the many ways that ‘deflationary’ and ‘inflationary’ theories of truth are said to differ is in their attitude towards truth qua property. This difference used to be very easy to delineate, with deflationists denying, and inflationists asserting, that truth is a property, but more recently the debate has become a lot more complicated, owing primarily to the fact that many contemporary deflationists often do allow for truth to be considered a property. Anxious to avoid inflation, however, these deflationists are at pains to point out that the truth property, on their view, is not a property of any significant interest. Correspondingly, inflationists have seen this as an opportunity to refine what kind of property they think truth is, which—according to them—moves their views beyond deflationism. The upshot of this is that there are number of different accounts in the literature of what distinguishes an inflationary truth property from a deflationary one, or—as it is sometimes put—what distinguishes a ‘substantive’ property from an ‘insubstantive’ one. This has made it hard to pin down exactly what is at issue at the metaphysical level between deflationists and inflationists, which makes it increasingly hard to see how debates between them are properly phrased. Given that these positions represent the two central attitudes towards truth in contemporary debates, this makes for a serious obstacle for the project of discerning the correct theory of truth. The aim of this paper is to discern the best way to distinguish between substantive and insubstantive properties, and thus to restore some focus to these debates. I argue that the three central distinctions in the literature fail, and offer what I take to be a more promising distinction in terms of a graded distinction between abundant and sparse properties.     

Higher realities and the inner self: One quest? Transcendence and the significance of the body in the new age circuit

Can New Age be religious? In this article it is argued that New Age should not be treated as just one meaning system. It is possible to discern several different meaning systems in the New Age networks, even though they share a common language. Before examining whether these meaning systems are religious or, in other words, whether they contain transcendent elements, the concept of transcendence is ‘de‐christianised’. For it is precisely the Christian interpretation, namely the idea that the transcendent reality has to be ‘outside’, that makes the concept useless for the study of New Age meaning systems. The analysis then shows that sometimes there is a higher reality, and sometimes not. Even in one and the same meaning system this difference can occur, since central notions are interpreted in different ways.     

塔斯基定理的一种推广

当把塔斯基对真概念提出的T-模式拓展到有向图上,塔斯基定理成立与否取决于归谬过程中使用的悖论及有向图的特征。本文证明了在使用说谎者悖论证明塔斯基定理时,在并且仅在有向图中含有奇循环时,说谎者悖论才会导致矛盾;在使用佐丹卡片悖论证明塔斯基定理时,在并且仅在有向图中含有高度不能被4整除的循环时,佐丹卡片悖论才会导致矛盾,这表明当T-模式拓展到有向图时,哥德尔关于"认识论悖论"应用于不完全性证明的思想能够被非平庸地类推于真之不可定义性的证明中。